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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis draws on over eighteen months of multi-sited fieldwork carried out in London 
and Dhaka, among geologists, lawyers, fund managers, engineers, and private sector 
development consultants intent on securing profitable extractive opportunities in new 
‘frontier’ markets, and among public intellectuals and politicians in Dhaka who oppose the 
development of Bangladesh’s energy resources by foreign corporations. The thesis 
contributes to a recently revitalized anthropological political economy and engages critically 
with the actor–network theory-inspired ‘social studies of finance’. By tracing 
ethnographically the production of extractive industry capitalism, I show that capital is not 
merely free–flowing or reproduced by its own inevitable logic. Rather, the movement and 
accumulation of capital is facilitated by distinct forms of knowledge production, such as 
political risk analysis and the emergent field of Corporate Diplomacy, and by historically 
constituted legal norms, most notably those of investor–state arbitration. Equally, I show 
that the calculative capacities exercised by financial analysts and fund managers have material 
consequences far beyond those normally considered by scholars in the social studies of 
finance, who tend to confine their analyses to the ‘bounded fieldsites’ provided by bank 
dealing rooms or stock exchange trading floors. Methodologically, this thesis defends the 
notion that ethnographically tracing the generation of extractive industry capitalism demands 
a rejection of the recent ‘post–critical’ turn in the ethnography of experts and elite groups. 
Ultimately, I argue that what allows extractive industry capitalism to be generated is the 
subordination of the sovereignty of ‘frontier’ states to the sovereignty of transnational 
extractive corporations. This subordination is supported by the norms of international 
arbitration, and is the source of the perceived ‘investment climate’ stability that ultimately 
allows extractive industry capitalists to attract speculative investment for resource 
exploration in new ‘frontiers’.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
FRONTIERS, CAPITAL & EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY 
IN LONDON & BANGLADESH 
 
In 1772, the English East India Company prepared a Commission of Supervision that would 
travel to Bengal and investigate the apparent misdeeds of their agents. These had been 
brought to London’s attention through a series of ‘Pamphlet Wars’, and among the parties 
to those Wars was one Adam Smith, who hoped to journey with the Commission. Having 
followed closely their increasingly profitable endeavours, Smith determined that despite 
being in arrears to the Crown, over payments for monopoly rights and customs duties, the 
Company should have been able to discharge its debts and return a handsome dividend. Where 
had Bengal’s riches gone? “The great increase of [the Company’s] fortune had, it seems, only 
served to furnish their servants with a pretext for greater profusion, and a cover for greater 
malversation [corruption of public office]” (A. Smith 1976, p. 751).  
Smith concluded that while the English Company “had not yet had time to establish in 
Bengal so perfectly destructive a system” as the Dutch had managed for the Spice Islands, 
the “plan of their government […] has had exactly the same tendency” (p. 636). But the 
Company’s Commission never materialized. Instead, a Parliamentary inquiry was initiated, 
culminating in Lord North’s 1773 Regulating Act. Building upon Robert Clive’s decisive 
defeat of the last Nawab of Bengal in 1757, the Regulating Act moved the Company ever 
closer to the Crown, and to direct government of India. Eventually, by 1784, Pitt’s India Act 
would declare that “to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India, are 
measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and policy of this nation.”  
Some two and a half centuries later, Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights initiated 
an inquiry into ‘Human rights and the UK private sector’ (JCHR 2009). Evidence submitted 
by the World Development Movement expressed concern over apparent UK Government 
support for Global Coal Management (GCM) Resources PLC. GCM is a UK-listed mining 
company whose proposed opencast coal mine in Phulbari, north-west Bangladesh, seemed 
likely to displace between 40,000 and 220,000 people, dewater fertile agricultural land, and 
go against the wishes of local residents, three of whom had been shot during a protest in 
2006. Of particular concern was the fact that the Department for International Development 
(DFID) seemed to deny any involvement in promoting the mine, while the Department for 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (now Business, Innovation and Skills) declared 
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not only that they were working with DFID on the subject, but that through the British High 
Commission in Dhaka, they had “lobbied to ensure that the Government of Bangladesh take 
the company’s interests into consideration and do not prohibit opencast mining.”1 
Meanwhile, the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG), largely funded by 
DFID, was set up in 2002 to encourage investment in the Global South. PIDG manages 
InfraCo Asia, who operate in Bangladesh as “patient capital,” taking early-stage development 
risk and encouraging foreign investment in projects “that would otherwise not have been 
done” (such intervention is not, they insist, to be confused with providing a subsidy).2 While 
forbidden from investing in ‘dirty’ fuels like coal, InfraCo Asia have been working to attract 
foreign capital that would enable a 220MW gas-fired power plant to be built in energy-hungry 
Bangladesh. 
Then, in 2015, PIDG were berated by the House of Commons’ Committee of Public 
Accounts. The Committee’s concerns included PIDG domiciling their funds in the effective 
‘tax haven’ of Mauritius, failing to prevent board members from booking dozens of flights 
costing in excess of £5000, partnering with known and suspected financial fraudsters, and 
leaving donor funds idle in accounts that the wealth management firm SG Hambros was able 
to manage, for profit, on their own account (Committee of Public Accounts 2015). That 
development funds could be used to facilitate such ‘malversation’ might well be considered 
repugnant to the wish, honour and policy of any nation.  
For some, the Parliamentary inquiries of 1773, 2009 and 2015 might be viewed as moments 
punctuating a continuous process of globalization that has seen the persistent exploitation 
and subjugation of Bengal/Bangladesh. Bangladeshi sociologist Hasanuzzaman Chowdhury 
(2011), for instance, emphasizes the continuities between the “bribery, conspiracy, treachery, 
oppression, murder and plunder” (p. 247) that enabled Company men to defeat the Nawab 
at Plassey and remove their “treasure” to London, and, more recently, the international oil 
companies who “have deepened their plundering process by buying off the personnel of 
BAPEX” (p. 255), Bangladesh’s parastatal oil exploration company, while also escaping any 
accountability for their errors and misdeeds.  
There are, of course, other temporalizing discourses through which to make sense of (or 
disguise) the intertwined histories of extraction in Bangladesh and accumulation in London. 
                                                          
1 Gareth Thomas, MP, in a Parliamentary answer to a question from Lynne Jones MP, 28 April 2008. 
2 Fieldnotes, interview with InfraCo Asia director in Dhaka, July 2013.  
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British Chancellor George Osborne, in a foreword contributed to a recent re-issue of The 
wealth of nations, argues that Adam Smith’s “universal” prescription of the “freedom to trade 
and compete” continues to be relevant in a world “where capitals [sic] flows around the 
world at the touch of a button and where communication travels at the speed of light” 
(Osborne 2007, p. ix).3 The passage of time may have seen technological innovation and ‘time-
space compression’, but the virtues of a free and competitive market are timeless. 
Between Chowdhury’s condemnation and Osborne’s encomium, much goes unexamined. 
How has sovereignty come to be configured in the interactions between Southern states and 
transnational extractive industry corporations since the days of the East India Company? 
How does the pursuit of profit align with or interrupt the ‘national interest’ of extractive 
industry corporations’ home and host nations, and how is that interest to be determined? Do 
(representations of) governance failures help or hinder those who would make their fortunes 
in contemporary Bangladesh? If ‘patient capital’ exists, is there also ‘impatient capital’, and 
what does that mean for the relationship between accumulation, dispossession and 
development? In this thesis, I provide partial answers to these questions by tracing out the 
work that goes into establishing profitable extractive industry ventures, or ‘money mines’, in 
countries like Bangladesh, increasingly viewed as ‘frontier’ markets.  
This thesis draws on over eighteen months of multi-sited fieldwork carried out in London 
and Dhaka, among geologists, lawyers, fund managers, engineers, and private sector 
development consultants intent on securing profitable extractive opportunities, and among 
public intellectuals and politicians in Dhaka who oppose the development of Bangladesh’s 
energy resources by foreign corporations. The thesis contributes to a recently revitalized 
anthropological political economy (Bear 2014; Carrier & Kalb 2015; Gregory 2015), and 
engages critically with the actor–network theory-inspired ‘social studies of finance’ (e.g. 
Callon, 1998; Beunza et al., 2006; MacKenzie, 2009; Muniesa, 2014). By tracing 
ethnographically the production of extractive industry capitalism, I show that capital is not 
merely free–flowing or reproduced by its own inevitable logic. Rather, the movement and 
accumulation of capital is facilitated by distinct forms of knowledge production, such as 
political risk analysis, and historically constituted legal institutions, most notably investor–
state arbitration forums. Equally, I show the calculative capacities exercised by financial 
                                                          
3 Osborne is not alone in failing to read (or remember) the portions of Smith that are critical of corporations 
and the commercial interest. For a good introduction to revisionist Smith scholarship that identifies in The 
wealth of nations an Enlightenment critique of globalization and the ills of transnational trading companies, see 
Muthu (2008). 
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analysts and fund managers have material consequences far beyond those normally 
considered by scholars in the social studies of finance, who tend to confine their analyses to 
the ‘bounded fieldsites’ provided by bank dealing rooms or stock exchange trading floors. 
My ethnography begins in London’s financial district, with the ‘junior’ mining companies 
who seek funds for exploration in new ‘frontier’ markets. In Chapter Three, I show that 
these firms are able to attract capital only by convincing investors that their prospects are 
located in sufficiently ‘Europeanized’ Southern states, where the ‘rule of law’, putatively 
instituted during the colonial period, remains intact. Subsequently, in Chapter Four I examine 
the accounting tools made available to analysts and fund managers by evangelical ‘money 
mining’ consultants. These self-described capitalists construe mineral deposits as ‘latent 
cash’, and the valuation techniques they promulgate encourage its rapid, impatient extraction. 
I then bring recent work on the political economy of capitalization to bear on this approach 
to valuing ‘money mines’; an approach which hinges upon extractive industry corporations 
being able to demonstrate to their financial backers that they are capable of disciplining and 
dominating host states and communities for as long as it takes to extract the ‘latent cash’. I 
suggest that extractive industry capitalism can be understood ethnographically by tracing out 
the instruments that are used to ensure domination and stability around money mines in 
frontier markets.  
Thus in Chapter Five, I describe the field of ‘Corporate Diplomacy’ that is increasingly 
overtaking and displacing Corporate Social Responsibility in the extractive industries. This 
emerging professional domain involves developing techniques for mapping, intervening in, 
and ensuring the compliance of mine area communities, in order to project that compliance 
back to the fund managers and analysts who would value these ‘money mines.’ Corporate 
Diplomacy does not always go unchallenged, however. In Bangladesh, where colonization 
by the East India Company (and, subsequently, ‘internal colonization’ by West Pakistan) is 
not easily forgotten, there is significant resistance to the foreign ownership and extraction of 
natural resources. In Chapter Six, I examine the efforts that public intellectuals aligned with 
the National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Ports and Natural Resources in Dhaka make to 
challenge foreign extractive industry corporations. While those in London’s mining market 
perceive any and all opposition to foreign investment in extractive industries as a 
manifestation of ‘resource nationalism’ motivated by greed, I show that in Dhaka, disputes 
over geological expertise and evidence must be understood in relation to intra– and interparty 
contests within Bangladesh’s bipolar political sphere, and the attempts that Leftist political 
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agencies make to situate themselves in relation to the 1971 Liberation War which saw 
Bangladesh (East Pakistan) gain independence.  
Where the function of Corporate Diplomacy is to secure money mines against local 
opposition, what mining lawyers term ‘Corporate Foreign Policy’ is designed to defend the 
interests of extractive industry corporations against nation-states. In Chapter Seven, I examine 
how World Bank and International Chamber of Commerce investor-state arbitration forums 
are used by extractive industry corporations to challenge the exercise of sovereignty by 
postcolonial states. The chapter is based on participation in training courses for lawyers in 
London, funded by ‘export promotion’ agencies, and in Dhaka, funded by donor agencies 
seeking to promote private sector development and foreign investment. Using my 
ethnography as a departure point, I describe how the careful reconstruction of international 
law undermines attempts by postcolonial nations to assert Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources, and has enabled extractive industry corporations to act with more 
sovereignty than is granted to ‘frontier’ states like Bangladesh. Where the hierarchical 
ordering of territories, according to a scale of ‘Europeanization’, is used to give peace of 
mind and attract speculative investment for resource exploration (Chapter Three), investor-
state arbitration lawyers working for private sector development agencies dismiss the 
possibility of corporations submitting to the courts of countries ‘like Bangladesh’, who fail 
to adhere to idealized models of English elite male behaviour, supposedly outside and above 
politics.  
There is, of course, a risk that an ethnographic strategy premised upon tracing out the work 
that goes into assembling money mines might invoke a transnational capitalist class, acting 
with total unity of purpose in their efforts to render frontier markets open for business. In 
Chapter Eight, I draw on ethnography carried out with investment promotion agencies and 
‘brokers’ for transnational extractive industry corporations in Dhaka. I argue that the 
constitution of Bangladesh as a new frontier for extractive investment emerges from a 
countervailing set of Bangladeshi elite globalizing projects. Perhaps surprisingly, those least 
capable of realising their own globalizing projects are the most instrumental to the ambitions 
of transnational extractive industry corporations. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter is divided into four sections. Firstly, in Section 
1.1, I introduce the political terrain upon which energy politics is played out in Bangladesh, 
and the dominant representations of Bangladesh that circulate in the financial press and 
expensive business intelligence subscription services. Bangladesh is represented with 
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remarkable consistency in the global business press, through summarizing metonyms of 
perpetually ‘battling begums’, and enthusiastic announcements that the development ‘basket 
case’ is now an enticing frontier market. These depictions dispense with subtlety, but may 
also have performative effects when it comes to directing and attracting foreign investment.  
In Section 1.2, I review the origins of the ‘frontier’ market concept. First popularized by the 
Bretton Woods institutions in the 1980s, as part of an effort to render ‘Third World’ or 
‘Southern’ states more attractive to those in possession of impatient Northern capital, the 
frontier markets concept has helped to reorganize the cognitive maps of the fund 
management industry, and reframed ‘basket cases’ like Bangladesh as exciting territories for 
profit hunters. But frontier market analysis is never merely technical. Ostensibly oriented to 
the emergent present of financial markets, quarterly reports and the matter of “where to bet 
now”,4 frontier market coverage almost always comes soaked through with the fevered 
language of masculine colonial exploration and first contact.  
If the frontier market designation was designed to attract or direct the flow of capital, then 
what are we to understand by ‘capital’? What exactly is flowing ‘at the touch of a button’, as 
George Osborne would have it, and what kind of social relations does it make and rely upon? 
In Section 1.3, I highlight the near-total absence of ‘capital’ in anthropological writing on 
capitalism (although see Bear, 2014). Some anthropologists and sociologists have adopted, 
like Osborne, a language of speed, flow, circulation and deterritorialization with which to 
speak of capital (Castells, 2000, 2009; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2001; Hardt & Negri, 2000; 
Jameson, 1997; Kearney, 2004; LiPuma & Lee, 2002) but I show this to be both analytically 
and politically impotent. An alternative approach to tracing out capital and its effects is 
offered by the actor–network theory-inspired ‘social studies of finance’. But while authors 
writing in this tradition have had much to say about the material and social components that 
come together to make markets, their silence on capital – and consequently, on domination, 
distribution and exploitation – has, with few exceptions (Bear et al., 2015), been deafening.  
Nowhere is capital less free-flowing, virtual and deterritorialized than in the extractive 
industries, where the political and economic relations engendered not merely by market 
exchange, but by capital accumulation, materialize in flattened mountains, toxic waterways, 
rotten food and broken bodies. I review in Section 1.4 the work that anthropologists have 
carried out in relation to extractive industries, emphasizing in particular recent efforts to 
                                                          
4 This was the headline on the cover of Foreign Affairs in January/February 2014, which featured a contribution 
from frontier/emerging markets guru Ruchir Sharma.  
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engage with the modes of domination engendered by resource extraction, and contests over 
resource sovereignty at a variety of geographical and social scales. Then, in Chapter Two, I 
recount my experience of designing, carrying out, and critically reflecting upon the practice 
of ethnography, as I traced the coming together of a frontier imaginary, capitalist ambition 
and opportunities for extraction between London and Bangladesh.  
1.1: BANGLADESH: SURPRISE, PARADOX OR FRONTIER? 
“Bangladesh: ‘basket case’ no more.” So ran the headline of Sadanand Dhume’s (2010) 
feature for the Wall Street Journal, on how Bangladesh, once dubbed a “basket case” by 
Henry Kissinger, now had much to be proud of. With GDP growth of over 6% for three 
years (and a willingness to confront “radical” Islam), it was no longer Bangladesh that was 
called up when one thought of a “South Asian country ravaged by floods, governed by 
bumblers and apparently teetering on the brink of chaos,” but Pakistan, of which Bangladesh 
was formerly the “eastern province.” 
Meanwhile, “Kissinger’s ‘basket case’ Bangladesh targets record growth.” This time it is Unni 
Krishnan (2011), writing for Bloomberg. Krishnan argued that the country’s consistently 
high GDP growth rates could be even higher, if only there was some investment in power 
generation and connectivity. If there was a more adequate power supply, the garment sector, 
the country’s growth engine, could boost GDP even more. Maybe 8% was possible. Bangladesh 
had, after all, been included in JP Morgan’s ‘Frontier Five’, and in Goldman Sachs ‘Next–
11’, the successors to the much-vaunted BRICs. Surely, someone would be investing in their 
power sector. 
Of course, as Dhume (2010) observed, there were problems, such as the feud between the 
Awami League (AL) Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wazed and the Bangladesh National Party 
(BNP) leader Khaleda Zia, which made “that of the Hatfields and McCoys look benign by 
comparison.” The Economist (2013, 2015) has dubbed Hasina and Khaleda the “battling 
begums,” a designation that has gained currency throughout countless, albeit less prestigious, 
business news services. But in their own “out of the basket” narrative, The Economist (2012) 
describes the “puzzle” that “Bangladesh combines economic disappointment with social 
progress.” Desperate to extricate themselves from an unwelcome possibility, The Economist 
asks, does Bangladesh mean “economic growth is pointless?”  
16 
 
How, precisely, is energy, growth, opportunity, and development configured such that 
Bangladesh can at once be a social success, an investment frontier and an economic 
disappointment?  
The Economist seems to be wrestling with what Chowhdury et al. (2013), writing in The 
Lancet, termed the ‘Bangladesh paradox’: on a number of human development indicators 
(infant mortality, under–5 mortality, maternal mortality, as well as female literacy and 
education), Bangladesh outperforms India and Pakistan, despite significantly lower per capita 
GDP and per capita income. This, in addition, is achieved with less per capita spending on 
healthcare, rendering Bangladesh a “positive deviant” (Chowdhury et al. 2013, p. 1737). The 
Bangladesh paradox can, for Chowdhury and colleagues, be accounted for by the post–
Liberation establishment of thriving, now global, NGOs like BRAC and Grameen. Many of 
these NGOs emerged in the vacuum resulting from the effective dissolution of the Pakistani 
state in newly independent Bangladesh, creating organizational innovations as they 
responded to the 1971 war which brought independence from Pakistan (and to the aftermath 
of the devastating 1970 Bhola cyclone).  
These NGOs benefitted from the huge influx of aid that – not Kissinger, but his under-
secretary – Ural Alexis Johnson felt might render Bangladesh perpetually aid dependent, and 
thus an “international basket case” (Lewis 2011, p. 36). In addition, Chowdhury et al. (2013, 
p. 1740) trace Bangladesh’s human development success to the public health system that was 
developed in line with the post-independence “commitment to equity.” As Kamal Hossain, 
author of independent Bangladesh’s first Constitution recounts in his biography, the 
Constitution provided “that a socialist economic society would be established with a view to 
ensuring the attainment of a just and egalitarian society, free from the exploitation of man 
by man” (Hossain 2013, pp. 145-153). The Constitution additionally ensured that no law 
providing for the nationalization of property could be deemed void or illegal.  
So that part of The Economist’s puzzle is solved, perhaps: success on human development 
indicators, despite poor per capita GDP, can be traced back to Bangladesh’s vibrant NGO 
sector and foundational commitment to socialism. Except, of course, that the commitment 
to state socialism was excised from the constitution under General Ershad’s military 
dictatorship (1982-1990). Before Ershad, General Ziaur Rahman (Zia), had come to power 
after Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib), the ‘Father of the Nation’ (Banghabondhu), was 
assassinated in 1975. Zia began to privatize the assets that had been nationalized under Mujib, 
after they were abandoned by the fleeing Pakistani elite in 1971. Zia, a career officer, was not 
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sympathetic to the egalitarian ideals that had been rehearsed by those Freedom Fighters 
(Mukhtijoddha) who saw and experienced the Liberation War in terms of an “oppressed 
Bengali peasantry against capitalist exploitation” (Ali 2010, p. 118). Nonetheless, he would 
eventually attempt (with some success) to draw the pro-Beijing tendency among 
Bangladesh’s Communist Party into a coalition of “professionals, entrepreneurs, former civil-
and-military bureaucrats, academics and politicians sharing his anti-Indian nationalist beliefs” 
(ibid., pp. 145–46). Zia’s frustration with Mujib and Kamal Hossain’s secular socialism saw 
a spate of denationalizations and ‘private sector development’ that eminent Bangladeshi 
economist Wahiduddin Mahmud terms “an early version of what is now called ‘crony 
capitalism’” (Mahmud et al. 2010, p. 234).  
After Zia and Ershad, came Khaleda Zia’s first term (1991–1996), and the establishment of 
a Privatization Board. Examining the path taken by privatization up to that date, Rehman 
Sobhan, who had been instrumental in bringing abandoned Pakistani-owned assets under 
government control during the Mujib era (Ali 2010, pp. 172–73), determined that of 449 
nationalized units divested under Zia and Ershad, 133 had closed and 141 were non-existent 
by 1990. By the early 1990s, the ownership of most of the previously public assets had passed 
on to, at most, 217 families (Haque 2002), and the vast majority of bank deposits in 
Bangladesh were controlled by no more than 37 families (Nurruzzaman 2004). Any dreams 
of a socialist, egalitarian Bangladesh were now dead and buried, as were the hopes that 
“bleeders would be leaders.”5 Freedom Fighter status has now become a fungible political 
and economic resource among Dhaka’s aspirant business elite, and more Mukhtijoddha 
‘certificates’ have been issued by the Ministry of Liberation War Affairs than there were 
recorded fighters within the Mukhti Bahini (Khan, 2013, pp. 139), even if the definition of 
who ‘counts’ as a legitimate Mukhtijoddha (beyond those who took up arms) continues to be 
contested. 
Thus we begin to move towards an understanding of a second puzzle disguised by The 
Economist, The Wall Street Journal, and Bloomberg when they frame Bangladesh as a 
prosperous ‘frontier’, albeit one beset by ‘battling begums’: this is the puzzle which 
Wahiduddin Mahmud addresses as ‘Bangladesh’s development surprise.’ Rather than 
focusing on the ‘paradox’ of human development success despite extremely low GDP per 
capita (and massive inequalities), Mahmud’s ‘surprise’ presents itself since Bangladesh has 
both high GDP growth rates and positive human development, but “is rated extremely poorly 
                                                          
5 Fieldnotes, August 2013; Parliamentary private sector interest group meeting, ‘PromoteCo’, Dhaka. 
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according to most global indicators of political and economic governance” – including the 
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index and the World Bank’s Doing 
Business survey (Mahmud et al., 2010, p. 228). These are, of course, measures of governance, 
investor protection and the ease of doing business that reflect the concerns of foreign 
investors, whom Bangladesh is avowedly eager to welcome. Indeed, since 2003, during 
Khaleda’s second term (2001–2006), Bangladesh removed virtually all restrictions on the 
movement of foreign private capital in and out the country.  
The Bangladesh Board of Investment’s Roadshow UK, hosted at London’s Canary Wharf 
during September 2015, advertised itself as being  
for investors and corporate heads who want to explore the 
opportunities of a frontier market like Bangladesh. The country 
offers untapped opportunities in [a] plethora of sectors which 
ensures handsome return, with smooth option for repatriation of 
equity and dividend. 
Bangladesh, they assure attendees, is the “investment friendly regime in South Asia,” with a 
young, cheap workforce to boot.6 Perhaps the governance issues that concern Mahmud, and 
which are recorded by the World Bank’s and World Economic Forum’s indices, do not 
concern foreign investors, especially not those managing ‘impatient capital’ which they hope 
to withdraw as quickly as it can accumulate.  
The surprise and the frontier dissolve into one another: where is the puzzle in a territory with 
poor governance, high GDP growth, no capital controls, but low income per capita and high 
levels of inequality? Doubtless, Adam Smith would find none. In fact, Smith wrote in The 
wealth of nations that the 
great fortunes so suddenly and so easily acquired in Bengal and the 
other British settlements in the East Indies, may satisfy us that, as 
the wages of labour are very low, so the profits of stock are very 
high in those ruined countries. (A. Smith 1976, p. 111) 
What remains a ‘paradox’ for orthodox development economics is the success of 
Bangladesh’s health sector and its apparent superiority over its neighbours in matters of 
human development. If those indices are to be taken as meaningful measures of development, 
it is perhaps alarming that development practice and political discourse in Bangladesh is 
moving consistently further and further away from its founding socialist ideals. Neither of 
                                                          
6 See Bangladesh Board of Investment (2015) ‘About roadshow’ [Online]: Available at: 
http://boievents.gov.bd/about-road-show/ (Accessed 11 September 2015). 
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the ‘battling begums’ is hostile to foreign investment, as any report on ‘political risk’ in 
Bangladesh from the Economist Intelligence Unit, IHS Global Insight, or Oxford Analytica 
will reassure you. So why The Economist’s interest in summarizing Bangladeshi politics 
through Khaleda and Hasina’s mutual disaffection? 
The reason, perhaps is not merely that politics in Bangladesh is exceedingly polarized, but 
that contests between Hasina’s Awami League and Khaleda’s BNP are played out through 
rolling ‘general strikes’ or hortals. The PRS Group was among the earliest political risk analysis 
services that sprung up to provide American transnational corporations with information on 
how to negotiate newly independent postcolonial states (see Chapter Seven). In 2011, The 
PRS Group expressed concerns that the sniping between incumbent Prime Minister Hasina 
and Khaleda (“all par for the course in Bangladesh”) would spill over into a boycott of the 
then-upcoming (but never held) 2014 general election: 
A boycott by the BNP would be disastrous for Bangladesh, as it 
would leave the opposition with no alternative to fighting its battles 
in the street, effectively guaranteeing that the political climate would 
be marred by frequent campaigns featuring disruptive rolling strikes 
(hartals) that would merely add to the many other deterrents that 
impede the government’s efforts to attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI)…aggressive action will be required to overcome the wariness 
of investors (The PRS Group 2011, pp. U–4 & 4). 
 
The trope of the battling begums perhaps acts to summarize the concerns that potential 
foreign investors might have about stability; about their ability to get themselves (and their 
exports) out of the country, or the likelihood that there might be sufficient un-interrupted 
demand from Bangladesh’s factories to make investment in coal, gas or oil extraction, or 
power generation, sufficiently profitable. 
The hostility between Hasina and Khaleda is, indeed, real, despite the regular interaction (and 
occasional intermarriage) of their close friends, advisers and relatives. That Khaleda’s 
husband, Zia, was implicated in the death of Hasina’s father, Mujib, set the tone for the two 
leaders’ lifetime of often petty antagonism. The awkward relationship between Zia and Mujib 
is, in fact, etched into the very foundational moment of the Bangladeshi nation. Zia initially 
announced independence from Pakistan over the Freedom Fighters’ Radio Behar, declaring 
himself leader, only to make a second broadcast, moments later, declaring independence in 
the name of the de facto leader of the struggle, Mujib. But the relationship between Khaleda 
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and Hasina is not sufficient to explain the Bangladeshi political sphere, least of all when it 
comes to energy politics.  
Another reductionist trope commonly circulated in business press and ‘political risk’ analyses 
of Bangladesh depicts the BNP standing for Islamic Bangladeshi nationalism and alignment 
with Pakistan, and the Awami League as propounding a form of secular7  Bengali nationalism 
and an affinity for India (e.g. Quadir, 2003 pp. 142–43). It is certainly true that depending 
upon which party is incumbent, Awami League and BNP factions alternatively dominate 
university departments, the Bar Association, medical associations, and the civil service, in a 
form of bipolar, winner–takes–all ‘partyarchy’ (Hassan et al., 2013; Quadir, 2003). But party 
membership or alignment is not always clearly ideologically determined, and often reflects 
an experience or interpretation of post–Liberation history not captured in the neat 
opposition between ‘secular–Bengali–Indian’ Awami League and ‘Islamic–Bangladeshi–
Pakistani’ BNP. There are, in addition, class dimensions, with many urban educated elites 
regarding the Awami League as the party of the rural poor. Likewise, there are strategic 
considerations related to the election cycle, with some young men aligning themselves with 
the BNP in the run up to the abortive 2014 elections because positions in the thana (police 
district) distributive machine were already taken by the Awami Leaguers five or six years their 
senior.8 
Nowhere does the relationship between Bangladesh the ‘surprise’, Bangladesh the ‘paradox’, 
and Bangladesh the ‘frontier’ come out more clearly than in relation to energy politics and 
the Leftist organizations involved in opposing foreign investment in coal, gas and oil 
development. It is here too that attempts to characterize Bangladesh’s political sphere in 
terms of a firm opposition between Awami League and BNP ideologies, or the personal 
relationships of the ‘battling begums’, also come up against their biggest challenges. As I 
explore in greater detail in Chapter Six, the opposition to foreign exploration and exploitation 
of coal, gas and oil in Bangladesh is spearheaded by the National Committee to Protect Oil, 
Gas, Ports and Natural Resources. Founded in 1998, and currently headed up by a politically 
                                                          
7 As Lewis (2011, p. 29) notes, the pre–independence and Liberation era Awami League was ‘secular’ to the 
extent Mujib wanted neutrality in religion, and freedom from the use of religion as a political weapon. This is 
quite distinct from the “moral narrative of modernity” that Webb Keane (2008a) describes, in terms of which 
secularism reflects a particular form of self understanding: the notion that agency has in the past ‘falsely’ been 
attributed to gods, and not individuals. This distinctly enunciated form of secular identity does in fact emerge 
among some young Bangladeshi professionals working for foreign banks and extractive industry corporations, 
however, as I discuss in Chapter Eight – many of whom nonetheless identify as BNP supporters, in spite of 
Jamaat. 
8 Fieldnotes, October–December 2013. 
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non-aligned consulting engineer, the National Committee includes amongst their strategies 
and tactics the calling of hortals, and is made up of a coalition of Leftist groups from both 
sides of an historic Moscow/Beijing split9 in the then-East Pakistan Communist Party. 
As mentioned above, General Zia was hostile to those among his officer corps who leaned 
towards socialism, and who saw the Liberation War as one moment in an unfinished class 
struggle. Nonetheless, he managed to draw into a single alliance Jamaat–e–Islami, the Beijing 
faction of the East Pakistan/Bangladesh Communist Party, and the Socialist Party (Jotiya 
Samajtantrik Dal) (Ali, 2010, p. 147). The National Committee’s politics are shaped and 
transformed by their members’ often bitter hatred of Jamaat–e–Islami and Hefazat–e–Islami, 
whom they see as anti-progressive, anti-secular, and anti-socialist, and whose members set 
fire to the offices of the Bangladesh Workers’ Party shortly before my fieldwork began. That 
Jamaat is in an opposition alliance with the BNP has brought the Leftist constituents of the 
National Committee closer, even if reluctantly, to the Awami League, whose leadership 
recently ‘rediscovered’ the war crimes committed by Jamaat’s pro–Pakistan leadership during 
1971, executing Jamaat leader Abdul Qader Mollah towards the end of my fieldwork in 2013.  
For the activist members of the National Committee, ‘anti-imperialist’ opposition to 
companies like GCM Resources PLC aligns with a form of patriotism that is additionally 
articulated as ‘anti-Islamist’. The co-optation of symbols and memorials pertaining to the 
Liberation War by the National Committee merges accusations that the Bangladeshi 
engineers and economists who work for international oil companies are insufficiently 
patriotic, with claims that they, the National Committee, are more patriotic than the Pakistan-
aligned Jamaat-e-Islami, whose membership is tainted with their leaders’ razakar 
(collaborator) past.10 The further co-mingling of energy politics, and the post–Liberation 
                                                          
9 On which see Maniruzzaman (2003, pp. 45–68). 
10 This has not prevented the National Committee from adopting Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, or the ‘Red 
Moulana’ (Moulana being a title conferred upon respected Islamic leaders), a pre–independence and Liberation 
era campaigner for socialist democracy,  as a source of inspiration. The National Committee’s volume Kagmari 
shommelon sharkoglontho (Kagmari conference commemoration), published in 2011 to commemorate the 1957 
Kagmari conference of the Awami League, bears images of Bhashani on the front cover, and an eagle coloured 
with the US flag, hovering above a gathering of raised fists, on the flyleaf. At the Kagmari conference, Bhashani 
had challenged then-Awami League leader Shaheed Suhrawardy (who had just been offered a post in the 
Pakistan cabinet) over his support for Pakistan’s military alliance with the United States. For many in the 
National Committee, the Awami League’s complicity with international oil companies is a continuation of their 
support for ‘imperialists’. At Kagmari, the Awami League split, and for those on the Bangladeshi Left, remained 
a ‘right wing’ movement, while the Leftists joined Bhasahani in his new National Awami Party or NAP (see 
Kabir, 2012). NAP then split again, with Bhashani’s faction, NAP (Bhashani), being pro–Beijing and aligning 
with the BNP, while NAP (Muzaffar), the pro–Moscow faction, aligned with the Awami League (see Ali, 2010, 
pp. 124–46). 
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politics of secularism and ‘Islamism’, can be found in the fact that while four ‘atheist’ bloggers 
have been murdered in Bangladesh during 2015, allegedly by Jamaat members and 
sympathizers, so too were the environmental journalists Meherun Runi and Sagar Sarowar 
in early 2012, while they were rumoured to be working on a story about corruption in 
Bangladesh’s energy sector.  
For the public intellectuals at the helm of the National Committee, and the engineers and 
geologists they jostle with on television talk shows, in newspaper columns, and in the halls 
of Dhaka University and the prestigious Bangladesh University of Engineering and 
Technology, political performance has an additional dimension. The massacre by Pakistani 
Army personnel of close to 1000 academics (as well as lawyers, journalists, physicians and 
engineers), in the hours before their surrender in December 1971, quite deliberately crippled 
the new nation of Bangladesh, already disrupted by the flight of the largely (West) Pakistani 
industrial and bureaucratic elite.  
Against this history, attempts to establish oneself as a respected public intellectual, or defend 
against allegations that your dealings with international oil companies render you 
insufficiently patriotic, are highly charged. Those who come from ‘old’ Dhaka families, 
established in the city during the Pakistan era and university educated for several generations, 
make efforts to mark themselves off from the ‘first-generation’ academics who grew up 
outside the city, often finding themselves university after having excelled in rural mission 
schools.  
The established, urbane intellectuals who side not so much with foreign extractive 
corporations, but against the National Committee, must therefore be understood in terms of 
their efforts to determine, steer and administer Bangladesh’s energy future. It is these 
intellectuals’ assessment of how best to reconfigure Bangladesh’s ‘paradox’ and its ‘surprise’ 
that determine their position regarding extractive industry corporations. The situation is by 
no means a simple one: there has been a failure so far to develop Bangladesh’s coal reserves; 
gas is consumed faster than it can be replaced (Imam, 2013, p. 86) due to a ten year 
exploration hiatus that followed from international oil companies finding the state’s terms 
unfavourable (see Chapters Six & Seven); it costs US$2.93 billion (231.25 billion taka) 
annually to subsidize high-sulphur fuel oil imports and quick rental power plants to cover 
the energy demand shortfall (Ahamad & Tanin, 2013, p. 280); only around 44% of the 
population is currently connected to electricity supply (Mondal et al., 2014); and there are 
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proposals for coal-fired power plants to be erected in the Sundarbans, a UNESCO World 
Heritage Centre.  
Should those plans go ahead, and if so, should coal be imported, at great cost to public 
finances, or extracted in Phulbari, at an entirely unquantifiable cost? For many among the 
anti-National Committee public intellectuals, the patriotic, rational, responsible and 
progressive decision is one and the same: Bangladesh needs energy for her growth, and the 
National Committee would shackle her and deny a prosperous future – or at least, Hasina’s 
more modest aim of being a ‘middle-income country’ by 2021. 
What is often missing in these debates, however, is an attempt to get to grips with the 
relationship between the ‘surprise’, the ‘paradox’, and the ‘frontier’. If Bangladesh can grow 
without good governance (the surprise), and achieve positive human development outcomes 
without high growth per capita (the paradox), then what will driving growth through energy 
development actually achieve, compared to the costs it generates? Will the National 
Committee be able to resuscitate Mujib and Kamal Hossain’s image of an egalitarian, socialist 
future? And do those who come looking for Bangladesh the frontier care at all about the 
‘surprise’ or the ‘paradox’ or the 56% of Bangladeshis without electricity connections? Or, 
do they simply want to take the Board of Investment up on their offer, and smoothly 
repatriate their much multiplied equity and dividends? Who comes looking for a ‘frontier’ 
investment, and just what, exactly, makes a frontier? 
1.2: FRONTIERS 
When I arrived in Dhaka in 2013, Asian Tiger Capital Partners, located in the city’s 
Sonargaon area, advertised opportunities for investment in Bangladesh with reference to the 
nation’s inclusion in JPMorgan’s ‘Frontier Five’ (Mowat & Gordon, 2007) and Goldman 
Sachs’ ‘Next–11’ (Goldman Sachs Global Economic Group, 2007). Across Dhaka, on the 
edges of the elite Gulshan district, SwissPro Invest was beginning to set up its offices. Amid 
the not-yet-assembled computers was a banner: above an image of a Bengal tiger were the 
words “Bangladesh: the hidden gem of the N–11.”11 SwissPro Invest was planning to launch 
a ‘UCITs–compliant’ fund that could be advertised to investors within the European Union, 
hoping to profit from portfolio investment in Bangladesh. The establishment of the fund 
was delayed, with the founder staying away from pre-election violence, though it is now up 
                                                          
11 Fieldnotes, July 2013. 
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and running. Since I completed my fieldwork, Barings’ frontier fund has taken an interest in 
Bangladesh, and the Rockefellers’ LR Global Frontier Market fund has also increased its 
presence.  
There is a remarkable consistency in the interviews that the managers of these funds give to 
the global financial media. The typical form is as follows: Often depicted as a ‘basket case’, 
Bangladesh has in fact been designated one of the ‘Frontier Five’ by JPMorgan, and included 
in the ‘Next–11’ by no less a personage than Goldman Sachs’ Jim O’Neill. Bangladesh has a 
young, growing workforce, and some political difficulties, but as one of the most 
“unexplored” countries in the region, there is potential to profit from huge growth, especially 
if promised improvements in energy supply mean that the young, growing, low-waged 
workforce can be fully taken advantage of in the garments and pharmaceutical sectors. In 
fact, Bangladesh “really could be like another Indonesia” (Keeler, 2013; see also Keeler, 2015; 
Walker, 2013). Clearly, the ‘frontier’ market designation is one designed to attract and steer 
the attention of Northern fund managers and investors, who see the potential to benefit 
from (exploit?) a growing economy.  
In fact, the frontier market classification emerged out of efforts made by the International 
Finance Corporation to render ‘Third World’ or ‘Southern’ countries more attractive to 
Northern investors whose capital they felt would encourage private sector development. The 
idea of the ‘Next–11’ subsequently emerged from within the fund management sector. These 
frontier market designations are not neutral. Not only do such classifications appear to have 
performative effects, reorganizing the structure and attention of fund managers, but they 
draw on earlier colonial discourses about the profit that active, masculine explorers might 
extract from wild and dangerous territories. Perhaps most significantly, frontier market 
discourse seems to have successfully written over histories of the ‘Third World project’ and 
the movement for a ‘Global South’, disguising historic attempts to overturn an exploitative 
system whereby capital seemed always to flow from South to North (The South Centre, 
1993). The financial press might drum up interest in frontier markets, but state agencies like 
the Bangladesh Board of Investment are only too keen to facilitate the quick and easy 
turnaround and repatriation of this ‘impatient’ capital. 
To make sense of frontier markets, we have to start with the notion of ‘emerging’ markets. 
Credit is usually given to Antoine van Agtmeal for coining the term emerging markets, back 
when he worked as the Deputy Director of Capital Markets for the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) in the 1980s – a post he subsequently left to found Emerging Markets 
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Management LLC, before authoring The Emerging Markets Century (2007), and ending up at 
the emerging markets fund, Ashmore Emerging Markets Management. What were previously 
known as developing economies became emerging markets, as part of the IFC’s effort to attract 
foreign investment to these countries, and usher in development led by the efficient 
allocation of overseas private capital (Wansleben, 2013, p. 456). The term ‘frontier markets’ 
was coined a little later, in 1992, by Farida Khambata, also at the IFC, but frontier markets 
– or ‘second-generation emerging markets’ (McCormick, 2013) – only became real news 
when in 1997 the IFC started publishing data on 14 frontiers (including Bangladesh), which 
were like emerging markets but with smaller, less liquid, less transparent capital markets. 
Like any significant category, ‘frontier’ and ‘emerging’ market designations were not received 
de novo; they were fitted into pre-existing discursive formations. In the words of the 
geographers James Sidaway and Michael Pryke (2000, p. 189), 
the general notion of places as ‘emerging markets’ is symptomatic 
of the diminishing credibility of a passé geopolitical division of the 
world into ‘Third’, ‘Second’ and ‘First’. Beyond the Cold War, in a 
‘New World Order’ the old poles of North and South and East and 
West are less credible. As capital seeks to remake an entire world in 
its image, so select zones of the earth are redesignated as ‘emerging 
markets’ … This label coexists with others. In this respect, a 
lingering ‘Third World’ endures. 
The advertisements for emerging market funds that circulated in the British media during 
the late 1990s were, for Sidaway and Pryke, merely “strategic reformulations” of colonial 
discourse, emphasizing ‘frontiers’, ‘pioneers’, ‘exploration’ and opportunities to profit from 
‘the world’ unseen since the ‘days of Empire’ (Sidaway & Pryke 2000, p. 195; also Lai 2006, 
p. 632). People do not come to Bangladesh in search only of a compound annual growth rate 
of 6.1% or a 1.2% population growth rate12 heavily skewed to the under 20s: they come in 
search of ‘hidden gems’ and ‘Asian tigers’. The technical macroeconomic definition of 
frontier markets as those with less ‘mature’ capital markets and growing populations (Mowat 
& Gordon, 2007) never works to attract investment without the aid of a fevered, masculine 
language of exploration and discovery.  
After emerging markets, and frontier markets, came the BRICS/s. The BRICs were Brazil, 
Russia, India and China, and subsequently the BRICS, including South Africa, and the term 
                                                          
12 It is a marker of the shift engendered by the frontier markets discourse that population growth is seen as a 
positive not a problem to be managed in the same way that it was when Faaland and Parkinson (1976, p. 5) 
described Bangladesh, with its growing population, as a “test case”: “If the problem of Bangladesh can be 
solved, there can be reasonable confidence that less difficult problems of development can also be solved.” 
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was coined by Goldman Sachs analyst Jim O’Neill in 2001, as part of a deliberate effort to 
“break this distinction…between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’” (O’Neill in Wansleben, 2013, 
p. 459). Where van Agtmael had introduced the term ‘emerging’ markets in the 1980s to 
imply more attractive destinations for foreign capital than the image of ‘developing countries’ 
did, O’Neill felt that by 2001 emerging markets too had become overly associated with 
marginality and fragility.  
It was time for something new – a classification that inspired more confidence among 
financial powerbrokers than the ‘emerging markets’ moniker, but which also took account 
of the fact that, in O’Neill’s words, “the world economy was no longer gonna grow by just 
those so-called advanced economies” (O’Neill in Wansleben, 2013, p. 459). It seems that 
critical anthropologists and postcolonial theorists are not the only ones to criticise the “first 
in Europe, then elsewhere” (Chakrabarty, 2000, p. 7) narrative of capitalist development, or 
demand that “the West recognizes that it is playing catch up with the temporality of its 
others” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012, p. 123). 
But the BRICS/s have a curious double existence. On the one hand, the sociologists Leon 
Wansleben (2013) and Marion Fourcade (2013) both point to the growth of BRICs-only 
(without South Africa) investment funds in response to O’Neill’s Goldman Sachs projections, 
the first ever 50-year projections produced by investment analysts. They suggest that this 
exemplifies a weak form of performativity (or a mild self-fulfilling prophecy). The notion of 
the BRICs seemed to help symbolically shape the classificatory regimes and even the practice 
of financial market participants.13 Yet as Wansleben and Fourcade both observe, O’Neill did 
not invent the BRICs from scratch.  
Brazil, Russia, India, and China, the BRICs as imagined by O’Neill, merged with the pre-
existing geopolitical union, the ‘IBSA’ bloc (India, Brazil, and South Africa) in April 2010, 
precipitating the first ‘BRICS’ (capital S) summit. More than part of the fund management 
industry’s reworked imagination, the BRICS exist as a geopolitical bloc and, perhaps, engines 
of history from the South. But historian Vijay Prashad is unimpressed with the BRICS, and 
their vision of what in his view amounts to little more than “neoliberalism with Southern 
                                                          
13 The less flattering PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) or PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and 
Spain) designation that popped up during the Eurozone crisis was banned fairly rapidly by both Barclays Capital 
and the Financial Times (Alloway ,2010). Even so, the PIGS/PIIGS acronym seemed to acquire an apparent 
solidity. Brazys and Hardiman (2015, p. 35) have shown, in their quantitative analysis of Irish bond yields and 
media coverage which used the PIGS/PIIGS acronym, that the PIIGS heuristic seems to transmit information 
about non-Irish PIIGS, unlinked to the Irish economy, that nonetheless caused it to have an impact on Irish 
bond yields. 
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characteristics” (Prashad, 2012, p. 15). The BRICS have abandoned, it seems, the ideals of 
the ‘Third World project’,14 the defining moment of which Prashad locates at the 1955 
Bandung conference, where a miniscule group of international brokers became leaders, 
elaborating principles that “skewered the hypocrisy of imperial liberalism and promoted 
social change,” signalling ‘their refusal to take orders from their former colonial masters’ 
(Prashad, 2007, pp. 29, 56)15. And the BRICS’ neoliberalism with Southern characteristics is 
a long way from the vision outlined by The South Commission (1993), of an economic order 
that would overturn the system whereby the South exported capital to the North, while being 
punished by a Northern protectionist system. 
Contemporary frontier market discourse is partly a creation of the IFC, partly a performative 
product of the financial knowledge industry. In principle a technical definition, frontier 
market discourse, in practice, always draws on older colonial discourses of exploration, 
adventure and the exploitable exotic. By drawing on colonial imagery while writing over 
postcolonial efforts to exert sovereignty and reorder the international economy through the 
‘Third World project’ and South Commission, frontier market discourse folds images of an 
exploitable past into visions of a profitable future, enabled by state agencies that aggressively 
promote the free passage of impatient capital. The frontier is, it should be remembered, a 
frontier for Northern investors – especially the “adventurous” ones (Stevenson, 2015). The 
futurity implied by the terms ‘frontier’ and ‘emerging’ disguise the fact that frontier markets 
are not only those on the “brink” of becoming emerging markets; they are also on the brink 
of “slipping down into more chaotic environments” (BloombergBusiness, 2015), as Greece 
discovered when they were relegated from ‘developed’ to ‘emerging’ market on the IFC’s 
(now MSCI’s) original frontier/emerging market index. That, after all, is what makes 
frontiers so exciting. 
                                                          
14 The term ‘Third World’ was introduced by the French journalist Albert Sauvy in a 1952 article for the Parisian 
newspaper L’Observateur, to signal the two-thirds of the world’s population who lived outside the bipolar world 
of the Cold War, and to invoke something of the ‘Third Estate’ of the French Revolution, thus implying that 
the Third World was not a silent place, but an active project. 
15 Anthropologist John D. Kelly (2012) offers up a more pessimistic reading of the Third World project. Kelly 
sees Nehru’s behaviour in Bandung as a marker of “the death of socialist internationalism” (2012, p. 6), and 
the beginning of a darker internationalist realism. In particular, Kelly looks at the extent to which the fate of 
Highland – or ‘frontier’ – Asia was determined at Bandung when Nehru and Zhou began to carve up 
borderlands and fix frontiers. Nehru, referred to Naga demands for independence as ‘absurd,’ and even before 
Bandung in 1955, he had deliberately sabotaged Highland Karen movements for independence, calling on the 
Commonwealth to broker a peace while he re-armed the Burmese national military. More than half a century 
later, Northeast Highland India is still a site of frequent police and military killings. To be fair, Prashad (2007, 
p. 29) does recognize that the Third World project frequently descended into “neopatriarchy.” 
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With the rise of frontier markets, attempts to articulate alternatives to a system that sees 
capital flowing from the South fall between the cracks.16 In Chapter Three, I explore how 
the frontier market discourse originated by the IFC intersects with a related, but not identical, 
search for extractive industry frontiers. And, as I show in Chapter Seven, there are those who 
would rescue the Third World project as they face off with transnational corporations in 
search of an extractive industry frontier in Bangladesh. In the next section of this 
introduction I consider a question that is thrown up by both critical and enthusiastic writing 
on ‘frontier’ markets: what is it to speak of the free flow of capital? How does ‘capital’ move, 
and to what effect? When Sidaway and Pryke (2000) refer to ‘capital’ seeking to remake an 
entire world in its image, does the term do any more than simply stand for those like Jim 
O’Neill who set out to rework the cognitive maps of fund managers? Is it the same ‘capital’ 
that we find in the immature ‘capital’ markets of countries like Bangladesh? 
1.3: CAPITAL  
It could hardly be said that anthropology has entirely overlooked capitalism. Still, there is an 
extent to which we speak of capitalisms in the plural (e.g. Blim, 2000) without specifying 
what characteristics allow us “to speak of them all under the rubric ‘capitalism’” (G. Smith, 
2014, p. 30) in the first place. The problem is not unique to anthropology. Just as Alfred 
Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn famously identified 164 definitions of ‘culture’ circulating in 
the 1950s, the historian Richard Passow observed 111 slightly different meanings of 
‘capitalism’ in 1918 (Köcka, 2010), and, much like his anthropological counterparts, was 
unimpressed with this evident lack of terminological refinement. Like their counterparts in 
political economy, those anthropologists who engage directly with Marxian political 
economy might find themselves struggling to mediate a critical concern with the “inherent 
logic of capitalism,” and an ethnographic interest in the actual histories of specific people, 
societies or classes, as they become incorporated within a capitalist ‘world system’ (Knafo, 
2002, p. 145; see Taussig, 1989).  
Furthermore, what might start as an ethnographic problem – how to avoid writing about a 
‘bounded’ fieldsite in the ‘ethnographic present’ without simply using ‘the world system’ as 
                                                          
16 It should be noted that the failure of the Third World project is not entirely due to imposition of ‘frontier’ 
conditions by the IFC and the World Bank. The turn to liberalization and the free movement of capital also 
had an internal or endogenous history in many Third World/Southern states, driven by economic ideologies 
among Oxford–trained economists in India (Mukherjee, 2013), and ‘regime consolidation’ strategies under 
Ershad and Zia in Bangladesh (Quadir, 2000). 
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an explanatory container – can descend very quickly into a political one. In fact, there seems 
to be a risk that those most critical of capitalist exploitation and domination, who would 
enlarge capitalism as an encompassing world system, may inadvertently produce paralyzing 
accounts of the complete and total victory of capitalism, writing over any alternatives that 
may already exist or be cultivated. As J.K. Gibson–Graham (2006, p. 262) put it, calling the 
economy as a whole ‘capitalist’ is to “deny the existence of these diverse economic and class 
processes, precluding economic diversity in the present and thus making it unlikely in the 
proximate future.” This is not to deny the “power or even the prevalence of capitalism,” 
which Gibson–Graham see as a social relation in which non-producers appropriate surplus 
labour in value form from free wage labourers, but “to question the presumption of both” 
(ibid.). 
Gibson–Graham’s work is about recovering latent or embryonic non-capitalist social 
relations, through which would-be wage labourers might escape from the appropriation and 
expropriation of surplus value. But despite the power and potency of their17 careful and 
challenging critique, it does little to equip anthropologists with the tools they might need to 
study how capitalists make capitalism, nor to think about what ‘capital’ might be. 
Anthropologists have explored in detail how the subjectivities of wage–labourers are formed 
(and how class conflict may thus arrive); they have even paid particular attention to how wage-
labourers create forms of value other than that which might be appropriated as profit by 
capitalists (Graeber, 2013; De Angelis, 2007). But whether explicitly or implicitly, by 
acquiescing to Marx’s depiction of the capitalist as the mere personification of capital, and 
the medium for its circulation, anthropological writing on capitalism has had “the effect of 
naturalizing capitalist desire and action” (Yanagisako, 2002, p. 15) all over again.  
Should it not be as true for ethnographers of capitalists as it is for those of labourers that 
“the study of how we reproduce capitalist social relations is a study of how we pursue the 
values that are characteristic of it” (De Angelis, 2007, p. 176)? And furthermore, if it is indeed 
problematic to “call an economy ‘capitalist’ when more hours of labor (over the life course 
of individuals) are spent in noncapitalist activity” (Gibson–Graham, 2006, p. 13), is it not 
also problematic to understand the value of capital, as per orthodox Marxist political 
                                                          
17 Gibson–Graham are in fact Katherine Gibson and the now deceased Julie Graham. 
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economy, in terms of measurable units of abstract labour?18 How can ‘capital’ be grasped 
ethnographically, alongside capitalist action? If people spend a great deal of their time in non-
capitalist economic activity, how might the link between capital, capitalism, power and 
domination be understood, and how might it be traced out in relation to extractive industry 
investment in frontier markets? 
One recent anthropological ‘solution’ to this problem has appeared in the work of those who 
take an interest in money, and in particular, the extent to which the dollar value of the trade 
in financial derivatives has begun to outstrip the ‘productive’ economy as measured by global 
GDP. This state of affairs has led some critical anthropologists to depict a world in which 
“capital strives to become autonomous of labor” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2001, p. 10). In 
this view, capital circulates in the form of financial derivatives, their price determined not by 
the labour theory of value, but by the extent to which they might open or close future 
financial possibilities (Lee & LiPuma, 2002). Compounding this perspective are those 
anthropologists who draw on Gilles Deleuze (e.g. M. Fortun, 1999) and Frederic Jameson 
(1997; e.g. Kearney, 2004, pp. 340–45) to argue that capital has become immaterial, and 
deterritorialized, much as George Osborne (2007) argued that capital flows around the world 
with the speed of light, at the touch of a button. 
In these depictions of deterritorialized, immaterial, circulatory capitalism, which often seem 
to hover between anxiety and a curious excitement, there is no scope for considering what it 
means to have capital controls removed in a country like Bangladesh, how frontier 
imaginaries guide capitalist activity towards specific territories, or how the extractive industries 
might be capitalist: surely, the opencast extraction of coal, or offshore oil exploration, could 
not be considered immaterial? How does capital, whether patient or impatient, move in and 
out of territories like Bangladesh in search of extractive industry frontiers? And under whose 
direction, jurisdiction, will and authority does it do so? The extent to which extractive 
industry capitalism is always territorial is highlighted throughout this thesis, and is the explicit 
focus of Chapter Six. But how then can the materiality of capital be conceptualized and traced, 
through ethnography? 
                                                          
18 If there is a ‘labour theory of value’, then the source of the monetary value of a commodity (and thus of the 
value of profit, accumulated wealth, and capital ‘stock’) is ultimately found in ‘units’ of abstract labour time.  
For a recent anthropological application of this approach see G. Smith (2014, p. 40–41), and for a recent, rather 
withering, critique, see Graeber (2013, pp. 223–34). For the classic defence of the orthodox approach to Marxist 
political economy which rests upon a rather politically dangerous and anthropologically problematic distinction 
between units of ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ labour, see Mohun (1996). 
31 
 
Donald MacKenzie, a leading practitioner of the actor–network theory-inspired ‘social 
studies of finance’, has listed among the precepts guiding this programme of research an 
attentiveness to the material equipment that enables market action to take place (MacKenzie, 
2009, pp. 13–25). MacKenzie has been particularly keen to challenge anthropologists and 
others who write about the ‘virtual’ and ‘imaginary’ qualities of derivatives. He explores 
instead the “material production of virtuality” (p. 65) by tracing out the contractual forms, 
physical locations, legal strictures and calculative mechanisms through which the ‘immaterial’ 
circulation of ‘deterritorialized’ derivatives takes place. Could this perspective perhaps be a 
way to remedy the absence of anthropological attention given to the concept of capital so far? 
After all, Greg Downey and Melissa Fisher’s (2006) essay on ‘The anthropology of capital 
and the frontiers of ethnography’ makes almost no mention of capital, focusing instead on 
the ‘cultural innovations’ that appeared to underpin the emergence of the New [Dot Com] 
Economy.  
The social studies of finance has taken a strong interest in accounting categories, exploring, for 
instance, the material work that goes into constructing and measuring “profits” (e.g. 
MacKenzie, 2009, pp. 108–36). Perhaps the first step towards investigating the ‘material 
production of capital’ might be untangling the distinction between ‘regulatory’ definitions of 
capital and ‘accounting’ definitions of capital, which do not share an identity. A good place 
to start might be the 1988 Basel Accords, where central bankers and regulators from around 
the world came together to work out a definition – strongly contested throughout the process 
(Singer, 2004) – of ‘capital’. The Basel rules on ‘risk weighted capital’ require that banks keep 
capital reserves worth at least 8% of their ‘risk weighted assets’, and have inadvertently 
promoted ‘cosmetic’ innovations allowing banks to boost their reported capital ratios. Some 
of these innovations were at the heart of the 2007–08 financial crisis.19  
The Basel rules are not at all insignificant for the frontier mining industry. After Basel I came 
Basel II in 2004, and eventually, after the crisis, Basel III, which meant that banks exposed 
to risky investments (like exploration for coal, oil or gas in Bangladesh, for instance) would 
                                                          
19 Writing in 2000, David Jones of the US Federal Reserve described how banks might set out to increase their 
‘shareholder value’ by massaging their risk weighted capital ratios, and returning profit from the riskier activities 
this enabled to their shareholders. Jones described how selling half the loans on a banks’ books and replacing 
them with a promise to guarantee the purchaser of the debts in the case of default, could double their leverage 
ratio, but only if the assets did not appear to emanate from the bank in the first place. Using a ‘special purpose 
vehicle’ to sell securities (rights to the income from a pool of loans) was one way banks could cosmetically alter 
their risk weighted capital ratios in a Basel–compliant manner, without truly reducing the risk that they were 
exposed to, or even enabling them to increase it (Jones, 2000: 40–44). This is precisely what happened in the 
run-up to the 2007–08 crisis (see Kapadia & Jayadev, 2008; Tett, 2009, pp. 28–32, 52–65). 
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have to keep more capital sitting idle in their reserves. “One unit of Basel II capital is therefore 
not the same as one unit of Basel III capital” (European Commission, 2013). Plans to 
introduce Basel III in 2013 caused problems for small or ‘junior’ mineral exploration firms 
in the City of London during my fieldwork. Fears of a “capital strike” (Blas, 2013) from large 
banks meant that mineral exploration firms had to search for more innovative forms of 
funding, turning to private equity or family wealth funds. This had an upside, however: 
explorers were now free to embrace their ‘pioneer spirit’, unencumbered by the regulatory 
compliance or transparency requirements that have increasingly begun to concern large, 
reputation-conscious banks involved in project finance (see Chapters Three & Five).  
Basel capital might matter to capitalists seeking out extractive industry frontiers, but it is not 
the same as the capital which is measured by accountants, or those who speak about ‘capital’ 
moving in and out of countries like Bangladesh. As Macintosh et al. (2000) recount, our 
understanding of capital has evolved with the changing function and structure of 
(transnational) trading companies. A major shift took place when the English East India 
Company issued ‘four-year stock’ in 1613, altering the accountant’s understanding of capital 
from a ‘share in goods’ to an “invested sum consisting of transferrable units” (Macintosh et 
al., 2000, p. 22). This would eventually encourage accountants to work out ways to draw a 
correspondence between an “individual’s wealth and his share in a living corporate person” 
(ibid., p. 23; cf. Welker & Wood, 2011).20  Could examining the social relations through, and 
because of which, individuals pursue the accrual of ‘wealth’ (accounting capital) explain how 
capitalist economies are animated in frontier markets like Bangladesh? I explore this dynamic 
in Chapter Eight. 
But there are a number of serious reasons to be wary of organizing analyses around the 
accounting concept of capital, or ‘wealth’. The equation of ‘wealth’ and ‘capital’ by 
anthropologist Jonathan Friedman (Ekholm & Friedman, 1982, 2008) has been the subject 
of both devastating (Graeber, 2006), and more sympathetic (Kalb, 2013), critiques. For 
Graeber, by equating capitalism with objective structures that see “concentrations of wealth 
employed simply to make more wealth” (2006, p. 68), Friedman naturalizes and 
                                                          
20 Contemporary accounting practices almost seem to partake in the immaterial, circulatory capitalism described 
by acolytes of Jameson and Deleuze. The accounting value of derivatives – say a ‘put option’ that allows the 
holder to buy a set of stocks at a future date – is calculated by summing the market value of the underlying 
stocks. But the value of a company’s stocks is accounted for by their past or expected earnings, and many of 
the companies that those stocks belong to will own similar derivatives. Where a company’s earnings are partially 
derived from trading in derivatives, “Companies’ earnings determine security prices, which determine derivative 
prices, which determine [other] companies’ earnings” (Macintosh et al., 2000, p. 36). Again, this kind of dynamic 
was at play in the 2007–08 crisis (Kapadia, 2009; Tett, 2009, pp. 199–202). 
33 
 
dehistoricizes capital, divorcing it from any specific kind of exploitative productive process. 
Graeber’s own conceptualization of capitalism is a slightly more pointed version of Gibson–
Graham’s: a system in which capitalists are able to profit, by refusing to pay for the non-
capitalist production of people who, as ‘workers’, go on to produce surplus value. Thomas 
Piketty’s (2014) recent work on Capital in the 21st century has also been attacked by both 
anthropologists (Bear, 2014; Gudeman, 2015) and heterodox–Marxist economists 
(Varoufakis, 2014), for equating capital with ‘wealth’, and erasing the social relations that 
underpin capital accumulation.  
Varoufakis, in a merciless attack on Capital in the 21st century, noted that Piketty treated stamp 
collections as capital as much as he did factory ownership, and yet, stamps cannot be 
understood as capital in the sense of “produced means of production,” let alone as a 
congealed social relation (Varoufakis, 2014, p. 19). These criticisms are well-placed. Capital 
and inert wealth are not the same thing. Equally, accounting capital, while it may leave the 
kind of material traces that satisfy scholars within the social studies of finance, says little 
about exploitation, domination, and power beyond the balance sheet.  
Graeber and Varoufakis both level their critiques against those who would equate capital 
with wealth from a position that, in seeking to identify the historically specific social relations 
that allow exploitation, accumulation and the generation of class inequalities, is perhaps 
aligned with the interests of the would–be ‘working class’. Graeber, for instance, is not 
concerned directly with exploring the non-capitalist economic processes through which 
persons are made as ‘capitalists’. What would happen to our understanding of capital if we 
asked, ethnographically, how do capitalists see capital? This is precisely the course taken by 
political economists Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler (Nitzan, 1998; Nitzan & Bichler, 
2009). Starting with the postulate that we cannot have a theory of capitalism without one of 
capital, Nitzan and Bichler carry out an exhaustive critique of both neoclassical and Marxist 
approaches to defining capital. Both approaches, they argue, always end up being circular.  
Orthodox Marxists start from the monetary value of capital, and then work backwards to 
calculate the value of a unit of abstract labour time, sometimes even developing troubling 
methods through which to distinguish ‘productive’ from ‘unproductive’ labour (e.g. Mohun, 
1996). Thus it is made known how many surplus units of abstract labour time were 
appropriated as value for the capitalist. Neoclassicals, however, measure the value of a 
quantum of capital in terms of its productivity, but since this is measured in monetary units, 
it requires that the monetary value of the capital be known beforehand! Echoing recent work 
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on the anthropology of price (e.g. Guyer, 2009), Nitzan and Bichler (2009, p. 149) ask, “isn’t 
it possible that these capitalist ratios are simply the outcome of social struggles and 
cooperation?” Understanding how the monetary magnitude of capital is linked to what capital 
accumulates, has, they argue, little to do with the means of production. 
Nitzan and Bichler’s perspective should not, however, be confused with the deterritorialized, 
immaterial imaginary of a circulatory capitalism decoupled from production. Instead, they 
offer a framework through which to reconcile MacKenzie’s interest in the material 
traceability of economic agency, and Gibson–Graham’s concern with identifying capitalist 
exploitation when and where it is occurring. To follow Nitzan and Bichler down this path, it is 
necessary, like any good ethnographer, to think like those you wish to understand: 
The economists would have us believe that the ‘real thing’ is the 
tangible quantities of production, consumption, knowledge and the 
capital stock, and that the nominal world merely reflects this ‘reality’ 
with unfortunate distortions. This view may appeal to workers, but 
it has nothing to do with the reality of accumulation. For the 
capitalist, the real thing is the nominal capitalization of future earnings. This 
capitalization is not ‘connected’ to reality; it is the reality. And what 
matters in that reality is not production and consumption, but power. 
(Nitzan & Bichler, 2009, p. 182) 
The nominal capitalization of future earnings is found in a particular accounting technique, 
the discounted cash flow analysis that is used to calculate the ‘net present value’ of, for 
instance, a proposed mine (see Chapter Four).  
In the eyes of the modern capitalist, Nitzan and Bichler argue, “capital means a capitalized 
earning capacity” consisting not of factories, mines or aeroplanes themselves, but “the 
present value of profits expected to be earned by force of such ownership” (Nitzan & 
Bichler, 2009, p. 182.). Starting with a specific monetary magnitude – accounting capital – a 
critically–minded political economist (or anthropologist) should recognize in this a 
quantification of “the way capitalists expect their power to unfold” (Nitzan & Bichler, 2010, 
p. 38). 
This is not an image of capital as abstract wealth that is disconnected from specific histories 
or exploitative practices (cf. Graeber, 2006; Varoufakis, 2014). Instead, it is tied to specific, 
material accounting techniques that emerged in the early twentieth century. In Nitzan and 
Bichler’s framework, “what is being capitalized is not the ability to produce but the power to 
appropriate” (Nitzan, 1998, p. 183). Or, 
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what is ultimately being capitalized by investors is the power of 
governments or corporations to shape and reshape the terrain of 
social reproduction in their favor relative to other organizations 
attempting to do the same thing. (DiMuzio, 2012, p. 371) 
If earnings do not meet expectations, capitalization will collapse, as an indication of a “failure 
to exert power over the social process” (ibid.). From this perspective, the fact that the total 
capitalization of oil and gas firms in the Financial Times Global 500 for 2010 was $3153 
trillion, while the capitalization of alternative energy companies was a ‘mere’ $196 billion, 
reflects a greater confidence among investors that oil and gas companies can shape the social 
process. 
Nitzan and Bichler’s ‘power theory of value’ (DiMuzio, 2014a) has been critiqued by Knafo 
et al. (2014), in terms echoing the accusations levelled at Piketty (2014) by Gudeman (2015) 
and Varoufakis (2014). For them, a focus on competitions between capitalists to control the 
‘social process’ is “a step back from Marx because it essentially forecloses the significant field 
of power relations that is ‘production’” (Knafo et al., 2014, p. 139). Furthermore,  
[t]o say that people are willing to pay more for a company which has 
more power is completely different from saying that the prices are 
proportionate to this power – a claim that cannot be established 
precisely because power is not a linear and discrete phenomenon 
which lends itself to quantification. (ibid., p. 144) 
There is certainly much to Knafo and colleagues’ critique, but, Nitzan and Bichler 
nonetheless offer something remarkable to ethnographers who hope to understand capital 
and capitalist action. They offer an opportunity to bridge the gap between the social studies 
of finance, where sociologists have traced the material distribution of market agency – but 
almost never beyond the trading floor of a given bank, hedge fund or stock exchange (e.g. 
Beunza et al., 2006, 2011; Hardie & MacKenzie, 2007; Pitluck, 2011) – and anthropology, 
where critical scholars have inadvertently reproduced capitalist fantasies of a frictionless 
world of flows in which territory plays no particular part, while seeking to account for 
domination and exploitation.  
Even if prices and power should not be accepted as directly proportionate or equivalent, the 
‘capitalization ritual’, through which the earning capacity of a potential ‘money mine’ is 
calculated, is a good place to start an ethnographic inquiry into extractive industry capitalism 
(see Chapter Four). In this manner, it becomes possible to trace out the concerns that 
capitalists have about the likelihood that they will be able to secure the social process around 
a mine in Bangladesh, or another frontier market, and so ensure a future earning capacity. 
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Attending to the capitalization ritual in this way can also direct ethnographers of extractive 
industry finance towards the techniques of Corporate Diplomacy (Chapter Five) and 
Corporate Foreign Policy (Chapter Seven) that are used to secure, as far as possible, this 
earning capacity. An earning capacity that, in turn, enables the exercise of claims over others 
in a much wider set of social contexts.  
1.4: EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
In this final section of the introduction, I review recent directions in the anthropology of 
extractive industries. The ethnography that is set out in the remainder of the thesis traces the 
processes by which opportunities are created for extractive industry corporations to secure 
earnings in frontier markets. Before describing how my fieldwork was designed and carried 
out (Chapter Two), I situate my thesis in relation to the literature on extractive industries, 
specifically a growing body of literature on the temporalities of resource extraction, and an 
emerging literature on ‘resource sovereignties’: it is in relation to temporal politics and 
sovereignty that I attempt to understand the allocation of capital to extractive industry 
‘frontiers’ throughout this thesis. A further significant body of work examining corporate 
personhood and Corporate Social Responsibility in the extractive industries has emerged 
over the last decade (e.g. Gardner, 2012, 2015; Kirsch, 2006; Rajak, 2011a, 2014; Welker, 
2009), and I engage more fully with this literature in relation to my account of the rise of 
Corporate Diplomacy in Chapter Five. 
The earliest ethnographies of extractive industries were conceived of in terms of a rather 
specific temporal rhythm: the linear, often disruptive time of ‘modernisation’ that saw the 
incorporation of mineworkers as simultaneously exploited by, and dependent upon, capitalist 
forms of resource extraction. Thus June Nash (1979) wrote of Bolivian tin mines as a 
“synecdoche for the modern age of industrialization” (p. 15), and explored the erection and 
negotiation of social hierarchies according to ‘modern’ and ‘backward’ styles of dress, 
consumption and comportment (pp. 312–32). Two decades later, James Ferguson’s 
masterful ethnography recorded the Zambian copperbelt in decline, and made the potent 
observation – worth recalling for all those who would imagine contemporary capitalism in 
terms of circulatory, immaterial, networked flows of capital – that an ‘advance’ in global 
communications systems, away from copper wiring and toward fibre optics, had led to 
Zambia’s disconnection from modernity.  
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On the declining copperbelt, the fiction of modernization theory’s teleology was affirmed by 
the experience of once prosperous, and then destitute, mineworkers. For these disappointed 
and disillusioned ex-workers, modernity’s promise had become “the object of nostalgic 
reverie, and ‘backwardness’ the anticipated (or dreaded) future,” and the juncture between 
Africa and the West had been revealed not as a stairway, but as a wall (Ferguson, 1999, pp. 
13, 237). Where Ferguson is clear that it was not a declining stock of copper, but a shift in 
copper prices and macroeconomic policies imposed by the World Bank Group, that 
precipitated this default on a modernity’s promise. Mandana Limbert’s ethnography of 
Oman ‘in the time of oil’ likewise examines how the temporality of resource extraction 
disturbs and disrupts social reproduction. This time, however, a declining, non-renewable 
resource is implicated. Intergenerational tensions in Oman’s interior emerge out of the 
changing patterns of work and leisure time that oil wealth has engendered. But with the 
official exhaustion of oil supplies constantly deferred twenty years into the future (Limbert, 
2010, pp. 10, 167), the time of oil is not set “within a myth of permanence or conceived of as 
a step in an ‘open’ teleology of progress.” It is experienced by many Omanis as a “time 
between the ‘realities’ of poverty” (p. 11).  
Similarly, around the Ok Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea, continuous deferral of mine 
closure dates has been profoundly discomforting for those who fear the loss of global scale 
and connection that such closure would entail, despite community relations personnel 
insisting that locals would be “comfortable” returning to “the bush” (Gilbert, 2012, p. 99). 
Elsewhere in Papua New Guinea, persistent cycles of mineral exploration, extraction and 
closure, from the colonial administration into the present, mean that for Biangai speakers, 
mine closure is “an opportunity for negotiation” (Halvaksz, 2008, p. 34). “Experiences with 
mine closure have taught Biangai that there is compensation and continuation, that mines 
reopen, that while the bankable reserves might be extracted, the resources remain” (ibid,).  
In the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, James Smith describes an experience of 
“temporal dispossession” that arises from a weak and absent state, and persistent conflict, 
producing “the inability to plan, predict, or build futures in an incremental way” (J. Smith, 
2011, p. 17). Here artisanal miners extract coltan, one of the ‘digital minerals’ whose 
extraction violently materializes globalizing fantasies of capital that can circulate instantly at 
the touch of a button (Mantz, 2008), Coltan mining allows for social relationships to be 
produced through incremental sales, rather than unpredictable agricultural cycles. For Smith, 
the “dispossession of Congolese from their capacity to produce predictable time is a major 
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feature of their violent and unequal insertion into global capitalism” (J. Smith 2011, p. 21). 
The incremental time of artisanal mining is always additionally threatened by untamed price 
fluctuations, driven by a speculative digital capitalism, as yet unsure of how precisely it may 
shape the social process.  
Time matters in the extractive industries, then, because the promise of connection, the fear 
of decline, and the violence of dispossession all depend upon how the future is capitalized 
upon by fund managers in London. In his masterful account of how extractive industry 
corporations have domesticated efforts to tame their sometimes diabolically harmful 
production processes, Stuart Kirsch (2014) draws on his long experience of campaigning 
with the Yonggom to extract compensation for the damage wrought upon their homes by 
the Ok Tedi mine, and observes that for indigenous peoples battling mining companies, the 
‘politics of space’ must give way to a ‘politics of time’. He entreats anthropologists to 
accelerate the learning curves of indigenous groups facing dispossession, by confronting the 
mining industry’s tendency to “defer non-production-related [i.e., compensation and 
environmental protection] expenses until after the project is operational and generating 
revenue” (Kirsch, 2014, p. 145), all while the industry weds their own temporal horizons to 
a “conspiracy of optimism” (pp. 134-152), denying to the public any possibility of ever again 
making mistakes like Ok Tedi. 
In Chapter Five I examine in more detail the temporal politics at stake in the shift from 
Corporate Social Responsibility to Corporate Diplomacy. But throughout this thesis, I set 
out to enlarge the opening that Kirsch has made in the temporal armour of the extractive 
industries. In Chapters Three and Four, I examine the energies, images and tools that go into 
gathering speculative investment funds for extractive industry exploration, and the 
techniques that are used to transform speculative accumulation into capitalization that reflects 
a certain confidence in securing a future flow of revenue. Kirsch is correct that extractive 
industry companies are vulnerable in their early, speculative stages – a delay can discourage 
investors from allocating funds needed to bring a mineral deposit into production. He is 
equally correct that speculative explorers tend not to budget for ‘social programmes’. But the 
question of how these explorers are often able to transform geological prospects into ‘money 
mines’ in spite of opposition, requires an examination of the legal architecture that has enabled 
‘frontier’ markets for extraction to emerge in the wake of a failed Third World project 
(Chapter Seven).  
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Shifting scales from the mine-area to the nation-state, Gisa Weszkalnys (2008, 2010) has 
investigated responses to the prospect of oil discoveries in São Tomé e Principe, which 
presents an opportunity to examine how dominant economic theories about oil wealth shape 
real life, rather than collecting socio-cultural data that could serve as the “stuffing” for 
economic truth (Weszkalnys, 2010, p. 89). The set of theories with which Weszkalnys 
engages are those to do with the ‘resource curse.’ The resource curse has come to refer to a 
range of political and economic theories suggesting correlations between oil wealth, poor 
economic growth, neo-patrimonialism and civil conflict (see Reyna & Behrends, 2008). In 
her work on rumoured oil discoveries on the Chad/Sudan border, Andrea Behrends plays 
these various theories off against each other. She finds that rather than war in Chad being 
motivated by resource wealth (as the World Bank’s Paul Collier might suggest), the breakdown 
of an existing patrimonial system saw separatists turn to newly ‘lootable’ resources 
(Behrends, 2008, pp. 48–49).  
Anthropologists have engaged with the resource curse in the terms that Weszkalnys 
challenges – providing ‘social’ stuffing for an economic theory – since June Nash wrote about 
the “social curse” of marginalization among Bolivian mineworkers (Nash, 1979, p. 1). Emma 
Gilberthorpe’s (2014) work on the distribution of extreme wealth or “money rain” to a very 
small number of Fasu residents around the Kutubu oil extraction site in Papua New Guinea 
is among the most refined of these approaches. Gilberthorpe argues that only local-level 
ethnographic analyses of “unquantifiable factors such as kinship, descent and exchange 
patterns can provide critical social explanations for the ‘resource curse’” (2014, p. 88). It 
would perhaps be unfair to dismiss this as mere social ‘stuffing’.  
Still, there are limits to the critical perspectives that can be produced from both Weszkalnys’ 
and Gilberthorpe’s frameworks, and these are both brought out in a collection on ‘resource 
sovereignties’ edited by John-Andrew McNeish and Owen Logan (2012). The economic 
theories whose social effects Weszkalnys explores in São Tomé are a set of particular 
formulations of the ‘resource curse’, and potential solutions to it, that are espoused by Joseph 
Stiglitz and Jeffrey Sachs, in a programme funded by George Soros’ Open Society Institute. 
For these globe-trotting scholars (Humphreys et al., 2007), there is a ‘cure’ for the resource 
curse, to be found in transparency, competitive bidding, and ‘multi-stakeholder groups’ that 
bring together civil society, industry and government. Apply the cure, and there will be no 
civil conflict, good growth, and an absence of neo-patrimonialism. The treatment has a 
specific temporal politics too: the multi-stakeholder groups must “calculate national wealth 
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correctly” (Humphreys et al., 2007, p. 325) to avoid the temptation to spend too much, too 
fast.  
In other words, the solutions to the problem are transplantable tools of technocracy that 
only make sense when “ruling out other influences and factors, ceteris paribus” (Logan & 
McNeish, 2012, p. 31). The much-vaunted ‘Norwegian model’ is treated by these global 
experts as a technocratic achievement suitable for export, a framing that writes over the 
struggle fought in mid-twentieth century Norway for a social-democratic form of 
government that could agree on sustained, rather than rapid, extraction. This consensus has, 
in fact, begun to crumble, and as I discuss in Chapters Six to Eight, Norway’s Statoil has 
even been seduced by Bangladesh’s extractive frontier: its capital proved impatient, however, 
and various attempts to exercise what Logan and McNeish refer to as ‘resource sovereignty’ 
in Bangladesh saw Statoil make an about turn.  
By speaking of resource sovereignties, Logan and McNeish mean to signal their interest in the 
countless struggles that occur, in different geographical contexts, for control over the 
disposition of resources, as well as the distribution of income that may be derived from them 
(however patiently or impatiently). They contrast their approach with that found Hardt and 
Negri’s Empire, where the Italian autonomist Marxists put forward the assertion, with echoes 
of Deleuze, that today capital “capital tends toward a smooth space defined by uncoded 
flows,” no longer relying on state sovereignty for its reproduction (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 
327), and that, as such, struggles over sovereignty and against capital are simply the struggles 
of an undifferentiated, immanent ‘multitude’. Instead, argue Logan and McNeish (2012, p. 
27), resource sovereignties are processes whereby groups attribute values and capacities to 
material resources, trace out the power structures in which resources and their own social 
relations are to be found, and contest or untangle them. 
Throughout this introduction I have emphasized the importance of territory, and of 
particular territorial imaginaries (or ‘codings’) in directing capital towards frontier markets. I 
have equally stressed the need to conceptualize capital as something that is material and 
traceable, but which points towards the technologies of social governance and legal 
architecture through which capitalists are able to ensure a profitable future. And, in Chapters 
Six and Seven, I explore directly the recent struggles over resource sovereignties that have played 
out between the Bangladesh state, public intellectuals, the National Committee and extractive 
industry corporations. Firstly, in Chapter Two, I introduce my fieldwork and address the 
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methodological challenges that emerge when attempting to conduct a critical ethnography of 
extractive industry capitalism among financial and technical experts.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
METHOD & METHODOLOGY: 
ELITES, EXPERTS & ETHNOGRAPHY 
 
What should we do so that our understanding of the world does not purely and 
simply coincide with the spirit of capitalism? 
 – Alexander R. Galloway, 2013, p. 352. 
Working amid and on collaborations significantly shifts the purposes of 
ethnography from description and analysis, inevitably distanced practices for 
which it has settled, to a deferral to subjects’ modes of knowing, a function to 
which ethnography has long aspired. 
– Douglas R. Holmes & George E. Marcus, 2008, p. 82 
 
In this chapter, I describe the ethnographic fieldwork that I carried out in London and Dhaka 
between 2012 and 2014. I present the contours of the fieldsite(s) that I carved out in the 
pursuit of partial answers to the questions which I posed in Chapter One; questions about 
how sovereignty, transnational corporations, national interest and capital might be 
configured in the extractive industries’ search for profitable frontiers, and how this search 
for new frontiers sat in the long history of extractive connection between the City of London 
and Bengal/Bangladesh. To enable an ethnographic response to these broader questions, I 
designed my fieldwork around ‘following’ the energies, expertise and expectations that enable 
the construction of profitable mining frontiers. Starting in London, this took me from the 
initial, speculative accumulation of funds for exploration and development (Chapter Three), 
to the creation of investable objects that capitalize upon an extractive industry corporation’s 
apparent ability to control host states and communities (Chapters Four & Five). I then 
moved to examine the enactments of expertise that come up against other forms of 
performative politics in conflicts over Bangladesh’s energy future (Chapters Six & Seven); 
and, finally, the globalizing ambitions among Bangladesh’s business elite that facilitate the 
re–configuration of Bangladesh as the ‘next frontier’. From the outset, I struggled to deal 
with an ‘anti–critical turn’ that has taken place in the anthropological study of elites. I outline 
this anti–critical turn in Section 2.1, before detailing my own fieldwork experience in Section 
2.2, and responding to the anti–critical turn in Section 2.3. 
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2.1: DEFERENT ETHNOGRAPHY AMONG ELITES & EXPERTS 
From the outset, as I tried to design and then begin to carry out my fieldwork, I ran up 
against a series of conceptual and practical problems that, at times, felt utterly debilitating. 
Recent work published on the anthropology of finance had emphasized that a full 
understanding of instruments like derivatives must be at once technical and socio–cultural 
(e.g. LiPuma & Lee, 2004, p. 64), or indeed, that anthropologists must attend to the technical 
aspects of legal and financial practice in order to be political (Riles, 2011, p. 223). It was 
immediately apparent that an enormous amount of expertise was at stake in the construction 
of extractive industry frontiers. Whether legal, financial or geological, this expertise may well 
carry with itself a certain amount of ‘symbolic capital’, but it is also functional, and has world–
making capacities. Certainly, if I wanted to reach for an understanding of extractive industry 
capitalism that did not resort to a language of deterritorialized, frictionless flows of capital, I 
would need to find a way to deal with technical expertise through ethnography. 
I therefore explored the actor–network theory (e.g. Latour, 1994, 2005) upon which 
anthropologists like Annelise Riles have drawn in order to make their claims about the mutual 
constitution of the technical and the political (e.g. Riles, 2011, p. 72). In so doing, I discovered 
the field of inquiry that has come to be known as ‘the social studies of finance’, associated 
with Michel Callon (1998, 2005, 2008; Callon & Latour, 1997; Callon et al., 2007; also Barry 
& Slater, 2002), Donald MacKenzie (2001, 2007, 2009; Hardie & MacKenzie, 2007), Daniel 
Beunza (Beunza et al. 2006, 2011), Yuval Millo (Millo et al., 2005; Mikes et al., 2013) Fabian 
Muniesa (Callon & Muniesa, 2005; Muniesa, 2014), and with which anthropologists like Riles 
(2010, 2011) and Douglas Holmes (2009) have begun to engage. As I began to discuss in 
Chapter One, the emphasis placed in the social studies of finance (SSF) on the material 
traceability of economic agency seems to offer a powerful antidote to totalizing images of 
capitalism that, in the guise of critique, tend to inadvertently reproduce paralyzing capitalist 
fantasies.  
Indeed, the social studies of finance’s two leading proponents or architects, MacKenzie 
(2009, pp. 182–83) and Callon (in Barry & Slater, 2002, p. 301), have both argued that their 
‘technopolitical’ approach is precisely what enables thinking about intervening in the design of 
markets, which, as economic anthropologists (Graeber, 2011; Hart & Hann, 2009) are wont 
to observe, need not only be capitalist. However, as I delved further into the SSF literature and 
its foundations in actor–network theory (ANT), it became apparent that the application of SSF 
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by sociologists and anthropologists has, by and large, been profoundly uncritical (anti–
critical, in fact), and wedded to a deeply conservative politics.  
As I wrestled with how it might be possible marry SSF – which has, it must be noted, opened 
up a great many financial contexts to anthropological understanding – with a more critical 
politics, I also began to explore the methodological writings of George Marcus (1989, 1995, 
1998, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2012; Deeb & Marcus 2011; Holmes & Marcus 2005, 
2008). Marcus has written extensively on how to design ethnography that is mobile or 
distributed, or otherwise in apparent violation of the discipline’s still strongly articulated 
commitment to producing the kind of knowledge that seems only to arise via extended 
immersion in unfamiliar places (e.g. Geertz, 1998; Mitchell, 2010; Sjørslev, 2013). Initially, I 
found Marcus’ work invaluable, both as an aid to the design of my research, and because it 
provided a high–status disciplinary discourse through which to justify the unconventional 
nature of my research.  
Through his partnership with Douglas Holmes (Holmes & Marcus, 2005, 2008), Marcus’ 
methodological anthropology was even brought to bear on Callon’s (1998) work in the social 
studies of finance, which Holmes (2009) deploys in his research on central banking. In fact, 
“finance capital” is considered by Marcus to be an exemplary topic in relation to which 
ethnography that is “both mobile and contained, appropriate to bounded circuits in 
globalizing regimes” might be developed (Marcus, 2007, p. 12). But once again, as I pursued 
a deeper reading of Marcus while designing and carrying out my fieldwork, it became 
apparent that his programme for multi–sited ethnography, or ethnography of the 
contemporary (Marcus, 2012), was explicitly anti–critical, and married to a political 
programme that I admit to finding deeply troubling. 
Marcus is perhaps best known for his critique of conventional ethnographic writing, and the 
disciplinary conceit that the lives of distant ‘Others’ could be explained with reference to 
spatially and temporally bounded fieldsites (Marcus, 1988, 1995). In later years, however, 
Marcus’ programme for multi–sited ethnography has mutated into an attempt to excise from 
anthropology (or at least marginalize) the “virtuously subversive” (2001, p. 7) subject of 
resistance studies. While Marcus insists that he is “not a reactionary, an elitist, or even one 
who argues for elite studies as a counterbalance to the study of those who suffer” (2008, p. 
12), the result of this shift has been an attempt to promote collaborative inquiry among the 
“intellectually more active of ethnography’s subjects, as interlocutors and epistemic partners 
in research” (2012, p. 435). In practice, these ‘epistemic partners’ turn out to be genomic 
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scientists, central bankers, derivatives traders and the directors of intergovernmental 
organizations. Even leaving aside the troubling implication that these elites are more 
‘intellectually active’ than less powerful anthropological interlocutors, Marcus’ programme 
explicitly excises critique by arguing for the cultivation of deferential partnerships with elites. 
The idea that contemporary ethnography should seek out epistemic partnerships builds on 
Marcus’ earlier (1998: 27n. 9) claim that anthropologists are not “temperamentally suited to 
be so clearly oppositional at the outset in relation to who they studied,” and so should avoid 
any attempt at “getting the ethnographic goods on elites.” Instead, anthropologists should 
seek out a problem “cognitively shared with the ethnographer” (Marcus, 2011, p. 23) among 
“reflexive subjects who are epistemic partners in that [ethnographic] endeavour” (Deeb & 
Marcus, 2011, p. 64). These subjects are ideally drawn from “epistemic communities – in 
which ‘research,’ broadly conceived, is integral to the function of these communities” 
(Holmes & Marcus, 2008, p. 82). In the ‘para–ethnographic’ encounters (Holmes & Marcus, 
2005)21 that result, with senior figures in the US Federal Reserve or the World Trade 
Organization, anthropologists “are not needed to add ‘critique,’ moral injunction, or higher 
meaning to these accounts” (Holmes & Marcus, 2008, p. 84).  
Instead, it seems that Marcus and his colleagues would have us maintain the conviction that 
ethnography involves “yielding to the preoccupations of others” (Strathern, 1999, p. 6) or 
“imposes interlocutors’ concerns and interests upon the ethnographer” (Englund & Leach, 
2000, p. 229), while dispensing with the discipline’s conventional politics that, David 
Graeber, suggests, seems to involve ritual declarations that “we are definitely not on the side 
of whomever, in a given situation, is or fancies themselves to be the elite” (Graeber, 2002, p. 
1223). Here Marcus’ programme for anti–critical elite ethnography intersects directly with 
the social studies of finance. In a methodological reflection of the politics implied by doing 
fieldwork with financial elites, Donald MacKenzie has, echoing Marcus’ discomfort with 
‘getting the goods’ on elites, argued that “Opposition and condemnation do not sit well with 
interviewing those who will be opposed and condemned” (2005, p. 570). But the leading 
lights of SSF also attempt a more fundamental excision of critique from their research 
programme.   
In what is arguably the foundational text in the social studies of finance, Callon (1998) makes 
the claim that economics does not merely observe or describe the economy, but may, under 
                                                          
21 I have explored my ethnographic encounter with ‘Corporate Diplomats’, described in Chapter Five of this 
thesis, in terms of the notion of ‘para–ethnography’ at length in Gilbert (2015b). 
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certain circumstances, perform, shape and format specific markets, such that economic models 
and theories appear true by construction. The best known and most widely–cited work on 
economic performativity comes from Donald MacKenzie and Yuval Millo’s (MacKenzie 
2001, 2005; MacKenzie & Millo, 2003) research into the Black-Scholes option pricing 
formula, and its introduction at the Chicago Board of Exchange in the 1970s. What 
MacKenzie and Millo show is that the initial assumptions about market function made by the 
Black–Scholes model did not, in fact, reflect reality. However, as traders began to use Black–
Scholes pricing sheets in their trades, the model came to predict prices even when it should not 
have done so. Thus it was that “the typical assumptions of finance theory have become 
empirically more realistic” (MacKenzie, 2001, p. 132).22  
For Callon (2005), performativity must not be understood as anything so simplistic as a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Instead, it describes a state of affairs whereby socio–technical agencements 
– assemblages comprising humans and non–human equipment, across which agency is 
distributed – align, such that market agency comes to align with a specific theory or model. 
As such (and here the SSF collides with Marcus’ ethnographic programme), a “passionate 
attention to the performative dimension of economics should replace the vain denunciation 
of its limits” (Callon & Latour, 1997, p. 19; see also Latour, 2004).  
As well as attending to the performative dimension of economics in his work on Black–
Scholes, MacKenzie has, along with Daniel Beunza and Iain Hardie, explored the socio–
technical agencements through which hedge funds – a diverse set of investment vehicles dealing 
with high–net wealth or specialist investors, and originally designed as legal entities via which 
short-selling would be permissible – trade in emerging market bonds. Hardie & MacKenzie 
(2007, p. 74) acknowledge that it is “essential to be selective” in order to avoid descending 
into an aimless listing of all the components that might in some way contribute to the socio–
technical agency of a hedge fund. Thus, they focus on the ‘non–obvious’ aspects of 
communications infrastructure that affect coordination and action in the market. This turns 
out to be the systems which have emerged for outsourcing the ‘back office’ work through 
which trades are checked, processed and confirmed, away from the high–speed, real–time 
market activity of the traders themselves. That this selectivity is a political act should be obvious, 
                                                          
22 In fact, as MacKenzie (2005) and Millo and MacKenzie (2009) describe, after the 1987 stock market crash, 
the model no longer predicted prices as it should have even when its putative assumptions did seem to hold. Traders 
using the model have, however, come to understand that it will not plot a straight line of volatility against price 
as it did in its early, performative days, but instead, a curved ‘volatility smile’. Thus traders have come to expect 
uncertainty, introducing yet another performativity loop (Esposito, 2011).  
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and it is perhaps not incidental that these leading practitioners in the social studies of science 
emphasize the extent to which desk and computer screen placement affects hedge fund 
agencements (Beunza et al., 2006,  pp. 732–33; Hardie & MacKenzie, 2007, p. 63), and the place 
of spreadsheets in their agentic assemblages  (Beunza et al., 2006, p. 738), but are silent on 
the extent to which the trade in emerging market bonds – government debt – can affect the 
ability of postcolonial nations to carry out and finance democratically achieved plans for the 
economic future (see Koelble & LiPuma, 2006). Similarly, they are silent on the place that 
the Mayfair–based hedge funds may have in reproducing anything that might be called 
capitalism or class.  
In fact, Callon is explicit in his insistence that capitalism as such does not exist, and is merely 
an invention of anti–capitalists who find pleasure in denunciatory critique (Callon & Latour, 
1997; Callon, 2005). While this position has been taken by Barry and Slater (2002, p. 297) to 
be on a par with Gibson–Graham’s (2006) view that totalizing accounts of capitalism simply 
reproduce capitalist fantasies and impair the cultivation of already–existing economic 
alternatives, there is in fact a fundamental gulf between Callon and Gibson–Graham. 
Gibson–Graham (2006, p. 263) ask that we never lose sight of the exploitation engendered by 
capitalist and other economic forms, albeit while refusing to grant capitalism a totalizing 
presence, and insisting that its existence be identified through specific ethnographic tracings. 
In Callon (2005), Hardie and MacKenzie (2007), and Beunza et al. (2006), however, critique 
disappears entirely. Callon (2005, p. 5) asks that instead of assuming that there is an 
overarching spirit or logic of capitalism, we should explain given forms of economic activity 
in terms of the “more or less chaotic, regular and general upsurge of calculative agencies 
[agencements] formatted and equipped to act on the basis of a logic of accumulation and 
maximization.” But why should we not also focus on the consequences of these calculative 
agencies, tracing them out beyond trading floors and dealing rooms in order to map out 
those “practices of organizational accumulation that involve violence, dispossession, and 
death” (Bannerjee, 2009, p. 1543)?  
During the design of my fieldwork, I began to deviate from SSF and from Marcus’ 
programme of deferential ethnography by accepting, with Adam Fish (2007, p. 6) that 
ethnography is always shaped, from the start, by the ethnographer’s own “specific 
subjectivity” and research concerns (as well as those of funding bodies, supervisors and 
potential employees). Fish finds it “resoundingly disingenuous” to claim that ethnography 
simply involves “following the interests of the subject” (ibid.). Perhaps Holmes and Marcus’ 
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(2008, p. 82) contention, reproduced in the epigraph to this chapter, that deferring to the 
concerns of one’s epistemic partners brings contemporary ethnographers ever–closer to the 
long held anthropological ideal of yielding to the preoccupation of others, is simply a way of 
masking the prior political subjectivity of the kind of ethnographer who would seek out elite 
collaboration and dispense with critique?  
Perhaps, but there is an added layer of complexity that emerges when it comes to dealing 
with extractive industry experts as elites, whose expertise can, at times, have performative 
effects. Part of Fish’s own critique stems from having heard ethnographers claim that if “the 
informants talk of the importance of ground water, the ethnographer studies hydrology, if 
she speaks of human rights, the ethnographer will look into international law” (2007, p. 6). 
While I share with Fish a scepticism about the extent to which ethnography is always 
conceived of purely in terms of one’s informants’ subjectivity, his reference to expert 
knowledge points toward another question I was dealing with in the design of my fieldwork: 
how does an anthropologist grapple with geology, asset valuation, arbitration law and 
Bangladeshi court proceedings? Surely, opening up these technical domains to ethnographic 
scrutiny can open them up to wider forms of political interventions, and challenge the often 
harmful consequences of elite enactments of expertise? Donald MacKenzie (2005) believes 
that it can, defending the political potency of a research strategy that involves tracing out 
agencements or opening up the technical ‘black boxes’ that enable financial markets to function 
as they do (see Chapter Four). And yet, MacKenzie argues, since “opening black boxes can 
be done only by speaking with those involved,” it inevitably “involves a certain blunting of 
oppositional political passion” (2005, p. 570) – precisely the kind of passion with which 
Marcus would dispense. 
Since those tracing agencements and opening up black boxes do not in fact tend to examine their 
consequences beyond specific bank dealing rooms or stock exchange trading floors, I turned 
to the anthropology of extractive industries to guide my research design. Precisely the kind 
of oppositional passion to which MacKenzie and Marcus object has animated almost all the 
ethnographic work that deals with what Stuart Kirsch (2014) terms ‘mining capitalism’, or the 
encounter between on the one hand, politically and socially marginalized indigenous groups 
and labouring populations, and on the other, immensely powerful transnational mining 
corporations, enabled by both state and international legal regimes to extract resources with 
often violently devastating consequences (see Chapters Six & Seven). Indeed, Stuart Kirsch 
describes his own participation in the ground-breaking Yonggom class-action suit against Ok 
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Tedi Mining Limited as a “logical extension of the commitment to reciprocity that underlies 
the practice of anthropology” (Kirsch, 2002, p. 178; see also Hyndman, 2001; Sawyer, 
2006).23  
In Kirsch’s more recent work on the relationship between extractive industry corporations 
and their critics, he provides an account that is unashamedly his own, never deferent, and 
always critical. Derived from participation in high–level UN summits alongside extractive 
industry corporations but in his capacity as a campaigner with the Yonggom, Kirsch 
unabashedly rejects the “anthropological tradition of suspending one’s disbelief when 
conducting ethnographic research” (2014, p. 232). There is an extent to which Kirsch is 
precisely out to ‘get the goods’ on the elites, as, it might be said, are Felix Padel and Samarendra 
Das. In their work on the cultural genocide perpetrated by the Aluminium mining industry 
in India, Padel and Das suggest that in response to the question “What do mining magnates 
actually believe in?” it is anthropologists who are “in a unique position to deconstruct their belief 
system and rhetorical strategies” (2010, p. 339, emphasis added). Such a deconstructive critique 
is precisely the kind that Callon, Latour, MacKenzie, Holmes and Marcus would all see 
discarded in favour of a collaborative, constructive engagement with their epistemic partners 
and who may – perhaps, upon closer inspection – also be powerful elites exercising capacities 
for domination and exploitation.  
What appears to have happened in the movement of ethnography into elite fieldsites is that 
the conviction that there is ideally an “onus towards comradeship” in the field (Amit, 2000, 
p. 2) has been maintained, but has been divorced from its earlier ethical correlate: an 
oppositional politics born of doing research with marginalized, subaltern or subjective 
‘Others’. And it often seems as if one or the other must go. I struggled with this apparent 
tension throughout my fieldwork. Could I not pursue collaborative fieldwork encounters with 
elites and experts in the extractive industries, in order to open up the black boxes through which 
mining capitalism is made, and in doing so point towards opportunities for political intervention 
or participation by those whom Graeber (2002) terms ‘the little guy’? In the following section 
I describe the difficult and discomforting process through which I attempted to do just that. 
2.2: CARVING OUT A FIELDSITE BETWEEN LONDON & DHAKA 
                                                          
23 Anthropologist Steven Feld even resigned from the University of Texas because of the Chancellor’s role on 
the board of Freeport–McMoRan, whose extractive activities in West Papua (Irian Jaya), where Feld worked, 
involved, as he put it “ecocide and ethnocide”.  
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My PhD project was conceived partially in response to queries I had been left with after my 
undergraduate research into the anticipation of continually deferred mine closure in Papua 
New Guinea (Gilbert, 2012). How were enormously consequential decisions about whether 
to close, expand, re–open, or explore for new mines made? Or, to put it differently, was there 
actually an interior to the operation of power in the global extractive economy, that could be 
apprehended through ethnography, rather than merely postulated by conspiracy theories (cf. 
Sanders & West, 2003; Smith, 2011; Walsh, 2004)? My ‘specific subjectivity’ as a prospective 
ethnographer was also shaped by the renewed anthropological interest in finance that arose 
in the immediate aftermath of the 2007–08 financial crisis (Hart & Ortiz, 2008; Tett, 2009). 
Searching out detailed accounts of the crisis that would be intelligible to a recent 
anthropology graduate, I was led to a report produced by The Corner House, a social justice 
think tank whose members draw heavily on anthropological insights and methods (Hildyard, 
2008). 
The Corner House’s report on the financial crisis included a reference to one particular hedge 
fund, RAB Special Situations Company Ltd. Making a point about the “ruthless pursuit” of 
returns by such funds, its author Nicholas Hildyard drew attention to RAB’s 2006 annual 
report, in which the shooting of protestors (of which three were killed) at the site of a 
proposed coal mine owned by GCM Resources in Phulbari, Bangladesh, was reported, along 
with the statement that RAB had “bought more [GCM] stocks and believe we will make 
good returns in the future” (Hildyard 2008, p. 38). RAB Special Situations had mattered to 
the financial crisis too, because it had been the largest shareholder in Northern Rock at the 
time of its nationalization, and the losses arising from this circumstance led to it having to 
pull out of the mining market rather rapidly.24 It appeared also that the very involvement of 
‘hedge funds’ like RAB, and the holding of ‘derivatives’ based on GCM Resources stock, was 
deployed as evidence of immorality by groups campaigning against the establishment of the 
Phulbari mine.25 A moral discourse emerging around certain kinds of financial instruments 
and institutions in the wake of a global financial crisis appeared to be mingling with advocacy 
against a particular proposal for opencast coal mining in Bangladesh. Likewise, funds 
speculating on the crisis were to be found to also be speculating on the likelihood that the 
                                                          
24 RAB in fact purchased the shares in Northern Rock after the run began in late 2007, in the hope that they 
would win from either a rally in the stock or a payout from the government. For an anthropological account of 
the RAB-Northern Rock relationship, see Bholat et al. (2012). 
25 See for example the Phulbari Resistance post ‘Changes in Equity, and Derivatives Trading of GCM Resources 
Plc Shares’ from November 13 2008, [Online] Available at: http://phulbariresistance.blogspot.co.uk/2008_
11_01_archive.html (Accessed: 16 September 2015). 
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value of shares in GCM Resources would rise, following a fatal shooting.26 This situation, 
surely, could not find an adequate ethnographic response in terms of tracing the contours of 
a socio–technical agencement selectively, such that its reaches were confined to the work and 
equipment of financial professionals. This was a terrain in which speculative energies, 
passionate opposition, the violent exercise of sovereignty, as well as the institutions and 
practices at the heart of a global crisis, were at stake.  
At the same time that hedge funds speculating on GCM were being drawn into a global 
financial crisis, Bangladesh was being presented in the financial media as a ‘frontier’ market 
replete with opportunity, one that was worth investing in precisely because it had managed 
to avoid the crisis (Boyde, 2012; Rintoul, 2012). Private sector development agencies like the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) and CDC Group27 were assisting in the 
establishment of a landmark ‘Frontier Fund’ spun off from the Swedish hedge fund 
Brummer Partners, with a mandate to focus exclusively on investment in Bangladesh (Ismail, 
2008; IFC, 2009). Other development agencies stressed the determining effect of power 
shortages on ‘underdevelopment’ in Bangladesh (Asian Development Bank, 2011), 
contributing to the construction of a discursive field in which hedge funds investing in the 
mining and energy sector could be cast not as morally problematic, but as highly ethical 
contributors to the wealth of the Bangladeshi nation.  
Then, in December 2011, while still putting together my research proposal, I attended an 
event addressing the proposed Phulbari mine at the Amnesty International offices in 
London, organized by the London Mining Network (LMN)28, a coordinating body working 
in support of communities affected by irresponsible and harmful extractive industry activity. 
At this event, representatives of pro- and anti-Phulbari constituencies – British, Bangladeshi, 
and British-Bangladeshi on both sides – clashed in heated arguments about the place of GCM 
and coal extraction in the future of the Bangladeshi nation. A video was screened, in which 
the consequences of GCM going ahead with the Phulbari mine were depicted as including 
                                                          
26 For a detailed account of these shootings and their aftermath see Luthfa (2011). 
27 The CDC Group was formerly known as the Colonial Development Corporation and subsequently the 
Commonwealth Development Corporation. It is today a British taxpayer-funded organization with a mandate 
to provide development finance to private sector initiatives, principally in the Commonwealth. Mike Cowen 
(1984) traces the origins of the CDC to the tension between the pre-1947 ‘welfare strand’ and 1947-50 ‘British 
national imperative’ strand of thought on colonial development. The tension between engaging in 
‘development’ and ensuring a necessary rate of return that arises through private sector–led development is 
discussed in Chapters Four & Six. 
28 See Kirsch (2014: 63-64) on the establishment of the London Mining Network during the 1990s. 
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the bulldozing of 14,000 hectares of fertile land; the use of sulphuric acid and arsenic in the 
open pit; and the displacement of more than 200,000 people including 50,000 indigenous 
people from 23 “tribal groups.” GCM was presented as an “imperialist” company operating 
in a vulnerable country, and Phulbari residents were quoted as willing to give their lives, in 
the wake of the August 26th 2006 shooting which had already claimed three, to prevent the 
project.  
A researcher from LMN questioned the feasibility of the mine without revenues from 
exporting coal, which mattered since the project was justified in terms of its mitigating effects 
on Bangladesh’s energy shortage. A representative from the International Accountability 
Project recounted successes in the campaign so far, including the withdrawal of the Asian 
Development Bank’s contribution to the project and the cancellation of the ‘political risk 
guarantee’ that they were initially to provide. The three complaints submitted so far to the 
UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) were referred to as a step in the 
right direction, but concern was expressed over “rumours” that the Department for 
International Development (DFID) and UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) were applying 
diplomatic pressure to secure the mine’s approval (rumours that were lent credence by 
Wikileaks cables that revealed the US Ambassador had done much the same). Condensed in 
this event were many of the ethnographic strands, pertaining to contested expertise, national 
and corporate sovereignty, political risk insurance and analysis, and the construal of national 
interest (see Chapters Six & Seven), that I would attempt to trace out during my subsequent 
fieldwork. 
But the event also made clear that choices would have to be made with regard to the 
configuration of critique, comradeship and ethnographic knowledge production that I would 
settle upon in my fieldwork. When the floor was opened to discussion, two well-dressed men 
raised their hands. The first suggested that he had “come here with an open mind – but it 
seems like propaganda.” Bangladesh, he said, “needs development” and the issue was to 
make sure people are “properly compensated.” He asked that the campaigners “get real – 
can’t you cooperate rather than this blind opposition?” The second speaker began by stating 
that “I take exception to some of the emotive language. To call GCM killers is puerile. In 
August 2006, demonstrators attacked Asia Energy [the GCM Resources subsidiary] office, 
and the Bangladesh Rifles fired to protect them as a last resort.” This second speaker took 
issue with the “emotive” figures of 220,000 being displaced, arguing that only 40,000 would 
be moved over the life of the mine. “You’re all painting a scenario of the worst case,” he 
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continued, “not accounting for GCM’s moral concerns for Bangladeshis and their country. I 
think it is a great pity you didn’t have someone from GCM here.” 
A Phulbari-born, London-based activist from Bangladesh’s National Committee to Protect 
Oil, Gas, Ports and Natural Resources then responded that she was from Phulbari, she saw 
the shootings with her own eyes, and that Asia Energy had acted against the government and 
people of Bangladesh. The two well–dressed men subsequently walked out, objecting to the 
suppression of “free speech” and the “hysterical propaganda” espoused by this activist. A 
doctoral student at a British sociology department, stood up to explain that in fact, the second 
speaker was B , who had been GCM/Asia Energy’s Public Relations (PR) man in Dhaka, 
and was misrepresenting himself as an independent party.  Much was concentrated in this 
brief and heated interaction. B-- and his comrade seemed to be drawing upon long 
established English discursive conventions whereby “hysterical” or “emotive” female figures 
are considered to be in need of disciplining by economically rational men (cf. de Goede, 2005, 
pp. 26–30), and perhaps there were also traces in this interaction of the British imperial 
discourse of the ‘effeminate Bengali’, incapable of being decisive, reasonable and honest 
without the guiding hand of the physically impressive Englishman (Sinha, 1995), tropes which 
return in Chapters Three and Seven. 
B   could also have been viewed as participating in (or at the very least endorsing) what 
Marina Welker (2009) terms the “violent defense of capital.” Welker’s work, on the local 
defense of Newmont mine in Indonesia against environmental activists, leads her to challenge 
the established anthropological habit of treating advocacy against mining capitalism as 
amenable to thick description, while viewing advocacy on behalf of the extractive industries as 
a mere by-product of the “inexorable, expanding logic of capital” (Welker, 2009, p. 166). 
Clearly there was more at stake in B  ’s outpouring then the simple unfolding logic of capital. 
I decided that trying to fathom his motivations, and the motivations and projects embarked 
upon by the Bangladeshis and British Bangladeshis in the room who had sided with B   in 
his diagnosis of Bangladesh’s need for Phulbari’s coal, would be made the subject of my 
ethnography – even if this would entail the navigation of a disquieting cocktail of critique, 
comradeship and complicity.  
The events I had witnessed at the Amnesty International offices framed much of my initial 
research strategy. When I would later visit Dhaka, I made an effort to trace out the authors 
of the conflicting environmental impact assessments relating to Phulbari (and other projects), 
most of whom were current or retired Professors in the geology or engineering departments 
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of Dhaka’s elite public universities. The effective framing of certain environmental and social 
impact scenarios as more likely and others as ‘emotive’ or ‘hysterical’ rests in part upon the 
creditworthiness of individual scientists and academics. Their known or suspected political 
allegiance or affiliation, to the Awami League, the Bangladesh National Party, or the 
technocratic caretaker government of 2006-08, was implicated in the public assessment of 
their creditworthiness in Bangladesh. The projected impacts of both Phulbari and other 
proposed oil and gas extraction projects matter not only to domestic politics, but because 
they play a part in the effective construction of Bangladesh as a frontier replete with 
opportunity, as opposed to a risky terrain into which investors will not venture. In Chapters 
Six and Eight, I explore conflicting technical reports on extractive industry development in 
Bangladesh, against a background of earlier accidents and blowouts elsewhere in the 
country’s oil and gas extraction sectors. I examine how these incidents and accidents are 
portrayed as either ‘normal’ or ‘negligent’ by experts who find themselves differently placed 
as defenders of capital or national sovereignty. 
But before I set out to Dhaka, I began establishing a fieldsite in London, and I did this by 
seeking out contexts in which the complicity between British development policy and 
businesses like GCM could be made visible. The links between British development finance 
and investment in Bangladesh had been made public in press releases about the CDC Group 
and the Bangladesh Frontier Fund, but my attempts to contact the fund manager in Dhaka 
were never successful, although I did spend time with several other fund managers (see 
Chapter Eight). Given the concerns articulated at the Amnesty meeting over DFID and 
UKTI pressuring the Bangladeshi government to go ahead with opencast coal extraction in 
Phulbari (see also Chapter One), I started my fieldwork in late 2012 by attending a DFID–
UKTI event in a conference centre opposite the Houses of Parliament. Here the Private 
Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG), whom I discussed in some detail in the 
introduction to this thesis, gave presentations on ‘new frontiers’ for infrastructure investment 
in Africa and Asia, framing as frontiers those territories with fast growing populations and a 
need for “commercial solutions to overcome development challenges.”  
Presentations from the PIDG subsidiaries Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund (managed 
by PIDG’s Frontier Markets Fund Management) and InfraCo Asia made it unambiguously 
clear that PIDG, funded by DFID and other European donor agencies, was an institution 
that believed in the private sector. It would not do business with the state or parastatals (unless 
they had subcontracted the relevant management capacities to the private sector), but would 
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fund private infrastructure, energy and mining projects with a (loosely defined) 
developmental mandate. And, as one PIDG functionary put it, they did so in such a way that 
would mitigate the “need for political risk insurance.” Attendees at the PIDG event included 
private investors, consulting engineers, and other development consultants looking for work. 
One turned to me over coffee and expressed a desire there would be some work coming out 
of this private sector-focused meeting: “development can’t all be grant-funded now can it?” 
I contacted some of those that I met at the event for interviews, and some agreed, although 
the initial interviews were not easy. When carrying out “ethnography by appointment” 
(Mitchell, 2010, p. 13), open-ended discussions can be intensely frustrating for those who 
have given up their scarce and valued time, and my lack of familiarity was not viewed as the 
‘quaint’ quirk of someone learning a new culture. Indeed, there is no doubt that in the early 
days of my fieldwork, I struggled to “take on a character [necessary] to elicit responses” (Fish, 
2007, p. 6), as I tried to position myself in an elite context with which I was not entirely 
comfortable. But, as with the Amnesty event, the PIDG briefings proved productive. I 
attended many more ‘frontier market’ investment promotion events that I learned about 
through PIDG, as well as a series of workshops that brought bureaucrats and IFC officials 
from around the world (including Bangladesh) to discuss ‘investment climate reform’) in the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, and the Houses of Parliament. I also began 
attending training events and market briefings at ‘ExportOrg’29, the quasi-governmental 
body, affiliated with UKTI, responsible for ‘exporting’ British development expertise, 
whether in the guise of engineering and architectural tenders, or environmental and social 
impact assessment (ESIA) consultancy. These training sessions addressed ‘risks and 
opportunities [for British expertise] in frontier markets,’ how to write the ‘winning proposal’ 
needed to acquire donor-funded business in the infrastructure sector, and how one might go 
about identifying investment opportunities in specific markets (including Bangladesh). One 
of these training sessions is discussed at length in Chapter Seven. 
In the initial PIDG briefing that I had attended during the Autumn of 2012, the claim that 
having investment from PIDG was an alternative to political risk insurance had struck me as 
significant. This was especially so given that one of the successes most celebrated by the 
London Mining Network and the National Committee in the Phulbari campaign, was the 
Asian Development Bank’s cancellation of political risk insurance for GCM in 2008. What 
                                                          
29 As with many specific organizations with whom I conducted fieldwork, the name of this particular trade 
export body has been pseudonymised. Any resemblance to actual organizations’ names is accidental. 
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was political risk insurance? What was political risk itself, for that matter? Why was the 
insurance so powerful? Do mining companies make profit because they take on exploration 
and ‘country risk’, or have they developed tools for ensuring a relatively stable operating 
environment? How much was PIDG’s belief in the private sector about the relative 
competitiveness and efficiency of market organization, and how much was it about 
redistributing sovereignty and sovereign guarantees to private actors?  
I provide partial ethnographic answers to these questions in Chapters Six and Seven, and I 
derived these answers from participation in a range of forums, networks and events that I 
sought out in response to the PIDG functionary’s aside on political risk. I purchased a ticket 
for the political risk insurance industry’s end of year forecasting and briefing event, organized 
by a well-known business intelligence firm, and hosted at a hotel in St James, for the price of 
£1558.80. That these events were about ‘networking’ as much as acquiring information was 
made clear by the fact that the slides and presentations from the meeting could be purchased 
for the comparatively modest sum of £260. I also came across a series of professional 
development masterclasses on political risk and extractive industries, held in the offices of a 
City of London law firm, and organized by a professional association to which many working 
in mining finance belong. I became a member of this association (and continue to be one), 
and became a regular at their masterclasses, debates, drinks and at the other briefings that 
were advertised to the association’s members by explorers seeking capital (and good 
relationships with the City’s brokers and analysts).  
These events included a state–of–the–market briefing organized by a mining focused 
business intelligence firm in October 2012, in the Ironmonger’s Hall, home to one of the 
City of London’s old livery companies, at the cost of £300 per day. At events like these, I 
became aware of the concerns gripping the mining market during my fieldwork, in particular 
the spectre of ‘resource nationalism’ (see Chapters Three & Six), and specific reputational 
crises like the then–recent Marikana shootings in South Africa, which were a focus of one 
event in particular (see Chapter Five). The mining market’s own moral economy also came 
to the fore at such events. Seated at a silver service lunch in the Ironmonger’s Hall, next to 
the CEO of one of the industry’s largest firms of consulting engineers, I was treated to choice 
words about the explorers who had come “begging” around the market in the lunchtime 
investor presentations: it would not do to keep asking for cash if you hadn’t rendered your 
resource any more attractive than it was the last time (see Chapter Three). I also became a 
regular attendee of the ‘Global Mining Finance’ days, including the ‘Global Mining Finance: 
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Frontier Mining’ event that had recently been introduced, and which brought together 
explorers seeking cash, consultants seeking work, and analysts or lawyers with advice to 
dispense. These were free, as were other events organized by the associations of mining 
finance professionals, such as ‘FINEX: Exploration Meets the City’, held in the Geological 
Society’s buildings in October–November 2012. But the biggest event on the calendar, Mines 
& Money London, was decidedly not so, coming in at £1342.50 for a two-day pass in 2012. 
I make Mines & Money, the quintessential extractive industry bazaar, my ethnographic entry 
point to the body of the thesis at the start of Chapter Three. 
At Mines & Money London, and numerous smaller but similar events, and at various high-
profile political risk briefings, not only did the mining market’s preoccupation with resource 
nationalism and the search for new frontiers become abundantly clear; it was equally apparent 
that there was a distinct core of key, ‘exemplary’ men who had significant influence over the 
allocation of funds and definition of opportunities (see Chapter Three). But at these events, 
consistent references were also made to using Corporate Social Responsibility as the ‘first 
line of defence’ against resource nationalist governments, intent on expropriating assets in 
politically risky frontiers.  
Particularly striking was the self-conscious, clearly-enunciated turn away from presenting 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the extractive industries as an ethical activity: among 
investors and explorers it mattered, but not for reasons to do with market morality or even, in 
a straightforward sense, reputation. But the CSR’ industry’s flagship events company, 
EthicalCorp, still ran an annual Extractive Industry Responsibility Summit. Two-day 
academic/NGO passes were available at a discounted rate, £899, and at the west London 
hotel in which it was hosted, I met some of the same public relations professionals I had 
earlier encountered at Mines & Money London. I would later meet several of them again at 
the World Bank/Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) residential summit on 
Extractive Industries, Transparency and Sustainability hosted at the FCO’s Wilton House in 
Sussex. What struck me at these events was the apparent mutation of Corporate Social 
Responsibility into something more instrumental, calculating and strategic, which came with 
a new name and an endorsement from leading business schools: ‘Corporate Diplomacy’. I 
address the rise of Corporate Diplomacy, and its role in enabling extractive industry 
capitalism, in Chapter Five. 
Attendees at these ‘social mining’ events were not often geologists, engineers or mineral 
economists; public relations officials in the extractive industries tend to have, more often 
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than not, a background in social and political sciences and the Civil Service (usually DFID 
or the FCO). But they nonetheless expressed to me the view that anti-mining protestors 
simply “did not understand the mineral economics,” and so, on the advice of the heads of 
public affairs and government relations at two of the world’s largest mining companies I 
took the same course they had taken upon entering the extractive industries, run by 
Resourceful Economics in the City of London (this time I managed to get in for free).  
In addition, I attended two seminars (originally publicised by the a mining analyst’s 
association and at Mines & Money), and one week–long training course on mine ‘enterprise 
optimization’. These were organized by one of the sector’s most celebrated technical 
consultancies, whose software is used by almost every company in the extractive industries. 
(Once again, I managed to gain an invite to the week–long training course without charge, 
although the full price was well in excess of £1000). At these ‘money mining’ seminars, I 
discovered one of the key devices through which the generativity of extractive industry 
capitalism can be traced: the calculation of ‘net present value’. I discuss these seminars, net 
present value calculation, and the possibility for building a rapprochement between the social 
studies of finance and political and economic anthropology – one which remains committed 
to open up ‘black boxes’, but equally to the critical confrontation of capitalist exploitation 
and domination – in Chapter Four. 
When after twelve months of fieldwork in London, I left for a further six months of 
fieldwork in Dhaka, my ethnographic experience altered rapidly. As Martha Macintyre notes, 
conventional images of fieldwork have largely been based around the idea that the 
ethnographer is an “outsider endowed with power or status derived from identification with 
earlier (or current) white colonials”, so much so that female ethnographers in male-
dominated societies might be granted ‘honorary’ status as social males (Macintyre, 1993, p. 
47). In London, I was unambiguously not endowed with status, but I was an outsider: I lacked 
kinship and other personal connections to the industry, I had not studied the right subjects 
(geology, engineering or mineral economics), and I was not at the right kind of university. In 
a reversal of the anthropological commonplace recounted by Macintyre, my performance of 
masculinity was frequently not quite adequate for me to be accepted as a full social person 
in this often aggressively hypermasculine industry. My performative inadequacy was made 
disquietingly clear to me at mining finance professionals after-work networking events, 
where I was at times, actively avoided. Indeed, some female ethnographers of the mining 
sector have described their gendered position in a hyper-competitive male-dominated 
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industry as an ethnographic advantage (Dinah Rajak, pers. comm.). But in Bangladesh, it is 
undeniable that my identification with earlier (or current) white colonials endowed me with 
an advantage and a certain amount of ‘pigmentational’ cultural capital, that made it possible 
for me to simply walk into Chambers of Commerce and ask to be introduced to their 
chairmen, to meet entrepreneurs in exclusive expatriate clubs, or be welcomed into the 
offices of prominent lawyers. I discuss the class and status dimensions of globalizing 
ambitions among Dhaka’s business elite in detail in Chapter Eight. 
The association of light skin with high status in South Asia – among Christian (Philips, 2004), 
Hindu (Säävälä, 2001, pp. 303-05) and Muslim (Kotalová, 1988) communities alike – is often 
discussed as a gendered issue, with the fairness of women being of greater significance for 
marriageability, independent of distinctions that might be made on ‘racial’ lines.30 While some 
social scientists have pointed to an increased use of whitening creams in South Asia as 
evidence of the globalization of a ‘white is right’ racial hierarchy (Glenn, 2008), and whitening 
creams like Fair and Lovely began marketing aggressively to male customers while I was in 
Bangladesh (using cricketer Toufiq Iqbal as a model), there is no doubt a distinction between 
the status afforded to men with lighter skin in Bangladesh and the access to the field afforded 
to me by my ‘outsider whiteness.’ In addition, as I discuss in Gilbert (2015a), my status was 
frequently evaluated through my affiliation with Sussex, historically the plate glass university 
“they’ve all heard of abroad” (Beloff, 1967, p. 80), and one which many of my interlocutors 
– including prominent consulting engineers and the Chief Economist of the central bank – 
had attended. This could not have been more different to the tepid evaluation placed upon 
my affiliation by those in the City of London’s mining market. When combined with being 
hosted by a ‘big’ family that included some of the first people to have been awarded a PhD 
in the Pakistan era, and which had significant relationships with senior military staff and 
prominent academics (including Muhammad Yunus), my entry into ‘the field’ in Bangladesh 
was much more smooth than it had been in London. 
This did not mean that my fieldwork in Dhaka generated no ethnographic and ethical 
concerns. Whereas I struggled to generate ‘comradeship’ in the field in London, I did develop 
a familiarity, and in some cases, friendships, with Bangladeshi geologists, lawyers, journalists 
                                                          
30 Race and gender are also frequently intercoded, however. Masculinity in the United States, for instance, is 
highly racialized in high school culture where acting ‘nerdy’ and acting ‘white’ are interdependent (Bucholtz, 
2001). Likewise, in comic book culture, the ‘excess’ and fear-inducing hypermasculinity of black males is often 
contrasted with the archetypal white character: a perfect masculine superhero with a less threatening, 
insufficiently masculine alter-ego (Brown, 1999). 
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and ‘brokers’ who were committed to facilitating extractive industry projects that could put 
hundreds of thousands of people at risk. While this was partially experienced as an 
ethnographic ‘success’, it contributed to my growing concerns about balancing critique and 
productive ethnographic intimacy. My first three meetings in Bangladesh (arranged before 
my arrival) were with the consultants who carried out the original impact assessment for 
GCM/Asia Energy (SMEC Ltd), the head of PIDG’s InfraCo Asia in Bangladesh, and the 
engineer who had worked on the Phulbari exploration back when it was a BHP/BHP 
Billiton, before GCM/Asia Energy moved in.  
Their open and frank accounts of the kind of creative destruction that is necessary for the 
growth of Bangladesh as an economy, and as a nation, are discussed in Chapter Six. Given 
their openness, it became immediately apparent to me that I could not even write about some of 
our discussions without seeming like I was, in Marcus’ terms, setting out to ‘get the goods’ on 
elites. Following from my first meetings with the consultants behind Asia Energy/GCM’s 
initial Phulbari development, and the head of InfraCo Asia, I proceeded to try and contact 
(with mixed success), the heads of the Frontier Fund supported by IFC and CDC Group 
(ultimately a failure), and the managing partners of a Dhaka-based investment advice and 
brokerage service which I will refer to as ‘FrontierCo’, who were so frequently cited in 
Financial Times reports on Bangladesh as a ‘frontier’ market. I was successful in meeting the 
founder of this company, and he subsequently put me in touch with the Bangladesh Brand 
Forum (BBF), whose directors were working on ‘re-branding Bangladesh’ as an investment 
destination.  
After meeting BBF board members several times, and attending their 2013 Awards ceremony 
at the luxurious Sonargaon Hotel, I was introduced to another group of young entrepreneurs 
working on ‘re-branding Bangladesh,’ via the head of research at a foreign investment agency 
that I will refer to as ‘PromoteCo’, whose director I had met at a Foreign Chamber of 
Commerce meeting (and subsequently visited several times). I had spoken to the director of 
the PromoteCo about recent interest in Bangladesh as an investment destination for oil and 
gas explorers – including Norway’s Statoil – and he and his institution appeared to acted as 
‘brokers’ or business diplomats for potential investors. At the same time, the PromoteCo 
worked with institutions like USAID, IFC, and the World Bank on programmes to reform 
Bangladesh’s ‘investment climate,’ which had also concerned those working at the nexus of 
development, trade promotion and political risk analysis in London. The sometimes 
conflicting ambitions of these business elites, and the role that their efforts to ‘re–brand’ 
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Bangladesh play in constructing new frontiers for patient and impatient capital, are the 
subject of Chapters Seven and Eight.  
In Dhaka, my institutional (and pigmentational) capital, and newly acquired social capital, 
afforded me access to communities of complicity on both sides of an incredibly antagonistic 
issue, from the Foreign Chamber of Commerce to the National Committee to Protect Oil, 
Gas and Ports. In fact, I was at times actively encouraged by my interlocutors to visit, 
challenge and question the (thoroughly suspect) ‘other side,’ which made carrying out my 
fieldwork less ethically problematic, even if it has made writing it up even more so. I 
interviewed a number of engineers, geologists and consultants who had worked for both 
Asia Energy and the opposition groups organized by the National Committee to Protect Oil, 
Gas and Ports, and for Awami League, Bangladesh National Party and interim or caretaker 
governments as energy advisers. Most of these interviews took place in offices on the campus 
of Dhaka University and the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology. I would, 
however, meet some of the engineers and geologists – but not those from the National 
Committee – at social events for Dhaka’s ‘high society’ (susil samaj) such as the Hay Festival, 
an offshoot of the Hay-on-Wye festival that is held at the Bangla Academy, or at weddings 
between prominent political families. When I discuss the conflicts over expertise that are at 
the heart of resource politics in Bangladesh in Chapter Six, I attempt to situate them not only 
in terms of the partyarchy politics discussed in Chapter One, but in terms of the projects of 
self–cultivation among public intellectuals that are shaped by post–independence class 
politics. 
I engaged with a number of activists and leaders within the National Committee, but spent 
most of my time with members of the Bangladesher Samyabadi Dal (Marxbadi-Leninbadi) or 
Bangladesh Communist Party (Marxist–Leninist) whom I had met on the anniversary of 
Phulbari Day (26th August) at the National Martyr’s Monument (Shohid Minar) near Dhaka 
University. I subsequently joined them for regular meetings in their offices, for 
commemorations of past leaders at the Dhaka Press Club, for a somewhat surprising 
conference at the luxurious Ruposhi Bangla Hotel, and on segments of a ‘Long March’ to 
protest Bangladesh’s proposed Rampal Nuclear Power Plant. I draw on this aspect of my 
fieldwork experience in Chapter Six, where I contrast the deterriorializing discourse of 
resource nationalism that arises from within London’s mining market, with the particular 
entanglements between anti-foreign direct investment campaigning and Bangladeshi 
nationalism as revealed in the run-up to Bangladesh’s 2014 national elections. 
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Towards the end of my fieldwork, I had begun to feel that I achieved a certain ethnographic 
competence in understanding who was involved and what was at stake in and beyond the 
socio-technical agencements that made up the extractive industry frontier. This multi–sited 
ethnography was hard work: my field did not simply “exist, awaiting discovery” but had to 
be “laboriously constructed, prised apart from all the other possibilities for contextualization 
to which its constituent relationships and connections could also be referred” (Amit, 2000, 
p. 6). But did this mean that I had, in Matei Candea’s (2007, p. 180) terms, reasserted the very 
“boundedness” that multi-sited research of this kind was supposed to do away with, 
eschewing the “contrived totality of a geographically bounded space for the ineffable totality 
of a protean, multi-sited ‘cultural formation’”? The overlap in attendees at the events I 
introduced above, and the shared concerns among those in the mining industry – resource 
nationalism, Corporate Diplomacy, the search for new frontiers – certainly seemed to give 
my constructed fieldsite some coherence.  
Then my final foray into ‘the field’ occurred in late February 2015, when I returned to the 
ExportOrg offices in Victoria. I was there to attend a training event on how to use Bilateral 
Investment Treaties in foreign direct investment, which was hosted by a partner at a 
prominent British law firm. This was the point at which I approached a concrete 
‘denouement’ in my fieldwork, and where it became apparent that I was not at all dealing with 
an ineffable, protean cultural formation, but one that had a coherent history, and a coherent, 
functional form in the contemporary. I attended this workshop because BITs were 
mentioned at many of the events I had joined during my fieldwork, from the expensive and 
exclusive political risk briefings described above, to Mines & Money, and the Global Mining 
Finance sessions. In addition, while in Dhaka, I had attended training courses for arbitration 
lawyers that was jointly funded by DFID and the IFC, as part of their project to reform 
Bangladesh’s investment climate (investment climate reform being a concern that was also 
foregrounded by the political risk analysts and insurers I had met at political risk events, and 
subsequently interviewed). Arbitration and BITs matter to each other, because the primary 
purpose of a BIT is to ensure that a corporation hosted in one state is treated fairly when 
operating in the second; if there is a feeling that a corporation is not being treated fairly, it 
will invoke the arbitration clause in the BIT, and begin proceedings at an arbitration venue 
like the World Bank’s ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes).  
The training session in Dhaka was held, like the Bangladesh Communist Party’s conference, 
at the five star Ruposhi Bangla hotel. Among the guests were Kamal Hossain, author of 
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Bangladesh’s constitution, and the lawyers who were at the time engaged in an arbitration 
between the Bangladeshi state and Niko Resources, a TSX–V-listed junior. Discussions at 
this training session turned eventually to the 2009 Saipem v. Bangladesh ICSID arbitral 
ruling, which was considered by many in attendance to be a gross injustice, and by Kamal 
Hossain to be the lowest point in his professional career. Quite unexpectedly, the key 
example through which the attendees of the ExportOrg event were taught about BITs was, 
also, the Saipem case, but it was cast in an entirely different, positive, light. In Chapter Seven, 
I discuss in detail these two, divergent uses of Saipem as a tool of instruction, and locate 
them in the death of the ‘Third World jurists’ project, which saw postcolonial nations seeking 
to assert Permanent Sovereignty over their Natural Resources. Arising from these distributed 
ethnographic encounters, a central argument of this thesis is that, through the norms of 
investor–state arbitration that developed after the death of the Third World jurists project, 
the extractive industries’ search for new frontiers is, in the final instance, enabled by the 
granting of sovereignty to transnational corporations, rather than to postcolonial states.  
2.3: IMPURITY, DANGER AND CRITIQUE 
As Candea’s (2007) much–cited challenge to multi–sited ethnography shows, there is still 
resistance to non–conventional and mobile fieldwork within the discipline. In providing a 
position from which to challenge this resistance, George Marcus’ designs for multi–sited 
fieldwork have been incredibly valuable. Often discussed in terms of ‘following’ people, ideas 
and commodities through space (e.g., Marcus, 1995), the notion of multi–sited ethnography 
also has a great deal to do with finding a way to represent “something of the [world] system 
itself” (1989, p. 9) through ethnography, rather than by merely using pre–packaged political 
economy as an explanatory context. In advancing the later notion of ‘non–obvious’ multi–
sited ethnography, Marcus speaks of research  
where there is very little actual contact or exchange between two 
sites but where the functioning of one of the sites (the more strategic 
one?) depends on a very specific imagining of what is going on 
elsewhere. (Marcus, 1999, p. 7) 
As I set out to generate ethnographic knowledge about the functioning of capitalism in the 
transnational extractive industries, and the role that political risk analysts and investment 
climate reform agents play in opening up ‘strategic’ sites like Bangladesh as new ‘frontiers’, 
Marcus’ work was an invaluable conceptual aid. But, as I argued in the introduction to this 
thesis, Marcus’ programme ends up distancing itself from critique, something that I found 
to be at odds with my own specific subjectivity, and with the wider disciplinary norms guiding 
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anthropological research into the effects of extractive industry capitalism as they tend to be 
felt by less powerful communities around the world. 
Likewise, and as I show in Chapter Four, the conceptual and analytical tools provided by the 
social studies of finance are essential for grasping capitalism as a produced and enacted set 
of structures and relationships, rather than an ineffable and totalizing circulatory sphere. 
There is, however, an additional problem posed by the actor–network theory-derived social 
studies of finance: drawing on Latour’s (1994, 2005) rejection of ‘the social’ as a pre–existing 
domain that can explain other forms of action (be they economic or otherwise), scholars of 
law, finance and natural resources have begun to ‘flatten’ out their descriptions of 
assemblages and agencements, rejecting forms of critique that would ‘expose’ the influence of 
‘society’ in a certain set of behaviours, beliefs or outcomes.  Annelise Riles (2011) has thus 
rejected the notion that the legal and financial expertise in derivatives markets can be 
understood in terms of a certain set of social ‘norms’, preferring to focus instead on the 
material form and agency of technical devices (see Chapter Seven).31  
Defending Riles against charges that her approach constitutes a capitulation to financial 
market elites, Bill Maurer has suggested that such accusations indicate nothing more than a 
failed critical imagination, according to which ‘“impurity” still means “danger”’ (Maurer & 
Mainwaring, 2012, p. 181). There may be some truth in the form Maurer gives to his defence 
of Riles. But while a reluctance to engage with the lives and experiences of elite experts may 
constitute a critical failure, engaging with those elites and yet refusing to account for their often violent 
world–making capacities is surely a far greater failure of the critical imagination. A certain anti– 
or ‘postcritical’ turn does seem to be underway in anthropology (e.g. Jensen, 2014; 
Venkatesan & Yarrow, 2012; also Latour, 2004), compounded by a ‘crisis of critique’ (Bessire 
& Bond, 2014) that is partially motivated by the so–called ‘ontological turn’. I discuss these 
developments in detail in relation to my own ethnography in Chapters Three, Four and 
Seven, but a concern with maintaining a critical ethnographic perspective on the generation of 
extractive industry capitalism runs throughout the thesis.  
                                                          
31 Riles (2011, p. 33) challenges the notion that “derivatives markets are a tribal world of secret customs and 
close–knit relationships in which actors conspire to develop their own private norms” and is perhaps thinking 
of Gillian Tett’s (2009, p. 37) depiction, of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association that Riles 
studies, as like a “hunter–gatherer tribe” within an “interest in upholding their norms.” 
65 
 
I am not suggesting instead a crude anthropology that would see impurity as danger, and set 
out to ‘get the goods on elites.’32 Ethnographic critique does, perhaps, have to take a 
particular form in light of the social studies of finance. Callon (2005, p. 10) argues that in the 
performativity programme, the question is no longer “Is this knowledge true?”, but is this 
knowledge able “to perform, to enact, a reality corresponding to what it says?” It may not be 
profitable to try and prove Callon’s the knowledge of financial, legal and geological experts 
working in the extractive industries ‘wrong’. Anthropology must have something to say about 
the energies, imagination, ambition, norms and histories which, along with technical 
equipment, go into performing or generating extractive industry capitalism: but they must 
also have something to say about the consequences of performed or enacted extractive 
economies, and their often devastating consequences for social and physical bodies. In short, 
anthropology must have something to say about finance and the extractive industries that 
“does not purely and simply coincide with the spirit of capitalism” (Galloway, 2013, p. 352).  
In Chapter Three, I begin the ethnographic component of this thesis by describing London’s 
market for mining finance, and introducing the speculative search for extractive industry 
frontiers that can be observed at Mines & Money London, one of the extractive industry’s 
largest trade and investment shows. Alongside the ethnography that I present, I highlight the 
‘post–critical’ consequences of recent anthropological approaches to studying finance (‘the 
anthropology of the contemporary’) and extractive industries (‘resource materialities’). These 
research programmes leave little room for developing critical accounts of extractive industry 
capitalism, something which I move towards in Chapter Four.  
2.4: A NOTE ON RESEARCH ETHICS & ANONYMITY 
In the previous sections of this chapter, I have outlined how I attempted to make space for 
critique while writing up ethnographic research that was only made possible through the 
(more-or-less ‘thick’) hospitality of powerful and often public figures. I have challenged the 
oft-made opposition between, on the one hand, unsophisticated anthropologists inclined to 
‘get the goods’ on elites, and who experience ‘impurity as danger’; and, on the other, ‘post-
                                                          
32 It is perhaps worth noting that while Marcus’ (1998, p. 27 n. 9) disparaging reference to emergent approaches 
towards ‘getting the ethnographic goods on elites’ has been read as a swipe towards Laura Nader’s (1972) 
programme for ‘studying up,’ (González & Stryker, 2014, p. 3), Nader’s research programme is better captured 
in relation to her interest in mapping ‘vertical slices’ through hierarchical societies. Nader was aware that ‘if 
anthropology were reinvented to study up, we would sooner or later need to study down as well’ (Nader, 1972, 
p. 292). Her aim was not to ‘get the goods’ on, say, the organizational culture of an insurance firm, but to 
understand how it might shape access to credit, residence patterns and life chances in inescapable worlds of 
scarcity and difference, structured in part through the actuarial gaze. 
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critical’ ethnographers who collaborate with, defer to, and think alongside their elite 
interlocutors. To frame the debate on critique and ethnography in this manner is to fail to 
apprehend what Michael D. Jackson (2009, p. 240) terms ‘ethnographic judgement’, where 
if critique is to emerge from ethnography it is 
not a matter of some unreflective, a prioristic, moralistic condemnation 
of difference on the egocentric or ethnocentric grounds that alien 
beliefs or practices belong outside the pale of what is human. On 
the contrary, judgment is a way of doing justice to the multiplex and 
ambiguous character of human reality by regarding others not as 
inhuman, but as ourselves in other circumstances. 
Nonetheless, particular ethical concerns do arise in relation to carrying out (and writing up) 
ethnographic research based on interactions with powerful individuals and agencies. Some 
of these are transformations of ethical issues that will be matters for consideration in all 
ethnographic settings; others are unique, or at the very least, amplified, when carrying out 
research with elites.  
The first ethical issue unique to the study of elites arises since, while some anthropologists 
will create ‘composite’ or ‘disaggregated’ figures that are representative of or recognizable in a given 
socio-cultural context (see Becker, 2001; Gay y Blasco & Wardle, 2007, pp. 39-42; Miller & 
Parrot, 2009, pp. 504, 516), it is often precisely the specific social identity and institutional 
position of public and elite figures that makes their stories ethnographically valuable. This 
creates a considerable ethical challenge for the very act of ethnographic writing and 
representation. Protecting the anonymity of one’s interlocutors (as I have done in this thesis) 
is necessitated, but excessively disguising the social coordinates at which specific individuals 
operate may, as observed in the recently revised Association of Social Anthropologists’ 
Ethical guidelines for good research practice, result in “so distorting the data as to compromise 
scholarly accuracy and integrity” (ASA, 2011, p. 6).33  
The second issue unique to the study of powerful, elite agencies arises when an 
anthropologist’s “paramount obligation…to their research participants” (ASA, 2011, p. 3) 
and commitment to not infringing upon the “‘private space’ (as locally defined) of an 
                                                          
33 Elizabeth Sheehan (1993, p. 83), writing about her fieldwork exploring the dense interrelationships between 
Irish intellectuals, politicians and members of the judiciary at a time of a great social transformation in the late 
1980s, asks: do not these public figures have “the right to expect the same kind of ethnographic discretion that 
would be granted a less public figure?” At the same time, however, Sheehan observes that “It is of more than 
passing interest to an ethnographer [and the wider public] to know that a number of a country’s now middle-
aged academics, writers, judges, and politicians were members of the same university cohort and have all been 
involved with the same women” (ibid., p. 79). 
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individual or group” (p. 5) runs up against their responsibilities to “other members of the 
public and wider society” (pp. 9-10). In Mark Sanders’ (2002) terms, this dilemma could be 
taken as a particular instance of the more general predicament of ‘intellectuals’ for whom 
responsibility is “typically a negotiation between various narrow senses of complicity,” and 
where “an affirmation of a parochial filiation or affiliation,” potentially derived from 
intimacies and loyalties cultivated during fieldwork, may be “at odds with a universalization 
or expansion” of responsibility derived from a broader complicity with “human-being as such” 
(Sanders, 2002, pp. 4, 15, 201).  
As the ASA Ethical guidelines observe, “Social inquiry is predicated on the belief that greater 
access to well-founded information will serve rather than threaten the interests of 
society/ies” (ASA, 2011, p. 10). But to speak of the ‘interests of society/ies’ begs the question 
of whose interests will be identified with those of society? In a reputation-conscious era, the extractive 
industries make a considered effort to present themselves as serving the general interest of 
world society, by provisioning ‘us’ with essential minerals and fuel (see Chapter Five). But to 
speak of the search for new extractive frontiers in terms of natural resources being ‘for the 
good of the world’ – to speak of those resources as belonging to humanity even as the profit 
from their extraction flows to very limited quarters indeed – is to silence further the abortive 
Third World jurists’ project, and the failed attempt made by several postcolonial nations to 
assert Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. Is it not important for anthropologists 
to make incursions into the ‘private space as locally defined’ in which extractive industry 
deals are made and opportunities projected? What happens when the anthropologists’ duty 
not only to wider society but to social inquiry itself comes into direct conflict with the interests 
of those with whom they research? With whom, exactly, will such an ethnographer be 
complicit? 
I have made the decision – not without reservation, and following an extended period of 
ethical reflection – to err on the side of ‘wider society’; to approach the forums in which I 
carried out my research as exclusive enclaves rather than private spaces. Nonetheless, in line 
with the ASA’s (2011, p. 2) cognizance of the conditions of fieldwork among internationally 
mobile groups of corporate elites, I always made my identity as a researcher known to all I 
met at the meetings, events, trade shows and seminars I describe in this thesis (in addition, 
of course, to those whom I met for interview). I did not, however, in all cases stress that I 
was an anthropologist, given that this was often a ‘conversation killer’ that appeared to 
generate suspicion: aside from the occasional joke about whether I was there to study “our 
68 
 
tribe”, it was not generally understood why an anthropologist would be interested in 
extractive industry finance and exploration. 
This, perhaps, is a problem related to broader public perceptions of the remit of 
anthropological research. In these cases, I presented myself as a ‘PhD researcher’ or 
‘university researcher’ interested in ‘political risk and resource nationalism’ (see Chapters Six 
& Seven). It is doubtless often true, as J.M. Coetzee (1985: unpaged) observed in a review of 
Vincent Crapanzano’s Waiting: the whites of South Africa, that “anthropology works only as long 
as the informant remains ignorant of the kinds of meaning being read out of his discourse” 
– or, at any rate, that many research participants, subjects or interlocutors are unaware of 
precisely which disciplinary lacunae the fieldworkers they encounter are seeking to address 
by converting their interactions into ethnographic ‘data’. This is not intended as a justification 
for misrepresenting oneself in the field; that would be profoundly and unambiguously 
unethical. It is, however, essential to acknowledge that having one’s company accepted after 
presenting oneself as ‘an anthropologist’ may not equate to a full understanding of what it is 
you intend to discover through ethnographic research. 
 As such, it is important to maintain an awareness that consent to participate – however 
marginally – in ethnographic fieldwork of the kind on which this thesis is based, is a process, 
rather than an irreversible decision (ASA, 2011, p. 5). Given the life that may be breathed 
into anthropological texts after publication, by members of the press or the communities 
represented therein (see Brettell, 1993), I have anonymised all those who appear in this thesis, 
even where they consented to appearing under their own names. It is certainly the case that 
some public figures may be recognizable, but I have done what I can to obscure their identity, 
and many of the most recognizable individuals appearing in this thesis did originally consent 
to being represented under their real names.34 Finally, it is worth noting that I do not perceive 
any contradiction between writing ‘for’ wider society more than ‘for’ some of those powerful 
individuals and agencies I encountered during fieldwork, and protecting these individuals’ 
identity. Much as the public’s ‘right to know’ should not be used as an ethical justification 
for journalistic inquiry animated by a mere ‘curiosity to know’ (Meyers, 1993), “the 
advancement of knowledge and the pursuit of information are not in themselves sufficient 
justifications for overriding the values and ignoring the interests of those studied” (ASA, 
                                                          
34 With the exception of three individuals – Robert Amsterdam, Ian Bremmer & Kamal Hossain – the 
ethnographic value of whose statements is given in part by the relationship they have to the influential public 
position these men hold as lawyers, consultants and academics. Only Kamal Hossain was interviewed by me; the 
comments made by the other two men are reported from public events where I was in attendance, and which 
were not subject to the Chatham House rule. 
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2011, p. 4). I hope that in this thesis, I have managed to do justice to the value of social 
inquiry, whilst avoiding any specific impairment of the interests of those who have, 
ultimately, made this inquiry possible.  
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PART II 
FROM SPECULATION TO ACCUMULATION 
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CHAPTER THREE 
INSIDE THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY BAZAAR 
Talk of “geopolitics” and the predominance of spatial images such as Western 
“expansion” cloud the fact that our exploitative relations also had temporal aspects. 
Resources have been transported from the past of their “backward” locations to the 
present of an industrial capitalist economy. A temporal conception of movement has 
always served to legitimize the colonial enterprise on all levels. Temporalizations 
expressed as passage from savagery to civilization, from peasant to industrial society, 
have long served an ideology whose ultimate purpose has been to justify the 
procurement of commodities for our markets.  
 – Johannes Fabian, 1983, p. 95 
 
In this first ethnographic chapter of the thesis, I introduce the contours of London’s market 
for mining finance. This market is distributed across a series of exclusive briefings, expensive 
‘matchmaking’ events where investors meet explorers, and professional networks that 
emerge from the cross-cutting career paths of geologists-cum-brokers-cum-executives. Here 
‘juniors’, or relatively unregulated resource exploration firms, seek the funding that they need 
in order to turn a geological prospect into a ‘bankable’ find and, ultimately, a flow of revenue 
for their investors. Funding juniors, especially in the early stages of exploration, is a 
speculative endeavour. Or, as some in the industry would put it, “it’s all a bit of a gamble.”35 
But it is not merely the existence of an ore body upon which mining investors speculate. 
Mining professionals are the first to recognize that politics makes the difference between a 
mineral deposit and a mine.  
One of the primary concerns for investors in the junior sector is the mining code that sets 
out royalty and taxation rates in a given jurisdiction. The geography of foreign investment in 
the extractive industries was “remarkably ‘sticky’” (Bridge 2004, p. 411) over the latter half 
of the twentieth century, with Canada, South Africa, and Australia being the primary 
recipients, and postcolonial nations viewed as ‘hostile’ to transnational extractive industry 
corporations. But since the 1990s, newly written mineral codes in the Global South, authored 
at the World Bank’s behest,36 have altered “calculations of the relative risks and rewards of 
investment” outside of conventional jurisdictions (Bridge, 2004, p. 406; see Emel & Huber, 
2008). Combined with concerns about the depletion of the world’s major metal and fossil 
                                                          
35 Fieldnotes, October 2012; well-known consulting geologist with over thirty years experience. 
36 Often by consultants who go on to work for extractive industry corporations in those same jurisdictions (see 
Chapter Six). 
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fuel deposits37, these altered assessments of risk and reward have driven juniors to seek out 
new resource ‘frontiers’.  
The shift toward exploration in relatively unknown environments has made juniors and their 
funders particularly sensitive to ‘political risk’, or events that might motivate local 
communities or host states to restrict the profitability of extractive projects for their foreign 
investors, whether by erecting blockades and preventing ore shipment, or ‘expropriating’ 
entire mine. When I carried out my fieldwork, between 2012 and 2014, the mining market’s 
anxiety about political risk in frontier jurisdictions was compounded by the spectre of 
‘resource nationalism’ that seemed to haunt the extractive industries. Resource nationalism 
is the name that mining professionals give to the apparent tendency for host states (especially 
those in the Global South) to renegotiate royalty and taxation rates that had initially been 
negotiated with explorers or developers in previous decades, when mineral and metal prices 
were at a nadir, prior to the commodities boom or ‘supercycle’ that seemed like it was about 
to peak in 2012-2013 (see Chapter Six).  
The pursuit of new frontiers and the negotiation of political risk became the explicit focus 
of many events on the mining market’s annual calendar, from continuing professional 
development masterclasses for members of a mining finance professionals organization that 
were held in the offices of City of London law firms, to ‘FINEX: Exploration Meets the 
City’, an end-of-year event held at the Geological Society’s premises on Piccadilly which 
epitomized the mingling of technoscience and capital in the market for mineral exploration. 
A new round of events was even set up by the organizers of quarterly ‘Global Mining 
Finance’ briefings in the City’s Chamber of Commerce: an annual session on ‘Global Mining 
Frontiers’. At ‘Mines & Money London’, one of the extractive industries’ three most 
significant events worldwide, explorers advertised the safety of their jurisdictions to potential 
investors, while lawyers gave seminars on how juniors could protect themselves against 
hostile states.  
At these events, it became apparent that the speculative production of extractive 
opportunities in new ‘frontiers’ rests less upon calculations of the relative risk and reward of 
investment in these jurisdictions (cf. Bridge, 2004) than it does upon the speculative framing 
of national territories as favourable ‘investment climates’. These framings draw on a long-
                                                          
37 See for instance Williams, L. (2012) ‘New gold finds not keeping up with resource depletion’, Mineweb, 18 
July [Online]. Available at http://www.mineweb.com/archive/new-gold-finds-not-keeping-up-with-resource-
depletion/ (Accessed: 8 September 2015) 
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standing practice of summarizing the national character of those who inhabit the territories 
in question, arranging the resultant images of ‘Europeanized’ or unruly populations into 
rankings that this time reflect the extractive industries’ willingness to invest (and which can 
serve as disciplinary devices when negotiating with host governments). I discuss these 
speculative hierarchies in Section 3.2, arguing that Mines & Money London is a successor to 
the World’s Fairs of previous centuries, where national populations were likewise arranged 
in hierarchies that reflected their prospects as trading partners. 
But the speculative is only one moment in the process of assembling productive and 
profitable mines. In Section 3.3 I describe the forms of expertise, calculation and inscription 
that must be deployed in order to transform a truly speculative prospect into a sober financial 
object, that can be listed on London’s Alternative Investment Market. In the process, I reflect 
critically on recent anthropological and sociological work that has taken a ‘material’ and 
‘posthuman’ turn, inspired partly by actor-network theory (e.g. Latour, 1994, 2005) and partly 
by a broader ‘ontological turn’ within anthropology (see Kohn, 2015). For those working in 
this tradition, market agencies or resource materialities emerge out of assemblages that draw 
in a range of human and non-human ‘actants’.  
My ethnographic tracing of the work that goes into assembling extractive industry 
investments suggests that these posthuman approaches share a great deal with market 
practitioners’ own understandings of how profitable resources materialize. Whereas this kind 
of accommodation or deferral to the voices and perspectives of one’s ethnographic subjects 
has traditionally been championed within anthropology (e.g. Englund & Leach, 2000; 
Fernandez, 1986; Strathern, 1999), it leaves little space for articulating an ethnographically-
grounded, critical perspective on the workings of extractive industry capitalism, something I 
move further towards in Chapter Four.  
Firstly, however, in Section 3.1 I situate the junior mining economy in terms of recent 
anthropological work on speculation and the temporality of financial markets. Much of this 
work has drawn upon ethnographies of currency and derivatives traders, and has emphasized 
the instantaneous time of networked markets, or the folding of forecasts and expectations 
into real-time market decision-making. In my ethnography of London’s mining market, 
however, the speculative accumulation of funds for exploration relies upon a different 
temporal imaginary: one which situates frontier jurisdictions outside the real-time of the 
market, on an evolutionary scale of temporal distance that places European investment elites 
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on the top rung. The more ‘Europeanized’ a territory is perceived to be, the greater the 
chance of attracting the funds needed to turn a mineral deposit into a mine.  
Temporal distancing of a similar kind has been thoroughly critiqued by Johannes Fabian, in 
his essays on the “denial of coevalness” between ethnographer and subject in early 
anthropological writing (Fabian, 1983, pp. 72-73 passim). One response within anthropology 
has been to articulate an ‘anthropology of the contemporary’ (Rabinow, 2008; Rabinow et 
al., 2008) that attempts to update the tools developed to study “people out of time” in order to 
study “timely phenomena” (Rees in Rabinow et al., 2008, p. 13). This programme of 
ethnography attuned to “the emergent present”38 that is (allegedly) occupied by “the 
intellectually more active of ethnography’s subjects” (Marcus, 2012, p. 435), or the experts 
whose job it is to observe and usher in the future (Rabinow, 2008, pp. 57–66), might seem 
particularly apposite for an anthropologist interested in financial markets. But in switching 
one’s ethnographic attention to the here and now, rather than the far-away and timeless 
(Marcus 2003), something is lost. The extent to which financial elites oriented to the 
emergent present continue to deny their coevalness with inhabitants of the frontier jurisdictions upon which 
they speculate is neither confronted, surpassed nor redressed. In the rush to make up for 
anthropology’s past temporalizing sins, it would be a grave error indeed to overlook those 
of our ethnographic ‘contemporaries’. 
3.1: THE TIME OF FINANCE 
The junior mining sector comes close to epitomizing what Manuel Castells (2000, p. 10-11) 
terms “network enterprise.” The product of a new, global capitalism underpinned by 
information and communication technologies, network enterprise sees firms continuing as 
the legal units of capital accumulation, while flexible, multi-firm business projects become the 
units of production. Certainly, some exploration projects (and many in the early stages of 
development) are joint ventures, but a form of network enterprise is also discernible in the 
recombinant boards of directors that form and reform as projects fail (or are sold on to 
                                                          
38 By the ‘emergent present’ Marcus (2012: 435) means “the ‘just past and the near future,’” which he suggests 
increasingly does (or should) define ethnographic projects “more than the space or site with a ‘definable past 
and a captured present.’” Similarly, Rabinow defines the ‘contemporary’ as neither simply ‘the new’, nor ‘the 
modern’ (as opposed to the traditional). Rather, the contemporary is  “a mode of historicity whose scale is 
relatively modest and whose scope is relatively short in range” (Rabinow in Rabinow et al. 2008: 58). An 
anthropology of the contemporary can be contrasted to older ‘salvage’ anthropology in which the ethnographer 
already knew “what was actual and what was passing from the [temporal stable] scene” (Rabinow 2008: 50); the 
ethnographer’s attention should be on emergent assemblages of diverse contemporary phenomena. 
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‘major’ mining corporations like Rio Tinto or Anglo American). Exploration is, as many 
geologists would tell you, a “thousand to one” gamble.39  
Take Gerard Holden, for instance. The CEO of GCM Resources PLC during most of my 
fieldwork, and a former head of natural resource investment at Barclay’s, Holden’s earlier 
position as CEO and Chairman of the controversial Democratic Republic of Congo-focused 
Brinkley Resources was highlighted in early 2012 by a London Mining Network report, that 
put forward a case for stronger regulatory oversight on the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM) (LMN 2012: 14-16). Holden had ceased his involvement in Brinkley (now de-listed) 
by the time the report was written, and had moved on to GCM. His is by no means a rare 
career path among the directors of junior listed on AIM. The less regulated, younger sibling 
of the London Stock Exchange, AIM is second only to the Toronto Venture Exchange 
(TSX–V) by the number of mining juniors listed.40 Listing on an exchange like AIM or TSX-
V, however, only occurs after a certain amount of speculative accumulation has taken place, 
and ‘scoping’, ‘pre-feasibility’ and ‘bankable feasibility’ studies have all been completed (see 
Section 3.3).  
In the early stages of exploration, listing can be detrimental to your business interests – 
especially when operating in frontiers or ‘pioneer’ environments. As one West Africa-focused 
gold explorer put it at ‘FINEX: Exploration Meets the City’ in 2012, 
When you’re in that sort of pioneer environment and you don’t 
know where your work is going to go, the last thing you want is to 
make announcements – it will make a gold rush. So stay off people’s 
radar screens, only go to the market and list once you have 
something of finite value. We raised our first five and a half million 
from friends and family.41 
                                                          
39 Fieldnotes, December 2012; freelance geologist. I met this geologist regularly as we both attended many of 
the mining market’s calendar of events, I for my research, and he in search of employment. I had asked him if 
it could be true that (as I’d earlier been told), 1000:1 was the ratio of exploration attempts to marketable 
discoveries: “that’s the number” was his firm response.  
40 Around 1400 of the 2340  companies listed on TSX-V are mining juniors. See Business in Vancouver (2015) 
‘“Zombie” miners pulling down TSX Venture exchange’, mining.com, 16 March [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.mining.com/web/zombie-miners-pulling-tsx-venture-exchange/  (Accessed 8 September 2015). 
As of 28th August, There are 125 mining companies listed on AIM, out of a total 1066. See Deneault and Sacher 
(2010) for a critical account of how Canada became the ‘legal haven of choice’ for the extractive industries.  
41 Fieldnotes, October 2012. 
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Once a company is listed, however, it becomes implicated in the kind of stock trading and 
portfolio investment that has occupied the attention of several sociologists and 
anthropologists working on the temporality of finance, and on speculation in particular.  
For Castells, the temporal complement to network enterprise is “timeless time,” in which 
time is compressed “as in split second global financial transactions” that take place in a 
“space of flows” (Castells, 2000, p. 13).42 A similar spatio-temporal imaginary inhabits Bill 
Maurer’s (1995) early work on offshore finance. Exploring the resonance between complex 
systems theory and offshore financial networks, Maurer (1995, p. 136) depicts offshore 
finance as existing in an “atemporal nonspace.”43 Edward LiPuma and Benjamin Lee’s (2002) 
work on derivatives and financial cultures of circulation parallels Castells’ argument by 
arguing that new information technologies and flexible, highly skilled workers will come 
together to create a “unified cosmopolitan culture of unimpeded circulation” divorced from 
production (LiPuma & Lee 2002, p. 210).  
Positioned in the space of flows, as nodes in a culture of circulation, the electronic herd of 
globally networked traders seem to be prime candidates for Marcus’ and Rabinow’s 
anthropology of the contemporary, concerned with the here-and-now rather than the far 
away and outside of time. Caitlin Zaloom (2003) describes, for instance, how the bond 
traders among whom she carried out research were largely unconcerned with interpreting the 
cause of a sudden spike in bond prices by turning to the Reuters news wire: “All the necessary 
information for these second-by-second traders is in the bid-ask numbers (Zaloom, 2003, p. 
262). A similar real-time fixation with the screen world of the market is described by Knorr-
Cetina and Bruegger (2000, 2002) in their study of Swiss currency traders.  
But some market practitioners deploy their own moralizing temporal imaginaries from which 
they pass judgement on these real-time orientations towards ‘atemporal nonspace’ and the 
‘timeless space of flows’. These imaginaries inevitably involve attempts to establish a 
                                                          
42 Castells (2009, p. xli) has expanded his notion of timeless time to encompass the time discipline through 
which flexible information workers are encouraged to purse the “mirage of transcending time,” and even to 
interpreting drone warfare, but maintains that “I first found the traces of timeless time while analyzing the 
workings of financial networks.” 
43 As to the precise relationship between the world of offshore finance as its practitioners present it, the 
complexity theory whose terms seem to describe it, and Maurer’s own apprehension of the offshore economy, 
his article is frustratingly opaque. Maurer neither claims that the offshore economy is ‘performed’ by complexity 
theory in Callon’s (1998) or MacKenzie’s (2001) sense; nor does he simply say that complexity theory describes 
the offshore economy. Instead, Maurer describes complexity theory and offshore finance as equally “complicit 
in the creation of this world” (Maurer, 1995, p. 115); refers to a new kind of posthuman, timeless economy 
“instantiated by complexity and offshore finance” (ibid., p. 117); and depicts a world “beyond time-space 
compression” that is “presented by complexity theory and offshore finance” (ibid., p. 121). 
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distinction between ‘speculation’ and ‘investment’. Marieke de Goede (2005) and Donald 
MacKenzie (2009) have both traced the historical and ongoing work that is required to 
distinguish speculation from gambling and periodically rearticulate speculation as a “virtuous 
business practice” carried out by “masculine and responsible managers of the future” (de 
Goede, 2005, 58). In the USA, court rulings issued during the nineteenth century established 
speculation as a legitimate practice “based on calculation containing elements of reason” 
(ibid.,65-66), while gambling was circumscribed as the blind submission to fortune and 
chance.44 
In financial textbooks, the ‘elements of reason’ that are to be found in speculation can be 
laid out in temporal terms. Speculators enter into markets – derivative markets, for instance 
– to take bets on future price directions, whereas hedgers would buy derivatives to offset a 
pre-existing exposure to a risk (see Miyazaki, 2007, pp. 399-400). In a recent piece written 
for the CFA [Chartered Financial Analysts’] Institute, Robert Hagstrom also presents 
speculative reason in temporal terms: 
All market activity lies on a time continuum. Moving from left to 
right, we observe buy–sell decisions in the stock market that occur 
in microseconds, minutes, hours, days, weeks, months, years, and 
decades. Although it is unclear exactly where the demarcation line 
is located, it is generally agreed that activity occurring on the left side 
of the time continuum is more likely to be speculation, whereas 
activity residing on the right side is thought to be investing. 
(Hagstrom, 2013, unpaged) 
Thus Zaloom’s bond traders, unpeturbed by the difference between Citibank and a Central 
Bank intervening in their market for more than a few seconds, would perhaps count as 
speculators.  
 Hagstrom’s temporal definition of speculation resonates with a moral temporalizing 
discourse found by Langenohl (2008) among the German portfolio managers whom he 
interviewed. For these portfolio managers, short-term investment was irrational and the cause 
                                                          
44 The specific temporal politics engendered by currency derivatives trading have been of particular interest to 
sociologists (Esposito 2011; Opitz & Tellman 2015) and anthropologists (Haiven 2014; Lee & LiPuma 2002; 
LiPuma & Lee 2004, 2005) in recent years, particularly in the wake of the 2007-08 financial crisis. These authors 
have argued that since the trade in derivatives is an attempt to deal with the volatility engendered by free-
floating currencies, and that volatility is a measure of the risk that investors face, the trade in derivatives is a 
trade in risk. The trade in risk is, in turn, a trade in exposure to future market states that not only runs the risk 
of creating further (correlated) risks, but forecloses upon attempts to generate alternative economic futures.  
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of socially harmful bubbles and crises, whilst long-term investment was rational and based 
on seeking a return on welfare-maximizing developments in the productive economy.45 
Langenohl’s fund managers’ self-depiction partakes of the very political polemic against 
speculation that anthropologist Ellen Hertz (2000) takes to task for opposing  
what is simultaneously real and good – a sane world of investment 
in which real value is produced through markets’ underlying relation 
with the productive economy – to what is concomitantly unreal and 
dangerous – the insane world of speculation. (Hertz, 2000, p. 41) 
The type specimen of this polemic is, for Hertz, J.M. Keynes’ famous analogy between beauty 
contests and speculation, where he derided the speculator for doing little more than 
“anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be” (Keynes, 1936, p. 
156). The issue for Hertz is not the temporal orientation of speculators, or even whether 
their calculations contain elements of reason: it is the fact that this anti-speculation polemic 
has emerged out of an apparent hostility toward ‘virtual’ representations where they seem to 
be generated independently from material production processes.  
This polemic, or moralizing tendency, can certainly be detected in Castell’s formulation of a 
timeless space of flows, Maurer’s atemporal nonspace, and Lee and LiPuma’s circulatory 
capitalism. Hertz’s work is useful in highlighting the extent to which almost all 
anthropological attempts to grapple with speculation run into or reflect moral assessments 
of certain kinds of economic practice and representation.  
Borrowing from Bruno Latour (1993) the notion that ‘moderns’ insist upon purifying and 
separating out the always-hybridized material from the social in financial markets, Hertz reads 
the political polemic against speculation as an expression of hostility towards the trade in 
economic representations that are neither explicitly material (linked to production processes 
and meeting economic needs) nor entirely social (speculation may, in fact, impact upon those 
very production processes). Continuing in a Latourian vein, Hertz suggests that abandoning 
this moral position would allow us to recognize financial markets as networks of quasi-
objects. A quasi-object is “neither mere object of human ingenuity nor ‘legal person’ subject 
only to the laws of economics” (Hertz, 2000, p. 49). Recognizing the hybrid nature of the 
                                                          
45 As Langenohl (2008: 18) shows, however, when he asked the portfolio managers about the (Second) Gulf 
War, they suggested that the moral order could best be sustained by them acting faster, before the irrational 
speculators, based on what they knew about the First Gulf War’s impact on pricing and production. 
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quasi-objects that populate financial markets might, she argues, allow us to better harness 
those same quasi-objects to serve the needs of the communities that financial markets create.  
I revisit this proposed move away from conceptualizing financial practice in virtual, 
circulatory, timeless terms, and towards exploring the materialities (MacKenzie, 2009) and 
‘quasi-objects’ (Hagglund, 2000) that must be assembled in order for extractive industry 
investments (speculative or otherwise) to proceed, in Section 3.3. Hertz’s work is significant 
in pointing towards this move, but she retains a number of problematic assumptions in her 
approach to speculation. Reminiscent of Hagstrom’s (2013) CFA briefing and the portfolio 
managers studied by Langenohl (2008), Hertz argues there are in fact good reasons to worry 
about speculation, because  
it disrupts the process of allocative efficiency, sending spurious 
signals to the productive economy which slow the flow of capital to 
its more efficient long-term users. (Hertz, 2000, p. 42) 
This assessment condenses a number of Hertz’s own moralizing and sociological assumptions 
that go un-confronted in her writing.  
Firstly, Hertz cleaves to the notion that market prices are signals that when working properly, 
direct economic production. Thus, questions about the extent to which prices might in fact 
register majority opinion (rather than the price-setting power of elite groups) are glossed 
over, as are more fundamental questions about the ability of the price mechanism to 
maximize welfare (cf. Bholat, 2010). It is unclear how reconceptualizing markets in terms of 
‘quasi-objects’ would run up against these avowedly less progressive elements of Hertz’s 
approach.  Finally, by writing about speculation in general or ‘ontological’ terms, Hertz 
reproduces a weakness that Sam Knafo (2009) observes in the popular accounts that would 
treat speculative bubbles as the outcome of unreasoned hype and the madness of crowds: 
she “frames speculation as something that is irrational and which, since it takes place in an 
institutional vacuum, seems to follow a same logic across time” (Knafo, 2009, p. 137). 
There is, then, a tendency for anthropologists and sociologists to set their accounts of 
speculation outside of historical time.46 This is done by treating speculative investment as a class 
of behaviour in and of itself, one that can be diagnosed in terms of a short-term profit-
                                                          
46 In fairness to Lee and LiPuma (2002; also LiPuma & Lee 2004), they do locate the rise of a speculative trade 
in derivatives in time, by seeing it is a consequence of the decline of Bretton Woods and the emergence of free-
floating currencies in the 1970s. However, by framing speculative capital as that which does not derive its value 
from production, and depicting circulatory capitalism as marked by a “significant break with the temporalities 
of production….that makes the speculative uses of these instruments possible” (Lee & LiPuma 2002, p. 209), 
they commit the analytical sins pinpointed by both Hertz (2000) and Knafo (2009).  
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motive, or the placing of bets upon a future state of a market independent of the production 
processes which that market ‘should’ support. How might I conceptualize the speculative 
practices that animate the junior mining market – whose practitioners eschew attempts to 
delineate ‘speculation’ and ‘gambling’ – in terms that are not ahistorical, overly-
psychologized, nor wedded to an assumption that without speculation, markets would operate 
efficiently? How can speculation be grasped beyond the putative atemporal nonspace of the 
trader’s screen?  
Mining professionals certainly differentiate between what they do in the early stages of 
attracting funds for exploration and the practices of stock, bond and derivative speculation 
that have captured the imagination of sociologists and anthropologists. In April 2013 I 
managed to secure a place on the ‘Mining in a Day’ course that was recommended to me by 
a group of Corporate Social Responsibility managers working for major extractive industry 
corporations. They had accused anti-mine protestors of not understanding mineral 
economics, and suggested that if I wanted to understand mineral economics properly, I 
would have to do the same course that they had done when they moved into the industry 
(see Chapters Two & Five).  
There, amongst the analysts and the professional directors newly appointed to the boards of 
mining companies, the exploration–geologist–turned–World–Bank–economist who ran the 
course began by stating that: 
We’re not talking about investment in shares. That’s a completely 
different ball game. I was gonna [sic] say I’m not qualified to talk 
about that but I don’t think anyone’s qualified, you know, to speak of 
why stocks go up and down.47 
In his assessment of stock market activity there is a hint of a moralizing and psychologizing 
discourse about speculative activity: where volatility in financial markets cannot be explained 
by efficient price signals or productive processes, someone must be speculating. And if 
something different happens in the junior mining economy it is, perhaps, less a matter of 
speculation than of “spectacular accumulation” in Anna Tsing’s terms, whereby “the self-
conscious making of a spectacle is a necessary aid to gathering investment funds” (Tsing, 
2000, p. 119). Tsing’s notion of spectacular accumulation has since been applied to a range 
of dramatic projects, from fortress conservation (Igoe, 2010) to genomic medicine startups 
(Sunder Rajan, 2005) and Indonesian land rushes (Li, 2014), but was originally developed 
                                                          
47 Fieldnotes, April 2013. 
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through an analysis of the Bre-X scandal. This involved a Canadian TSX–V-listed junior 
whose stock price rose to C$300 per share before plummeting, upon the discovery that its 
finds in Busang, Indonesia, did not exist. 
Tsing’s point was that drama, performance and spectacle are not only at play in fraudulent 
speculative frenzies; they are functional to all attempts to explore for or develop mines. 
Companies “must exaggerate the possibilities of their [prospects] in order to attract investors 
so that they might, at some point, find something” (Tsing, 2000, p. 119). I will return to 
Tsing’s writing on Bre–X in Section 3.3, since responses to and a certain awareness of Bre–
X within the mining market has fundamentally reshaped the processes by which speculative 
mines are assembled into investable ‘quasi-objects’. Tsing draws attention away from trading 
floors, and away from conceptualizing speculation as a distortion of price signals in an 
otherwise efficient productive economy. She foregrounds the extent to which “the magical 
storytelling of investment opportunities…performatively constitute[s] ‘real’ economic 
performance, in the form of measured international capital flows” (de Goede, 2005, p. 8). 
But, unfortunately, she too ends up crafting a theory of speculation that is out of time, 
arguing that spectacular accumulation can be found not only in Bre–X, or more generally 
today, but “in the South Sea bubble and every gold rush in history’ (Tsing, 2000, p. 142; cf. 
Knafo, 2009).  
One promising perspective on speculation that has been put forward recently comes from 
Laura Bear’s (2015) ethnography of Hooghly River bureaucrats and entrepreneurs. Bear 
develops Tsing’s interest in the magical storytelling that precedes accumulation, but asks how 
speculative investment is guided to rather than drawn in towards specific enterprises. 
Speculation is not conceived of as interference in otherwise efficient price signals, nor as a 
kind of short-termism. Rather, speculation is found in the moments where “exemplary men” 
can create meaning out of accidental occurrences, turning them into “truth events” that can be 
used to guide investment that may, sometimes, lead to the accumulation of capital.  
Bear’s approach lends itself to an ethnographically grounded conceptualization of 
speculation, in relation to specific institutional and discursive contexts. It demands that we 
ask about how it is that certain men come to be ‘exemplary’; and about what kinds of 
discourses, images and frames they use to create meaning and guide investment. In Section 
3.2, I engage with Bear’s approach to speculation, fleshing out the temporalizing frames 
through which exemplary men operating in the market for mining finance guide investment 
towards particular ‘frontier’ jurisdictions, and not others. Drawing comparisons between 
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Mines & Money London and the World’s Fairs of previous centuries, I show that placing 
nations and territories on a hierarchy of progress towards ‘Europeanization’ allows certain 
exemplary – even if not necessarily ethical – men to designate the accidental occurrence of 
some ore bodies as potentially profitable mines, and others as mere mineral deposits.  
3.2: WORLD’S FAIR, TRADE FAIR, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY BAZAAR 
Mines & Money London is one of the three most significant dates in the extractive industry 
calendar. The other two are PDAC (Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada), 
hosted in Toronto, and Mining Indaba, held in South Africa. Where PDAC has a ‘technical’ 
focus and a reputation for being where ‘the real deals get done’, Mining Indaba is known for 
having a greater focus on ‘networking’ and public relations. The atmosphere and emphasis 
of Mines & Money falls midway between PDAC and Indaba. It is a chance for the mostly 
male analysts, auditors, lawyers, geologists and explorers from Canada, Australia, South 
Africa and London, to reconnect since they last met at PDAC (which takes place in March), 
and make plans for Indaba (held in February). But Mines & Money is not open to just anyone. 
A two-pass in 2012 – the full event runs for four and a half days – ran to £1342.50, and my 
access for the remainder of the week was afforded by a sympathetic event planner.48 
There was a heavy security presence at the entrance to the venue, the choice of which is 
anything but incidental. Mines & Money is hosted at the Business Design Centre in Islington, 
North London, which, for the convenience of transnational elites on the move, is adjoined 
to the Hilton. The Business Design Centre was originally opened as the Royal Agricultural 
Hall in 1862, the year of the South Kensington International Exhibition, and designed 
specifically to emulate the Crystal Palace which hosted the inaugural World’s Fair in 1851. 
The Hall had been built, in part, to bring the rowdy atmosphere of Vauxhall Pleasure 
Gardens in to an “established and respectable venue, patronized by the Queen herself” 
(Toulmin, 2006, p. 132). Such mingling of bawdiness and establishment respectability was 
recalled when, on the third day of Mines & Money London 2012, a metal trading firm hosted 
a business-card prize draw, made by a scantily clad Miss England, with the prize on offer 
being the value of the London Metals Exchange index on the day in question, at 2 p.m. (The 
value of this index is derived from the average price of six key non-ferrous metals over the 
                                                          
48 Unless otherwise stated, all quotes and observations referred to in Section 3.2 are drawn from Mines & 
Money London 2012, which was held from 2nd to 6th of December, 2012. 
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previous three months, and is used in the pricing of futures contracts for those who desire 
‘exposure’ to the metal trade.)  
The unabashedly salacious comments made by the suited men arranged in a circle around 
Miss England served as a reminder that, efforts of the ‘Women in Mining Network’ 
notwithstanding, London’s mining market is an avowedly male domain. This in turn is a fact 
often made the subject of ironic asides made between men who are aware of, but do not 
disavow, the industry’s hypermasculine social codes. In the centre of the Business Design 
Centre, not far from the prize draw, tables were arranged for ‘business to business’ meetings 
between explorers and potential investors, who discussed expected returns, the problem of 
‘resource nationalism’ (see Chapter Six), and the need to look to new, potentially risky, 
frontiers. Similar “matchmaking” or “frontier mining speed-dating” sessions were held for 
investors, consulting geologists, explorers, and analysts at the Global Mining Finance and 
Global Mining Frontiers events held throughout the year in the City of London’s Chamber 
of Commerce.49  
Stalls arranged around the meeting tables advertised engineering equipment, geological 
consultancies, and the services that could be provided by ‘Big Four’ auditing firms Ernst & 
Young and Pricewaterhousecoopers. I mentioned, when asked by the head of extractive 
industries at Ernst & Young what I was researching, that I had head a great deal about 
‘political risk’ and ‘resource nationalism’. “Here,” he responded, handing me a USB stick. 
“Have some of our thought leadership” (see Chapter Six). “I grew up in Rhodesia so I know 
all about political instability and what it can do, and the way they treated mining companies 
there, which was terrible.” On the opposite side of the hall was a stand hosted by a wealth 
management firm, whose directors had flown over from Bermuda to offer solutions for 
exploration geologists paid in “unregistered paper” or bearer shares. “Eight out of ten times, 
the project fails. But if it works, we can really do things.” For the speculative consulting 
geologist, this was one way to move up the junior mining market’s internal hierarchy, and 
becoming a director for one of its recombinant, ‘network enterprises’. 
Later in the event, I bumped into Mark, a consulting geologist whom I had already met at a 
number of events, including masterclasses hosted by associations of mining finance 
professionals and ‘FINEX’, and asked about the unregistered paper. “It never used to be 
that way, but a few geologists in the 90s started working for equity. If you get it right…” He 
                                                          
49 Fieldnotes, October& December 2012; April 2013. 
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knew a geologist who had been paid with speculative shares in Aureus Gold and ended up 
with £500 million, but seemed somewhat disapproving. Mark was there for the rock (see 
Chapter Four).  
Stopping briefly to speak to a journalist from a Canadian mining industry publication, in 
London to “check the mood of the market,” I paused at a stall belonging to an Australia–
based, West Africa–focused junior, which was entirely composed of drilling results and 
geological survey maps. I asked how they were faring, and the surprisingly honest reply was 
“not good enough, but we’re drilling. Burkina is the biggest place for Australia right now.” 
And Liberia, I asked, noting the location of some of their other drill sites?  
Yeah, it’s to do with the change to the mining act. It’s easier to drill 
there than in Australia. It can take twelve months [in Australia] 
because you have to get Native Title. There’s none of that here. 
Liberia is a new country. It needs investment. The administration 
can be a bit backwards sometimes, but it’s a good jurisdiction. 
The Native Title Act (1993) was passed in Australia after the hard-fought Mabo ruling, 
delivered in 1992, overturned the standing doctrine of terra nullius, which stated that there 
had been no pre-colonial owners of any land in Australia (see also Chapter Seven). Native 
Title considerations are at stake in many Australian mining projects (e.g. Martin et al., 2014). 
And, while Native Title proceedings have been critiqued for forcing indigenous categories 
of belonging and relatedness to submit to the distortion of Euro-Australian legal forms in 
their quest for recognition (Povinelli, 2002), it is clear that this imperfect move towards 
greater justice for indigenous Australians has tried the patience of speculative extractive 
industry capital, pushing them to search for new frontiers that, however ‘backward’, pose 
less of a threat to the ability to secure future earnings from a mineral deposit.  
Nearby, I spoke to a young broker, Tim, who had worked as an engineer in Canada and 
South Africa before graduating to the financial side of the resource exploration market and 
joining one of the two dominant extractive industry brokerage firms in the City. He explained 
to me that while the market was at the bottom of a slump, it was partly because eighteen 
months ago, a lot of “open-ended money, not very intelligent money” had been coming in – 
in other words, retail investment funds with no limit on the number of shares in a fund that 
can be bought, and investors may cash out whenever they want. The “smart money” was 
going to start coming in to the mining sector soon, he assured me; the more discreet funds 
who often use borrowed funds to leverage their investments, seeking bigger and more long-
term returns, and who are more careful about getting burned by ‘political risk’ and ‘resource 
nationalism’. And resource nationalism was a big problem at the moment: Guinea, he said, 
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had recently hiked their tax and royalty payments, so Rio Tinto had sent them a “big fuck 
you” by announcing that they would not be spending anything on bringing Guinea’s 
Simandou project, the ‘El Dorado of iron ore’, into production. “Basically,” said Tim, “if 
you fuck around with us, we’ll fuck around with you.” 
“Compare Burkina Faso,” he continued. “It’s a poor country, but has 25% taxation, and 2% 
royalty. The Ethiopians have something like 35% and 8%. Which is just impossible.” Unless, 
Tim said, “you bring in the World Bank and the IFC. They look after the projects.” Later in 
the week, I made the mistake of mentioning to a representative of an Ethiopia-focused 
junior, ‘PotashCo’, that a broker had recently told me that Ethiopia was not a good 
jurisdiction, and impossible unless you had IFC backing. He demanded several times to point 
out the broker who had given voice to these damaging sentiments (although I would not tell 
him, unsure of quite what I had done).  True, he said, they had finance from the IFC. But 
that was just “reams of compliance. IFC was only interested in the social welfare and not the 
economic side, but they saw that we were bringing jobs and infrastructure.” This depiction 
is, certainly, at odds with the World Bank Group’s own internal review of IFC support for 
extractive industry projects, which showed them to often have little regard for, if not a 
damaging effect upon, mine-area residents (Salim, 2002). 
In fact, the head of natural resource investments at the IFC’s London office was, in fact, a 
regular attendee at the mining market’s calendar of events. At a Global Mining Finance event 
in 2013, he gave a presentation shortly after a lawyer from a firm specialising in family wealth 
had offered lessons on how to choose the right location in which to domicile an exploration 
firm, in order to minimize tax while avoiding the excess attention that comes with going 
“offshore.” The lawyer also encouraged miners to look to family wealth offices, who were 
getting more “sophisticated,” and interested in “filling the vacuum now that banks are de-
risking their balance sheets” in light of new Basel III risk-weighted capital requirements (see 
Chapter One). The head of IFC’s natural resources portfolio then gave the keynote 
presentation, before the networking or ‘speed–dating’ began, and started with the 
observation that “the economic centre of gravity of the world is shifting east and slightly 
south.”  
Intersecting with elements of the frontier market discourse described in Chapter One – and 
originating, initially, from the IFC itself – he went on to observe that the challenge for the 
mining industry was 
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How do you convert this bulging youth into a workforce…which is 
good for political stability and social stability but which is also gonna 
get your mines built? 
Of course, to do so, you would have to negotiate the fact that “things are not getting any 
easier because communities are getting more and more expectations,” so good community 
engagement was essential. After his presentation, a question was put to the IFC 
representative by a Danish Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) consultant, who I would 
meet again at an ‘ethical mining’ summit discussed in Chapter Five: “You talk about 
community engagement and all these lovely things, what does it do to their cost of capital 
and why should investors be willing to do that?” The answer was that: 
It’s part of your insurance. It is not a matter of should I spend this 
on a new truck or a community project. If you get this wrong you 
might have spent $200 million or $300 million on your mill or 
processing plant, but if they’re blocking the road you’re not going 
to get anything. 
The IFC representative was hoping to convince the market that rather than being a ‘cost to 
capital,’ CSR programmes constituted a type of insurance that was increasingly essential as 
juniors began to explore in new frontiers. And where the earnings of juniors like PotashCo, 
or even major projects like Simandou, was threatened by ‘resource nationalism’ (tax and 
royalty hikes), the IFC could be a useful equity partner. In this case, they would effectively 
provide ‘insurance’ against expressions of sovereignty by postcolonial nations (see Chapter 
Seven), ensuring that at least some revenue could be recovered even if mining companies 
failed to fully exercise social control around their projects.  
When I interviewed the head of natural resources at IFC, he insisted that they would only 
partner with those miners who shared their concern with job creation and infrastructure 
development, something that PotashCo had hinted at. They would not partner with those 
who had a “grab–the–money–and–run mentality.”50 Such people most certainly do exist in 
the junior mining sector, and their (im)morality is often discussed with reference to ‘lifestyle 
companies’. With so many exploration bids failing, it can be hard to know for sure who is 
running a lifestyle company that is not producing revenue for its investors. At the annual 
general meeting of a mining finance professionals’ association, just over a week after Mines 
& Money 2012, M  , a former analyst and author of a number of guides to mining investment, 
launched his new ‘official’ history of the industry. Gathered in the City of London’s 
underground virtual golf course, around the corner from the Bank of England, the assembled 
                                                          
50 Interview notes, February 2013. 
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crowd was told they could be proud of their shared heritage: Benjamin Disraeli had in fact 
been an early mining analyst. Of course, M   joked, the industry had its “rogues,” such as the 
well-known and celebrated ‘Mr R’, and the analysts responded with complicit laughter. I 
asked him during drinks afterwards what he had meant. M   replied that “liars and tricksters, 
you’ll get them. You’re mostly brokers here [at the meeting]. So sometimes you’ll get the 
same ones coming back through your door and you wonder, why do you bother?”51 “Some 
of them are just liars,” put in an exploration geologist–turned–analyst, who was frequently 
featured on Bloomberg’s financial television news, “but the trouble is, the industry’s basically 
impossible to regulate.” 
When I spoke to Tim, the broker who almost landed me in hot water with PotashCo, at his 
office in 2013, he also observed that in the small world of the junior mining sector, you see 
the same faces all the time. Although, if you’re seeing them at events like Global Mining 
Finance and Mines & Money, “they’ve got spare time, and they aren’t making a lot of 
money.”52 And lifestyle companies weren’t just the liars, they were the players in an economy 
of appearances, generating a spectacle to attract funds for exploration, who failed to produce 
a cash flow. Tim knew one explorer, for instance, who “had this office with fantastic oak 
furniture in Mayfair,” but then had his premises stripped down, and now works from home. 
For those new to the sector, moral questions about accumulation do not only arise in relation 
to whether explorers are ‘lying’ or failing to generate cash flow. Even from the centre, the 
mining industry can appear like an occult economy. 
Jean and John Comaroff (2003, p. 150) have written about the proliferation of zombie 
imagery in the “occult economies” that emerge when material enrichment appears to proceed 
through magical means, set apart from more transparent productive processes. Alongside 
their work, a number of anthropologists (e.g. Smith, 2011; Walsh, 2004) have written about 
the conspiratorial accounts that are generated when mine-area communities or artisanal 
miners attempt to make sense of fluctuating mining markets that allow accumulation for 
extractive industry corporations but not for those outside of their fence line. For Todd 
Sanders and Harry West (2003), the proliferation of conspiracy discourses reflects an 
assumption there is an “interior” to the workings of power, but question how far it can be 
made “transparent.” One might conceive of extractive industry bazaars like Mines & Money 
                                                          
51 Fieldnotes, December 2012. 
52 Interview, April 2013. 
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as just such an ‘interior’, in which the operation of power in the mining market is made 
manifest. But not all experience it that way.  
I chatted to Greg, a recent PhD graduate in geology, at several events on the mining calendar, 
and at the seminars on ‘money mining’ that are discussed in Chapter Four. We both, it seems, 
felt equally out of place in the mining market’s aggressively hypermasculine social order. 
Greg hadn’t made it to Mines & Money, his company was “feeling the squeeze,” but we met 
again soon after.53 He differentiated himself from the ‘corporates’ in the mining world, and 
was not the first person to tell me to be suspicious of overly glossy investor presentations 
that sacrificed geological data for high production values, in an apparent effort to seduce the 
less discerning investor. His boss, he told me, was “a bit of a genius.,” and had just managed 
to acquire licenses for gold exploration in Sudan. This despite the fact that “no one from the 
company has ever set foot there.” Talking about his boss, and about the ‘corporates’ with 
their glossy presentations, he casually remarked that, in fact “you don’t actually have to turn 
anything into a mine to make it valuable.” Instead, you “just have to find a little bit more 
than the next guy and sell it on and then – that’s what my CEO does.”  
Slightly taken aback by his honesty, I expressed to him my surprise that so many companies 
circulating in these opulent settings could describe themselves as ‘starving’ or ‘dying’. His 
response was that: 
You can’t really do much drilling for much less than one million US 
dollars. It goes really quickly. I don’t really understand it to be 
honest. It’s so expensive and so much money is lost and yet it still 
comes. We’ve been drilling in Kenya for years, and we keep sending 
ore away for analysis and I guess it looks like – well the more, say, 
sinister, locals accuse us of making money. 
Perhaps Greg meant suspicious or conspiratorial rather than ‘sinister’, but his account contains 
an intriguing inversion of the Comaroffs’ perspective on occult economies: he cannot reason 
out the magical creation of wealth in the mining sector, and knows that it does not always 
have to do with bringing deposits into production. Still, however, he rejects the ‘accusation’ 
that his project has been making money, reproducing a strongly held conviction that those 
in frontier markets tend to demand more than their fair share from mining juniors. 
In Chapter Four, I discuss in detail the tension between those who try and pump up the 
value of extractive industry prospects with no regard to production, and those who insist 
that the extracted volumes of rock and metal are all that counts as value. And, in Section 3.3, 
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I explore the ‘quasi-objects’ through which the mining industry has both tried to avoid 
fraudulent attempts at speculation, and which in fact enables the creation of value ‘on paper’. 
Firstly, however, I return to Mines & Money London 2012, and introduce some of the 
‘exemplary men’ (cf. Bear, 2015) whose attempts at stabilizing the meaning of particular 
frontier territories and ore deposits helps to guide speculative capital allocation towards 
them. I begin with Mr E, head of the world’s biggest natural resources investment fund at 
BlackRock, who berated the attendees in the auditorium to the side of the Business Design 
Centre, precisely for failing to provide adequate returns to their investors. 
Gold companies seem to have started thinking that “equity capital is basically free,” said Mr 
E, and have not been paying their shareholders (like his BlackRock fund), their dividends. 
This was disappointing since shareholders “are actually the true owners, not management.” 
Making it clear that, as an influential fund manager, cash and not ounces or tonnes mattered, 
Mr E called for “a greater level of discipline from managers not to chase volume for volume 
sake, but more growth for the shareholders.” Acknowledging the need to look to new 
‘frontiers’, Mr E said BlackRock understood “about the challenges of workforces in remote 
locations, but we won’t tolerate poor returns.” The market had been warned. 
Also due on stage in the auditorium was Mr R, the ‘rogue’ who would be half-celebrated at 
the meeting of mining finance professionals discussed above. Known to some as an 
“environmental devil”54 due to his past involvement in controversial projects, he was 
nonetheless undeniably an ‘exemplary’ man for those in the sector. The arrival of Mr R’s 
limousine at the Business Design Centre was announced to an eager crowd, and the stage 
was immediately mobbed as he walked in. When the madness of the mining crowd had 
dissipated, Mr R spoke about an upcoming, fully automated, worker–less platinum project 
he was putting together in South Africa, which was much discussed in the industry (see 
Chapter Four). “There will be no fatalities, there will be no musclepower whatsoever,” 
because compelling people to go down a mine for fifteen dollars a day “is just dead, it’s not 
a viable proposition right now.” If Mr R could convince the assembled crowd that it was 
inevitable that mines should be mechanised in South Africa (and, perhaps, ethical), and that 
he would be able to contain any hostility to an absence of jobs, he would be able to attract 
funds to his project. 
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Next up was his Kamoa project in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In keeping with Bear’s 
(2015) understanding of speculative activity, this (roguish) exemplary man set about to render 
potential digital futures meaningful for those who would invest in this copper mine: “I mean, 
think how much electricity the cloud is gonna need?” That was the point of investing in 
Kamoa. But just as the frontier market discourse outlined in Chapter One is not purely 
technical, Mr R did not set out to conjure speculative investment in his prospective mine 
purely with reference to the supply and demand of copper.  
Instead, the story of his copper mine was told through reminiscence about the time he spent 
with President Laurent Kabila in the Democratic Republic of Congo, on the day that war 
had broken out. These hypermasculine narratives are not incidental to spectacular 
accumulation, but an important part of the performance through which capital commitments 
are secured. At ‘FINEX: Exploration Meets the City’, hosted a few months before Mines & 
Money, a West Africa–focused gold explorer, after extolling the virtues of seeking out family 
wealth, given the reluctance of banks to engage with junior miners, took a question from the 
audience relating to the pictures he had displayed of his “base camp.” The questioner was 
none other than Mark (see above): “Can you go back to the pictures of the camp? For a 
twenty year–old graduate, a project like that is a dream! Do you employ young expats?”55  
The reply was affirmative, he did employ young Canadian, Australian and British geologists, 
and images of ‘base camps’ recurred in a number of investor presentations during the event, 
alongside drilling results and reports on whether reserves were proven, probable, inferred or 
indicated (see Section 3.3). The following day, an Australian miner with a platinum 
exploration project in the Republic of Congo took his turn to present, after being introduced 
as a “former Wallaby” or international rugby player. He too made a point of situating himself 
in the landscape by showing pictures of the ‘base camps’ from which drilling was carried out, 
much as earlier anthropologists would recount scenes of their arrival in frontier locations, 
looking out from their tents (Pratt, 1986; Rosaldo, 1986).  
There was much speculative work to be done here for the accident of a platinum discovery 
in Congo to be turned into a profitable mine; it had to be made meaningful in a careful way. 
For a start, investors needed to know it was the right Congo: 
Notwithstanding the branding issue of Joseph Conrad writing the 
Heart of Darkness, Congo is a good place. The Republic of Congo that 
is – not the DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo]. It’s the good 
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Congo, they have a new mineral code. The DRC, I’m afraid, is a 
shithole! 
Setting aside his confusion over the territory in which Conrad’s Heart of Darkness had in fact 
been located, this ex–Wallaby attempted to drawn in capital through a form of speculation 
that relies on a particular kind of territorial imagination. 
 Firstly, a summary image of the territory in which he operates is produced, distinguishing it 
from other more risky environments. Then, through a public performance, the meaning that 
‘his’ jurisdiction has been endowed with is projected, in the hope of transforming an accident 
of geology into a profitable mine – or, at the very least, one that is worth a little more, and 
can be sold on. This genre of performance was relatively stable across the mining economy, 
right down to the muscular capitalism that exemplary mining men would enact in order to 
accomplish a speculative moment. In early 2013, at a political risk industry event (see Chapter 
Seven) focused largely on the threat that ‘resource nationalism’ posed to mining, the stage 
was taken by a “Cambridge Blue in boxing,” who explaining that his Sierra Leone–focused 
project had on its board an ex–22 SAS General. He then attempted to convince the 
assembled crowd that Sierra Leone was misunderstood. Hoping to endow the territory (and 
the opportunities contained by it) with new meaning, he explained that he was taking 
advantage of “mispriced risk,” making easy profits in a friendly jurisdiction where few others 
compete.56 
The symbolic resources through which exemplary men seek to make meaning out of 
accidents of geology, thus channelling investment to their speculative endeavours, form part 
of a very specific imaginary. Drawing on colonial fantasies of exploration, pioneer activity, 
and inert landscapes awaiting rational exploitation by muscular European capitalists, meaning 
is explicitly given to deposits with reference to the territories in which they are found. And this 
is done in terms of an explicit territorial hierarchy that resonates profoundly with those that 
were once laid out in World’s Fairs, such as the 1851 Exposition whose Crystal Palace 
inspired the design and earlier use of Mines & Money’s Business Design Centre. 
In Peter Hoffenberg’s (2001) history of imperial expositions from Crystal Palace in 1851, to 
the early twentieth century, these World’s Fairs are presented as sites in which an imperial 
world picture was conceived of and grasped; this was a picture of a single ‘globe’ 
differentiated by race, nation and progress. The Fairs created images of empire and nation 
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which, in the words of one Dr Whewell, speaking in 1854 to the Royal Society on the Crystal 
Palace Exhibition, at Prince Albert’s behest, “‘annihilated’ time and space, or previously 
assumed chronological and geographical distances, while simultaneously creating other 
distinctions” (Hoffenberg, 2001, p. 18). Australia’s submissions to both Crystal Palace in 
1851 and the 1862 South Kensington Exhibition aimed to present an image of colonial 
progress, or trading opportunities, and to compete with other white dominions for European 
migrants (p. 141). At Mines & Money London 2012, the South Australian Government 
hosted a stand in the Business Design Centre under the banner “Mining’s Next Frontier,” 
competing anew for investment, this time with new frontiers like Liberia where the 
impediment of Native Title was not an issue. 
World’s Fairs also ordered exhibits and asked jurors to measure the “‘progress’ of each 
colony according to standard scientific criteria and stages” (Hoffenberg, 2001, p. 26). As 
Tony Bennett put it, writing on continuities between imperial exhibitions and Expo ’88 in 
Brisbane, “the underlying rhetoric of the exposition form is one of progress” (1991, p. 34). 
Penny Harvey (1996) likewise describes the spectacle through which nation-states and their 
exhibits were ranked by their resources and ingenuity at Expo ’92 in Seville. The trade fair, 
where players in globalizing markets come together to learn “what is new” and generate a 
“condition of comparability” (Skov, 2006, p. 769) is perhaps a lateral descendant of the 
World’s Fair. Mines & Money, the quintessential extractive industry bazaar, folds the trade 
fair and the World’s Fair back into one another.  
Alongside drilling results and images of ‘base camp’, presentations made by explorers to 
potential investors almost invariably involve some reference to the Fraser Institute’s Policy 
Potential Index, a ‘report card to governments’ on the attractiveness of their jurisdiction, 
compiled by surveying a pool of junior mining executives. As with frontier market discourse 
however (see Chapter One), these abstract rankings of taxation rates and environmental 
protection requirements are received and discoursed upon in light of past practices of 
arranging national populations and territories in hierarchies of progress – practices 
exemplified by imperial World’s Fairs. Consider for instance, the following headline on the 
stall for Maya Gold and Silver, in the main hall at Mines & Money: “Why Morocco? 
Constitutional monarchy with a long history of political stability. Africa’s most Europeanized 
country.” 
There is nothing innocent or merely technical about this attempt to give meaning to the 
accident of a geological deposit. It is worth investing in, because it might become a mine, 
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because Morocco’s inhabitants are reasonable, subdued, stable. Europeanized. James 
Ferguson (2006, pp. 39–40), drawing on the work of political scientist William Reno, has 
argued that the tendency for oil wealth to flow in and out of Africa through miniscule 
enclaves, without local socio–spatial connection, can be viewed as the product of a re–
animated French colonial distinction between l’Afrique utile et l’Afrique inutile; useful and 
useless Africa. I would argue, in parallel, that rankings of the ‘investment climate’ afforded 
to resource explorations in certain territories, on the basis of which capital may be 
speculatively drawn in, reflect a recovery of the Belgian colonial category of the évolué, the 
evolved Africans who did not suffer the same weakness of character that their compatriots 
did, and who were rewarded with civic recognition (see Hunt, 1990). 
Mining investors are interested in territories inhabited by putative évolués, because these are 
the territories in which there can be confidence in a future flow of revenue; an entire political 
risk industry has been built up around transmitting this kind of information (see Chapter 
Seven). The évolué is also a marker for exemplary men in the mining market – and their 
audiences – of a good ‘rule of law’, taken by conservative economists to have been bestowed 
upon unruly territories by European colonial administrations (e.g. La Porta et al., 1998). 
Stability is all. Take the headline from another stall, by Bassari Mining, seeking funds for 
exploration in Senegal: “Senegal: Successful democracy since 1960; New mining code 
introduced in 2003; Politically stable – demonstrated with recent 2012 Presidential election.”  
It may be that exemplary men are able to attract and guide speculative capital by signalling 
that their deposits are located in territories where they have confidence in their capacity to 
exert social control. But how to move from the performative attraction of speculative capital, 
to the production of a more sober object of investment that can be listed and traded on the 
stock market?  
In the next section of the chapter, I return to the issues raised by Ellen Hertz (2000), 
regarding the ‘quasi–objects’ that inhabit speculative markets, and engage with recent work 
on resource materialities in anthropology. Describing how the mining industry has responded 
to the same Bre–X scandal that Anna Tsing (2000) made the bedrock of her discourse on 
spectacular accumulation, I suggest that conceptualizing the work that geologists and 
consultants do to make mines investable in terms of quasi–objects and resource materialities 
has little critical purchase without a concept of extractive industry capitalism. This is addressed 
directly in Chapter Four. 
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3.3: QUASI–OBJECTS & RESOURCE MATERIALITIES 
For Anna Tsing (2000), the speculative bubble created by Bre–X, the Canadian miner whose 
fantastic gold find in Indonesia turned out to be non–existent, was the quintessential case of 
spectacular accumulation. What was interesting was not that it was a fraud, but that the same 
dynamics of performatively conjuring up speculative capital are at play in any context where 
funds must be accumulated before any productive or trading activity takes place. For the 
geologist–turned–economist who hosted the ‘Mining in a Day’ course for new directors, 
analysts and public relations officials in the City of London in early 2013, however, Bre–X 
was “pure fraud.”57 Bre–X is frequently mentioned at presentations, masterclasses, and 
briefings in London’s mining market, which does not seem to have quite yet recovered from 
the trauma. 
However, the mining industry did respond to Bre–X. In early 2014, I attended a mining 
finance professionals’ masterclass on the evolution of resource classification codes, along 
with a group of analysts recently back from, and exchanging stories about, that year’s Mining 
Indaba.58 Epitomizing the industry’s habit of making use of the City’s spectacular 
architecture, the meeting was held at the Counting House, the previous home of Prescott’s 
Bank (long since absorbed into the Royal Bank of Scotland). The internal arrangements are 
almost unchanged, with the clerk’s desks now forming the bars. The speaker, Pete, a geologist 
with more than twenty years of experience, began by stating that, as the assembled analysts 
doubtless knew, “a resource is made up of tonnage and political and economic factors.” This 
understanding of what makes a resource can also be found in the introduction to the 
industry’s basic textbook on ore deposits: “it is important that the geologist appreciates that 
the factors which determine whether a mineral deposit will be mined are mainly political and 
economic” (Edwards & Atkinson, 1986, p. 4). Of course, the work of exemplary men helps 
too.  
Pete argued that the challenge for explorers was twofold, and they need to answer two 
questions: how can the extent of the resource be worked out, and how can it be conveyed to 
people? He then began to speak about the Australian JORC (Joint Ore Reserves Committee) 
code, the first standardized code for reporting ‘measured,’ ‘possible,’ ‘probable’ and ‘ore in 
sight’ mineral deposits, in existence since 1989. Initially, he said, it didn’t make much 
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difference. Before the establishment of the Alternative Investment Market in 1995, London 
was “anti-junior,” unwilling to take a bet on explorers. And then Bre-X happened: 
We all know about Bre-X, we all talk about Bre-X. But it’s worth 
remembering this is a project where the developer said there were 
70 million ounces, with a possible 200 million ounces. And the fact 
it was fraud, you know, not a bad estimate like 40 million or 60 
million.  The 43-101 was a direct outcome. It doesn’t solve Bre-X 
weirdly enough because it was fraud. So one could still do that. 
The ’43-101’ to which he referred is the NI 43-101, or National Instrument 43-101, which 
was an absolutely explicit response from the Canadian mining industry and Canadian 
Securities Authority to the Bre-X scandal. Unlike JORC, which is simply a mineral reporting 
code, the NI 43-101 is a market disclosure code, which breaks classifications of geological 
prospects into ‘Mineral Resources (broken down in increasing order of confidence into 
‘Inferred’, ‘Indicated’ and ‘Measured’), and ‘Mineral Reserves’ (broken down into ‘Probable’ 
and ‘Proven’), with expensive pre-feasibility and feasibility studies required to transform 
‘Indicated’ into ‘Probable’ and ‘Measured’ into ‘Proven’ Reserves. As Greg, the geologist I 
referred to above, and whose company has been drilling in Kenya for several years, explained, 
the difference between Proven and Probable “comes down to just that figure of ounces and 
the confidence interval – after looking at literally millions of data points.”59 
Pete was sceptical about the real effect of the NI 43–101, and the extent to which it could 
prevent ‘fraud’ like Bre–X. His analysis echoed those produced by anthropologists studying 
audit cultures, including Strathern’s (2000, p. 314) observation that under regimes of audit, 
if “you put your trust in the measures themselves, it is because you cannot put your trust in 
other outcomes of performance,” and Corsin’s (2011, p. 185) notion that “closing the gap of 
(assured) information opens yet another gap, that of the quality of the analysis upon which 
the information is based.” Pete argued that: 
It is no better now, people go through a process rather than a 
thoughtful process. That’s just me getting old!...There is still a bit of 
a misconception about what the codes do. Reporting codes – JORC, 
and so on – they are just reporting codes, not estimation codes. It 
might be JORC but it doesn’t mean it’s any good. It doesn’t convey 
any real info about the estimation methodology. It just means we 
reported that according to JORC. 
But 43–101s and JORC are important, because they are what enable geological deposits to 
turn into investable ‘quasi–objects’. Peter Hägglund (2000) in his ethnographic work on 
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investment analysts, draws on Latour (1993) to describe the work of these analysts as a 
process of making ‘quasi–companies’: the ‘company’ that is traded on the stock market is not 
the physical company, or even a legal entity, but a set of facts, figures and representations, the 
company re–inscribed in spreadsheet form: “it is the quasi–company that is traded” 
(Hägglund, 2000, p. 326).  
When Bruno Latour writes of ‘quasi–objects’, he uses it to destabilize what he sees as a 
modern predilection for insisting on a neat divide between a transcendent, always–existing 
nature, universal in time and space, and a continually constructed realm of society and social 
artefacts. In truth, argues Latour, those who subscribe to this dualism constantly create a 
proliferation of quasi–objects. Neither distinctly the product of human artifice, nor natural 
and given, Latour believes these quasi–objects make us uncomfortable, and so we prefer not 
to recognize them. Focusing particularly on conservation movements, he chastises those who 
would have us “return to our narrow human confines,” and is keen to embrace the “ever–
increasing degree of intimacy with the new natures we are constantly creating” (Latour, 2011, 
unpaged). The creation and recognition of quasi–objects is emancipatory for Latour, as it is 
for Ellen Hertz (2000) who, as discussed above, feels that speculation incites discontent only 
because it involves betting on hybrids. Anticipating what the average person thinks the 
average person will do involves building representations that are disconcertingly hybrid: 
insufficiently ‘real’ and insufficiently ‘virtual’. In Hägglund’s hands, however, the notion of 
the quasi–object is less politicized, but it is not without purchase. 
Those in the mining market know, to an extent, that a resource is always a quasi–object, even 
if they would never use that term. For instance, at a masterclass held in the same week of 
Mines & Money 2012, explorers were told by a team of lawyers and accountants, how to list 
a junior on a market like London’s AIM or Toronto’s TSX–V.  This was, in Latour, Hertz 
and Hägglund’s terms, a masterclass in the creation of quasi–objects: 
A deposit is only a resource if it can come to book – if it’s near the 
surface, with a good slope and good grade60. If it’s only going to be 
viable in thirty years [after surface mining or price changes], that’s 
not a resource – it never was and it certainly isn’t now. Something 
in the ground is not a resource. It must be economic. 
Personnel count too, when making a resource. At a round table of fund managers hosted 
during Mines & Money 2012, one fund manager responded to an audience question about 
how many juniors coming to them for funds receive them. The answer? “it’s all about people 
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for us, the assets don’t create value for themselves.”61 And in frontier markets, the ability to 
control a population matters too. At the introduction to a Global Mining Finance ‘New 
Frontiers’ event designed to bring miners and financiers together in the City of London, the 
geologist–turned–economist who runs events explained their purpose was “to look out 
beyond some of the run-of-the-mill locations to the further reaches.” This would necessitate 
a certain amount of attention to “the ‘blowouts’ that happen when you cannot get social 
permission. These are even more important than capital in creating a resource” (emphasis added).62 
Does it matter to say that for resources to be listed on stock exchanges, or approved for 
funding by banks, a ‘quasi–object’ must be created? That a resource only exists when the 
right people, the right ‘social license’, the right geology, the right reporting codes and the 
right economics can bring a deposit ‘to book’? Perhaps it is interesting to note that despite 
Latour’s insistence that moderns refuse to recognize the proliferation of quasi–objects, 
mining professionals most certainly do (albeit without using his analytical language). If you 
want to earn revenue from a mine, it matters precisely how that an ore deposit is assembled 
into a mine.  
Where these observations become potent is when they are put alongside Latour’s suggestion 
that proliferations of human–nature hybrids are somehow progressive and emancipatory. In 
Tanya Richardson and Gisa Weszkalnys’ (2014) work on resource materialities, Latour’s 
approach is itself hybridized with the so-called ‘ontological turn’ in anthropology. This 
ontological turn draws inspiration from indigenous understandings of nature/society, in 
order to reject the standard Western/anthropological practice of positing a single nature, of 
which there are many “representations” in many cultures (e.g. Henare et al., 2007, p. 10). 
The ontological turn aims to avoid reducing the perspectives of others to mere ‘cultural 
perspectives’, instead asking that anthropologists take seriously the manner in which others 
attribute agency and distinctions to human and non–human forms. Richardson and 
Weszkalnys apply the ontological turn (and Latour) to their concept of “resource 
materialities” which aims to challenge anthropological analyses of resources in terms of the 
extraction of natural substances by social agents. Resources are “not substances ‘in nature’” 
they argue, nor are they “dead matter, disembedded from the environments in which they 
are found,” as “Capitalist forms of resource extraction” would cast them (Richardson & 
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Weszklanys, 2014, pp. 7, 15). Instead, resources are “complex arrangements of physical stuff, 
extractive infrastructures, calculative devices, discourses of the market and development, the 
nation and the corporation…that allow those substances to exist as resources” (p. 7). There 
would, perhaps, be little dispute from the mining professionals whose analyses I have 
recounted above. 
Richardson and Weszkalnys argue that “natural resources are not ‘out there’ ready to be 
seized upon” (p. 16), but are always in Deleuzian assemblages of substances and practices of 
abstraction. But they do not offer a framework with which to “counter the contemporary 
‘extractive project’ and undiminished resource consumption with a strong notion of 
resources as historically and ontologically ‘becoming’” (p. 22). That their critique is misplaced 
is not without significance, especially given the increasing popularity of the ‘ontological turn’ 
in anthropology. Richardson and Weszkalnys take the Latourian bent that can be found in 
the social studies of finance – where researchers always emphasize the distribution of market 
agency across assemblages of computer screens, desk arrangements, spreadsheets and 
theoretical models, but never have anything to say about inequality or exploitation (e.g. 
Beunza et al., 2006; Hardie & MacKenzie, 2007) – and wed it to a putatively emancipatory 
ontological anthropology. In doing so, they inadvertently depoliticize the study of extractive 
industries even further.  
If the mining market already knows that resources are not ‘out there’, ready to be seized 
upon, but have to be created through a careful process of speculation, stabilizing the meaning 
of particular territories, and assembling millions of data points to render resources as 
‘indicated’, ‘inferred’, ‘proved’ or ‘probable’, before assembling the right team that can bring 
a resource ‘to book’, how can an interest in resource materialities challenge the extractive 
project? Is Richardson and Weszkalnys’ approach just as devoid of critical politics as Marcus 
and Rabinow’s ‘emergent’ anthropology of the ‘contemporary’, which would depart from a 
critique of anthropologists representing others as ‘outside of time’ within, and move to study 
those whose speculative practices do much the same? 
Mario Blaser, whose work has influenced Richardson and Weszkalnys (2014, p. 13) and who 
aligns with ‘ontological’ anthropology, has argued that the Western European creation of a 
world in which “the distinction between Nature and Culture constitutes the ontological 
bedrock of a system of hierarchies between the modern and the non-modern” has required 
the keeping away of “worlds that operate on different ontological premises,” and this has 
been achieved by simply rendering these Other/indigenous worlds as ‘cultural perspectives’ 
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based on errors and misplaced beliefs (Blaser, 2009, p. 888; cf. Latour, 1993). There is no 
denying that Western Europeans have exerted violence through resource extraction and 
through failing to engage with indigenous premises. What Richardson and Weszkalnys term 
the ‘extractive project’ depends for its speculative purposes upon generating images of others 
on a scale of Europeanization. But this does not equate to saying that the extractive project is animated 
and propelled by an ontological distinction between nature and culture, or a conception of resources as ‘out 
there’ in nature ready to be seized. That violence is wrought by this extractive project is undeniable, 
but disrupting it will take more than a conceptual turn towards Deleuzian assemblage. 
As Arun Saldanha (2012, p. 195) reminds us in his insightful challenge to the notion that 
assemblage thinking is somehow emancipatory, in the last few centuries almost “all 
assemblages on the planet have become crisscrossed and gambled by capital.” And the 
flatness of assemblage theory – and of the ontological turn in anthropology, both of which 
refuse to distinguish between human and non-human relations, or matter and language – 
“leads to a relativism at odds not only with the professed realism but also our ethico–political 
commitments to intervention” (ibid.). Because the mining market already operates through 
assemblages, telling mining professionals to think in terms of assemblages and resources that 
are ontologically ‘becoming’ will do little to interrupt the extractive project. Instead, we need 
to understand what enables the generation of extractive industry capitalism, a project whereby 
certain actors are able to exert control over others in an ‘assemblage’, in order to secure a 
flow of revenue. A move towards this kind of analysis is made in Chapter Four.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
MONEY MINING! 
OPENING THE BLACK BOXES OF EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY CAPITALISM 
 
The question is: now that prices are popularly recognized and vigorously engaged 
with as fictional, fetishistic, and composite, what can and should analysis focus 
on, and about what is analysis revelatory? 
– Jane Guyer, 2009, p. 205. 
For the capitalist, the real thing is the nominal capitalization of future earnings 
– Jonathan Nitzan & Shimshon Bichler, 2009, p. 182. 
 
This chapter picks up where Chapter Three left off, resuming the task of tracing the work 
through which profitable extractive industry projects are established in frontier markets. The 
ethnographic material presented in this chapter draws on my participation in a series of 
‘executive briefings’ in 2012–13, and a week–long training course (2014), run by one of the 
extractive industries’ leading ‘enterprise optimisation’ consultancies, which I term 
‘ValuationCo’. I describe how ValuationCo’s emissaries attempt, with some success, to 
spread their “philosophy of cash” through the mining market, and convince geologists, 
engineers, executives and analysts that value is not produced by stockpiling ounces and tonnes 
of ore, but by manipulating mine planning in order to maximize a project or company’s ‘net 
present value’.  
ValuationCo, and the converts to what they term “money mining” among the City of 
London’s analysts and fund managers, do not look to invest in rock, or dead matter to be 
extracted from inert natural environments. Instead, they would invest in ‘quasi–companies’ 
that are both real and created (Hägglund, 2000; Hertz, 2000; Latour, 1993). ValuationCo’s 
money mining software deals with representations of the ‘real’ world (ore reserves, grade, 
projected mineral prices, taxation rates, the cost of labour, transport costs), but its enterprise 
optimiser runs this data through a computational ‘black box’ in order to produce the plan 
for mine management that will maximize ‘net present value’, a particular way of calculating 
the total future earnings that a mine might produce. The output from ValuationCo’s black 
box – an increased net present value (NPV), and the new plan for mine management upon 
which that increase in value is dependent – constitutes the ‘quasi–company’ in which fund 
managers are interested. 
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Before presenting my ethnography, I discuss in Section 4.1 why it might be that scholars 
operating in the social studies of finance (SSF), who have had much to say about valuation 
in financial markets, are so silent on the matter of capitalism. Then, in Section 4.2, I draw on 
Nitzan and Bichler’s (2009) political economy, which places the calculation of NPV at the 
heart of a theory of capitalist power. I place Nitzan and Bichler’s work alongside the accounts 
that ValuationCo’s money miners give of themselves as capitalists, to draw out some 
contradictions in SSF, and the actor–network theory upon which it draws, thus revealing its 
practitioners’ failure to account for capital and capitalism as a political choice. Finally, I show in 
Section 4.3 how ValuationCo’s money mining agenda, although contested by some in 
London’s mining market, reveals to the ethnographic gaze what is at stake in the move from 
speculation (Chapter Three), to capitalization, a process which involves securing future flows 
of revenue for investors.  
While practitioners of the SSF have been interest in how projected cash flows are used by 
analysts to produce market ‘facts’ (Hagglund, 2000) or ‘frames’ (Beunza & Garud, 2007) that 
can be used to help investors make decisions, they have not traced out the power relations 
upon which generating those future earnings depends. For Nitzan and Bichler (2009), 
however, net present value calculations reflect precisely a capitalist’s confidence in their ability 
to order social relations, such that future flows of revenue can be generated and claimed. 
Equipped with insights from SSF and political economy, and motivated by my ethnographic 
encounter with ValuationCo, I go on to explore precisely how that confidence is generated, 
realized and projected to the market in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.  
4.1: ACCOUNTING FOR CAPITAL IN SSF 
A number of scholars working in the ‘social studies of finance’ tradition, which emphasizes 
the performativity of economics and the material distribution of agency in markets (see 
Chapter Two), have turned their attention to the contribution that securities analysts make 
to the functioning of stock markets (Beunza & Garud, 2007; Hagglund, 2000; Knorr Cetina, 
2011). These authors have tended to emphasize the parallels between the production of 
scientific facts and the production by securities analysts of market ‘facts’ (see also 
MacKenzie, 2009). Daniel Beunza and Rahul Garud have argued in their research into the 
‘frames’ constructed by securities analysts, that these frames – clusters of analogies and 
metrics with an internal consistency – are performative, since they “make possible the world of 
calculation hypothesized by orthodox economics” (Beunza & Garud, 2007, p. 33). This is 
the case even if the existence of these frames in the form of documents and spreadsheets 
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challenges the “orthodox view that calculation is innate, abstract and individual” (ibid.). In 
this case, they argue, calculative agency is distributed across investors, analysts, and their 
material or technical ‘equipment’. Beunza and Garud’s interpretation of securities analysts 
reveals clearly the extent to which SSF is inspired by actor–network theory: they insist that 
humans cannot act “naked,” but that “their equipment goes beyond their bodies,” and that 
cognition is distributed across a range of relations and material artefacts (Beunza et al., 2006, 
pp. 739–41; see Callon & Muniesa, 2005; Strum & Latour, 1994, pp. 790–93).  
But SSF in general, and in particular, studies of the analysts whose calculations of value 
enable investment decisions to be made, speak only of markets, and never of capitalism. Is 
there no capitalism to be found in stock markets, or in ValuationCo’s enterprise optimiser? 
Compare, for instance, Beunza and Garud’s (2007) argument that frames created by analysts 
perform orthodox economics with Richard Peet’s (2011: unpaged) claim that  
The gaze of the ‘investment analyst’ representing the ‘confidence of 
the market’ is the active form taken by the financial capitalist 
interest, although ‘investor confidence’ is presented as somehow 
neutral and technical, in the best long-term interest of everyone – 
‘professional economics’ is to blame for this misrepresentation. 
Some of the same terms are at play: professional economists are implicated in widespread 
understandings of the market, and the investment analyst’s work enables investment. Perhaps 
those schooled in the SSF would take issue with the notion that it is the investment analyst’s 
gaze, and not a materially distributed calculative apparatus, that helps to perform the market. 
But it also seems that most SSF practitioners would either overlook, or reject, the idea that 
there is a ‘financial capitalist interest’ behind stock market activity. 
Michel Callon, who was behind the foundational SSF text on the performativity or 
performation of economics (Callon, 1998), has argued along with Bruno Latour (Callon & 
Latour, 1997, p. 19) that one need not concern oneself with capitalism: “happily for us, it 
does not exist!” Both Latour and Callon have independently argued against ‘adding’ capitalism 
to an explanation or attribution of market agency. In one of his early works expounding upon 
actor–network theory, Latour argued that since agency is distributed across human and non–
human components, and the task of the sociologist/anthropologist is to trace those networks 
of ‘actants’, you  
do not need to add to them Capitalism or Zeitgest…either the cause 
designates a body of practices which is tied to the network under 
description…or it is not related, and then it is just a word. (Latour, 
1996, p. 376) 
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In his more recent work, Latour (2005, p. 54) has explained that his insistence on the a priori 
indeterminacy of what can be an actant, giving agency to a network or assemblage, is designed 
to dispense with ‘figurative’ causal explanations of the type “explained by capitalism” or 
“moved by your own interest.” Similar methodological concerns have recently been 
advanced in the anthropological field of ‘everyday ethics’ (see Keane, 2014), over the extent 
to which positing ‘neoliberalism’ or ‘society’ as causes of or explanations for behaviour curtails 
inquiry into how actors themselves attribute social and ethical agency. 
Callon has also likewise entreated anthropologists and sociologists to trace out the socio–
technical agencements to which market agency can be attributed. He, like Latour, has rejected 
the notion that market actors are ‘moved by their own interest’ (e.g. Callon & Muniesa, 2005; 
also Beunza & Garud, 2007; Beunza et al., 2006), and the notion that market agency can be 
attributed to “the spirit of capitalism or an overall logic of a mode of production” (Callon, 
2005, p.5). But he goes further, claiming in an interview that capitalism “is an invention of 
anti-capitalists” (Callon in Barry & Slater, 2002, p. 297). Like the anthropological authors 
who object to accounts which would deny ethical agency to their interlocutors (Keane, 2014), 
Callon attacks the (largely unnamed)63 anthropologists of capitalism who would, he argues, 
posit workers or consumers as mere vehicles of capital, with brains “like clay deformed by 
pressure” (Callon, 2005, p. 5). While it is no doubt true that some who invoke capitalism as 
a cause for observed social and economic agencies do so too readily, and might stand accused 
of “seek[ing] satisfaction in the critical gesture itself” (Boltanski, 2011, p. 147; also Gibson–
Graham, 2006), it is difficult to believe that such is the case for the ValuationCo emissaries 
whose ‘money mining’ briefings and training courses inform the bulk of this chapter.  
Consider, for instance the introductory statement that was made by a ValuationCo executive 
to the geologists, engineers, mineral economists, bankers, and environmental and social 
impact consultants, who had assembled for a week long training seminar in 2014. We sat in 
one of Fleet Street’s serviced meeting-room suites, real estate’s answer to a globalizing 
managerial class with limited commitment to place, and the ValuationCo man began: 
                                                          
63 This was written in the context of an exchange between Callon (1998, 2005) and Daniel Miller (2002, 2005). 
Callon unfairly depicts Miller as claiming that consumers in Trinidad are servants of capital with brains ‘like 
clay deformed by pressure’. Miller’s work in fact shows that consumers in Trinidad were caught between, on 
the one hand, locally generated marketing strategies and consumption acts rooted in the reproduction of social 
relationships, and, on the other, the ‘pure’ textbook form of capitalism which the IMF and World Bank would 
have seen instantiated in Trinidad. This seems, in fact, like a perfect opportunity for a rapprochement between 
Miller’s ethnography and Callon’s interest in performativity/performation of economics, but Callon’s refusal 
to do anything other than dissolve capitalism and trace market agency seems to have prevented any more fruitful 
dialogue. 
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It’s not a gold mine, it’s not a copper mine. It’s a money mine. The 
only reason you go into any business is to make money. I’m a 
capitalist – so are you. Let’s say it out loud – it’s not a dirty word64. 
Later in the week, even more evocative of ValuationCo’s missionary zeal, complete with 
repetitive allusions to “easy-to-use recipes for self-conversion” (Coleman, 2003, p. 16), we 
have the following: 
If we can’t say ‘I’m a capitalist, money has a time value, we want it 
now’ – if you can’t say it out loud, it’s not gonna happen by accident. 
It’s a mentality first. The logic of the model is impeccable. 
It is difficult, perhaps, to imagine, as Callon would ask us to, that these self–proclaimed 
‘capitalists’ identify as such purely because they have had their wills bent, ‘like clay deformed 
under by pressure’, by the ‘anti–capitalists’ who ‘invented capitalism.’  
In fact, to dispense with ‘capitalism’ while attempting to trace out the agency of self–
confessed capitalists should be at odds with Latour’s own framework. His actor–network 
theory project (or as he terms it in later work, the sociology of associations) is designed to 
challenge what he perceives to be a kind of arrogance or elitism in conventional 
anthropology/sociology. Conventional social scientists, he alleges, are inclined to dismiss the 
manner in which their ‘informants’ attribute agency as delusional, in order to explain, for 
instance, “the ‘obvious’ delusion of an actor ‘finding pretext’ in a religious icon” (Latour, 
2005, p. 48) in terms of said icon being “nothing but a mere receptacle for the forces of 
determination” known as society (Latour, 2004, p. 241). But if Latour asks that our inquiries 
be “put in motion” (Latour, 2005, p. 48, emphasis in original) by precisely the kind of 
encounters he describes (in his example, with a pilgrim who claims to be called to a monastery 
by the Virgin Mary), should we not also “seize the chance offered by the [capitalist] to fathom 
the diversity of agencies acting at once in the world?” (ibid.). As I show below, the arguments 
that actor–network theory-inspired practitioners of the social studies of finance give for not 
attending to capitalists as capitalists ultimately fail to convince. They seem to arise not out of 
a commitment to exhaustive tracing of socio–technical market agencements (see also Chapter 
Two), but out of a seemingly deliberate, non–confrontational political stance. 
The argument between those in the SSF who reject incorporating political economy or 
macro–structural considerations into their work has been played out particularly in relation 
to the way SSF scholars responded to the 2007–08 financial crisis, largely between Daniel 
Beunza for SSF (Beunza, 2010; also Lenglet, 2011), and Karel Williams, Julie Froud and their 
                                                          
64 Fieldnotes, March 2014 (Fleet Street training seminar). 
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colleagues against SSF, or at least for political economy (e.g. Froud et al., 2010; see also Nik–
Khah, 2006; Roberts, 2012). Froud et al. (2010) have challenged the performativity of 
economics approach championed by Callon (1998) and MacKenzie (2001), and the wider 
social studies of finance, for its tendency to produce “scholarly, narrowly focused, historical 
case stud[ies] of technicality which [are] a poor guide to the large scale dynamics of financial 
innovation and crisis” (Froud et al., 2010, p. 101). Froud et al. go on to berate SSF scholars 
for neglecting “informal stories in political contexts” since it is these stories that form part 
of a “struggle to impose ‘closure’ which narrows political agendas in ways that consolidate 
elite power” (ibid.). Beunza’s (2010: unpaged) first response to Karel Williams has been to 
challenge Williams’ and Froud’s focus on “cunning bankers, in conspiracy with politicians,” 
duping the public with over-complex business models, arguing that the same kinds of 
securitization which contributed to the financial crisis are now being used “to finance the 
investments in clean tech that will hopefully cool the planet.”  
Writing “as an ethnographer,” Beunza (2010) asserts that he would take “empirical insight 
over critique anytime.” This, he argues, requires suspending moral judgement about the 
people he is studying, exposing himself to “surprise,” and rejecting macro-pictures painted 
by political economists – whose models portray actors driven by neat and simple interests. 
Certainly, little is gained by reproducing models of self–interested capitalists as if the cause 
of all crises is always already known beforehand (see Chapter Eight). But Beunza presents 
the political orientation of his and his colleagues’ work as an outcome of his methodological 
concerns as an ethnographer, which are oriented towards tracing socio–technical agencements 
through markets. Some practitioners of the social studies of finance even argue that their 
approach is the more political, because it exposes the countless devices and arrangements 
upon which market functioning depends (e.g. Lenglet, 2011, p. 46; MacKenzie, 2009, pp. 
182–83). And yet, writing about his attempts to open up the ‘black boxes’ of international 
finance to ethnographic scrutiny – the work that Froud et al. (2010) dismiss as narrow case 
studies of technicality – MacKenzie (2005) has argued that the politically potent work of opening 
the black boxes of finance requires a certain blunting of oppositional passion. In Holmes & 
Marcus (2005) terms, it requires a certain amount of ethnographic deferral. 
In the remainder of this section I challenge the notion that the SSF as it stands is more 
politically aware or potent that Froud et al.’s (2010) form of political economy. As Beunza 
has written elsewhere (Beunza et al., 2006; also Hardie & MacKenzie, 2007), deciding when 
to stop tracing a calculative agencement through the market is a strategic decision to be made by 
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the ethnographer. Likewise, I suggest that refusing to countenance the possibility that forms 
of agency other than the calculative can be attributed to agencements or financial ‘black boxes’ is 
to make a strategic choice, to ignore those “practices of organizational accumulation that 
involve violence, dispossession, and death” (Bannerjee, 2009, p. 1543). But I do not abandon 
the interest of MacKenzie, Callon, Beunza and others in calculative devices and black boxes. 
Instead, starting with the concerns that self–designated ‘capitalists’ and ‘money miners’ 
express in ValuationCo’s executive briefings and training seminars, I treat their ‘enterprise 
optimiser’ as a black box that, when partially opened, does not only speak to the attribution 
of agency in financial markets. Instead, ValuationCo’s black box demands that critical 
ethnographers trace out the power relations and other legal and technical devices which make 
it possible for extractive industry capitalists to capitalize upon speculative money mines, 
ensuring for themselves a future flow of revenue. 
The notion of the ‘black box’ that MacKenzie (2005) deploys in his work on financial markets 
derives from Callon and Latour’s (1981) approach to conceptualizing ‘macro–actors’ in their 
otherwise flat world of actor–networks (see also Latour, 1994, p. 51; Strum & Latour, pp. 
793–97). For Callon and Latour, the ‘macro’ realm of political economy, of states and 
corporations, and with which Beunza is decidedly un–enamoured, should be understood 
merely in terms of macro–actors who have “successfully ‘translated’ other actors’ wills into 
a single will for which they speak” (Callon & Latour, 1981, p. 277). To become a macro–
actor, a network or assemblage of actants must put relationships in to ‘black boxes’, 
containing “that which no longer needs to be reconsidered, those things whose contents 
have become a matter of indifference” (p. 285). As such, “macro–actors are micro–actors 
seated on top of many (leaky) black boxes” (p. 286), neither larger nor more complex (but 
just as flat) as any other ‘micro–actors’. Although his account of power is ultimately tempered 
by his ethnographic deference, Donald MacKenzie argues that “the instinct to open black 
boxes is linked to an account of power” (2005, p. 557). I agree with MacKenzie on this point, 
but insist that this instinct cannot be fulfilled if the workings of power are not traced beyond 
the boundaries of trading floors and dealing rooms.  
The black box I hope to open up in this chapter is ValuationCo’s enterprise optimizer, whose 
internal operations can be more–or–less forgotten by those concerned with finding out how 
the net present value of their proposed mine can be maximized. For the critical political 
economists Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler (2009), whose theory of capital and 
capitalism was introduced in Chapter One, the calculation of net present value is at the heart 
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of the generation and diagnosis of capitalist power. Thus, in Section 4.2, I introduce Nitzan’s 
account of net present value as the ritual of capitalization, alongside Peter Miller’s 
genealogical work on the historical struggles that made net present value calculation possible, 
functional and desirable. Once more attempting to bring Froud et al.’s (2010) critical 
approach to bear on Beunza’s (2010) interest in the material traceability of market agency, I 
show how the capitalization ritual contained by ValuationCo’s black box only work when wedded 
to discursive and practical strategies for imposing closure, narrowing political discussion and reproducing elite 
power. Tracing out these strategies becomes the work of Chapters Five, Six and Seven. First, 
in Section 4.3, I begin to open up not only the technical black boxes that enable extractive 
industry capitalism, but equally, to open up what Rhodes et al. (2007) term the black boxes 
of elite behaviour. Only with such a move can politics – and capital – be accounted for within 
the social studies of finance. 
4.2: THE RITUAL OF CAPITALIZATION 
For the geographers Andrew Leyshon and Nigel Thrift, it is capitalization, or the 
construction of new revenue streams, and not some “spectacular system of speculation” that 
forms “the bedrock of financial capitalism” (Leyshon & Thrift, 2007, p. 98; cf. Tsing, 2000). 
Leyshon and Thrift do not seem to associate capitalization with capitalism itself. They argue 
that even alternative, non–capitalist currency movements might scale themselves up by 
identifying assets with long–term income streams that could be capitalized upon: packaged 
into securities, guaranteeing an income to the owner, these securitised income streams can 
be sold for a “lump sum which can then be used to deepen and widen alternative economies” 
(Leyshon and Thrift, 2007, pp. 110–12). Perhaps this distinction is made because Leyshon 
and Thrift conceive of capitalism in terms of a particular mode of production, defined by the 
extraction of surplus (labour) value. Political economists Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon 
Bichler, whose conception of capital and capitalism was introduced in Chapter One, would, 
however, be likely to disagree with Leyshon and Thrift. For Nitzan and Bichler, the moment 
of capitalization is the defining ritual of capitalism.  
Nitzan and Bichler reject the notion that the dollar (or pound) value of capital can be derived 
from abstract labour power, or the ‘utils’ posited by neoclassical economists. In either case, 
analysis becomes circular: either the monetary value of abstract labour is determined by the 
price of capital (which is calculated in terms of the surplus units of abstract labour 
appropriated by the capitalist), or it is determined by the ‘productivity’ of capital (which can 
only be calculated as a ratio if the price of capital is known before and after it is put to work). 
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They begin their analysis, instead, as recent anthropologists of price (e.g. Guyer, 2009) have, 
by asking what those who price capital understand themselves to be doing, and how prices 
emerge not from the productivity of capital, but from broader social struggles: 
In the eyes of a modern investor, capital means a capitalized earning 
capacity. It consists not of the owned factories, mines, aeroplanes or 
retail establishments but of the present value of profits expected to 
be earned by force of such ownership…What is being capitalized is 
not the ability to produce, but the power to appropriate (Nitzan, 1998, pp. 
182-83) 
It is precisely the ‘present value of profits expected to be earned by force of such ownership’ 
that ValuationCo’s money miners concern themselves with. And they are not alone in the 
mining market. One lawyer for private family wealth offices, providing advice to the 
speculative crowd assembled at Mines & Money London 2012 (see Chapter There), described 
how he is responsible for matching US$12 billion in untapped private equity to capital hungry 
mining juniors: “The end of the journey is full monetization. This is about making money, it’s 
not about growing an investment for the next twenty to twenty–five years.”65 
When they refer to capitalizing upon the ‘power to appropriate’, Nitzan and Bichler are 
signalling their rejection of theories which seek to derive the monetary price of capital from its 
productivity, and advancing what DiMuzio (2014a) terms their ‘power theory of value’. 
Rendering their work thoroughly appropriate for the analysis of ValuationCo’s money 
mining or enterprise optimisation seminars, Nitzan and Bichler take the calculation of net 
present value – what they term the ‘capitalization ritual’ – to be at the heart of capitalist 
generativity. In their view, net present value, and the discounted cash flow models upon 
which it is based, “quantifies the way capitalists expect their power to unfold…their 
confidence in obedience” (Nitzan & Bichler, 2010, p. 17). The calculation of net present 
value is what money mining is all about. And as I show below, it absolutely does quantify the 
confidence that capitalists place in their ability to earn revenue in the future, and point 
towards ethnographic inquiry into the conditions that generate such confidence. Firstly, 
however, a brief technical and historical detour is required in order to unpick precisely what 
net present value calculations and discounted cash flow models mean, and why the 
ValuationCo emissary referred to above was insisted that accepting the ‘time value of money’ 
was an essential pre–requisite for conversion to his philosophy of cash.” 
                                                          
65 Fieldnotes, December 2012 (Mines & Money London) 
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A visit to the online investment dictionary at Investopedia 66 will inform you that the time value 
of money is a “core principal of finance” based on the “universal fact” that as long as money 
can earn interest, the same denominated amount is worth more in the present than in the 
future. In other words, having £5 now is worth more than having£5 in a year. This is because, 
given interest rates of 10 percent, the £5 you have now can become £5.50 in a year, but if you 
take the £5 now, you lose out on the chance to earn that 10% interest. An investment (or 
the allocation of capital) in this view involves buying a set of future earnings, and the 
“discount rate” determines what we are willing to pay for those future sums of money now, 
taking into account both interest rates and the risk that you may never see said earnings. 
Using the discount rate, cash flows that are thought likely to materialize in the future can be 
“discounted” to their value in the present. It is the sum of all future discounted cash flows 
arising from a project (a mine with a given life-span, for instance) that comprises a project’s 
net present value (NPV). 
Investopedia’s naturalizing language, however, whisks a great deal of history, conflict and 
anguish out of sight: financial practice has not always been so forward looking, nor so 
tolerant of discounted cash flow calculations. In the 1930s, discounted cash flow (DCF) was 
promoted to the British accountancy profession as a means of evaluating and comparing 
investment proposals. In the pages of The Accountant, DCF was described as “dangerous 
nonsense” and the pro-DCF camp in the accountancy profession was painted as having 
“gone berserk”. Accountants were advised to “record the present as it flows into the past,” 
leaving aside the “risky business of tearing aside the veil which conceals the future” (Miller, 
1991, p. 740; 1998, pp. 182-85). At the same time, across the Atlantic, Benjamin Graham and 
David Dodd’s (1934) Security Analysis, the first modern investment manual, encouraged 
investors to accept that the value of a stock depends entirely upon what it will earn in the 
future.  
Echoing the reaction of Britain’s accountancy profession, the response from Graham and 
Dodd’s contemporaries was that such a method of valuation was “vicious” and “unsound” 
(Nitzan & Bichler, 2009, pp. 155-57; 2010, pp. 6-7). Yet, by the 1960s, the apparent facticity 
of the time value of money, the importance of DCF calculations, and the soundness of 
making investment decisions based on NPV, had been firmly established. A highly influential 
article in the Harvard Business Review saw Joel Dean position himself rather successfully among 
American executives as “the missionary rather than the anthropologist” (Dean, 1954, p. 121), 
                                                          
66 Available at: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/timevalueofmoney.asp (Accessed: 20 June 2015). 
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entrusted with convincing executives that they should rely less on intuition and authority, and 
more on discounted cash flow models when making their decisions. This, he stressed, would 
allow executives to discover an ‘objective’ means of evaluating investment proposals, in 
terms of the productivity of capital. For Peter Miller (2001, pp. 387-91), DCF likewise established 
itself in the UK because it provided an apparently ‘objective’ measure of the productivity of 
capital, combining a capacity to render the future calculable with a measure in relation to 
which managers could exercise self-discipline – all while contributing to national economic 
growth.67  
Miller stresses the extent to which DCF models are not neutral technologies (Miller 1991, p. 
739), but performative ones (Miller & Napier, 1993, p. 633) which “actually constitutes the 
economic domain” (Miller 2001, p. 694). The models do this, as noted above, by tethering 
managerial discipline and decision-making to specific ways of dealing with the future. But, in 
focusing on the performative aspects of NPV calculation and DCF models, Miller leaves aside 
the question of whether or not it is sensible to talk about ‘the productivity of capital’ – Joel 
Dean’s Holy Grail – in the first place. For some scholars in the social studies of finance who, 
like Miller, recognize that economic and accounting knowledge can perform economic 
agency, critiquing performative economic models is a pointless procedure. As Fabian Muniesa 
puts it (2014, p. 38): 
performativity…generated epistemic discomfort among some 
critics of economics precisely because the ultimate, quite 
naturalistic, epistemic critique – that of accusing a body of science 
of being wrong – is jeopardized within the performative idiom... The 
paradox (not to say the pity) is that a critique of economics that is 
uncomfortable with performativity has to claim, first, that 
economics does not matter (literally, since as such it does not 
provoke anything) and, second, that it needs to be criticized anyway. 
But why should we waste time criticizing something that does not 
matter? 
Muniesa has, however, extricated himself from this ontological quagmire rather too readily. 
As Beunza and Garud (2007) observe in their work on securities analysts, the frames that 
these analysts produce ‘perform’ the kind of calculative stock market behaviour that 
                                                          
67 Both Miller (1991, p. 740) and Nitzan and Bichler (2009, pp. 155-57) note that discounting computations 
were used as long ago as the fourteenth century, but they argue that discounted cash flow analysis only became 
part of a pervasive ordering financial apparatus in the mid-twentieth century, when it began to govern both 
capital expenditure within organizations, and investment opportunities on stock exchanges. Brackenborough 
et al. (2001, pp. 141-43) and Pitts (2001) provide evidence of discounted cash flow analysis being used by 
Newcastle colliery ‘viewers’ as far back as 1772, but this was largely to calculate lessors’ and lessees’ shares of 
returns, and was not used to choose between alternative investments. Hence it lacked the systemic or structuring 
role that it appears to have in both Miller’s and Nitzan and Bichler’s eyes. 
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economists predict, but do so in a way that is not accounted for by orthodox economists, who 
populate their models with discrete rational (or cognitively biased) calculative individuals. 
Surely, it is not an especially difficult move to say that the rise of NPV calculation, DCF 
modelling and the ‘ritual of capitalization’ is performative, inasmuch as these accounting 
practices constitute the economic domain, while also maintaining that these calculative 
devices do not do exactly what their adherents think that they do? In other words, where 
accountants, executives and economists insist that NPV and DCF allow them to make 
decisions based on the productivity of capital, my ethnography leads me to conclude that Nitzan 
and Bichler’s understanding of NPV calculations, as the capitalization ritual which quantifies 
capitalists’ confidence in their own ability to exert power, is more accurate. Indeed, Nitzan 
and Bichler’s critique comes close to the accounts of their own practice generated by 
ValuationCo’s money miners, to whom I now turn.  
The first time I attended a briefing run by ValuationCo was in late 2012, shortly after Mines 
& Money London 2012, while a few of the mining industry’s transnational elites were still in 
town. The briefing was held over breakfast, in a serviced meeting room on the margins of 
the Square Mile. The conversation over coffee beforehand reflected the spectre of resource 
nationalism that seemed to haunt the industry at the time (see Chapter Six). One of the 
ValuationCo accountants in attendance spoke about recent changes to Indonesia’s mining 
laws as well as the frustrating effect that the privatization of power supply had on the power-
hungry Chilean mining sector: “No company wants to step up. The government says it’s not 
a problem – except when it affects the citizens, the normal people. Then they make a big 
fuss.”68 The funding crisis that was “starving” the exploration industry was unsurprisingly 
also a significant concern. 
My first executive briefing on money mining began when one of ValuationCo’s executives 
recalled what Mr E, manager at BlackRock’s Natural Resource’s Equity fund (the world’s 
largest) had said about the “terrible capital discipline’ in the mining industry a short while 
earlier, at Mines & Money (see Chapter Three): 
Just the other day at Mines and Money, Mr E had said ‘It’s easy to 
blame Mother Nature, but the capital discipline in the market has 
been appalling.’ So we need to show the market the money. Bring 
the cash to the start of the project. NPV is the objective function. 
Mr E reckons it’s a good idea, we reckon it’s a good idea.69 
                                                          
68 Fieldnotes, December 2012. 
69 Fieldnotes, December 2012. 
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Here, the ValuationCo executive seemed to be attempting to generate a rather complex 
speculative moment: he was attempting to make meaning out of a crisis gripping the mining 
market, enunciating as its cause the failure for explorers and juniors to adopt his money 
mining software, and deploying Mr E’s significant reputation in the industry to encourage 
extractive industry professionals to capitalize upon new frontiers, by speculating upon his 
enterprise optimiser. 
Later, during 2013 at a better-attended briefing, hosted during lunchtime at the offices of 
one of the UK’s ‘Big Four’ accountancy and audit firms, the same ValuationCo salesman 
pitched the consultancy’s enterprise optimisation services with reference to the recent ‘cull’ 
of CEOs from major mining corporations (see Wilson, 2013): 
I’ve been walking the investor corridor at PDAC for the last week, 
picking up on market sentiment. The hottest topic? CEOs wouldn’t 
have lost their jobs if they’d thought about capital efficiency.70 
This consultant’s efforts to market the enterprise optimiser centred on attempts to link his 
software solution to market ‘sentiment,’ but also to the speech and judgment of eminent or 
‘exemplary’ men like Mr E. In a 2013 briefing, the ValuationCo man was also keen to quote 
from a banker he had spoken to recently about ValuationCo’s software: “It is up to the credit 
committee, but if it was up to me, I’d use it on all of our projects.” The need for the briefings, 
though, emerged because not everybody understood quite so well the “philosophy of cash.” At 
the week–long training course I attended in 2014, the ValuationCo executive running the 
session was frank about the work to be done: “There is a disconnect, between what mining 
investors want and what investors want. Bankers want the ‘magic number,’ the NPV. Miners 
don’t, they want ounces.”71 
Therefore, the aim of the briefings, and especially the week-long training course, was to win 
the “hearts and minds” of those in the industry. Bankers and fund managers like Mr E are 
often amenable to money mining or the philosophy of cash. Private equity companies who 
buy up juniors often hire ValuationCo to run their optimizer and tell them how to “make the 
management responsible” in order to maximize NPV. Analysts, however, still need to be 
taught the philosophy of cash. This need to work on analysts arises because they seem to be 
wedded to an understanding of NPV calculations as a reflection of the productivity of a mine 
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or proposed mine, rather than as a ritual through which extractive industry capitalists quantify 
their confidence in the future receipt of earnings.  
The enterprise optimisation model does apparently odd things to mine planning, especially 
from the perspective of the conventional proxies that analysts use to value prospective 
extractive endeavours – such as operational costs, idle equipment levels, ore recovery rates 
and length of mine. By focusing on NPV maximization, the enterprise optimizer’s black box 
sets out to “push back costs” and “bring cash forward”.72 Hence, conventional proxy 
measures used by financial analysts, such as the quantity of idle equipment, or the simple 
volume of costs (without regard to the time at which they are incurred) must be discarded: 
Don’t buy the trucks, hire them. When you don’t need them, let 
them go. You pay extra but it’s going to reduce OPEX [Operating 
Expenditure] over 10 years.73 
An even bigger ‘emotional’ obstacle to the uptake of enterprise optimization for NPV is the 
apparent attachment that geologists have to using all the available rock in a mine. To quote 
once more from the longer Fleet Street training course during 2014: 
The mentality in mining is that we have to use all the rock – that 
doesn’t make sense! That’s not even basic business. I think we’ve 
fallen in love with the rock. This is basic business. It’s not even 
mineral economics. Sometimes the right thing to do is to throw away 
the rock – don’t process low grade material, it’s a distraction and a 
cost. People struggle with this for emotional reasons. And that’s why 
I like to make fun of those emotions. 
The message then: untangle your emotional attachment to the ore body, adhere to the 
philosophy of cash, and recognize that all mines are money mines. Speed up the extractive 
project, and get the cash out fast: 
It seems, too, that ValuationCo was having some success, and they boasted a high 
‘conversion’ rate: 
Money mining is a term that came to us from a lot of people who 
did our two-day course. It doesn’t matter what it is – precious 
metals, base metals, bulk metals – it’s all latent cash in the ground. 
It’s a money mine, it has a time value so we need to get it out now.74 
The idea that money has a ‘time value’ is one that is commonsensical to most participants in 
the mining markets and other financial arenas, even though it is a historically contingent way 
of thinking about the production and circulation of value (see above). While many who 
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attended their briefings and seminars were initially credulous that their ‘enterprise optimiser’ 
could add 5%, 35%, or even more than 100% to the value of a given project or mine, at least 
a few left converted to their philosophy of cash. 
That said, not everyone is committed to the ritual of capitalization, or the sacralization of 
money mining. (Of course, if they were, ValuationCo would have no need to provide 
executive briefings.) Consider this pronouncement, given by a Canadian gold miner at a 
Question & Answer session for explorers and fund managers at Mines & Money London: 
In Hong Kong the problem there is corporate governance…It’s all 
gambling over there. The problem is it’s all cash flow-based. You 
can have a gold company with one year’s worth of resource and 
they’ll give it a great value. It’s meaningless. It’s a different way of 
thinking.75 
Here, as so often in the mining market, questionable ‘corporate governance’ stands in for 
‘otherness’, and forms the basis of one critique of ValuationCo’s approach. Likewise, Tim, 
one of the brokers I met at Mines & Money later met me in his offices, and expressed at least 
some reservations, explicitly about ValuationCo and their ‘money mining’ approach. 
Referring to a West African Gold project in which his brokerage firm had been involved, he 
explained how ValuationCo brought about the mine’s downfall: 
The broker says there’s better value if you extract one million 
ounces, the engineer says you can for one year, then raped the 
resource and recover for a year. He said, I don’t care, I ‘brought the 
cast forward’, and got 920,000 ounces, and the CEO resigned. They 
got their million ounces and then they were ruined. They had to get 
a new CEO and have a merger. You get it in a commodity boom, 
when there is stress or euphoria in the market.76 
Nonetheless, when I had asked earlier in our meeting what Tim did at his brokerage, his 
response was unequivocal: “we’re trying to sell money. NPV is what it all comes down to. 
Not necessarily in practice, but for investors, that’s what they’re trying to see. A high NPV.” 
Perhaps, he admitted, decisions based on NPV couldn’t account for the long–term ‘cycles’ 
through which the extractive industries often passed (see Chapter Six). 
Net present value, and discounted cash flow, most certainly did matter to Tim and his clients, 
as it did to ValuationCo. The capitalization ritual, understood as a quantification of how 
capitalists expect their power to unfold, depends ultimately upon a troublingly qualitative 
computation: the selection of a ‘discount rate’. The discount rate determines the price that 
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capitalists put on future earnings, and reflects, in part, their confidence that those earnings 
will materialise. Hence, the selection of the discount rate constitutes the moment at which 
assessments of ‘political risk’, and speculative images of the relative ‘Europeanization’ of 
certain territories, are folded into capitalization (see Chapter Three). Thus, Tim explained, 
planning a project in a particular jurisdiction can require that the net present value of a 
company be discounted by 8–10%. Of course, if it is  
a first world country with a very good mining code, it can be 5%. 
Hardly any are like that now. That’s the whole subjective part of 
building a financial model. It’s a bit of a thumb such.77 
Likewise, at ValuationCo’s 2014 training seminar, the executive providing the training 
lamented the subjectivity implied by choosing a discount rate: 
A lot of science goes into the project and we just end up using an 
estimate for the key number in the project. All this science – millions 
of dollars by the way, not just science – and then we turn around, 
look at this number, and decide whether to spend a billion dollars. 
It’s subjective, not arbitrary, but it is subjective, it’s personal 
judgement. It’s not a problem if you want to fine tune a project in 
Canada, but if you want to choose between Canada and the Congo 
you have a problem.78  
The ValuationCo trainer described two methods for choosing the discount rate. Firstly, you 
can “ask the market,” by finding out the rate at which people were willing to lend for a 
project in a given territory (see Chapter Six). Or, you can take the bank rate of interest (the 
putative ‘risk free’ rate of return) and, “if you’re gonna invest in the Congo, well, you better 
go 10% over.” Ultimately, when you get your discount rate from ‘the market,’ you are simply 
outsourcing the moment of subjective judgement in order to receive a more ‘objective’ 
discount rate that has been shorn of any traces of authorship, in return.  
In either scenario, the ValuationCo man, like Tim the broker, was clearly uncomfortable with 
the extent to which his powerful black box, the enterprise optimiser, produced and designed 
to calculate NPV, much vaunted for its ability to rescue executives from relying on “intuition 
and authority” (Dean, 1954, p. 129), was determined, ultimately, by an intuitive and 
‘subjective’ factor. Except it would be a mistake to take from this the simple idea that 
quantitative calculation frequently rests upon techniques for making financial entities and 
processes explicable in ‘qualitative’ terms (cf. Pryke, 2010; Zaloom, 2003). As I showed in 
Chapter Three, intuitive, speculative or otherwise qualitative assessments about the 
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possibility for turning a frontier mineral deposit into a mine depend upon a very particular grammar 
according to which territories and the populations inhabiting them are placed in a ‘hierarchy’ of stability, 
rendered as ‘Europeanization’. 
Recall, for instance (in Chapter Three), the former Wallaby who wanted to make it clear that 
his project was in “the good Congo,” not the “Heart of Darkness shithole.” Or, alternatively, 
the value proposition put forward by the Canadian platinum explorer (also Chapter Three), 
who argued that his was one of the few feasible projects outside of territories where 
“politically speaking, you don’t want to drink the water.” When explorers and juniors are 
able to give meaning an image of a geological prospect (and its host jurisdiction) through 
public performance, that prospect will only become a ‘bankable’ ‘quasi–company’ when its 
NPV is considered favourable. Through the discount rate, the spectacular process of 
speculation, which Leyshon and Thrift (2007) feel attracts a disproportionate amount of 
social scientists’ attention, is folded into the very ritual of capitalization. It is certainly true 
that the capitalization ritual does not ensure capitalist power and a future flow of revenue, but 
it reflects expectations about “the power of governments or corporations to shape and reshape 
the terrain of social reproduction in their favour relative to other organizations attempting to 
do the same thing’ (DiMuzio, 2012, p. 371). As such, the capitalization ritual demands that 
ethnographers of extractive industry capitalism identify and trace out the institutions, 
relations and techniques through which efforts are made to actualize that power and realize 
profits. In Chapter Five, I examine how corporations attempt to influence mine–area 
populations; in Chapter Six, I explore the depoliticising discourse of ‘resource nationalism’ 
through which mining professionals attempt to dismiss opposition to extractive industry 
expansion in frontier jurisdictions like Bangladesh; and in Chapter Seven, I examine how 
precisely the ‘stability’ which extractive industry investors crave is reinforced through a set 
of international arbitration conventions and practices. Firstly, however, I examine how 
extractive industry professionals attending ValuationCo’s briefings sought, themselves, to 
open up and challenge the ‘black box’ of the resource enterprise optimiser. 
4.3: TRACING POWER IN EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY CAPITALISM 
The black box of the enterprise optimizer does not merely produce the “magic number,” 
which can be achieved with a relatively basic discounted cash flow model. What 
ValuationCo’s black box does is take in millions of pieces of information about geology, 
metallurgy, price forecasts, labour costs, material costs, energy costs and maintenance costs, 
and manipulates the relations between them in order to maximize NPV. Hence the 
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occasionally shocking results, when companies are told that “throwing away” (or planning 
to throw away) apparently valuable rock will maximize their NPV, or that leaving an entire 
rock mill or fleet of trucks idle for years at a time will be better for the ‘margin’ than running 
them (despite the cost of maintaining idle equipment). The management guru Eli Goldratt’s 
(1990) Theory of Constraints was the bible of the ValuationCo executive who ran the Fleet 
Street briefings. Before he joined his father (who had founded ValuationCo), this money 
mining evangelist had adopted Goldratt’s technique of forcing the ‘bottlenecks’ in systems 
to pay ‘rent’ to the company, during his time at the Ford Motor Company. For adherents to 
Goldratt’s theory, if the rock mill is a bottleneck, “leave the hard rock in the ground, and you 
get half a billion dollars’ extra value by changing the ore you mine and mill, all in a costing 
spreadsheet.”79 Thus, money miners can assemble their ‘quasi–companies’. 
Intriguingly, ValuationCo’s enterprise optimising black box seems to provide a vindication 
of Nitzan and Bichler’s (2009) approach to studying capital and capitalization. One pertinent 
critique, put forward by Sam Knafo and colleagues (Knafo et al., 2014), is that Nitzan and 
Bichler’s focus on finance and only finance, to the neglect of the power relations that order 
production processes, takes an effective step backwards from Marx. However, what 
ValuationCo’s black box does is to incorporate questions about the power relations that infuse 
extractive industry production processes, attempting to link them ultimately, to the magic 
number, NPV. However, as ValuationCo attempts to sell their consulting services and 
enterprise optimisation software to the mining market, they confront a certain amount of 
critique and resistance from seasoned extractive industry professionals. As I show below, 
this resistance arises precisely from concerns that attempts to manipulate production 
processes with reference to maximizing NPV will produce a kind of backlash, that, in turn, 
threatens a project’s future earning capacity. 
At the 2013 executive briefing, in the offices of one of the UK’s Big Four auditing firms, one 
extractive industry financier, a familiar face in London’s mining market, asked whether Mr 
R’s proposed “jobless”, automated platinum mine (discussed in Chapter Three) was a good 
idea, given concerns about unemployment on South Africa’s platinum belt. The consultant 
running the session responded: “Well, I know what the optimizer would say!” This response 
was not taken entirely well. Several of the explorers and financiers in attendance were aware 
of the ‘risk’ that such actions could pose to the continuing profitability of mines (see Chapter 
Five). The challenge to ValuationCo continued, however, when in one of the briefing’s case 
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studies, ValuationCo’s enterprise optimiser suggested that the best way to maximize NPV 
was to not buy trucks, but hire them. That way, when you do not need them, you can “let 
them go – you may pay extra but it’s going to reduce operating expenditure over ten years.” 
The same outcome occurred for a labour force in one of the optimiser’s case studies. 
The financier who had challenged ValuationCo regarding Mr R continued. “If you’re in 
somewhere like Africa, where you’ve trained your guys up from scratch, you’re gonna lose 
‘em all. Is it possible for the optimizer to make strategic sense?” The response was muted: 
“The optimizer is to push back costs. We create the context within which the day-to-day 
needs need to be generated.” While the ValuationCo man did not go so far as to endorse 
what might be seen as either ‘socially’ or ‘strategically’ irresponsible hiring practices, he was 
more forceful in response to the next question, from a different attendee this time: “What 
do you do about environmental liability? Only going for the high grade and throwing away 
the rest of the rock makes a nasty stockpile.” His response threw considerable light on the 
tension between ‘sustainable’ or ‘responsible’ mining and the imperatives of capital 
accumulation, realized through the capitalization ritual and manifested in the ability to order 
the terrain of social reproduction: 
Well, ‘nasty’ stockpile, I don’t look at it as ‘nasty’ – it’s money. 
Environmental restoration is a cost, so is CSR. If you’ve got to move 
a village, if the pit’s under a village – and it usually is – the CSR has 
to be paid for, so you have to find cash to move the village. If you 
have cash, you can do CSR and sustainability, and give to 
shareholders. So get the cash first! Recently an African mining 
minister said to me, ‘We want long term.’ We said, “wait a minute, you 
got a depleting resource, your roads don’t work, hospitals don’t 
work, there is high AIDS – do you want that now or in five to ten 
years? I think now! Whether it gets there or not [laughter] – you 
can’t model corruption! So make as much as you can now and then 
invest in CSR or sustainability.80  
What strikes the anthropological reader of the above quote first is perhaps the work that 
‘Africa’ does here to signify a constellation of social, technical and laughable political failures 
which only the rapid extraction of ‘money’ can remedy. There is no consideration of the fact 
that the rate of extraction could be subjected to political contestation, and that successfully 
tempering the rate of large-scale resource extraction can have an enormous impact on a 
nation or region’s ability to avoid the ‘resource curse’ (McNeish & Logan, 2012). Indeed, 
even the most technocratic of high-profile prescriptions for avoiding ‘resource curse’ type 
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scenarios advise a tempered rate of extraction, and do not advise the pursuit of NPV 
maximisation (Humphreys et al., 2007).  
ValuationCo and their converts effectively delegate to the enterprise optimizer the question 
of the time-scale over which extraction should take place, burying this decision in a 
technological ‘black box’ which seems to place it outside of politics. Yet the life of a mine 
and the rapidity with which extraction proceeds is one of the most frequent sources of 
conflict around proposed and existing mine sites (Halvaksz, 2008; Limbert, 2010; 
Weszkalnys, 2008) and has significant distributional consequences. At the 2014 Fleet Street 
training course, ValuationCo’s family representative was even more clear about the need to 
get the money out, and get it out fast: 
Decreasing the life of the mine I would argue is the objective. The 
quicker we get it out the better. Stringing our ore body along is 
completely counterintuitive to every value proposition. (emphasis 
added)81 
 Once again, the concerns of mine-area communities, and the enormous and irreversible 
disruption caused by mining projects with short or uncertain lifespans (Gilbert 2012) is not 
only overlooked, but rendered a ‘non–problem’ through deferral to the enterprise optimiser’s 
black box. 
From a perspective rooted in the social studies of finance, a solution to these clashes between 
the temporalities of money mining, national development, and local social reproduction, 
might be to democratize the technical procedures at the heart of the capitalization process: 
to open up the black box to broader participation (e.g. Callon et al. 2007). And this, indeed, 
is what the consultancy began to do mid-way through 2014, with the addition of a new 
‘module’ to their enterprise optimizer. Returning once again to Fleet Street in 2014: 
Of course we want to make money, but if we’re not acceptable to 
all stakeholders we won’t be making anything. If you’ve got the local 
villagers throwing rocks at you – if you’ve got the government 
threatening to take you over cos [sic] they don’t understand how 
your mining company can make money for you – thirty years ago 
you could get away with that, but those groups are a lot stronger 
now and you shouldn’t have been doing it anyway. We’re capitalists 
but we’re not greedy, self-centred capitalists. We’re benevolent 
capitalists, but we still want to maximize the capital under our 
control.82  
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The extractive industries’ response to ‘local villagers throwing rocks’ is discussed in the 
subsequent chapter (Chapter Five), and the apparent threat of government takeover, or 
‘resource nationalism’, is the subject of Chapter Six.  
Once again, though, we can turn to the words of the self-confessed capitalists that constitute 
the subject of this chapter in order to point to the shortcomings of an approach to studying 
expertise in economic life that only considers markets and not capital. For Callon et al. (2007, 
pp. 237-38), creating forums in which “every voice” can be heard creates the conditions to 
reorganize markets and “internalize the externalities”, to ensure that markets are reorganized 
and, for instance, “firms producing aluminium take responsibility for a part of the costs they 
induce.”83  In ValuationCo’s executive briefings and training seminars we might see the 
enterprise optimizer’s black box partially opened up, in order to augment NPV calculations 
such that they take water table depletion or dust generation into account. But as long as these 
efforts are subordinated to the ritual of capitalization, and the accumulation of capital – 
which ValuationCo insist they will be – there will be very little that is different about the power 
relations organising this new, ‘benevolent’ capitalism. 
This is perhaps most clearly demonstrated by the manner in which both the family member 
who ran the 2014 training course, and the consultant who led the two briefings during 2013, 
spoke about the risks generated by and to the enterprises which they set out to optimize: 
If you’re not making money, what on earth are you doing, asking 
employees to risk their lives, asking countries to risk their scarce 
resources, asking your shareholders to risk their money? If you’ve 
raised capital on any stock market anywhere in the world, you’ve 
made the statement: you’re in it for the cash flow.84 
Let’s think about this industry – we’re taking out a depleted 
resource, we’re damaging the environment, we’re using other 
peoples’ money, we’re risking peoples’ lives. So we’re risking money, 
people and environment – so we probably want to get the maximum 
yield that we can.85 
                                                          
83 Examining an actual proposed bauxite mine in Odisha, Temper and Martinez-Alier (2013) show that 
strategies designed to challenge the company by calculating the NPV of the forests to be razed, and challenging 
the proposed mine on ‘cost-benefit’ grounds, were bound to be failures, since as long as a company can pay 
compensation for the forest to be lost (priced in terms of NPV), it can continue to afford to produce 
externalities. If a price is put on a forest to be lost, then a mining company paying that price has ‘internalized 
its externalities’ successfully. It was only by successfully articulating non-market values of the forest that the 
particular mine in question was halted. 
84 Fieldnotes, March 2014. 
85 Fieldnotes, March 2013 
121 
 
What can be seen here, very clearly articulated, is the conception of shareholding to which 
these self-conscious capitalists subscribe, the links between that conception and a very 
specific notion of risk, and the extent to which the capitalization ritual subordinates ‘CSR’ 
and ‘sustainability’ issues – even where the consultants claimed to be selling a form of 
‘benevolent’ capitalism.  
Firstly, to the extent that they presented (to an approving audience) the notion that risking 
lives and resources justified, or even required, an intensification of the money-mining process, 
the consultants seem to invoke the “risk-based concept of corporate control” that Power 
(2004, p. 255) suggests has been ascendant during the last two decades. Under this model, 
risk management is transformed from a “specialist control side-show to a (shareholder) value 
enhancing activity” (p. 162). Risk becomes a language that allows the re-description of 
hazards caused by organizational activities, in terms of potential risks to shareholder value. 
These risks can even become a justification for the acceleration of money mining. The 
corresponding conception of share ownership activated here is that of the absentee 
shareholder, with no attachment to the corporate person other than being “in it for the cash 
flow”: this sometimes mythical (Welker & Wood, 2011, p. S4) but sometimes very real 
reference point supports the shareholder discourse which, as Power notes, has been 
augmented by a very particular language of risk (see Chapter Five). 
For Nitzan (1998, p. 182), modern absentee ownership has not merely altered the meaning 
of shareholding as Welker and Wood (2011) suggest. It has gone further and altered the meaning 
of capital itself. It is absentee ownership that has enabled the proliferation of the capitalization 
ritual, by reconceptualizing the business transaction as a claim on money income rather than the 
augmentation and intensification of physical means of production. Capitalization thus 
reflects a claim on the discounted value of expected earnings, expressed as NPV, and can 
work to diagnose the instruments and arrangements to which money miners look, in order to 
secure those earnings. I have also suggested towards the end of this chapter that the 
purported ‘benevolent’ turn made recently by the ‘money mining’ consultants will always be 
constrained as long as it is subordinated to the ritual of capitalization. For Nitzan and Bichler, 
this would be because while capital exists as capitalized earning capacity, what is being capitalized 
is the degree to which capitalists can contain their own uncertainty (Nitzan, 1998, p. 210), 
and thus ensure future earnings. By exploring the interactions between ValuationCo and their 
converts to money mining, it has been possible to show that opening up the black boxes of 
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finance can be a political move, but only if it acts as the preface to exploring how capitalists 
contain their own uncertainty.  
To conceive of extractive industry ‘capitalism’ is not, as Callon and Latour would suggest, to 
take pleasure in the critical moment and deny agency to those whose wills have putatively 
been deformed by a totalizing entity. Instead, it is to begin with how self–conscious capitalists 
understand their own activities, and to go on to challenge elite attempts to impose ‘closure’ on 
accounts of the often violent processes through which capitalists contain their uncertainty. 
In the next chapter, I begin exploring the first in a set of regimes of domination and 
instruments of power that the capitalization ritual (ValuationCo’s black box) points us 
towards: the transformation from ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ into Corporate 
Diplomacy. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE RISE OF THE CORPORATE DIPLOMAT 
[W]e should be careful not to become so intrigued by the diplomacy and the 
indirection that we forget these are channels of communication, means by which 
people seek not only to express themselves or enact cultural forms, but can also 
seek to induce their fellows to think and act in certain ways, to the benefit of some 
rather than others 
– James Carrier, 2001, p. 299. 
 
In Chapter Three of this thesis, I introduced London’s market for mining finance. I 
presented the narrative and performative work that participants in this market do in order to 
attract the speculative investment that might transform a mineral deposit into a money mine. 
Subsequently, in Chapter Four, I outlined the political economy of capitalization that is at 
the heart of the contemporary extractive project. Maximizing net present value, the fund 
manager’s ‘magic number,’ requires that mining corporations convince participants in the 
market that they will be able to exert sufficient control over their extractive projects, so as to 
ensure a future flow of revenue to their shareholders; capitalization quantifies a mining 
capitalist’s expectation of order in and around a mine site. In this chapter, I delve further 
into the specific techniques through which extractive industry corporations seek to enforce 
this order, and make it visible to investors. I locate the emergence of these techniques in 
terms of a shift away from the regimes of Corporate Social Responsibility which are 
increasingly well studied by anthropologists, and towards the practice of ‘Corporate 
Diplomacy’. I also begin to focus more explicitly on the multiple temporalities that structure 
the accumulation of capital in the extractive industries. Whereas Chapters Three and Four 
focused on the anticipatory temporalities of speculation and capitalization, this chapter 
foregrounds the ways in which participants in the mining market structure their narratives 
about their industry’s past. This approach allows me to cut across contemporary debates 
about the nature of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) by showing not only that CSR is 
evolving into Corporate Diplomacy, but that these new formations exist alongside 
commitments to corporate philanthropy which are ‘officially’ discredited and consigned by 
CSR professionals (and some critical social scientists) to the distant past. 
This chapter explores in detail the role that ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’, ‘Social 
Performance’ and ‘Public Affairs’ professionals play in constructing London’s market for 
mining finance. It draws on ethnographic fieldwork that was organized around professional 
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development seminars, industry colloquia, executive briefings and high-level residential 
summits for lawyers, consultants, public relations professionals and investors active in the 
mining sector. As a complement to ethnographic research that has explored the social 
transformations and extensions of corporate control driven by mining companies’ Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) programmes as they are actualized in specific localities (Kirsch, 
2006; Rajak, 2008, 2010b; Gardner, 2012, 2015; Welker, 2009), or research which has 
explored the multi-sited construction of a generic global Corporate Social Responsibility 
agenda (Garsten, 2010), this chapter is an attempt to grasp what it means to ‘see like the 
mining market’. In other words, I look to narratives about responsibility and reputation, and 
the techniques that underpin emerging Corporate Diplomacy regimes, in order to shed light 
on how professionals in the mining market think about, make visible and act upon those 
whom they would term their ‘stakeholders’. I explore and how, in the process, they construe 
themselves and the companies they work for as particular kinds of moral agents or persons. 
An immanent critique of the corporate social responsibility agenda, and the term CSR itself, 
has led mining companies (especially the large ‘majors’ such as Anglo-American, BHP 
Billiton and Rio Tinto) to adopt a hard-nosed, pragmatic approach to talking about and 
dealing with social engagement in recent years. In the words of the head of public affairs 
from one but London-listed oil and gas exploration firm which has a significant presence in 
Bangladesh: 
We don’t actually talk about CSR anymore. It has connotations of 
philanthropy. And maybe it was like that in the past…It’s now about 
managing social risk because without that we can’t be there. It’s a 
business decision and I’m not ashamed.86  
Yet at the same time mining companies are more concerned about reputation than ever, and 
insistent that they have never been more ethical than they are today. For many mining 
company representatives, this is because they are among the ‘converts’, the upstanding and 
enlightened corporate citizens in an industry not short of its ‘rogues’ (see Chapter Three) 
 For others, especially public relations professionals and reputation managers, or those who 
position themselves so as to speak for the industry as a whole, any mining company that 
exists today is necessarily beyond moral reproach. This putative moral purity derives, in part, 
from the fact that it is the extractive industries who provision most sectors of our economy. 
Equally, however, it is not uncommon to hear those who work in the mining sector claim 
that companies cannot be irresponsible, because “someone would have posted it on YouTube 
                                                          
86 Fieldnotes, April 2013. 
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already”87 if they were. This notion that mining companies are disciplined by the 
instantaneous time of a digitally networked panopticon of the subaltern88 is captured neatly 
by one of the leading public relations firms in the sector, with their classification of the 
contemporary as the ‘Age of Conversation.’ On closer examination, as I argue towards the 
end of this chapter, the Age of Conversation might be more appropriately termed the ‘Age 
of Influence,’ as mining corporations begin to invest explicitly in developing their diplomatic 
and foreign policy (see Chapter Seven) capacities.  
Reputation matters to mining companies and investors, certainly, but reputation matters less 
because it may impact on their share price in the short term, and more because it is in effect 
an index of their capacity to influence mine-site communities, workforces and, in particular, 
host governments. Much as Nancy Munn argued in The Fame of Gawa that reputation or fame 
(butu) was a “coding of influence” (Munn, 1992, pp. 117) or a reflection of a Gawan’s ability 
to influence a kula exchange partner and successfully transact with them, reputation in the 
mining market is a mark of the extent to which companies and investors may be able to 
successfully develop a project – especially in a ‘frontier’ market. The figure capable of doing 
so successfully, it would seem, is the Corporate Diplomat. 
A great deal of recent work in anthropology and sociology stresses the futurity of financial 
markets, and the performative work that hype, expectation and anticipation does in order to 
shape action and format agency in financial markets (Appadurai, 2012; de Goede, 2005; 
Holmes, 2009; Knorr Cetina, 2011; Pollock & Williams, 2010; Sunder Rajan, 2005; Tsing, 
2000; Wajcman, 2015). The present chapter, however, is concerned with the way that 
moral(izing) narratives about the mining industry’s past help to position corporate and 
financial persons as they find themselves “negotiating new political orders, legislative 
imperatives, and social challenges” (Rajak, 2014, p. 260). If the reworking of corporate and 
financial memory, or the invention of industrial tradition, is neglected in favour of 
anthropologies of the future, social scientists run the risk of uncritically reproducing the 
“logic of decay, dissipation, and temporary truth” that Karin Knorr Cetina (2011, pp. 409-
11) suggests is characteristic of research conducted within financial markets.89 My 
                                                          
87 Fieldnotes, April 2013.  
88 I have borrowed this phrase from James Hynes’ The Lecturer’s Tale in which the character Kraljevic declares: 
“I am the Pantopticon…I am not the Panopticon of the center, looking out. No, no, no!...I am the Panopticon 
of the periphery, the Pantopticon of the margin, the Panopticon of the subaltern. I look in at the imperial center to 
fix it in my gaze and exclude it” (Hynes 2007: 256). 
89 Knorr Cetina compares the “intended production of stable findings and permanent truth that we find in the 
natural sciences” (2011, pp. 410) with the logic of decay and dissipation characteristic of analysts responding 
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ethnography, set out below, suggests that such a logic of decay allows analysts to eschew 
accountability for depoliticizing reports they may have written about embattled mining sites 
or companies at any given moment in the past. Not only that, but a similar approach to 
temporal decay and the dissipation of accountability is reproduced in the wider narratives 
that extractive industry professionals produce about the sector as a whole, and which portray 
certain companies as ‘converts’ and any persistent social or reputational problems as ‘legacy’ 
issues.  
At first glance, it may seem possible to resolve the temporalities of the convert (who has 
broken with the immoral mining industry of the past) and the legacy issue (conflicts over 
mining which arise as a result of pre-conversion corporate immorality). However, the most 
outspoken, converts in the industry, the reputation conscious ‘majors’, are ultimately reliant 
upon the few remaining ‘rogues’ among the junior exploration companies for their own 
reproduction. It is these companies who, as they will frequently acknowledge, continue to 
produce legacy-type social risks and problems in the present. To borrow from Rajak (2014, 
p. 267), “The moral authority accrued from the former [conversion] proves as crucial to the 
success, survival, and reproduction of corporate power as the economic might achieved from 
the latter [the rogues].” Before presenting my ethnographic material, I will briefly introduce 
the context in which the mining industry’s conversion took place, and the dominant 
approaches that anthropologists have taken to studying Corporate Social Responsibility and 
moves toward ethical capitalism. 
5.1: DISCOVERING CSR IN ANTHROPOLOGY & THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
Around the turn of the millennium, the extractive industries announced their renaissance. A 
series of high-profile international initiatives, toolkits and councils90 have successfully placed 
these previously vilified companies among the vanguard of an emergent, professionalized, 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) industry (Bebbington et al., 2008; Buxton, 2012; 
Kirsch, 2014, pp. 159-187). This apparent conversion has not, however, been met with 
credulity in all quarters. The researchers who in the 1980s compiled The Gulliver File (Moody, 
1991), a near-exhaustive catalogue of ecological disregard, indigenous rights violations, and 
                                                          
to a constant and ceaseless flow of data in twenty-four hour financial markets. But see MacKenzie (2009, pp. 
8-17) for a reading of financial market facts as equivalent to natural scientific facts. 
90 These initiatives and exercises include the establishment of the International Council on Metals and Mining (2001-
present), the Mines, Minerals and Sustainable Development programme (2000-02), and the World Bank’s Extractive 
Industries Review (see Salim, 2003). 
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complicity with human rights abuse, have hardly found themselves out of work. The London 
Mining Network’s91 recent report on UK-listed mining companies documents persistent 
failures to comply with the numerous codes of conduct developed for mining companies in 
particular, and multinational corporations in general (LMN, 2012)92. But the report also 
highlights the extent to which breaches of these (largely voluntary) codes of conduct go 
unreported, as well as the absence of any regulatory mechanism for enforcing the visibility 
of corporate irresponsibility. Much of the existing anthropological work on CSR in the 
extractive industries has likewise been concerned with the work done by voluntary codes of 
conduct, the delegation of regulation to market practitioners themselves, and the visibility 
(or veiling) of corporate irresponsibility. In their efforts to make sense of CSR, 
anthropologists have traced its emergence, development and circulation as a global or 
universalizing discourse, as well as enactments of CSR programmes at the local scale. In so 
doing, they have drawn upon canonical works on gift exchange and ‘soft’ law, as well as more 
recent approaches to the study of audit cultures and documentary practices. 
Offering a bird’s eye view of the development CSR as a response to transnational corporate 
activity in general, Christina Garsten (2008, 2010; Garsten & de Montoya, 2008) has 
examined the emergence of the UN’s Global Compact, a voluntary code of conduct or 
instrument of ‘soft law’ that was inaugurated by Kofi Annan in 1999. Efforts to introduce 
‘hard’ regulation of transboundary corporate activity were, at the same time, derailed precisely 
because they failed to attain support from the very UN member states whose borders 
transnational corporations habitually traverse (Garsten, 2008, p. 36).93 The establishment of 
these voluntary codes of corporate conduct produced a series of effects that anthropologists 
identify as typical of audit cultures. Garsten has depicted these audit cultures as part of a 
delegation of regulation to the market, and taken corporate transparency and accountability 
protocols to be “moving rapidly from being voluntary acts to becoming normative 
imperatives considered basic for establishing trust and generating profits and value” (Garsten 
                                                          
91 Roger Moody is a researcher at London Mining Network, Mines and Communities, and Nostromo Research. 
92 For example, the IFC’s Performance Standards, the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and 
the UN’s Global Compact. See Garsten (2008) for an anthropological overview of the development of the 
Global Compact as a ‘soft’ corporate accountability measure, and the abortive attempts made within the UN 
to develop a ‘hard’ regulatory framework for multinational corporations. 
93 Intriguingly, although perhaps not surprising for anthropologists liable to recognize the weight carried by 
‘non-contractual’ moral obligations, Lorenzo (2010, p. 56) has shown that international ‘soft’ law regarding 
racial equality within transnational corporations operating in Brazil tends to be treated with more weight than 
Brazil’s own ‘hard’ constitutional law. This troubles certain critical narratives which assume that the delegation 
of corporate regulation to voluntaristic soft law is an effective capitulation to the whims of unethical market 
practitioners. 
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& de Montoya 2008: 11). Anthropologists working on the application of these codes of 
conduct to particular factories and sites of agricultural production in the Global South have 
emphasized instead how they transform putatively ‘ethical’ concerns into questions of risk 
management. Ethical audits become instruments of surveillance, distinguishing and 
disciplining compliant and non-compliant producers within visibly ‘ethical’ supply chains 
that are nonetheless pushed to adopt lean and flexible production practices (De Neve, 2009; 
Dolan, 2008; Raworth & Kidder, 2009). The UN Global Compact, with its “language of 
dialogue, partnership and voluntarism” (Garsten, 2008, p. 39), has also been scrutinised by 
ethnographers of CSR in the extractive industries. Dinah Rajak (2011b) has noted that from 
its inception, the Global Compact was presented not so much as a matter of devolving 
regulation to the market, but, in the words of Kofi Annan, as part of a movement to 
“reconcile the creative forces of private enterprise with the needs of the disadvantaged.” 
Transnational corporations were not merely to take over from states in regulating their own 
conduct; they were to become the agents of “emancipation through the market” (Rajak, 
2011a, p. 10). 
Rajak’s ethnography begins with an exposition of idealised CSR discourse and practice as it 
is formed and reformed within the ‘theatres of virtue’ that are hosted regularly in illustrious 
London hotels, London being the mining industry’s (if not the world’s) CSR capital (Rajak 
2011a). In these theatres of virtue, CSR professionals reflect upon their own practice, and 
reveal to themselves their commitments and assumptions: that ethical action within the 
extractive industries consists of establishing partnerships with NGOs, and empowering 
mineworkers and mine-area community members through cultivating entrepreneurial 
subjectivities. Adapting Stirrat and Henkel’s (1997) work on the ‘development gift’, Rajak 
interprets the application of these ideals to South Africa’s post-Apartheid platinum mining 
industry in terms of corporate giving. In the 1990s “shifting the discourse of development 
away from charity and gifts toward, for example, enablement or institution building [allowed] 
development NGOs to avoid the charge that they are being patrons…the slogan [became] 
‘helping the poor to help themselves’” (Stirrat & Henkel, 1997, p. 73). Similarly, Anglo-
Platinum’s CSR programmes are keen to distance themselves from Apartheid-era 
philanthropy, offering instead a chance at self-empowerment in South Africa’s market 
economy (Rajak, 2008). The twist in the tail of the corporate gift is found in the CSR 
professionals’ clear expectations of a ‘return’ from the young South Africans whose 
education they sponsor, and their apparent frustration when these ‘empowered’ individuals 
graduated and left to work for other companies. While officially, philanthropy has been left 
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behind, empowerment in the marketplace is only available for those whose indebtedness 
Anglo-Platinum engineers via their corporate largesse: “The company’s investment of 
‘educational capital’ thus serves as a mechanism for business to legitimately maintain and 
reproduce, rather than ‘transform’ itself” (Rajak, 2008, p. 16). In Anglo-Platinum’s HIV 
treatment programme, there is likewise an effort to reassert control over labouring bodies 
(Rajak, 2010b). If the market asserts itself on this CSR programme, it does so not by 
displacing the paternalistic relations of colonial and Apartheid-era workforce management, 
but by further entrenching a logic of efficiency that colours the company’s dealings with its 
workers. 
Similarly, Katy Gardner’s work on Chevron’s CSR programmes in Bibiyana, Bangladesh, 
shows that corporate gifts, like Muhammad Yunus’ much-vaunted and equally vilified 
microcredit programmes (A. Rahman, 1999), are only made available to appropriately 
entrepreneurial subjects (Gardner 2012, 2015). A chula (wood-fired stove) emblazoned with 
the Chevron logo is only accessible for those prepared to invest in it. As for gas from the 
nearby Bibiyana field, there is to be no connection. Here, the question of the ‘return’ gift is 
more problematic, and this perhaps relates to a distinction that James Ferguson (2006) makes 
between socially ‘thick’ mining (as found in South Africa’s unionized platinum industry, with 
a workforce thoroughly integrated into national-level politics), and the socially ‘thin’ 
operations characteristic of enclaved oil and gas extraction, relatively independent from local 
labour. For Gardner, if there is a ‘return’ to Chevron’s corporate gift, it is found in “the 
compliance of the local population, a shining reputation at regional and global levels, and the 
production of a certain kind of ‘community’” (Gardner, 2012: 169). In more recent work, 
Gardner has drawn on Jamie Cross’s (2011, 2014) ethnography of ethical audit and corporate 
gifting in a South Indian diamond polishing factory, in order to argue that Chevron’s “gift 
of empowerment and self-reliance carries considerable rhetorical power but aims to 
ultimately absolve the company from long term commitment or connections” (Gardner, 
2015, unpaged). In a moral landscape where great value is placed on “helping our own poor” 
(Gardner & Ahmed, 2009, p. 140), and where the struggle for development is in part a 
struggle for transnational connection (Gardner 2008), this socially thin gas company is not 
seen to extend its control over those living in Bibiyana under the pretext of empowering 
them. Instead, Chevron gives them nothing.  
Gardner draws on two facets of Cross’s work in her recent writings. Firstly, his notion of 
detachment as a corporate ethic (Cross, 2011). Drawing on Michel Callon (1998) and Marilyn 
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Strathern (1996), Cross emphasizes the work that managers in the Worldwide Diamonds 
factory did to cut their ties with their subordinates, to extricate themselves from potential 
relationships of patronage, and dissipate responsibility for their actions onto the 
documentary form that their internationally-imposed codes of conduct take.94 Secondly, 
Cross’s more recent work on corporate giving at Worldwide Diamonds, which extends his 
interest in Marilyn Strathern’s (1996, 1999, 2000) take on gift exchange as a process of making 
social relationships and capacities visible.95 Cross objects to work done by Rajak (2008) and 
others on the grounds that there,  
the only happenings, meanings and consequences worth recording 
appear to be those that can be entered into a corporate balance sheet 
or that contain indices of profit…the coming of the corporate gift 
is an exchange initiated, directed and framed by capital. (Cross, 
2014, p. 126) 
 Cross argues that instead of seeing corporate giving “as the managers do,” gifts of gold coins 
(swarna mudra) made by Worldwide Diamonds to long serving employees should be seen as 
those employees saw them: “as an object that revealed them as particular kinds of people 
[and their labour] as a capacity…that could elicit the recognition and reciprocity of a patron” 
(p. 139). Certainly, as Gardner (2015) has shown, there is value in generating perspectives on 
corporate giving other than those aligned with the corporate balance sheet, but Cross may 
not be comparing like with like when he contrasts the corporate gifts of Worldwide 
Diamonds and Anglo-Platinum. 
It has often been noted in anthropology that Mauss’s writings on the gift have been subject 
to manifold interpretations and put to diverse political uses (Sigaud, 2002). Framing the 
anthropological debate as one over the corporate gift, in the singular, risks eliding the 
distinctions that might be made between what are in fact distinct forms of economic 
transaction. As Sigaud (2002) and Graeber (2011) note, Levi-Strauss’s elevation of reciprocity 
to a general principle of social life has cast an unfortunate shadow on economic 
                                                          
94 Cross draws on Annelise Riles’s (2006) approach to studying documents, which emphasizes the social work 
done by form-filling, rather than the norms that these documents might encode. Likewise, in her work on 
Environmental Impact Assessments around the Cajamarca mine in Peru, Fabiana Li (2009, p. 225) argues that 
the form taken by these Assessments “implicitly facilitates a project’s eventual approval” by shaping the 
perception of the ‘problems’ for which it turns out always to be the solution. 
95 Strictly speaking, this is Strathern’s understanding of Melanesian gift exchange which she explicitly 
counterposes to an ‘indigenous’ Euro-American understanding of gifting as the exchange of objects between 
fully-formed and distinct persons. Increasingly, however, Strathern’s work on the gift is being treated not as a 
theory of Melanesian (as opposed to Euro-American) sociality, but as an untethered analytical approach to 
understanding exchange. Strathern herself has applied it to understanding university audits in the United 
Kingdom (Strathern, 2000).  
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anthropology, which can in extremis see the logic of the marketplace insinuated “even into the 
thinking of those most opposed to it’” (Graeber, 2011, p. 90). Graeber proposes instead that 
economic life be conceptualised in terms of three modalities: communism (generalised 
reciprocity), exchange and hierarchy. The ethic of detachment which Worldwide Diamonds 
and socially thin Chevron managers evince is one that is rooted in the exchange of equivalences, 
and which can be called off at any time. Indeed, Callon’s framework, upon which Cross 
draws, is custom made for analysing the way that market participants call it “quits” and 
disentangle themselves after an encounter (Callon, 1998, pp. 19). By extricating themselves 
from relationships with their subordinates (Cross) or local residents (Gardner), these 
corporate representatives are extending a market principle. They indulge in neither 
communism, nor relations of hierarchy. Hierarchy, argues Graeber (2011, p. 109), is premised 
on a “logic of precedent,” on an expected cycle of obligations and counter-obligations that 
are never intended to be equivalent, much like the CSR programmes that set out to extend control 
over the bodies and futures of Anglo-Platinum employees and their relatives.  
The pride with which Cross’s colleagues at Worldwide Diamonds received their gold coins, 
which made visible their capacity to “elicit the recognition and reciprocity of a patron” can 
be recast, in Graeber’s framework, as a relationship of hierarchy (the swarna mudra does not 
even out the labourer-employer relationship) and debt. Debt is, for Graeber, the essence of 
the wage-labour contract (and of informal patronage), and represents an “agreement between 
equals to no longer be equal” (2011, p. 119). Cross’s use of the language of reciprocity perhaps 
disguises the extent to which logics of exchange, hierarchy and debt mingle on the factory 
floor – much as they do (albeit in different configurations) in Bibiyana and at Anglo-
Platinum. A comparative analysis of corporate giving might, therefore, be well served by 
eschewing the often obfuscatory language of gifts and reciprocity to which anthropological 
analyses are often wedded. 
I depart from Cross by exploring precisely the ways in which mining professionals see their 
relationships with those around extractive industry projects, and I ultimately avoid the 
language of gifts and reciprocity in analysing my own ethnographic material. However, 
Cross’s appropriation of Marilyn Strathern’s work on making corporate relationships visible 
is exciting and productive. This is particularly so in light of the emphasis placed on corporate 
reputation by many of my interlocutors, and the rise of corporate reputation management as 
a matter of practical concern for management scholars and consultants (Fombrun et al., 
2000; Jackson et al., 2014). Whereas some social critics view CSR as a “smokescreen” or 
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“mirage” that is about producing reputation, imagined as an empty signifier, and little more 
(e.g. Corporate Reform Collective, 2014), an approach that draws on Strathern can point 
towards an understanding of the strategic significance of reputational concerns, and the 
significance of the lengths that Corporate Diplomats go to in order to make certain 
relationships visible. For Strathern, gift exchange in Mount Hagen, Papua New Guinea, is 
precisely about making capacities and relationships visible. In making an exchange, a man’s 
“capacity is shown twice over: in detaching wealth from others, and in turning it into 
prosperity for themselves” (Strathern, 1999, p. 39). A similar point is made by Nancy Munn 
in her work on Gawan kula exchange. For Munn, successful kula exchange rests upon 
influencing another’s will (kareiwaga) such that they will transact a high-status shell with you 
(Munn, 1992, pp. 55-73). Fame works as a “coding of influence” that “models the 
spatiotemporal expansion of self effected by acts of influence by recasting these influential 
acts (moving the mind of another) into the movement or circulation of one’s name” (ibid.: 
117). Following Munn, markers of corporate reputation or depictions of ethical corporate 
behaviour are not merely hollow representations floating above the fray (cf. Barry, 2006), but 
act as a “a material part and participant in the moral world of social agents” (Keane, 2008b, 
p. 30). Based on the ethnography set out below, I argue that when extractive industry 
corporations make their relationships with mineworkers and mine-area residents visible, it is 
in order to demonstrate their capacity to maintain and extend their money mining activities. 
Corporate fame acts as a coding of influence that propitiates fund managers, via the ritual of 
capitalization.  
Influence is a key term in understanding the transformation of CSR into Corporate 
Diplomacy. Corporate Diplomats are also very careful about whom they wish to influence, 
and how they wish to make their agentic capacities visible within the communities that they 
attempt to manage at a distance. In the remainder of this chapter I present ethnographic 
material gathered during encounters with individuals and members of organizations who 
represent three phases in the mining industry’s ethical and reputational history. They stand 
for three temporal orientations which structure claims about moral agency in the extractive 
industries. In Section 5.2, I introduce Mr P, an elder statesmen of the mining market, who 
remains committed to the allegedly passé philanthropic ideals of corporate responsibility and 
the importance of reputation as gentlemanly creditworthiness. Then, in Section 5.3, I 
describe a residential summit on transparency and responsibility in the extractive industries, 
where the attendees were committed to an initially puzzling combination of framing CSR as 
nothing more than a strategic concern, while insisting that they were converts to a newly ethical 
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extractive sect. Finally, in Section 5.4, I present material from an ethnographic encounter 
with public relations professionals who are at work formalizing the practice of Corporate 
Diplomacy. By invoking the notion that harmful consequences of resource extraction are 
only and always attributable to legacy effects, these Corporate Diplomats allow themselves 
to reconcile the harmful consequences of money mining with the notion of a post-
conversion, ethical industry.  
5.2: GENTLEMANLY MINING CAPITALISM 
 Mr P’s biographical history of a changing mining industry came imbued with a nostalgic 
quality. Reputation, influence and visibility were central to his narrative, which decries the 
end of a gentlemanly capitalism premised on creditworthiness rather than legalistic 
compliance. At the same time, he expressed reservation about the visibility that new media 
brings to his and other companies in the sector. Mr P is a scion of one of the oldest merchant 
banks in the City of London. After a distinguished history, family control ended in the late 
1980s, around the time of Thatcher’s Big Bang. The various wings of the bank were sold to 
international banking corporations in the 1990s, but Mr P’s gold mining operations have 
remained a family business. His family first entered into anthropological literature in 1959, 
in a paper by Tom Lupton and Shirley Wilson that rightly asserts its place as the first work 
in the ethnography of finance.96 Lupton and Wilson’s concern was the Parker Tribunal of 
1958 into the ‘Leakage of the Bank Rate’, a City scandal that saw the Bank of England’s plan 
to increase the rate at which it could lend to commercial banks ‘leaked’ early to the market97.  
Intrigued by the informality of exchanges between the tribunal and those who sat before it, 
the persistent references to ‘precedent and custom,’ and the recorded familiarity between 
ministers, Bank of England Governors and commercial bankers, Lupton and Wilson’s thesis 
was that the “basis of informality in social relationships is often a shared social background, 
which promotes shared beliefs and confidence in customary procedures” (Lupton & Wilson, 
1959, p. 32). To this end they produced a genealogical diagram depicting the relations of 
affinity and descent connecting those involved in the Tribunal. Lupton and Wilson 
                                                          
96 Peter and Patricia Adler’s social psychology work in the New York Stock Exchange is, however, frequently 
cited as the first ethnography of finance by practitioners of the social studies of finance (e.g. Callon 1998) 
97 This was in the days when central banks operated on the principles of secrecy and closure, before the ‘Quiet 
Revolution’, after which many central banks became explicitly communicative, attempting to influence citizen-
consumers’ behaviour by releasing statements designed to affect their expectations, and thus bring them to act 
as the banks desired them to (Holmes, 2009).  
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interpreted their kinship diagrams as representations of the structures98 (based on 
intermarriage) that produced informality and ‘customary’ relations of familiarity that cut 
across commercial and state lines in the City.99 While the professionalization of the City may 
have eroded the commercial significance of these affinal relationships, there is continuity in 
the informality and familiarity characterizing relationships between state and mining market 
representatives today, as I discuss in Section 5.3. 
I had first come into contact with Mr P at FINEX 2012, an end-of-year event designed to 
bring exploration geologists into contact with City money. Introducing the event, Mr P 
described himself as a “serial investor in mining.” He decried the state of the mining market 
along two, interlinked lines. People could not find money for their projects, and the weight 
of post-financial crisis compliance requirements was stifling exploration. BlackRock, who 
manage the world’s largest natural resource investment fund, could not send a representative, 
because of new compliance concerns about information sharing in forums such as these. Mr 
P mentioned that BlackRock was started by an old family friend, and recalled walking into 
his office in the 1980s and telling him about a prospective gold deposit. The family friend 
asked him how confident he was, and then proceeded to sign over more money than he had 
asked for in the first instance. “The market,” Mr P argued, “has lost that sort of 
entrepreneurial spirit. The people – if you’re looking for money you should focus on the 
private investors, the family houses.”100  
When I later met with Mr P in his sumptuous Knightsbridge offices, overlooking 
Buckingham Palace, he continued to bemoan the state of the market in terms initially familiar 
to me (see Chapter Three): “We are suffering, we have been suffering, the whole market has 
been suffering from this very negative short term.” He then fleshed out his narrative about 
the decline of entrepreneurialism with reference to the death of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’. His 
great-great-great-great-great-grandfather had been a dry goods salesman.  
If he knew a miller was good for his word on the delivery of grain, 
then he would add his name to a piece of paper. That was the real 
                                                          
98 Recent approaches to kinship in anthropology have been critical of the ‘genealogical method’ (Bamford & 
Leach, 2009) on the grounds that it reflects a uniquely English, class-inflected approach to understanding kinship 
as ‘pedigree,’ and genealogical diagrams as markers of hierarchy and exclusion as much as relatedness. If 
anything this should serve to reinforce the aptness of Lupton and Wilson’s method in the context with which 
they were concerned. 
99 Lisle-Williams (1984) reverses the causality implied by Lupton and Wilson, arguing instead that such kinship 
structures were the product of existing levels of social cohesion, caused by a shared, defensive pursuit of rewards 
in the British ‘honours’ system on the part of a rising commercial class of merchant banking families that was 
centred on attendance at Eton. 
100 Fieldnotes, October–November 2012. 
136 
 
reason for the growth of London as a financial sector in the 19th 
century. Eventually my family were making more money by putting 
their name on other goods then from selling…I am doing the same 
as my great-great-great-great-great-grandfather except with gold.101 
Mr P also invoked his family history when defending his adherence to the now 
‘unfashionable’ philanthropic approach to Corporate Social Responsibility. It is, he says,  
a totally necessary part of doing business. It’s deeply unfashionable 
and politically incorrect to be paternalistic. But if you come from a 
long line of people who have been employing other people for 100s 
of years, there’s an inherent belief you are responsible for the people 
you employ. Responsible to and for. 
 What changed in the 1980s, he said, was that “people we didn’t know moved in,” and they 
were people who brought in “teams of lawyers” and a culture of legalistic compliance. Prior 
to that, “the City was a village. [Our family] bank staff wore green uniforms and when I 
walked down the street they all called out, ‘Morning Mr P!’ It’s no different to a fish market 
or whatever if someone comes and sells shoddy goods or something, the other traders gang 
up.”  
Mr P’s narrative about the loss of the entrepreneurial spirit in the City, and in the junior 
mining market especially, was evocative of the etymological roots of the concept of financial 
‘credit,’ which are to be found in the Latin credere, meaning trust or belief (cf. ‘credible’). We 
might expect Mr P, then, to be comfortable with the intensified concern with reputation that 
preoccupied the other mining market professionals I met during my fieldwork (see below). 
But this was not the case. When asked about how he manages his own reputation, Mr P 
responded: 
When I was asked what my image was to be – and you probably 
won’t understand – but it was to be a White Five Pound note. When 
I was a kid it was the biggest note in circulation and it was incredibly 
exciting. If you were incredibly lucky someone might give you a 
White Five Pound note for your birthday and it was like heaven. My 
favourite comment to see in the newspapers would be “Mr P the 
gold mining expert said he had no comment.” Do you see? But life 
is different now, the instant media, Facebook and such, that you 
can’t do anymore. It’s not possible. The result is that unless you 
manage it well it’s a nightmare.  
Here the notion that, for Mr P, reputation means being credible is brought out once again 
through his putative personification as a White Five Pound note. As Mary Poovey (2008, pp. 
91-94; 2009, pp. 792-793) has demonstrated, such bank notes were not themselves always 
                                                          
101 Fieldnotes, May 2013. 
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seen as unproblematically bearing (or even representing) value, and an enormous amount of 
work went in to making Bank of England notes as credible as they were creditworthy during 
the eighteenth century. Mr P recalls a City that, like a fish market, is based on face-to-face 
interaction, and where being ‘good for your word’ was all that was necessary.  
This was a City that required the establishment of trust before trading could begin (Graeber 
2011, p. 117; Hart, 1986, p. 648), or in Stephen Gudeman’s (2009, p. 20) terms, required a 
“framework of mutuality in which competitive trade and calculative reason may [have been] 
exercised.” Today’s City, post-Big Bang, obviates the need for trust to a large extent, by 
embedding exchanges in instruments of legal compliance (cf. Riles, 2011, pp. 54-63). Yet Mr 
P’s distaste for today’s highly mediated economy of reputation also hints at a gulf between 
his ideal economy of credit and credibility and the strategic reputation management services 
offered by London’s Reputation Institute, Oxford’s Corporate Reputation Centre, and the 
reputation tracking service102 engaged by the International Council on Mining and Metals. 
For many of these professionals, reputation is closely related to quantitative credit ratings, 
which divorce the morality of a corporate person from the real matter of concern, its financial 
performance (e.g. Barron & Rolfe, 2012).  
In the extractive industries, however, with long operational life-spans and extreme 
environmental and social impacts, the strategic management of reputation has come to mean 
more than accruing esteem through the timely settlement of accounts. In Section 5.4, I show 
how a new breed of extractive industry professional, the Corporate Diplomat, operates with 
an understanding of reputation as something that does not belong to their companies, but 
which is open to contestation within a broader ‘Age of Conversation.’ Mr P’s attempts to 
manage his reputation centrally and discreetly is, for most Corporate Diplomats, simply 
impossible, and indeed, undesirable. This apparent desire to participate in an Age of 
Conversation is not merely a matter of transparency and accountability “becoming normative 
imperatives considered basic for establishing trust and generating profits and value” (Garsten 
& de Montoya, 2008, p. 11). It is part of a strategic move away from Corporate Social 
Responsibility to Corporate Diplomacy, but one which is framed by a sense that the 
extractive industries have converted, and that extractive industry professionals working for 
                                                          
102 I interviewed the owner and founder of this service a number of times during my fieldwork, but only after 
signing a non-disclosure agreement. 
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major mining corporations are “the good guys.”103 The following section introduces this 
transformation in the extractive industries’ ethical self-understanding. 
5.3: CONVERTS & ROGUES: TRANSPARENCY OFF THE RECORD 
In this section I discuss the historical narratives about the mining industry’s past and its 
recent moral conversion that were deployed behind the closed doors of a state-industry-civil 
society summit on transparency held in 2013 at a residential retreat on Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office grounds. The mining professionals I encountered there offer up a 
narrative about temporality and morality in the sector that is an almost exact inversion of Mr 
P’s. They are insistent about the moral rectitude of the contemporary mining sector and 
embrace reputation management (even if they do so behind closed doors and under the 
Chatham House Rule),104 while consigning any contemporary conflicts to the realm of ‘legacy 
problems’ that arose before their turn-of-the-century ‘conversion’ – to Mr P’s golden age, in 
fact. 
The summit was an opportunity for mining corporations, investors, transparency 
campaigners and state development agencies to meet and discuss responsibility and 
sustainable development in the mining sector. There was a partial emphasis on the post-
financial crisis Dodd-Frank Act in the US, and its potential consequences for mining 
companies. Of particular concern were Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires 
that mining companies register the payments that they make to host governments on a 
project-by-project basis, and Section 1502, which introduced reporting requirements for any 
company that deals with designated ‘conflict minerals’ (gold, tin, tantalum and tungsten). 
Currently, the US Securities and Exchange Commission is being sued by Oxfam for failing 
to implement the Act, after its initial attempt to do so was struck down by a US District 
Court in 2013. In the language of academic diplomacy studies, this Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office-hosted event was a site of “club diplomacy,” taking place behind 
closed doors and under the Chatham House Rule, quite apart from the ideals of corporate 
“network diplomacy” that I will discuss below (see Heine, 2006). Not only was the event 
                                                          
103 Fieldnotes, April 2013. 
104 The Chatham House Rule is often interpreted, incorrectly, as a prohibition against quoting from a given 
even or meeting. In fact, the Rule runs as follows: “When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham 
House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of 
the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.” In keeping with the rule, I have neither used 
real names nor given specific affiliations in this chapter. All of the fieldnotes from this meeting are from April 
2013. 
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organized by the daughter of a serving British diplomat, but bona fide state diplomats were 
also present. One South African-born Canadian diplomat, after getting visibly agitated over 
the European Union’s attitude towards the environmental impact of Canadian tar sands 
extraction, related the story of how he came to offer his services as an early corporate 
diplomat to Anglo-American, towards the end of Apartheid.  
In the late 1980s, he told me, he had said to Anglo, “‘You’re going to re-enter the 
international community, and you’re going to need to manage that.’ And do you know what 
they said?” Adopting a mock-South African accent, he continued: “‘We read The 
Economist.’ We read The Economist? I mean come on?” He was heartened to see that so many 
representatives of corporate ‘foreign affairs’ departments were in attendance. The world, it 
seemed, had caught up with him. This ethnographic vignette does not only serve to highlight 
the increasing salience of political risk and foreign policy for corporate players in the mining 
world. The Canadian diplomat also seems to embody the figure of the broker (James, 2011), 
who appears able to embrace all at once the centralized hierarchical moral authority of the 
state (or large corporation), as well as the choice-based (even entrepreneurial) morality of a 
globalizing mining market, or the consensual moral atmosphere of the residential summit. 
Like all of the other attendees at this event, he seemed comfortable acting “partly 
opportunistically and partly in response to his constituents’ demands” (James, 2011, p. 334).  
The ethical ambiguity of embraced by these powerbrokers was sometimes quite difficult for 
me to process ethnographically. Consider the following exchange, between the public affairs 
representative of a major mining company, and a representative of a European state 
development agency: 
[Mining Company]: ‘I admit it’s about being sustainable – we’re 
being entirely selfish. We want to stimulate potash production but 
also a local agriculture development programme. It’s not about 
charity, it’s about markets where business can do business, but in a 
socially responsible way. It’s about going beyond charity, beyond 
CSR. If it’s impacting the bottom line, it’s sustainable.’  
[Development Agency]: ‘Exactly…it’s not about reaching into your 
pocket for a school, but about the bottom line. What you want is 
companies that can make money out of poor people. It sounds alien 
but…’  
[Mining Company]: ‘I’m so pleased to hear you say that.’ 
It is admittedly difficult to present such an exchange without appearing as if your intention 
was to ‘dish the dirt’ on elites (cf. Marcus, 1998, p. 28n.9).  
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Nonetheless my aim in representing this moment of brokerage is not simply to ‘pose the 
ambiguity and messiness’ (Marcus, 1998) of Corporate Diplomacy, but to critically engage 
with transformations in the Corporate Social Responsibility concept as it is seen by the 
mining industry, and state donor agencies. In this instance there appears to be a 
transformation in the understanding of CSR such that doing business, or making markets, 
becomes responsible in and of itself, aside from any efforts to produce ethical visibility, or 
receiving for your corporate largesse a shining reputation at national and local levels. The 
mining company in question wants to stimulate agriculture near their large potash mine in 
order that they may have a larger market for that potash. At the same time, the concept of 
sustainability is reworked, with any apparently ‘ethical’ veneer removed, such that sustainability 
simply means sustaining a business as a profitable concern. The CSR professional and the 
donor agency representative appear to embrace the morality of the pure market, rather than 
strive for a more ‘moral’ version of it.  
That said, the public affairs representative from the major mining company in question was 
not unconcerned with reputation. Later over lunch, she spoke about the stress of having 
worked with Ivan Glasenberg, the undeniably ‘roguish’ head of resource trading giant 
Glencore (now merged with mining company Xstrata to form Glencore Xstrata). “I would 
kill him if he was my boss!” she remarked, visibly agitated while reliving a speech she 
witnessed at an Australian Chamber of Commerce meeting, in which Glasenberg had joked 
openly about the idea of having women on a company board, and the inconvenience of 
corporate disclosure. The response from a public affairs representative from another major 
on our table was that “I’m not saying they are unethical but traders [like Glasenberg] are a 
different kind of people to miners.” A civil society organisation (CSO) representation 
concurred: those at the summit were “the good guys here,” unlike the traders and juniors 
who were “rarely around the table.” The moral fortitude of the mining sector was carefully 
reinforced at this quintessentially diplomatic site.105  
The broker-like qualities of the corporate, state and civil society diplomats in attendance were 
brought out again in one civil society organization (CSO) representative’s rare violation of a 
workshop’s consensual atmosphere, when he charged that “it’s quite difficult to have an 
honest debate when you’re sitting round the table with people you are suing.” He was 
                                                          
105 Black (2001, pp. 255-257) has written about the significance of the “country home atmosphere” in Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office diplomatic practice, and the use of “representational homes” such as the one in 
which this summit was held. Along with Neumann (2013), Black also recognizes the table as the quintessential 
diplomatic site. 
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referring to the American Petroleum Institute (some of whose representatives were in 
attendance) suing the US government over Section 1504 Dodd-Frank Act, the contents of 
which had been lobbied for and written in part by his and other attending CSOs.106 His 
intervention was not a hostile one, and he certainly did not consider himself as standing 
opposed to industry. Rather, the efforts he made to address unnamed individuals in the room 
are a reminder that the ‘manipulation of ambiguity, and indirectness within communication, 
lie at the heart of the diplomatic profession’ (Black 2001, p. 255). Moments later, he was free 
of representing his organization, and reinserted himself into the summit’s wider community 
of complicity; he joined several public affairs representatives from a large mining company 
in their mockery of anti-mining protestors.  
Two representatives from one major company talked about facing protest outside their 
Annual General Meetings (AGM) – to which an FCO diplomat in attendance replied, in 
apparently genuine shock, “but you’re the good guys!” True enough, one of the company 
representatives responded, they were among the “converts.” But when people are 
complaining at an AGM, “it is usually about something we did 10 years ago. They’re legacy 
issues. There is one group that is always in attendance, ‘Localtown107 Mum’s for Clean Air.’ 
They sent an actress, to cry, ‘Oh my child’s got asthma.’” As shock reverberated around the 
table, the aforementioned CSO representative half-joked “A responsible company would 
start an NGO called ‘Localtown Dad’s for Mining.’”  
A few weeks later, I met with representatives from three of the companies that had been in 
attendance, whom I discovered had all previously worked together at the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (along with the aforementioned CSO representative and a fund 
manager whom I had met at another mining related event). These were Corporate Diplomats 
in more than just name. In a coffee shop just off Whitehall, the public affairs manager from 
one of the companies, joining me briefly before heading to a pre-G8 meeting around the 
corner, spoke about the difference between “converts” like her own company and the more 
roguish among the junior miners.  
ICMM [International Council on Mining and Metals] exists to bring 
juniors in. To pull the overall standards of the industry up. We don’t 
have the resources to teach the juniors to do things “the Major 
Company Way.” Juniors pretty much exist to sell stuff to midcaps 
                                                          
106 Ultimately, the American Petroleum Institute’s efforts were successful and they prevented the Securities and 
Exchange Commission from implementing S1504, as a result of which Oxfam has launched an ongoing 
counter-suit, suing the SEC for not implementing the Act five years after it was passed. 
107 The region in question has been anonymised 
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and then to us ultimately, and they have to. Now does that mean we 
are happy to deal with juniors who go in cheaply and do things 
badly? Not if we’re buying the risk that goes on with it. At some 
point people who’ve treated people badly are not going to be able 
to deal with us.108 
And corporate social responsibility she said, if it was about anything, was about dealing with 
just the kind of ‘people risk’ that juniors tended to discount.  
That corporate social responsibility has perhaps always been about ‘people risk’ was also 
suggested when I had spoken to one of the co-inventors of political risk and war insurance 
for the mining sector, whom I first met at the exclusive political risk briefing first discussed 
in Chapter Two.109 This insurance broker told the story of a company operating in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo who were “one of the first, before really anyone was doing 
it, to have a really good social programme.” Their trucks and planes were used by the military, 
and an “NGO got at them.” In response they developed a social programme and this, he 
suggested, was good news for those insuring a company’s right to develop their resource:   
Although we are hard-nosed commercial beings, we’re not as 
concerned as MIGA [Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency] or 
the ADB [Asian Development Bank] regarding the Environmental 
and Social Governance stuff. But we still take comfort in positive 
affirmation from a host that there is an EIA [Environmental Impact 
Assessment] and a social programme…And there are very good 
commercial reasons. And in that case you can get people on your 
side, there are commercial benefits…As part of underwriting due 
diligence we want to see a good social programme.110 
Likewise, at Mines & Money London 2012, shortly after Mr E – also a member of an old 
banking family, but now working in mineral exploration and investment – had spoken out 
about “Greenfield projects located in new regions with greater social, political and 
infrastructural challenges,” where explorers “don’t think about the social license to operate 
and the cost of that to shareholders,” a leading political risk lawyer spoke out about “the 
need to use your CSR programme as a defensive weapon.” This lawyer explained that “Buy-
in from the local community is your first line of support against less significant political 
clowns,” especially in kleptocratic, African resource-rich states.111 
                                                          
108 Fieldnotes, May 2013.  
109 Fieldnotes, April 2013. 
110 Fieldnotes, March 2013. 
111 Fieldnotes, December 2012. 
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But the idea of a gulf between the ‘Major Company Way’ and the ‘people risk’-producing 
Junior Way was belied by a conversation I had witnessed between the same group of ex-
FCO corporate diplomats back at the residential summit. They spoke about an old 
acquaintance with mining interests in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: 
He’s a bit gung-ho. Ex-Army. And he laments the loss of that 
pioneering spirit. You know, a lot of younger ex-military chaps are like 
that, going out to mining in the DRC and they just get frustrated 
with the red tape. I mean he really does believe he’s done good for 
them, the Africans, and he just doesn’t want to lose that pioneering 
spirit, and is sick of paperwork.112 
The masculine frontier spirit that goes into assembling speculative resource materialities (see 
Chapter Three) makes its appearance once again. Indeed, the old entrepreneurial spirit, the 
loss of which Mr P lamented, was here again valorized, and the burden of legalistic 
compliance once again derided.  
What is presented outside the summit as the irresponsibility of juniors, from which “the good 
guys” will always distance themselves, is discussed in private, behind closed doors, in terms 
of a valuable pioneering spirit, too often restrained by a compliance culture. And it is this spirit 
upon which the expansion of the majors ultimately depends. Legacy issues, it seems, continue 
to be produced by rogues (or perhaps pioneers?) upon whom the converts ultimately rely for 
their own reproduction. 
5.4: THE AGE OF CONVERSATION & THE AGE OF INFLUENCE  
In this section I draw on material from Mines & Money London 2012, and from a week long 
ethical mining summit or ‘theatre of virtue’ (Rajak 2011a) hosted in a West London hotel, as 
well as from subsequent meetings and interviews with several of the Corporate Diplomats 
whom I encountered in those spaces. At Mines & Money I had attended an executive 
masterclass on initial public offerings (IPOs), or the process of listing junior mining 
companies on the London Stock Exchange. One of the sessions was run by Catherine, a 
partner in one of the mining industry’s leading communications and public relations (PR) 
firms. Catherine introduced her presentation by announcing that “we are within what we call 
the Age of Conversation…reputation is no longer controlled from within a Citadel.” Social 
media, it seemed, had a big part to play in this change: “Right now, everyone is a journalist, 
everyone is an activist…people you wouldn’t expect can be overly cynical about business and 
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overly interested in your personal wealth.” The role of the communications firm in the 
mining company’s IPO or the role of the “PR machine,” as she called it, was to counter 
efforts to drive the price down: “you price, but you can’t just go away and get on with your 
day jobs.” As long as there is conversation, there is a contest over price. In closing she argued 
that “shaping opinion” and “getting truth” were one and the same, especially when you’re 
“looking at it from a broader societal view, as we have entered into this Age of 
Conversation.”113   
The notion that reputational risk arose from the expansion of social media coverage – and 
the idea that ‘everyone is a journalist’ – is not, of course, unique to the mining market. I had 
and would go on to encounter it many more times during my fieldwork, at London’s 
Reputation Institute114, and at a masterclass for lawyers and PR professionals concerned with 
managing reputational risk. What was different here was the notion of the Age of 
Conversation, and Catherine’s idea that reputation was once managed from within a 
metaphorical ‘Citadel’, but now circulates more freely, albeit not without contest, in a highly 
networked world. I spoke to Catherine after her presentation and was pleased, given the 
difficulties I had faced during my fieldwork, at her interest in my work. She seemed genuinely 
keen to meet me and exchange views on how the mining market should or can look at and 
speak to ‘society’. I felt, for the first time during my fieldwork, as if I might have found 
someone with whom I could collaborate on a problem that was ‘cognitively shared’ (cf. 
Marcus, 2011) – not that I was expecting to agree entirely with Catherine’s approach, 
methods, or the ends to which she put her insights.  
Nonetheless, at her invitation, I arranged to meet Catherine and her colleagues at her offices 
some weeks later, to discuss further this idea of the Age of Conversation. In her company’s 
own publications, the prevalence of conversation or “lively debate” could be understood 
directly in terms of the pursuit of resource opportunities in “frontier markets.” As they put 
it: 
Our search for resources takes us to increasingly remote and 
inaccessible places – which pushes up the social, environmental and 
                                                          
113 Fieldnotes, December 2012. 
114 ‘Forty years ago, reputation could be bought with mass media. You literally could create a brand and you 
could swamp any criticism. Brand is not what it was. Reputation is no longer about brand. We don’t manage 
our reputation, we only influence…The reputation doesn’t belong to you. Reputation is not a vaccination.’ (HSBC 
reputation manager, Reputation Institute, October 2012). 
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financial cost. There's a lively debate about how to minimize the 
impact, or whether we should extract at all.115 
Much as the residential summit on transparency and responsibility in mining had been 
conducted under the Chatham House Rule, the home of the Age of Conversation could 
easily be mistaken for a Citadel. Appropriately attired, I was buzzed into the unmarked 
building before I could ring, and ushered into a room hung with an original Picasso, and 
three surviving prints from a now incomplete series produced by William Blake. I could not 
dispel the impression that in drawing Catherine and her colleagues’ attention to the artworks 
(or at least my slightly awestruck apprehension of them), I had revealed the frailty of my 
efforts to perform as a member of this elite culture.  
But we sat down, and Catherine was friendly. One of her associates had recently left behind 
a career in investigative journalism, the other was trained in the UN system. We talked about 
the age of conversation, about the importance of maintaining and facilitating a conversation 
‘between companies and society’. Feeling bold, I asked about the recent events in Marikana 
(see Breckenridge, 2012; Rajak, 2014b), as I knew her firm to be dealing with the mining 
company which employed the striking workers, of whom more than 40 had been shot dead, 
in a dispute at Lonmin’s South African mine. This, she said, was a legacy issue. All such events 
were “legacy issues, bad decisions that were made 20 to 30 years ago, when there was no 
internet.” Remarkably, Catherine seemed to suggest that because of the disciplinary power 
of social media in the Age of Conversation, companies today could not be unethical. Thus, any 
‘social risk’ arising at a mine site would necessarily be a legacy issue. Rio Tinto’s ongoing 
problems in Utah? “Legacy issues is what they are. Projects don’t go ahead nowadays if they 
do harm. If you’re not gonna get buy-in from the community, you have to walk away.”  
Since Catherine had introduced the concept of ‘harm’, I asked how she would respond to 
the view held by some mining researchers in anthropology (e.g. Benson & Kirsch, 2010) that 
mining is always and necessarily predicated on social and environmental harm? Her reply was 
telling: “I don’t know – when was that published? But I can only assume it was some time 
ago!”116 In other words, before the mining industry’s conversion which precipitated the 
paradoxical treatment of a ‘corporate legacy’ as something totally isolated from the 
contemporary corporate body.  
                                                          
115 In the interests of anonymity, I have not provided any bibliographic references relating to this company. 
116 Fieldnotes, February 2013. 
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It would, of course, be naïve to take Catherine’s statements as simple and transparent 
expressions of her understanding of the mining industry. Given her professional position, it 
would be reasonable to view her statements as part of a performance. If, following Julie Froud, 
the stories told by business elites can be understood as performative efforts to impose 
‘closure’ in a field of public debate, narrowing a political agenda and consolidating power 
(Froud et al. 2010, pp. 101-02), then the notion of the Age of Conversation could, 
paradoxically, be viewed as an attempt to undermine the voices of those who would critique 
the mining industry as a harm industry. But this does not mean that discussions taking place 
behind the closed doors of ethical mining summits held in luxury hotels are more transparent 
then those taking place on ‘the outside’ or in the offices of PR firms like Catherine’s.  
At an EthicalCorp event on sustainability and responsibility in the extractive industries, 
hosted shortly after I met Catherine, a spokesman for Shell stood up to lament the fact that 
Shell’s success story in South China, Nanhai, was hardly spoken about. Whereas Mr P 
expressed his desire to be like a White Five Pound Note (barely visible until there were good 
returns to report), and Catherine’s PR agency describe the contemporary era as one saturated 
by digitally-mediated conversation, the Shell representative here seemed disappointed in the 
lack of reputational capital accrued from their success. He continued:   
If an NGO stands up and says Shell did a really good thing, the 
people who really hate Shell, they really loathe Shell, they still fill up 
their cars with petrol, but they will go after your friends, the 
NGOs.117 
 In a curious response to this statement typical of the diplomatic indirection characteristic of 
these ‘transparency’ events (see above), a member of an international civil society 
organisation (whom I had in fact met the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s residential 
summit) stood up to say “I have nothing to say about my colleague’s statement”, before 
sitting down again. He offered an indirect acknowledgement that although he was one of 
Shell’s friends (and he was), it would not do to make it known. This civil society 
representative, when I had breakfast with him a couple of days later, spoke about a project 
in north-east India that he would shortly be jetting off to as a consultant. His comments, 
once again, belied the notion of a dialogic Age of Conversation, and hinted at the role that 
CSR professionals play in reducing ‘people risk’ and strategically securing the license to 
operate in the mining sector: “The problem though is that communities want independence. 
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I need to give them responsible information that’s realistic. If it’s independence from India 
that they want, I’ll be on the plane back.” 
Later in the same week, at the EthicalCorp event, I would again meet Catherine’s young 
associate – the former UN employee, recently returned from Marikana. I asked what it had 
been like, speaking to the mineworkers as a representative of the firm in question, Lonmin. 
“Oh, no,” she replied, “well we don’t speak to everyone, only the influencers. We don’t engage 
with all stakeholders, some we engage, some we just map.” In any case, she continued, it has 
now been eight months. “That is I think it’s behind them, and the whole industry has had to 
move on.” As well as displacing the events at the mine onto structural problems in the South 
African political sphere, in a manner analogous to the efforts that Peter Benson (2014) 
suggests tobacco firms make to dissipate accountability, Catherine’s young associate was 
exhibiting the logic of temporal decay that characterizes attitudes to news events in the 
financial markets.  
The market’s willingness to overlook the structural problems surrounding the Marikana issue 
are revealed in an analyst note, produced by Panmure Gordon, the stock–broking firm at 
which British Prime Minister David Cameron’s father, grandfather and great–grandfather 
had all worked, shortly after the crisis: 
Whilst we continue to regard Lonmin as presenting a longer term 
value opportunity, in the short term significant risk remains and it 
does look increasingly likely that the company may require 
additional funding to see it through the downturn. 
The significance of the events had started to decay, and the industry was looking for a way to 
‘move on’ (and find the funding to help them do so). What is particularly noteworthy about 
Catherine’s colleague’s statement here, is that it reveals the extent to which reputational 
problems that occur in the post-conversion period can quickly decay into legacy problems. 
The extractive industries’ ethical conversion seems to involve perpetually renewed 
redemption from what Elizabeth Povinelli (2002, p. 155) terms “the unconditional of the 
future perfect proposition.” In other words, while they may have been wrong in the past, they 
never will have been wrong again.   
At the same EthicalCorp event, I had lunch with the public affairs manager from a large 
Africa-focused mining company, and a former Human Terrain anthropologist who now ran 
a Middle East-focused mining and oil CSR consultancy. (The work, he said, was rather 
similar.) In between conversations about the quality of gated housing in Tanzania as opposed 
to South Africa, the public affairs manager from the Africa focused miner began to speak 
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about a project he had been working on with professors from Wharton Business School, 
called Stakeholder 360. The system works based on a stakeholder mapping procedure, to be 
repeated every 15 months. The mapping exercise involves 50 minutes of non-context-
specific questions “about who you are related to and the issues you are related to.” This 
provides you with a “moving model that tells you who to act on.” A value of zero means the 
person will oppose you, a value of five means that person will ‘do things that are good for 
you without you having to ask them. Currently the mine he is working on has an average 
score of 3.6. As he said, 
The model tells you how to get to 4.8. It tells you what three issues 
and what influencers you can speak to. The focus is how to 
influence and change the shape of the network. For instance, the 
artisanal and small-scale miners on our property in “Mineville.” You 
identify the point of influence, even if it is the local Highways agency 
– whoever has good relations! 
 In the recently released book on Corporate Diplomacy by Wharton School professor Witold 
Henisz, a similar methodology is described for identifying and traversing ‘influencers’ such 
that mining companies might be able to ‘expand a coalition of local supporters without 
appearing to undermine a powerful tribal leader’s authority’ (Henisz 2014: 53). Much as 
Catherine’s colleague had mapped everyone but only spoken to ‘the influencers,’ it seems 
that the Age of Conversation is less about endless dialogue, and more about careful managing 
strategically significant relationships in order to reduce ‘people risk’ and secure a mine’s 
ability to operate. 
Towards the end of 2014 I met again with Catherine at a mining analysts’ professional 
masterclass on managing political risk. The keynote speaker was an ex-military man from 
one of the City’s leading political risk insurance agencies. He spoke about the need to start 
thinking strategically about CSR, which is “not just about scholarships for local tribal 
leaders.”118 The key, he said, was the “deployment of the skills of the diplomat on the 
ground.” He referred to Moore and Sullivan’s (2011) work from the Center for Emerging 
Market Enterprises at Tufts, where they argue that “diplomacy, which deals with and often 
thrives upon ambiguity, is a useful source of learning for business leaders,” especially in 
frontier markets which are “human centric,” “relationship-driven” and so “inherently 
political.”  
                                                          
118 Fieldnotes, December 2014. 
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Catherine, in her presentation, spoke again about the importance of digital dialogue, the 
mapping of stakeholder influence, and the challenge involved in making mine employees 
‘company ambassadors.’ Employees, she argued, “should be going home with their jackets 
on and be proud, A, that they have a job, and B, that they work for your mine.” She stressed 
the importance of a project she was working on with ICMM that was about moving from 
seeing mining as the enemy to seeing it as the saviour who can 
provide all the resources and move the economy out of poverty and 
into middle classes around the world…Why be hostile? Why? 
Everything in this room is mined. We need those resources and we 
need to change that conversation.119 
There is a certain element of truth in such a statement, of course. Ours is a world intensely 
reliant upon mining. But as I argued in Chapter Four, many professionals in the mining 
market are quite comfortable with the fact that mining is unsustainable, and that they are not 
so much provisioning the world as mining cash, and fast. And, as I go on to show in Chapter 
Seven, to claim that the extractive industries provide humanity–at–large with natural 
resources is a highly de–politicising act, writing over the efforts that postcolonial nations 
have made to assert sovereignty over their own natural resources. 
There are also reasons to be critical about an industry or an agency that presents itself as a 
participant in the Age of Conversation, when plans to change that conversation are outlined 
quite literally, in the sorts of exclusive Citadels that are not open to all. Recall how Catherine’s 
firm presents frontier mining in the Age of Conversation to outsiders: “There's a lively debate 
about how to minimize the impact, or whether we should extract at all.” Her later words, 
issued behind closed doors, suggest instead an attempt to force closure onto the 
conversation. Much as it seems possible to keep on creating legacy problems in the present, 
the Citadel still has a place in the Age of Conversation.  
In this chapter, I have departed from pre-existing anthropological approaches to analysing 
CSR in the extractive industries and elsewhere, in part because CSR is itself evolving into 
something new: Corporate Diplomacy. By focusing on the overlapping temporal orientations 
through which participants in the mining market position themselves as moral agents, the 
apparent contradiction between a rise in concerns about reputation and public relations, and 
an insistence that CSR is now purely a strategic affair conducted in a marketplace that has no 
                                                          
119 See also the head of a professional mining body, during an interview at the Institute of Directors in January 
2013: “As an industry we never used to see the benefit of giving our side of the story. You know for journalists 
always mining is dirty, dangerous and somehow immoral. If you always start with the position you’re the bad 
guy, people are going to be defensive. We’re not just a necessary evil, we can be a force for good. And we are 
necessary.” 
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need for a moral supplement, can be resolved. By framing social and environmental harm caused 
by mining as always and only a legacy effect, and allowing the cause of contemporary crises to 
dissipate into the past, Corporate Diplomats and public relations professionals know that the 
extractive industries will never again have been wrong.  
While some such as Mr P prefer to manage their reputation from within a ‘Citadel,’ Corporate 
Diplomats claim to be morally disciplined by a networked subaltern of the panopticon. At 
the same time, they develop techniques to manage very carefully the extent to which they 
make their agency visible in mine-area communities. Corporate Diplomats act in an 
awareness of the fact that making corporate capacities visible may not only bring esteem, but 
can also create ‘people risk.’ Ultimately, by making their capacities to control people risk 
(their ‘reputations’) visible to fund managers in the mining market, extractive industry 
corporations demonstrate their capacity to create the very kinds of social order that money 
miners wish to capitalize upon. 
Raymond Saner and Lichia Yiu, the self-proclaimed originators of the concept of business 
diplomacy, argued recently in The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, that “Cases where MNEs use 
business diplomacy to further goals that many would consider unethical have not been 
analysed” (Saner & Liu, 2014, p. 323). Catherine and her colleagues likewise work with a 
rather purified image of the Corporate Diplomat, which overlooks the extent to which 
“diplomacy is necessarily imbricated in wider relations that are oftentimes violent” 
(Neumann, 2013, p. 37). In the next chapter, therefore, I move to look at the often violent 
encounters that take place between money miners and anti–foreign investment campaigners 
in Bangladesh. I explore in particular how extractive industry professionals set out to 
depoliticise this historically constituted opposition to oil, gas and coal extraction in terms of 
an ahistorical, deterritorialized discourse of ‘resource nationalism’. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
RESOURCE NATIONALISM & RESOURCE SOVEREIGNTY  
IN LONDON & DHAKA 
 
This chapter draws on fieldwork carried out in Dhaka during 2013, as well as on fieldwork 
that took place in London’s market for mining finance between 2012 and 2014. Mining 
professionals in London were particularly concerned during this period with an apparent 
upsurge in ‘resource nationalism,’ by which they meant the tendency for resource-rich states 
to renegotiate taxation regimes and Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs), or even nationalize 
extractive sites and corporations. In the many discussions about resource nationalism that 
were held at events like Mines & Money London (see Chapter Three) or the mining analysts’ 
professional development seminars referred to throughout this thesis, as well as in the 
‘thought leadership’ published and circulated by firms like McKinsey and Ernst & Young, 
resource nationalism was described as a reaction to the point at which the mining industry 
found itself in a particularly long commodity ‘supercycle’ or price bubble. In other words, 
the cyclical movement of the market through time was taken to explain the behaviour of 
diverse resource-rich states, and the various constituencies opposed to foreign ownership of 
extractive industries to be found therein.  
By assimilating diverse struggles over resource sovereignty, or the disposition of resources, as 
well as the distribution of income that may be derived from them (McNeish & Logan, 2012), 
in terms of a discourse of resource nationalism and the supercycle, mining professionals at 
once deterritorialize and dehistoricize these struggles. In Bangladesh, however debates and 
contests over the disposition of resources and the distribution of income arising from their 
extraction are heated and public affairs – and they are distinctly territorial, and rooted in the 
unfinished politics of the 1971 Liberation War. The export-led growth strategy that has made 
Bangladesh an apparent ‘success story’ has certainly demanded that factories were powered 
somehow. Should the model Production Sharing Contract (PSC) that determined the 
division of spoils between international oil and gas companies and the parastatal Petrobangla 
be reformed to attract more gas exploration? Or would that be an act of betrayal, ceding the 
national patrimony to ‘money miners’ intent on re-colonising a nation that had already been 
colonised twice before – once by the British, and once by (West) Pakistan? These issues were 
debated by public intellectuals, members of the susil samaj (polite society) who appeared on 
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late-night political chat shows; they were the focus of discussions among young professionals 
working for international NGOs and multinational oil companies in Dhaka’s elite Gulshan 
district (see Chapter Eight); and they provided the impetus for those of a less exalted 
obhusthan (social standing) who participate in the political performances that regularly possess 
Dhaka’s public spaces.  
Of equal concern in these high profile political contests over Bangladesh’s resource 
sovereignty were questions such as: Should the low-sulphur coal reserves in the north-west 
be extracted? If so, should they be exported to India, given Bangladesh’s shortage of coal-
burning power plants? Or could that coal be burned in the new power plants planned for 
Rampal in the Sundarbans? What was better for national development, to burn low-cost, 
low-sulphur domestic coal while displacing Phulbari residents and depleting their water table, 
or importing expensive coal at great monetary cost to the nation? How much longer could 
Bangladesh continue depleting their foreign currency reserves in order to import high-
sulphur fuel oil to burn in the quick-rental power plants that had sprung up to plug the 
country’s power shortfall, amid allegations of collusion between domestic power companies 
and cabinet ministers? The battle lines over these debates are roughly drawn between those 
who vociferously oppose foreign investment in extractive industries and the energy sector, 
represented by the Leftist coalition, the National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Ports and 
Natural Resources, and those technical experts and politicians who are willing to work with 
foreign extractive corporations, and insist that doing so is the only patriotic path along which 
an energy hungry nation like Bangladesh should be steered. Those Bangladeshi elites and 
experts who oppose the National Committee often term Committee members ‘resource 
nationalists’, but do not deploy the same deterritorializing, dehistoricizing discourse of 
resource nationalism that can be found in London’s mining market.  
In the context of multi–sited ethnography that moves between London’s mining market, 
Bangladeshi engineering and geological experts, and National Committee activists, the 
anthropological commitment to generating knowledge by “yielding to the preoccupations of 
others” (Strathern, 1999, p. 6) becomes particularly challenging: yielding to a single point of 
identification would in effect erase or mute the interests of at least one other set of 
interlocutors. This chapter thus proceeds by juxtaposing the orientations toward ‘resource 
nationalism’ and ‘resource sovereignty’ that were found in three distinct constituencies, 
“where there is very little actual contact or exchange” between the sites, but where the 
functioning of each site depends upon a “very specific imagining of what is going on 
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elsewhere” (Marcus, 1999, p. 7). In particular, I foreground the temporalizing discourses and 
practices through which each of the three constituencies attempted to make sense of, contest, 
and position themselves in relation to, the others. Firstly, in Section 6.1, I begin in the City 
of London, with the concerns that mining professionals articulated during 2012-2014 with 
over an apparently global rise in ‘resource nationalism’ that could be explained in terms of the 
mining market’s cyclical movements. Subsequently, in Section 6.2, I move to Bangladesh, 
where a number of geologists and engineers, whose careers have seen them move through 
the mining market’s central nodes, identify ongoing local opposition to foreign investment 
in oil, gas and coal, likewise, as a sign of resource nationalism. Finally, in Section 6.3, the 
majority of the chapter is spent exploring the enactment of so-called ‘resource nationalism’ 
in Bangladesh, which primarily takes place through the organization of public political 
performance by the National Committee: Long Marches, hortals, and the augmentation of 
national practices of memorialisation.  
6.1: SUPERCYCLES & RESOURCE NATIONALISM IN LONDON 
The phenomenon that most occupied the attention of the mining professionals among 
whom I did fieldwork in London was the mining ‘supercycle’ and its relationship to an 
apparent upswing in expressions of ‘resource nationalism’ (see Chapter Three). This so–
called mining supercycle is, quite simply, a particularly inflated and temporally extended 
‘bubble’ in the price of mined commodities. For many mining professionals, this price bubble 
was the primary (if not only) reason why, around 2012–13, host jurisdictions were attempting 
to renegotiate contracts with transnational extractive industry corporations, or raise taxation 
and royalty rates – a set of putative responses to the supercycle that were gathered together 
under the designation ‘resource nationalism’. 
The idea of a supercycle began in the global “investing community” (Jacks, 2013, p. 10) as a 
way of talking about the boom in metal, ore and fossil fuel prices that had begun around 
2000, following a price nadir in the late 1990s. The commodities supercycle was both a cause 
for concern, creating the perception for some that the world was running out of raw 
materials, even if for others, money was to be made riding the rising tide of prices. The 
supercycle also seemed to have enchanting effects, and was the reason that one young 
financial analyst whom I regularly met at briefings in the City gave for being drawn away 
from her job at a boutique fund management firm towards one in the mining sector. “It’s 
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exciting,” she explained, “you know, when will it end, the supercycle?”120 The headlines at 
mining.com, a leading industry news source, reflected the excitement and anxiety engendered 
by efforts to predict (or declare) the end of the supercycle. Explanations for the cycle’s 
behaviour were largely offered in terms of rising levels of demand for metals and fossil fuels 
in India and China.121 While this might appear to reflect a cyclical rather than linear 
understanding of the process of capitalist expansion and development, some mining 
journalists could not dispense with evolutionary language in the discussion of the cycle. The 
editor of mining.com, for instance, wrote that the supercycle reflected a “once in lifetime 
event”: following the European and North American industrial revolution which enabled the 
expansion of a middle class, “developing countries finally get it and are now trying to catch 
up” (McRae, 2012, unpaged). Such a portrayal of Northern industrialisation as unrelated to 
resource extraction in the South, and simply a matter of advanced ‘mentality’, was not 
uncommon among mining professionals. It reflects, perhaps, a refusal to acknowledge the 
interactions between money mining and struggles over resource sovereignty. It is also, as I 
show in Section 6.3, almost the exact opposite of the position taken by members of the 
National Committee in Bangladesh.  
Analyses of the supercycle provided by mining professionals and journalists were soon joined 
by those produced by economists at the World Bank (Canuto, 2014) and NBER (Jacks, 
2013).122 While not partaking of the evolutionist language found on mining.com, these 
economists did see the supercycles as medium-term deviations from a long-term secular 
trend of rising mined commodity prices that were, in this case, ultimately caused by rising 
mass industrial demand in China. Canuto (2014, p. 1) identifies four discrete cycles that have 
taken place since the late-nineteenth century, of twenty-eight to forty years each, while Jacks 
(2013, pp. 11-12) identifies cycles of twenty to seventy years in nine mined commodities 
since the 1850s, which, at least in the most recent ‘supercycle’, do seem roughly correlated. 
While a focus on the way that mining journalists and economists talk about supercycles may 
                                                          
120 Fieldnotes, March 2013. 
121 The following examples are all article titles from www.mining.com, a leading industry news site: A. Hallie 
on 07/03/2013, “Commodities 'supercycle' will last another 15 years: JP Morgan,” (http://www.mining.com/
commodities-supercycle-will-last-another-15-years-jp-morgan-85593/); C. Jasmamie on 12/05/2013, 
“Commodity supercycle is essentially over: Citigroup,” (http://www.mining.com/commodity-supercycle-is-
essentially-over-citigroup-73028/); A. Komnenic on 26/09/2013, “Rumours of supercycle's death are greatly 
exaggerated: McKinsey,” (http://www.mining.com/rumours-of-the-supercycles-death-are-greatly-exaggerated
-mckinsey-48435/) 
122 While Jacks (2013, p. 13) predicted that the end of the supercycle was near in 2013 based on historical cycle 
patterns, Canuto (2014, pp. 2-3) challenged the notion that the peak of the cycle had yet been reached by 2014. 
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seem like somewhat of a disciplinary derailment, a close reading of the ways in which specific 
economic methods are used to give meaning to market events offers itself up to an 
anthropological understanding of supercycles and discourses of resource nationalism in 
terms of the “temporalizing practices whereby the inherent temporal character of social life is 
brought out” (Hodges, 2008, p. 405).  
When he refers to ‘temporalizing practices’, Hodges borrows from Nancy Munn (1992) the 
notion that symbolic social action consists, in large part, of making the temporal horizons of 
particular practices explicit and meaningful (see also Fabian, 1983, p. 74). When mining 
professionals and economists identify ‘supercycles’ that are driven by demand from China 
against a long-term secular rise in commodity prices, they present an image of the global 
economy as a coherent entity, operating according to an internal logic, and which is generally 
in equilibrium, give-or-take a few oscillating ‘supercycles’ that stand out against an expected 
long-run trend towards commodity price rises. To assimilate price rises to a pattern of cycles 
ongoing since the 1850s is to endow capitalist world history with a coherent and 
incontestable internal dynamic, and write over any historical specificities in terms of which 
China’s increased demand could be explained. And the political consequences of making 
supercycles explicit and meaningful become particularly clear when considering how mining 
professionals relate outbreaks of ‘resource nationalism’ to the movement of the supercycle.  
During my fieldwork in London, barely a meeting, briefing or masterclass went by without a 
mention of resource nationalism, most of which involved a reference to Ernst & Young’s 
(2012) Business risks facing mining and metals 2012-2013. This was one in a series of annual 
reports based on interviews with mining executives and fund managers, designed to elicit 
their perceptions of the major risks faced by money miners around the globe: 
Resource nationalism retains the number one risk ranking with 
many governments around the world going beyond taxation in 
seeking a greater take from the sector...Amendments to mining and 
tax laws can result in changes to capital allocation based on a weaker 
risk/reward profile...During 2011 and the for the first six months of 
2012, a number of countries have announced or enacted increases 
to taxes or royalties including Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Ghana, Mongolia, Peru, Poland, and the USA, to name a few. (Ernst 
& Young, 2012, pp. 7, 14) 
The Ernst & Young report was cited by analysts giving sector forecasts, by junior miners 
hoping to emphasize that their prospective project was located in a ‘safe’ territory (see 
Chapter Three), and even by representatives of the IFC, who highlighted the benefits for 
juniors of partnering with them when operating in these politically risky territories (see 
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Chapter Seven). In this regard, the rise of resource nationalism could cut both ways. As a 
report by McKinsey & Company put it, the apparent failure to satisfy world demand for 
resources during the supercycle meant that “Mineral resources increasingly need to be 
developed in regions that have high political risks” (Dobbs et al. 2013: 1).  
For most in the mining market, resource nationalism was a source of anxiety if not anger. 
And its rise was explained explicitly with reference to the commodities supercycle. Ian 
Bremmer, a self-styled political risk guru who provided occasional, very expensive, briefings 
to the mining market had written about resource nationalism as a result of governments 
seeking a greater ‘take’ at the top of the commodities supercycle (Bremmer & Johnston, 
2009, pp. 155-57). His rhetoric positions Bremmer unambiguously on the side of ‘foreign’ 
extractive industries corporations, and makes it clear that Southern states were less likely to 
play by the mining market’s rules than the few Northern states that erred on the side of 
resource nationalism:  
Ownership of prized assets may be wrenched away through forced 
renegotiation of existing contracts using perceived historical 
injustice or alleged environmental or contractual misdeeds by the 
companies as justification…OECD countries have the same 
motivations as those pursuing economic resource nationalism but 
generally avoid tearing up existing contracts and using arbitrary 
tactics. (ibid., pp. 150-52) 
Badly behaved Southern states should be reminded, Bremmer argues, that without “the deep 
pockets and technology of the mining multinationals,” their riches will “remain in the 
ground” (ibid., p. 151). These are precisely the terms that are contested by members of 
groups like the National Committee in Bangladesh (see Sections 6.2 & 6.3). 
Chatham House’s energy experts had also written about the “cyclical nature to the way in 
which resource nationalism finds its expression” (Joffé et al., 2009, p. 4), and were particularly 
concerned with transnational legal techniques for dealing with what many mining 
professionals deemed ‘creeping expropriation,’ or the increase of state royalties, taxation and 
production shares.  In Chapter Seven I discuss in depth the techniques that celebrity lawyers 
like Robert Amsterdam advised the mining market to adopt as part of a well-rounded 
‘Corporate Foreign Policy’ in the face of resource nationalism, and the broader implications 
of gurus like Ian Bremmer referring to perceived historical injustice as ‘arbitrary’ grounds for 
contract negotiation. The point I wish to make at the present time is that most mining 
professionals in London were preoccupied with resource nationalism, expressed in the form 
of ‘creeping expropriation’ and efforts to increase the state’s ‘take’ from their money mines. 
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They saw resource nationalism as a cyclical phenomenon, a mere behaviourist reaction to a 
supercycle in commodity prices that would soon right itself as capitalist world development 
returned to its true course. Resource nationalism was experienced as an injustice by those in 
the mining market, as well as a foolish deviation from the righteous path of multinational 
private-sector led money mining. 
I met Colin at a number of mining finance networking and 'state-of-the-market' briefing 
events in the City of London during 2012 and 2013. He was a geologist and engineer by 
training, who had consulted on mine privatization in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and 
Eastern Europe, and had worked privately and with the World Bank on producing new 
mining codes for several jurisdictions, most recently in Jordan. Shortly after the code’s 
implementation, he had established an “off-the-shelf” exploration company to operate in 
Jordan’s gas extraction sector. In his eyes, there was nothing wrong with his business practice, 
since only private sector experts such as himself were suited to advising on “best practice” 
for mineral codes. He had recently arranged an internship for his son, he informed me, at 
RAB Capital, the fund manager which had invested in the Phulbari coal development license 
holders, GCM Resources Ltd, shortly before a bet on Northern Rock sent it into a downward 
spiral (see Chapter Two). 
Colin invited me to meet him in his offices in Mayfair, and then again at the Institute of 
Directors on Pall Mall, which occupied the old United Services Club buildings, and had 
retained its martial décor. (The building has since been taken over and become a squat.) His 
Mayfair office was in fact a small, sparse room in a serviced office building that bore no 
company names or identifying logos. This was useful, he said, since it allowed him to leave 
visitors, most recently a group of investors from Dubai, in the reception area, before leading 
them to one of the luxurious, catered meeting rooms on the ground floor. In Colin's words, 
“it leaves an impression,” specifically that the whole office block belonged to his company. 
At other times he would hire out rooms in the City’s Livery Company halls in order to 
impress prospective investors in his roster of exploration firms. He seemed perfectly at home 
with his place in what Anna Tsing (2000, p. 18) calls the “economy of appearances,” 
apparently recognising the extent to which “spectacle is a necessary aid to gathering 
investment funds.” 
 Sitting in his surprisingly unglamorous office, Colin began to relate to me how, during the 
1990s, “London was the fountain of all knowledge on privatization. All countries were 
realising government should never be involved in business. I mean, look at Venezuela!” Here 
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he was referring to Venezuela's recent nationalization of the gold mining industry. Colin 
reached for a sheet of paper and began to draw the axes of a graph, and then a flat horizontal 
line: the “expected” annual revenue a mine would produce over its life. Then he 
superimposed a large parabolic curve towards the end of the time period displayed on the 
graph. “You see; the private sector brings the cost down. Then the price [of the mineral] 
goes up, and the government says, 'wait a minute, you're making a lot of money, and we want 
to take this off you. Oh well, we will nationalize you.' And of course it doesn't work, because 
their objective is to make jobs, and there is no reinvestment. In twenty years, you have to 
privatize again.”  
Colin makes it painfully clear that for resolute money miners, resource nationalism (or any 
struggle over the terrain of resource sovereignty) interferes with the capitalization ritual, thus 
reducing an extractive corporation’s ability to ensure a flow of revenue to its shareholders. 
Resource nationalism is a threat because it interferes with that most exalted of magic 
numbers, Net Present Value. Likewise, in an email exchange with me that took place during 
mid–2013, an influential mineral economics consultant in the junior mining market attacked 
not only resource nationalism, but the apparent support for high royalty payments coming 
from the World Bank and IFC: 
high government royalties, as advocated by IFC/World Bank, are 
highly counterproductive, as they are simply costs. They effectively 
raise cut-off grades, and hence reduce the effective exploitation of, 
and Long Term economic benefit for the host from, the mineral 
deposit (shorter life, effect on community etc.).123 
While the ValuationCo trainers in Chapter Four argued that a shorter mine life could be 
beneficial for host communities, to the extent it involved ‘getting the money out’ faster, this 
consultant argues that royalty and taxation rates would produce shorter mine lives that would 
be detrimental for host communities. Yet the underlying logic, of subordinating resource 
sovereignty to money mining remains: the mine life will only be curtailed in the first place if higher 
royalty rates threaten to interfere with the business of getting ‘latent cash’ out of the ground. 
In the next section, I introduce the high-profile arguments that have taken place between the 
engineers, geologists and economists in Dhaka over the extent to which Bangladesh’s energy 
future should be a matter of expert administration or public concern. While many of these 
                                                          
123 It is worth noting that this consultant's view of the World Bank/IFC as in favour of higher shares for host 
countries is not always borne out by their history of steering mineral code reform in a pro-industry direction 
(see Emel & Huber, 2008), which is itself perhaps unsurprising given that money miners like Colin participate 
in such reform agendas. 
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mining professionals and been trained by and worked in multinational oil, gas and mining 
companies, their view of resource nationalism and the role of private multinational expertise 
is somewhat different to that found in London. They cannot escape Bangladesh’s troubled 
post-independence political terrain, saturated with claims and accusations of patriotism and 
disloyalty.  
6.2: ENGINEERING DISSENT 
In this section, I shift to the second of the three sites in which the relationship between 
money mining and struggles over resource sovereignty are played out: the small community 
of engineers and geologists who engage in high-profile and often heated contests over 
Bangladesh’s energy futures in Dhaka. Some of these geologists and engineers find 
themselves sympathetic towards members of the anti–foreign investment coalition, the 
National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Ports and National Resources (see Section 6.3), 
albeit without becoming directly involved. Others, however vociferously reject their attempts 
to claim matters of geological or engineering in terms of popular politics. These experts, 
often occupying positions as public intellectuals, deem such political activity to be injudicious 
‘resource nationalism’.  While invocations of expertise are used by those on both sides of the 
pro– and anti–foreign investment divide, there was a tendency for those in favour of foreign 
involvement in oil, gas and coal extraction to invoke geological and engineering expertise acquired 
while working for extractive industry multinationals when making their political claims, while 
those opposed to foreign investment looked to legal expertise in order to delegitimize the 
operations of these companies. These contests over the intersection of resource sovereignty 
and money mining in contemporary Bangladesh present challenges to existing social 
scientific approaches to the study of engineers in society. 
While anthropologists have historically had little to say on matters of engineering expertise, 
sociologists have engaged consistently with the subject, and the two poles of this sociological 
work are perhaps best captured in papers by John Law and Michel Callon (1988) and Peter 
Meiksins (1988). In their paper, Law and Callon unpick a military aviation project in terms 
that would come to be associated with actor-network theory, arguing that since engineers 
“are not just people who sit in drawing offices and design machines” but also “social activists 
who design societies or social institutions to fit those machines,” engineers were “practical 
sociologists long before the discipline was invented” (Law & Callon, 1988, p. 284). Given 
that technical innovations have social consequences, and social innovations imply technical 
change, Law and Callon argue for a method that does not distinguish between social and 
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technical components (something they argue engineers would never do). Instead, they trace 
out attempts to mobilize a sociotechnical network that was first envisaged in the aviation 
engineers’ proposals, recognizing that neither the success nor the failure of a sociotechnical 
engineering project can be known beforehand. In Peter Meiksins’ work, engineers appear as 
sociologists of a different kind, concerned with the kind of relationship they wish to have 
with the public as a whole. Meiksins’ historical sociology explores the repeated revolts that 
took place in the American engineering profession from the 1920s onwards, as engineering 
reformers attempted to distance themselves from the role the increasingly seemed to occupy 
as “puppets of business interests,” attempting to reconstitute the engineer as “an expert, 
working for the public as a whole” (Meiksins 1988, p. 232).124 Law and Callon are perhaps 
correct that engineers are by virtue of their professional capacities ‘social activists’ of a sort, 
while Meiksins’ work highlights the extent to which ‘the engineer’ cannot be treated as a 
singular, neutral technical descriptor as it is by Law and Callon. The kind of social activism 
in which different engineers (and geologists) engage needs to be accounted for if their efforts 
to make society durable through engineering work are to be fully understood. In Bangladesh, 
struggles over the demarcation of domains as ‘expert’ rather than public affairs, and the 
constitution of experts as puppets of business interests or servants of the public, cannot be 
understood apart from the situation of individual engineers and geologists in Dhaka’s finely 
graded status hierarchy. Nor can these struggles be understood independently from the 
rivalries created in Bangladesh’s public sphere as a result of the allegiances demanded by a 
system that has come to be described as a ‘partyarchy’ (see Chapter One). 
My exploration of engineering dissent in Dhaka began with a series of meetings I had at 
BUET, the prestigious Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology. I met initially 
with Toufiq, a petroleum engineer and former energy adviser to the 2007-09 caretaker 
government. Toufiq was seen as largely outside of partyarchy politics, but was not viewed as 
entirely neutral by certain members of the National Committee, who were somewhat 
disconcerted that I had spent time in his company. I met separately with Imtiaz, a chemical 
engineer who had sat on the board of BAPEX, the parastatal oil and gas exploration firm, 
and contributed to a number of government panels convened to discuss an (as yet un-
                                                          
124 It should be noted that the outcomes of these engineering revolts could be surprising. Frederick Taylor, 
father of modern scientific management, was among those reformers who “disparaged the corporate elite’s 
preoccupation with ‘making money quickly’ rather than being concerned about making one’s company ‘the 
finest of its kind’” (Meiksins, 1988, p. 229). Yet it was the managerial revolution ushered in by Taylor and his 
colleagues, as part of their efforts to define a professional identity for themselves that set them apart from 
business elites, which perhaps did more to expand the power of the American business elite during the twentieth 
century than anything else.  
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finalised) coal policy.  Imtiaz was more vociferously opposed to the ‘resource nationalists’ in 
the National Committee than Toufiq, but he articulated his opposition to them in terms of 
concerns about the future of Bangladesh’s energy–hungry economy, and the need to serve 
the public interest of the nation-as-economy. Both men were also well connected within 
Dhaka’s susil samaj, and I would meet them both again at events like the Dhaka Hay festival, 
an offshoot of the Hay-on-Wye literary festival held annually at the Bangla Academy in 
Dhaka’s Shahbag university district. 
When I first met Toufiq, we began by talking about the National Committee, and the recent 
press coverage of changes to the standard Production Sharing Contract, and the opening up 
of a new round of exploration bidding. While companies like Norway’s Statoil had expressed 
an interest in exploring for oil and gas in Bangladesh, they had been in retreat over the 2012 
model Production Sharing Contract (PSC), which had reversed the provision in the 2008 
contract for negotiation over the price at which Bangladesh would buy gas from 
multinational producers, and prohibited the export of any natural gas. In the 2008 bidding 
round, the price of gas was uncapped and the export of liquefied natural gas had been 
allowed. Toufiq began to speak about the National Committee,  
a group in Bangladesh, basically a leftist group, I call them resource 
nationalists, this group is basically opposed to any foreign investment 
in the energy sector, suggesting that they are exploiters, that they 
take control of the critical sectors and strategic sectors and take all 
the money away. (emphasis added)125 
 They seemed to have no interest in other sectors where multinationals operate, like 
telecommunications, he noted, but “because of some accidents, they have asked for some 
compensation with their own calculations which have no basis.”  
These accidents, a series of oil well blowouts, and the legal wrangling over the payment of 
compensation by oil and gas exploration firms operating in Bangladesh, will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter Seven. Toufiq continued, alleging that the activities of these ‘resource 
nationalists’ had “basically stopped major onshore investment for the last 8 to 10 years which 
is political. They are basically focusing their attention on BAPEX, but BAPEX [the state 
exploration company] has limitations, limited expertise.” The parastatals had only discovered 
three trillion cubic feet of gas since 1972, while just one of Chevron’s finds (Bibiyana) was 
4.5 trillion cubic feet. “So which way do we go?” 
                                                          
125 Fieldnotes, September 2013. 
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Toufiq was not opposed to ‘resource nationalism’ for the same reasons that could be found 
in London – that it would increase costs for multinational money miners and so damage the 
magic number, Net Present Value. Instead, he was concerned about the ability of an energy-
hungry Bangladesh to extract its oil and gas. The National Committee was putting their faith 
in BAPEX, he argued, but they had only found one field, of 50 billion cubic feet, in the last 
four years. Such a find “can never be declared as a commercial discovery but they, the 
National Committee, have declared it as a commercial discovery.” For members of the 
National Committee such as Ashraful126, an economist at Dhaka University, however, the 
first question to be answered was why BAPEX was not allowed to join multinationals in the 
bidding for exploration. And for Sayeeful, a professor in Dhaka University’s geology 
department, who was sympathetic to the activities of the National Committee, the idea that 
BAPEX lacked capacity was particularly problematic in light of the fact that in their 40 years 
of drilling they had produced no blowouts. The same could not be said for a number of 
foreign exploration firms (see Chapter Seven). 
Elsewhere in BUET, Imtiaz was also dismissive of BAPEX’s ability to compete with 
multinationals, and spoke from his position as a former BAPEX board member: 
It is the same group of people who say that we, BAPEX, should 
explore domestically. But we don’t have the capacity. The Managing 
Director says that! We could say that BUET is like MIT. We can say 
that, but it’s not. We’ve had the worst performance in the last four 
to five years, with nothing added to the grid.127 
Imtiaz too was dismissive of the National Committee, whom he also termed ‘resource 
nationalists.’ He deployed this phrase not in relation to current disputes about the 2012 
model PSC, but the ongoing opposition to the Phulbari coal project in Dinajpur: 
A left wing movement in Bangladesh I would call it. The company 
that kind of discovered this field, BHP, naturally got the rights to 
develop it. BHP quickly transferred the moral and legal rights to 
Asia Energy. At the time, there was no capacity for 15 million tons 
of coal in Bangladesh, so naturally in their proposal they said 
Bangladesh should export! At this time, there was not a tweet from 
the group [the National Committee], and then in the guise of 
environmental activists, they whipped people up, and people were 
killed. Hasina stood up for them. But this is not the language of 
people trying to protect the environment. This is pure left-wing 
politics. This is pure nationalism, resource nationalism, almost like what 
happens in Bolivia. (emphasis added) 
                                                          
126 As with all of the names of experts in this chapter, this is a pseudonym. 
127 Fieldnotes, October 2013. 
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Here Imtiaz comes closest of anyone with whom I spoke in Dhaka to echoing the view 
found in London’s mining market, that would take Bangladeshi energy politics as the 
manifestation of a global upswing in ‘resource nationalism.’ Imtiaz is able to abstract the 
politics of the National Committee and present them as inauthentic in part because the 
Committee had not always been opposed to the Phulbari project (but see Section 6.4). Toufiq 
also had questioned their authenticity because they had begun with opposition to the 
project’s export provisions and royalty rates, but when these were changed, and provision 
was made for a 5000 MW power plant at the mine mouth, the focus turned to environmental 
impacts and the effects of the mine on the Phulbari water table. 
The proposal for an open-cast coal mine in Phulbari, Dinajpur, to be developed by Asia 
Energy, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the London-listed GCM Resources Ltd., is the locus 
for what are perhaps the most heated and divisive debates about the shape of Bangladesh’s 
energy future. The death of three Phulbari residents after firing by the Bangladesh Rifles 
(which is elided in Imtiaz’s account) has engendered conspiracy theories on both sides of the 
debate. For some, like Toufiq, the reports that everyone who marched on the Asia Energy 
offices on 26th August 2006 were carrying sticks cut to exactly three feet indicated sinister 
input from an outside organization. Among the engineers and energy journalists I spoke to 
who were opposed to the ‘resource nationalists,’ several implied that an Indian ‘coal mafia’ 
responsible for smuggling coal over the border may have been behind efforts to disrupt or 
tarnish the project.128  
Intriguingly, the allegations of conspiracy that circulate among Dhaka’s energy publics are 
invoked by powerful individuals and institutions as readily as they are by the less powerful. 
Anthropologists have tended to take conspiracy theories as attempts to articulate experience 
of subjection to the capricious and opaque operation of bureaucratic and market forces 
which purportedly operate according to a logic of transparency or rationality (Sanders & 
West, 2003; Smith, 2011, pp. 22-24; Walsh, 2004, p. 227). Not only do apparently powerful 
representatives of state and market institutions rely on conspiratorial narratives, but the 
apparent tendency for key consultation, policy and environmental impact documents to 
disappear from the offices of public bureaucracies requires that engineers and geologists rely 
                                                          
128 For an example of the oblique references to a cross–border ‘coal mafia’ made in the Bangladeshi news media, 
see ‘Man on Mamata’s entourage to Dhaka arrested in Kolkata’, New Age, 23 February 2015 [Online] Available 
at: http://newagebd.net/97418/man-on-mamatas-entourage-to-dhaka-arrested-in-kolkata/#sthash.
pC4mAqSE.dpbs (Accessed: 22 September 2015);  
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on claims of having ‘been there’ far more than they do on transparent materiality of 
documentary evidence. 
In Imtiaz’s commentary on resource nationalism around Phulbari, he refers to Asia Energy 
acquiring the rights and licenses to the coal mine from BHP. BHP explored in Phulbari 
between 1994 and 1997, and its licenses were transferred to Asia Energy in 2003. This 
followed the embroilment of BHP (BHP Billiton after 2001) in a series of transnational class 
action lawsuits brought by Yonggom people living downstream from the environmentally 
disastrous Ok Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea, after which BHP Billiton departed from Ok 
Tedi stating that it was “not compatible with our environmental values” (see Kirsch, 2007, 
p. 309). It is thus conceivable that BHP Billiton left Bangladesh because of the perceived 
reputational damage or ‘social risk’ that would be engendered by operating an open-cast coal 
mine in a densely populated agricultural district. This is precisely the claim that is made by 
the geologists Sayeeful at Dhaka University, and Nurul Islam, formerly of BUET, both of 
whom are viewed as sympathetic experts by the National Committee, even if they distance 
themselves from the Committee’s political performances. The claim is based on accounts 
given by Nazrul Islam, a former BHP geologist now living in Australia. These claims are 
vigorously contested, however, by M—, a former BHP and Asia Energy geologist now 
working for Beximco, one of Bangladesh’s largest industrial houses. 
M—, like Hossain and Toufiq, rejects the authenticity of the National Committee’s political 
actions, arguing that they are less about coal as such and more about gaining access to the 
spoils that are accessed by success within Bangladesh’s ‘partyarchy.’ He became visibly angry 
when referring to the National Committee questioning his “patriotism,” and rejected calls 
for alternatives to coal in the form of solar energy, arguing that upcoming solar projects 
would only add 60 MW to a country that has a demand of over 6700 MW and a shortfall of 
approximately 2000 MW in supply. On Nazrul Islam’s reports from BHP, he was equally 
unequivocal. He knew Islam well, but he had “exaggerated definitely, and had a lack of 
understanding. He was only three months associated with the project.” BHP, M— said, left 
Bangladesh simply because the project was not suitable from BHP’s corporate perspective. 
He made no reference to how the Ok Tedi case may have brought environmental and 
reputational risks to bear on these decisions. Instead, he contested Islam’s authority and 
knowledge of BHP documents: 
He claims to know BHP papers. That’s wrong. Also wrong. I was 
the deputy project manager from 1994 to 2007…I can claim I had 
more access to BHP documents than any of the consultants who 
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came for a couple of weeks. And I cannot claim what he claims. It 
fits very much with the activist case, that’s why he is getting that 
much importance. I have never seen any such documents as Nazrul 
claims.129  
Not only this, but M— contested the ‘counter’ impact assessments which had been done 
under the guidance of Nurul Islam, showing that the Phulbari project would displace four 
times as many people as the company had originally suggested (see Chapter Two). His 
comments on my own research reflected a pragmatic approach to the authority of academic 
documents: “If your thesis says Bangladesh shouldn’t do coal? So what? There will be three, 
four, five other studies which say Bangladesh needs to develop coal.” 
The Nurul Islam report has been quoted in a U.K. Parliamentary hearing on government 
support for British companies like GCM Resources Ltd operating high-risk operations 
overseas, but Islam would not share it with me, as it remained confidential, he said. He 
contested the arguments put forward by his former colleagues at BUET, that BAPEX lacks 
capacity: “When I was on the board of BAPEX, BAPEX worked as the subcontractor for 
Tullow [a multinational mid–size oil and gas company listed in London]. How can they be 
the subcontractor if they have no capacity?”130 He objected to local companies suffering from 
a tax burden not shouldered by international oil companies, but distanced himself from the 
“emotional” language and approach of the National Committee, which ignored well-head 
gas pricing, and the undue advantage that was given to multinationals. On Phulbari, he was 
not entirely opposed, but did suggest that “if BHP had come, people would be less scared. 
BHP has massive experience…One man with maybe 100 years’ experience, that is not 
enough. A company has to have experience, as a company.” The fact that Asia Energy was a 
junior specifically constituted for the purpose of developing the Phulbari coal project was 
cause for concern, although as detailed in Chapters Three and Five, the mining industry 
depends on the speculative assembly of resource projects, and the socially responsible majors 
like BHP depend upon juniors to reproduce themselves. In Chapter Seven, I return to the 
issue of inexperienced juniors operating in Southern states, and the historical constitution of 
the legal architectures and techniques which facilitate their doing so.  
Over at Dhaka University, Sayeeful had been on Islam’s ‘Nurul Committee,’ which had given 
him access to the original Asia Energy feasibility study. He said the report had rejected the 
export requirements because Bangladesh needed the coal for its development, and there were 
                                                          
129 Fieldnotes, July 2013. 
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significant issues with water management. Sayeeful argued that BHP had not gone ahead 
with the Phulbari mine because the alluvial plain in Phulbari means a soft sandy layer above 
the coal, and that dewatering at that depth, whether for an open-pit or underground mine, is 
unsafe. On BHP, 
What they saw at the time, this is according to the geologist of BHP, 
that if they go for open pit mining in BHP, they cannot stretch to 
the environmental laws in Australia. Their code of conduct has to 
be changed, that’s the reason. 
When I mentioned M—’s opposition to this claim, Sayeeful retorted, 
But then why didn’t BHP mine it? Why did they spend so much 
money and then go away? I find it really difficult. It is because they 
were interested in underground mining. If they found a pit at less 
depth, they would probably go for open pit. There is a rumour that 
Asia Energy took the BHP license and first planned an underground 
pit, then changed. If the coal was at 100 metres, you could go for 
open pit [without a dewatering problem]. 
Finally, Sayeeful claimed that the manner in which the Asia Energy feasibility study had been 
produced, without the proper permissions, made it “technically illegal.” When I mentioned 
this to Nurul Islam at a later date, he asserted “not technically illegal, illegally illegal!”  
It was precisely the legal terms in which the Nurul Committee opposed Phulbari that Toufiq 
and Imtiaz objected to. In the aftermath of the 2006 shooting, Toufiq said, 
a Professor at BUET was asked to scrutinize. Instead of looking into 
the methodology and the engineering and all these things, the guy 
said the contractual aspects were illegal - but I don’t think that’s true 
because when you find something you give some money and it is 
accepted you will develop it. 
Another petroleum engineer, formerly at Petrobangla, also referred to the Nurul report as 
“another stupid committee” in which learned people, “I’m sorry to say, instead of looking at 
the technological issues and its environmental effect, look elsewhere at the legal issues.”131 
Where Callon and Law (1988) see engineers as archetypal sociologists, concerned as much 
with designing societies to fit their machines as they are with the machines themselves, here 
engineers and geologists make distinctions between legal and technical matters in their battles 
over expertise. For those engineers who are not opposed to foreign investment in 
Bangladesh’s energy sector, and who insist that national exploration and extraction capacity 
is inadequate, much as Ian Bremmer (Bremmer & Johnston, 2009) did in London’s mining 
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market, the appeal to legal expertise is an escape from issues that should be left to engineers. 
Toufiq continued: 
But these are engineering challenges. You cannot shy away from 
projects that are good for the country because of engineering 
challenges…You see the garment factories, the dyeing factories, the 
leather factories, they are polluting the rivers in a big way. But, this 
has happened in Europe and USA. And if you put down too many 
restrictions for a new fledgling sector, nothing will happen. The 
Rhine river used to have no fish! But later they cleaned up their act. 
Sounding only a little like the mining journalists who viewed the commodity supercyle as a 
result of Southern states finally “getting it” and learning to play catch-up (see Section 6.1), 
Toufiq positions himself not as a money miner, but as an engineer whose efforts at building 
Bangladesh’s energy futures are more legitimate than those carried out by legal experts or 
‘resource nationalists’ who would claim energy policy as a matter of public concern.  
Thus we see how the discourse of ‘resource nationalism’ discoverable in London’s mining 
market does not map on precisely to the way ‘resource nationalism’ is used in Dhaka. In 
London, resource nationalism is seen as an impediment to money mining, but a lack of 
opposition to foreign involvement in Bangladesh’s energy sector does not constitute a 
commitment to money mining, even if this is how it is perceived by some activists in the 
National Committee. Instead, engineers and geologists on both sides of the divide in Dhaka 
take the object of their politics to be Bangladesh’s energy future, and the development of the 
nation–as–economy that may depend upon domestically extracted and generated fossil fuel 
energy. As Toufiq put it in relation to the National Committee’s opposition to the Rampal 
power plant in the Sundarbans, 
The same group has also opposed coal development, one opposing 
Rampal right now. The same group. They are basically against 
energy development, which inherently has environmental issues, 
and Bangladesh being a small country, somebody’s going to be 
affected’ 
Accusations of national disloyalty are not only levelled by ‘resource nationalists,’ but by 
engineers viewed by the National Committee as ‘hirelings’ or ‘comprador bourgeoisie’ (see 
Section 6.3). The activists over Rampal are “being fed by some international group,” Toufiq 
explained. And one my first visit to the offices of Bangladesh’s leading energy and power 
industry publication, I was greeted in a less than welcoming manner: 
You are from the UK? Your company is supporting this evil group 
here, this National Oil and Gas Committee [sic]. Actually, they are 
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backed by NGOs, one is Oxfam, one is Action Aid, and there is 
another one. These grounds, they don’t have any real proof.132 
Rather than viewing NGOs in South Asia as agents of imperialism on the grounds that they 
“have become the latest vehicle for upward mobility for the ambitious educated classes” 
(Petras, 1999, p. 429), they are seen as undermining the ability of Bangladeshi professionals 
to steer the nation towards a flourishing energy future, even if ‘somebody’ gets affected along 
the way.  
That efforts to engineer this energy future are a matter of the educated urban elite, the susil 
samaj, came to the fore when I spoke to Mr C, a former Petrobangla director. He described 
how he had visited PDAC, Toronto’s answer to Mines & Money (see Chapter Three), and 
there, in front of thousands of delegates, 
It was opened by a tribal leader. His opening speech was very small, 
but precise. ‘We are for development. You have to take us as your 
development partner. But if you ignore us, we will resist.’133 
And so it was in Phulbari, argued Mr C, where most of the residents are Buno and Santals, 
“neither Bengali nor Urdu, their character is very rough.” The resonance between World’s 
Fairs and extractive industry bazaars is evident in Mr C’s recollection of the ‘tribal leader’ 
and his performance at PDAC (see Chapter Three), and his use of a ‘tribal’ analogy is not 
inconsequential. But other elites and political actors also claim partnership with the people 
of Phulbari, and with the nation as a whole. Members of the National Committee, however, 
argue for a different kind of energy future, and make their claims manifest through political 
performance, rather than through claims to authority that rest on having seen expert 
documents that, more often than not, can no longer be made visible.  
6.3: MINERALS AND MARTYRDOM 
In this section I move to the chapter’s final point of ethnographic identification, located 
among those who are deemed ‘resource nationalists’ by the engineers discussed above: 
activists involved with the National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Ports and National 
Resources. In the previous two sections, I have shown that mining professionals in London 
see resource nationalism as a cyclical phenomenon that arises from the market’s internal 
logic, while engineers at BUET take the National Committee, whom they term ‘resource 
nationalists’, to be opportunistic activist-troublemakers whose politics lacks authenticity or 
                                                          
132 Fieldnotes, October 2013. 
133 Fieldnotes, December 2013. 
169 
 
expertise. To understand the activities of National Committee members on their own terms, 
however, is to recognize that the political performances which comprise the larger part of 
their activist endeavours are not entirely designed to erode “investor confidence” and turn 
multinational coal, gas and oil companies away from Bangladesh (cf. Ó Tuathail, 1997, p. 
309). Instead, these performances, consisting of hortals, Long Marches, and the appropriation 
or overlayering of national spaces of memorialisation, make manifest the continuities 
between colonisation by the British, internal colonisation by Pakistan, and the perceived 
threat that multinational extractive industry corporations pose to Bangladesh’s resource 
sovereignty and its energy–hungry ‘frontier’ economy.  
At the same time, these hortals, Long Marches and rituals of memorialisation constitute means 
for activists within the Left–wing parties that make up the National Committee to advance 
in the intensely hierarchical and professionalised political organisations structures that 
compete for control over ministries and resources within Bangladesh’s regime of ‘partyarchy’ 
(Hassan et al., 2014). To the extent that it makes sense to write about the National Committee 
in the context of mining professionals’ anxieties about ‘resource nationalism’, members of 
the Committee are concerned with fostering domestic capitalism rather than a radical 
alternative to the organisation of Bangladesh’s economy. And while the National Committee 
claims a number of victories for itself, its failure to gain real political ground – and the failure 
of Left politics in Bangladesh more broadly - perhaps reflects the awkward historical 
relationship that the radical left has had with Bangladesh’s struggle for independence. It is 
difficult to assert your right to contest the contours of a national economy and its energy 
future when your political commitment to its foundation is under question.  
Bangladesh’s secular national calendar is punctuated by regular rituals of memorialisation. 
National Mourning Day (Jatiyo Shok Dibosh) on the 15th of August commemorates the killing 
of Sheikh Mujibur (Mujib) Rahman, the ‘Father of the Nation.’ Wreaths are laid, and an 
exhibition is erected, along with blood donation stations, at Mujib’s house in Dhanmondi, 
where his dried blood remains visible on the floor.134 Language Martyrs’ Day, often known 
simply as Martyrs’ Day (Shohid Dibosh) is observed on the 21st (Ekushey) of February, to mark 
the killing of students who protested against the imposition of Urdu as the sole official 
language during the Pakistan period. Wreaths are laid at the national Shohid Minar (Martyrs’ 
Monument), and the countless replica minars to be found in schools, university campuses and 
                                                          
134 See Copeman (2013; Copeman & Street, 2014) on blood donation ‘to the nation’ in the context of Indian 
blood paintings that depict martyrs. 
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government buildings around the country. Martyred Intellectuals’ Day (Shohid Buddhijibi 
Dibosh), on the 14th of December, recalls the killing of Hindu and Buddhist intellectuals in 
the last days before Independence from Pakistan on the 16th of December 1971. Shohid 
Buddhijibi Dibosh is memorialised at memorials in Mirpur and at the site of the killings in 
Rayerbazar, which have become particularly significant for middle-class Bangladeshis who 
mourn the loss of the intellectuals and the nation’s failure to realize the ideals for which they 
seem to have stood (Mukherjee, 2007).135 My relationship with members of one of the 
National Committee’s constituent groups began at the national Shohid Minar in Shahbag, on 
the 26th of August: ‘Phulbari Day’. 
Phulbari Day has become an annual commemoration of the shooting of unarmed protestors 
in Phulbari on the 26th of August 2006. By commemorating Phulbari Day at the Shohid Minar, 
the National Committee augments what Dipesh Chakrabarty (2007) would term a site of 
memorialisation through acts of memorising. If memorialisation is about seizing upon an 
historical moment to produce “metaphors for public life” that are nonetheless open to 
contestation (Chakrabarty, 2007, p. 1694; see Mukherjee, 2007, pp. 275-78), memorising 
strategies harness rituals of memorialisation to activate an “incitement for popular politics” 
(Chakrabarty, 2007, p. 1695). The visual grammar of Phulbari Day recalls the 
commemoration of other martyrs to Bangladesh’s independence, from Mujib to the 
Language Martyrs in whose memory the Shohid Minar was designed and erected (see Figures 
1, 2 & 3). 
                                                          
135 Properly speaking, Mukherjee (2007) argues that middle-class Bangladeshis experience these memorials in 
terms of melancholia rather than mourning; melancholia being an incomplete form of mourning as well as a 
predominant aesthetic mode in middle-class Bangladeshi literature and poetry (N. Ahmed, 2014). Not fully able 
to mourn the Martyred Intellectuals, middle-class Bengalis take these commemorative spaces as injunctions to 
mobilize Bangladesh to strive towards the ideals for which the dead apparently stood. See Pinney (2014) for an 
account of a comparable political aesthetics in Indian cinema that aims to commemorate national martyrs such 
as Bhagat Singh while also mobilizing Indian youth towards fulfilment of the apparently abandoned ideals 
which Singh and other martyrs like Gandhi seemed to stand. 
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Figure 2: Members of the National Committee’s constituent groups remove their shoes and wait in line to lay 
wreaths at the Shohid Minar in Shahbag 
At Phulbari Day in 2013, while young men, and some young women, stood in line to place 
wreaths on behalf of Left-wing and environmental organizations, mostly affiliated with the 
National Committee, I began to speak to Sumon, from the student environmentalist group 
Green Voice (see Figure 4). He was laying the wreath, he said, to commemorate those who 
were “martyred against Asia Energy.” When I asked why the Phulbari Day events took place 
at the Shohid Minar, he explained that “Anyone who died protecting their country and 
protecting their natural resources, that person is a martyr.”136 A number of engineers, 
including some of Toufiq and Hossain’s junior colleagues from BUET, gave speeches, and 
Ashraful gave a climactic speech about the National Committee’s campaign, that would not 
end until Asia Energy, with their proposals for an open pit mine that would have devastating 
consequences for Phulbari’s water, walked away. 
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Figure 3: Wreaths offered with 'reverence' or 'devotion' to Mujib on Jotiya Shok Dibosh, 2013 
 
Figure 4: Wreath laid at Phulbari Day, 2013. The wreath is dedicated to 'Phulbari martyrs' with ‘reverence’ or 
‘devotion’ from 'Green Voice' 
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While the term shohid derives from the Arabic root-word istishhad, and is often taken to signify 
death while bearing witness to the Islamic faith, in Bangladesh and South Asia more broadly, 
it is frequently “resignified to refer to patriots who willingly – even eagerly – shed their blood 
for the ostensibly secular truth of the nation” (Ramaswamy, 2008, p. 840).137 As I was told 
by Mateen, a senior member of the youth (jubo) wing of Bangladesher Samyabadi Dal (Marxbadi-
Leninbadi) or the Bangladesh Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), with whom I spent a great 
deal of time after meeting him at the Phulbari Day commemoration in 2013,  
Bangladesh is a mixed nation, so we have a mixed language, from 
Hindi, Urdu, Farsi, even English. A martyr is one who dies for the 
good of the nation, for the good of the people. He who dies for his 
own self-interests cannot be a martyr. in our language, we also have 
some similar words like atotaeg, but atotaeg means ‘self-sacrifice,’ and 
a martyr must be killed. Do you understand?138 
We began to talk about martyrdom because Mateen had begun his day at 6 AM with a 
meeting of the fourteen party ‘youth alliance’ (Jubo Songram Porishad), a Left-wing coalition of 
parties that broadly but not exactly mapped onto National Committee membership. They 
were participating in yet another moment of memorialisation, commemorating the 
martyrdom of Shohid Nur Hussain who was killed by police while protesting against the 
Ershad regime in 1987. This was not simply an act of memorialisation, however. The 
fourteen party Left-wing youth alliance was also trying to leverage spaces of memorialisation 
for projects of memorising, appropriating Hussain’s martyrdom as part of a protest against 
the rise of “communal forces” represented by Jamaat-e-Islami, a minor partner in the 
Bangladesh National Party’s opposition coalition, and Hefazat-e-Islami, a burgeoning rural 
movement which had been organizing and planning hortals and moha somabesh (large rallies) in 
Dhaka in the run-up to the (eventually abortive) 2014 elections.  
I had met other members of the fourteen party youth coalition during a commemoration of 
the 64th Anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, hosted in the five-
star Ruposhi Bangla hotel. On that particular day, Dhaka’s urban space was saturated with 
memorialisation. Outside the hotel, banners announced a ceremony to commemorate the 
foreign friends of Bangladesh’s freedom fighters, and General Zia’s announcement of 
Independence on behalf of Mujib was played over loudspeakers. Inside, the most senior 
figure in Mateen’s party, ‘Comrade’ Dilip Barua, a recent addition to Sheikh Hasina’s cabinet, 
                                                          
137 See Asad (2007, pp. 48-52) on the multiple meanings of shohid in Islam, and a critique of the contemporary 
tendency to gloss the broader set of meanings captured by shahada as ‘martyrdom’ read as a ritual sacrifice. 
138 Fieldnotes, November 2013. 
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made a curious speech that seemed to borrow from the same discourses that circulate among 
London’s mining professionals: 
We have overthrown the shackles of colonial rule, but have not 
defeated poverty. The solution is to be found in transboundary 
resources, attracting investment, and, above all, a private-sector-led 
development strategy.139 
This is perhaps unusual language for the leader of a Communist Party that was a core 
member of the National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Ports and National Resources, and 
whose original “slogans” in 1998 were “Annul anti-Bangladesh, anti-national Production 
Sharing Contracts” and “Encourage Growth and Development of National Exploration 
Company.”140 And, as Ashraful informed me, the Committee’s main slogan today is simply 
“No Foreign Intrusion.”141 For middle-class Bangladeshi observers, critical of ‘Comrade’ 
Barua, the butt of many a joke, this speech would be evidence of the fact that the National 
Committee are not ‘authentic’ activists, but simply seeking spoils in Bangladesh’s partyarchy. 
Being drawn into Hasina’s cabinet brings access to significant institutional resources, and 
Mateen was not averse to mocking a current director at Petrobangla, a former leader in the 
Workers’ Party and activist in the National Committee, who seemed to have been effectively 
bought out.  
Indeed, there certainly appeared to be tensions within the National Committee and the youth 
league itself. Mateen introduced me to “Faruk bhai,” a leader in the youth wing of the ruling 
Awami League, the Jubo League. Despite being together on the Jubo Songram Porishad, Faruk 
joked, Mateen and his comrades “are against us now, over Rampal.” Rampal was the 
proposed coal fired power plant to be built in the Sundarbans in a joint venture with the 
Indian national coal company. The all too familiar disappearance of key impact assessment 
documents relating to Rampal (see Section 6.2) fed into conspiracy theories among National 
Committee activists, and a broader coalition of middle-class environmentalists opposed to 
the project. Among the academics and consultants concerned with engineering Bangladesh’s 
energy futures, Rampal’s construction was welcomed as a means to compensate for the 
shortfall in Bangladesh’s power supply, but raised new questions about whether to import 
‘dirty’ coal from Australia, or push for the mining of Phulbari’s low sulphur coal. A Long 
March was organized to protest against Rampal, and the National Committee threatened to 
                                                          
139 Fieldnotes, September 2013. 
140 Fieldnotes, September 2013. 
141 Fieldnotes, November 2013. 
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call a hortal in protest over it, but were unsuccessful – an outcome that is not without 
significance. 
While the National Committee was not capable of arranging a hortal in opposition to the 
Rampal development, they did organize a Long March, that set off, as they usually do, from 
Dhaka’s Press Club, a circumstance which foregrounds the performative nature of this 
particular genre of political action. I spent the run up to the Long March with Mateen and 
his colleagues, who were a little nervous about how to proceed. Ultimately, he received news 
from ‘Comrade’ Barua – whom he always addressed in the deferent apni/ji register142 – that 
core activists like Mateen may participate, but should not recruit too many people or carry a 
Bangladesher Samyabadi Dal (Marxbadi-Leninbadi) banner.  
 
Figure 5: The 'Green Voice' banner at the start of the Long March from Dhaka Press Club to Rampal, 
September 2013 
 
  
                                                          
142 Bangla has three effective pronoun registers. The deferent, in which apni (you) and ji (yes) are used, the 
equivalent (tumi, hei), and the familiar, condescending or insulting (tui, hei).  
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The Long March was relatively small by the standards of Bangladeshi political rallies, but was 
considered a success by many of the participants. It took place over three weeks, and is a 
form of political performance that is both media conscious and attempts to have a 
pedagogical function. Both Ashraful and the current non-partisan, engineer leader of the 
National Committee, pointed to Mao as an inspiration for the form of the Long March. In 
the words of Ashraful, 
You see the history of the Chinese Revolution shows that the Long 
March was practiced for a long period, and that was the real Long 
March. In Bangladesh it is not possible, so we start in cars, then raise 
slogans and so on. From Dhaka to Rampal there will be thirty to 
forty meetings. This helps very much because throughout these days 
the March is in the daily newspaper and the focus of the whole 
nation is on the March. The workers, especially young people, 
participate, and very old people with zeal, and many join by 
snowballing, with the March becoming a huge sea of population. In 
Bangladesh the Long March gets the name, the semantic from 
China, not the spirit, not the leadership. This is because the left 
circle dominates the tel-gas [oil-gas] Committee. Previously there was 
a Moscow/China Split in the Left, but now this is irrelevant. 
The focus on media attention, recruitment of crowds, and the raising of fixed and often-
repeated slogans draws attention once again to the performative nature of these political acts. 
Bert Suykens and Aynul Islam (2013) have recently challenged the common middle-class 
Bangladeshi and international interpretation of hortals as simple techniques for use by 
opposition parties to hold incumbents to political ransom, in a political system characterized 
by ‘partyarchy’, where the winning party which gains almost total control of the Civil Service 
as well as the Parliament (Jotiya Songsod). There is certainly some truth in this understanding 
of hortals, but, Suykens and Islam argue, hortals are also performances oriented to internal 
audiences, revealing the organizational capacity of local level politicians to those more senior 
in the incredibly hierarchical structures that characterize Bangladeshi parties. Hence Mateen’s 
reluctance to make his organizational capacities visible in the March against Rampal, which 
would challenge his ability to rise in the Bangladesher Samyabadi Dal hierarchy. ‘Comrade’ 
Barua, to whom due deference must always be shown, would in turn find his position in 
Hasina’s cabinet somewhat imperilled.  
The Rampal Long March enabled an array of political performances that coalesced around 
an attempt to pressure the government into cancelling a planned power plant, whilst also 
signalling the organizational capacities of party activists to their superiors. Environmental 
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activists came together with those opposed to Indian involvement in the Bangladeshi 
economy, and its energy future in particular (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: These posters, depicting an Indian power station killing the Bengal tiger and the Sundarbans, began 
to appear around Dhaka in the weeks leading up to the Long March. The caption at the bottom reads 
'Gonoshonghoti Andolon' or 'Mass People's Uprising' 
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As Mateen, Ashraful, and other leading organizers within the National Committee would tell 
me, they were not opposed to private ownership of Bangladesh’s resources, simply foreign 
ownership. When over the course of several long discussions, Mateen explained to me his 
position on Bangladesh’s elite, using language that might seem somewhat anachronistic to 
an audience from the European Left, he seemed to suggest that the problem with Bangladesh 
was that they did not have good enough capitalists: 
Our country has no bourgeoisie. Only a comprador bourgeoisie. They 
are not patriots. And if any country does not have a patriotic 
bourgeois class, that country will not run into a rich position. 
Comparatively, if we look at India - India has a strong bourgeois 
class. They are patriotic! For example, Tata. They are developed, 
challenging the Imperialists. But in this country, we don’t have any 
group that can oppose Imperial groups. They are acting as agents of 
American capitalists, British capital, German capital, Dutch capital. 
They earn for their service a drop of money for slaughtering their 
people’s interests. 
At this point I asked Mateen if he then supported Bangladeshi capitalists: 
I’m coming to your question. After the Liberation, we earned a new 
politics, new culture, new capitalist community. The middle class of 
East Bengal, the middle class of East Pakistan, they earned freedom 
opposing Pakistani capitalists. This middle class earned their 
freedom for their fate, for their future. They were not capitalists, 
they were not industrialists. But after the birth of Bangladesh they 
became capitalists by trading business. But trading business is not 
the basis of economic development. Trading business is one kind of 
brokerage, dalal. The Awami leadership looted after the state 
entrepreneurship era. As an example, I am telling you, Mr N. Do 
you know Mr N? He is the owner of W— [a large hospitality 
corporation]. Now he is a leading businessman in Bangladesh. 
Before liberation he was penniless. After Liberation, he earned 
independence, he earned freedom, as well as financial success. 
Political liberty gave him financial liberty and financial topmost 
position. Now he is starting over the hill of money. That’s Mr N. 
There were more Mr Ns created after ’71, by looting the state 
entrepreneurship.’ They used their cunningness, cheating. We call this 
dhurta, protarona. 
Mateen continued with his list of ‘other Mr Ns’, including those at the centre of the ongoing 
Hall-Mark corruption scandal (see Chapter Seven). Capitalists who brokered the interests of 
foreign extractive corporations, and capitalists who exploited the post-Independence turmoil 
to become rich. Bangladesh seemed to lack the kind of businessman who, like the Tatas 
could contribute to the growth of Bangladesh’s economy. But Mateen was also keen to 
foreground Bangladesh’s “history of struggle, history of emancipation” from Imperialism 
that was lost in international media coverage that focused on cyclones, floods and hunger. 
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Caught up in Bangladesh’s partyarchy system, however, Mateen found himself drawn 
uncomfortably back towards the Awami Leaguers whom he so despised, by virtue of 
‘Comrade’ Barua’s political incorporation.  
This in itself was widely interpreted among Bangladeshi middle classes as a sign of the Awami 
League’s desire to draw Left-wing, anti-Islamic parties into the fold in an attempt to bolster 
their position against the BNP-Jamaat opposition. And it played into the perception among 
engineers and geologists (Section 6.3) that the National Committee were activists without 
authenticity. Mateen’s discomfort with the Awami League can perhaps be traced to the fact 
that Bangladesher Samyabadi Dal is one of the few Left-leaning parties in the National 
Committee that traces its roots back to the China side of the ‘Moscow/China Split’ to which 
Ashraful referred (above). The progenitor organization of Mateen’s party had fought “for 
the liberation of the Bangladeshi people” against both Pakistan and the Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman’s loyalist faction within the freedom fighters, the Mujib Bahini. His group’s position 
as patriots or nationalists was already tentative in the eyes of many, making it even harder for 
them to successfully appropriate national memorials as incitements to popular action. Unable 
to enact successful political performances at the Rampal Long March because of their 
absorption into one key audience, Hasina’s cabinet, and, consequently, unable to organize 
enough support to successfully arrange a hortal, the National Committee does not appear 
particularly capable of influencing the shape of Bangladesh’s energy future. But, their 
opposition to foreign involvement in Bangladesh’s resource sector notwithstanding, the 
National Committee are not ‘resource nationalists’ as London’s mining professionals would 
have it.  
The National Committee are not concerned with ‘creeping expropriation’ at the top of a 
supercycle, but with the development of a national exploration and extraction industry. Nor 
are these so-called ‘resource nationalists’ the opportunist activists that BUET’s elite engineers 
would take them to be. Their audience is not potential foreign investors, and their activities 
barely register in the political risk briefings on Bangladesh that circulate in London’s mining 
market. They are not engineers, looking to design a national society around its energy needs 
(cf. Callon & Law, 1988). Instead, they are attempting to reclaim Bangladesh’s energy future 
as a matter of public concern through a mode of political performance, the success of which 
is as difficult to measure as critical energy policy documents are to find. In the next chapter, 
I move to examine what happens when attempts to depoliticise and vilify struggles over 
resource sovereignty, by depicting them as simple reactions to the mining ‘supercycle’, fail, 
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and money miners take their host nations to court. Here, too, a distinct temporal politics is 
at play. Thanks to an architecture of international arbitration that has emerged over the last 
four decades, it is only those nations who appear sufficiently ‘Europeanized’ in the eyes of 
extractive industry capitalists whose sovereignty must be fully recognized and respected. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
STATE OF EXTRACTION: POLITICAL RISK, SOVEREIGNTY & 
ARBITRATION IN GLOBAL MINING CAPITALISM 
 
The global marketplace demands confidence, certainty and predictability to 
operate. 
 – Javier Díetz-Hochleitner & Jesús Remón, 2014, p. 141 
 
This chapter is concerned with the significance that extractive industry corporations place 
on political risk management. It is equally concerned with the tools of ‘Corporate Foreign 
Policy’ that are deployed by these corporations in order to contain uncertainty and ensure 
the continued operation of money mines, particularly those that have been developed in 
‘high-risk’ frontier jurisdictions. The chapter begins in London, where the ethnographic 
notes I took at a series of exclusive, expensive political risk briefings lead into a short history 
of political risk assessment and management (Section 7.1). The political risk industry is a 
thriving,143 albeit relatively young one, whose roots can be found in the confluence of two 
significant post-World War Two trends: a ‘managerial revolution’ in American transnational 
corporations, and the anxiety produced for these corporations by the break-up of an 
apparently stable colonial world order. It was, in fact, unwelcome expressions of sovereignty 
by post-colonial nation-states that triggered this growth in the political risk assessment and 
management industry.  
In Section 7.2, therefore, I trace the fate of attempts that have been made by post-colonial 
nations to exercise sovereignty over their natural resource endowments. Efforts to assert 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources formed a cornerstone of what Vijay Prashad 
(2007) and others have termed the short-lived ‘Third World project’. Today, however, any 
move that post-colonial states make to exercise sovereignty over their natural resources is 
likely to be seen as a political risk, a manifestation of ‘resource nationalism’ (see Chapter Six), 
and grounds for demotion on any number of international ‘investment climate’ rankings. At 
briefings in London’s mining market, celebrity lawyers advise their audiences to mitigate the 
risk of expropriation by developing a sophisticated ‘Corporate Foreign Policy’, the 
                                                          
143 See for instance the recent Financial Times report, ‘Political risk is now a growth industry in its own right’ 
(Thompson 2014). See also Tett (2011) on the rediscovery of geopolitical risk after the financial crisis, and 
Stephens (2015) on the ‘booming business of calculating geopolitical risk’. 
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cornerstone of which is ensuring that Bilateral Investment Treaties are in place between their 
home and host jurisdictions. In Bangladesh, state agencies have recently invoked the 
sovereignty over natural resources that is enshrined in their Constitution in the course of 
filing claims against an allegedly negligent exploration company, Niko Resources 
(Bangladesh) Ltd, which is the focus of Section 7.3. Niko’s response has been to pursue 
dispute resolution via arbitration hosted by the World Bank’s International Center for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), as provided for by precisely the kind of Bilateral 
Investment Treaty which forms an indispensable part of the modern extractive corporation’s 
Corporate Foreign Policy. 
Finally, Section 7.4 focuses on arbitration proceedings that have taken place between foreign 
oil and gas companies and Bangladeshi state agencies, as well as on attempts that have been 
made to improve Bangladesh’s investment climate by building arbitration ‘capacity’. This 
section begins with my participation in a set of training events for Bangladeshi arbitrators, 
held in Dhaka as part of an aid-funded investment climate reform programme. Subsequently, 
I present material derived from a training course which I attended on Bilateral Investment 
Treaties at the offices of a London-based trade organisation which supports British 
construction, engineering and extractive industry firms seeking to operate in frontier markets. 
In both contexts, the training focused in large part on a particular arbitration, and the Bilateral 
Investment Treaty which supported it. The case in point was the 2009 Saipem vs. Bangladesh 
arbitration in which an ICSID tribunal ruled in favour of Saipem, an Italian pipeline 
construction firm, on rather unusual grounds. The grounds on which this decision was based, 
discussed at length below, were held up as a shining example of the creative application of 
legal techniques at the London trade organisation. At the arbitration training sessions in 
Dhaka, however, the decision became a focal point for expressions of frustration at the 
tribunal’s apparent violation of Bangladeshi sovereignty, and a moment in which to 
interrogate the IFC/World Bank trainers who were present.  
In my subsequent interviews with these arbitration trainers, it appeared that perceived 
shortcomings in the ‘rule of law’ in Bangladesh worked as a justification for the extension of 
ICSID’s arbitral authority, even where that meant an effective curtailment of Bangladeshi 
sovereignty. In concluding this chapter, I argue that investment climate reform programmes 
can be viewed as efforts to replace the certainty once afforded to investors in colonially 
administered territories. I show that the language of ‘political risk’ works as a means to 
delegitimize post-colonial efforts to exercise sovereignty. Money mining is thus only made 
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possible because of the emergence of transnational private legal techniques that effectively 
curb the extensions of sovereignty over natural resource endowments by post-colonial states. 
  
7.1: NEW WORLD DISORDERS: THE RISE & RISE OF ‘POLITICAL RISK’ 
During my fieldwork in London’s market for mining finance, few briefings, investor 
presentations or matchmaking sessions proceeded without mention of political risk in 
general, or ‘creeping expropriation’ and resource nationalism as the most salient political risks 
of the moment. When junior mining companies were asked by potential investors about the 
jurisdiction in which they would be exploring, most would refer to the ranking achieved by 
their project’s host country in the Fraser Institute’s Policy Potential Index (renamed during 
my fieldwork as the Policy Perception Index). Thus when a Namibia-focused explorer was 
asked at Mines & Money about political risk, the response was simple: “I will refer you back 
to the Fraser Institute. Namibia is between USA and Norway.”144 Part of a much broader 
proliferation of indices that rank nations according to their business environment, 
competitiveness, and apparent levels of corruption and transparency (see Gilbert 2015a), 
indices like those produced by the Fraser Institute are designed with a disciplinary, 
pedagogical function in mind, rendering jurisdictional difference “value laden, a shortcoming 
rather than a viable alternative” (Sauder & Espeland, 2009, p. 73).  
The Fraser Institute’s Index is designed as a “report card to governments on how attractive 
their policies are to an exploration manager” and even includes a “room for improvement” 
section (Fraser Institute, 2013, pp. 24-25).145 Reminiscent of the aesthetics of the World’s 
Fair that are reproduced in extractive industry bazaars like Mines & Money (see Chapter 
Three), such rankings locate nations unambiguously within competitive hierarchies.146 
World’s Fairs have not only been noted for curating competitive hierarchies of nations; they 
have also been understood as the sites in which a new model of the world, the world-as-picture, 
                                                          
144 Fieldnotes, December 2012. 
145 Managers and consultants are asked to rate jurisdictions with which they are familiar in terms of fifteen 
criteria, including uncertainty over what will be designated protected areas, uncertainty concerning 
environmental regulations, legal process, political stability and taxation, on a scale from “Encourages 
exploration investment” to “Would not pursue exploration investment in this region due to this factor.” 
146 There is one significant difference between the national hierarchies curated in World’s Fairs and those 
produced by rankings of political risk: in World’s Fairs nations were arranged in hierarchies of evolutionary 
progress (Bennett, 1991, pp. 33-34; Hoffenberg, 2001, p. 222), whereas contemporary nation rankings imply a 
zero-sum future that constantly demands adjustment, but has the capacity to endlessly postpone success. If the 
Fraser Institute’s ‘report card’ works as the disciplinary device they intend it to, there is no guarantee your 
jurisdiction will ever come out on top. 
184 
 
took hold (P. Harvey, 1995, p. 5; Hoffenberg, 2001, p. 19). And, elsewhere in the mining 
market, political risk analysts could be found at work producing contemporary analogues to 
the world-as-picture, graphical and narrative representations of global levels of political risk. 
The political risk analysts and gurus whom I met and heard from at end-of-year briefings for 
infrastructure and extractive industry investors were experts whose authority was not 
necessarily undermined by failing to predict events. Their clients work with an understanding 
of the future which does not demand that these gurus’ predictions and prognoses be 
abandoned in the face of past failures, but simply demands them evermore (cf. Rabinow, 
2008, p. 60).147 Unpredicted events, such as the then-recent Arab Spring, did focus a great 
deal of the political risk industry’s attention, pushing analysts to reconfigure their world 
picture. The ‘rise of China’, a potential shale gas boom in the USA, and the demographics of 
emerging markets were also invoked as “reference points” (ibid., p. 59) that would not so 
much allow for the making of clear political risk prognoses, but acted as the fixed terms in 
any arguments or controversies about the distribution of political risk as it could be pictured 
for the world as a whole.  Before exploring the historical emergence of political risk analysis, 
and the relevance of its history for disputes between foreign investors and the state in 
contemporary Bangladesh, I will present ethnographic material from one particular political 
risk briefing that took place at the end of 2012. 
The analysts in attendance at this briefing included Ian Bremmer, whose take on resource 
nationalism was encountered in Chapter Six, Mina Toksoz, who subsequently authored The 
Economist guide to country risk (Toksoz, 2014), and two of the original architects of private 
political risk insurance.148 Other attendees represented large international banks, smaller 
boutique political risk analysis firms, and mining and infrastructure investors operating in 
jurisdictions that were perceived to be high in political risk. Many of the attendees transacted 
business with each other, the boutique analysis firms providing assessments for the political 
                                                          
147 Rabinow, drawing on Niklas Luhmann, takes this to be the form taken by the future in general ‘modern’ 
terms, marked off from pre-nineteenth century attitudes to the future in that utterly novel events are expected to 
happen, even if the events themselves are not known. He contrasts this with the form taken by the future in 
Medieval and Early Modern Europe where “what was at issue was not the appearance of any startling new 
things, but, concern over what would happen” (Rabinow, 2008, p. 58). The form taken by the future today 
leads, Rabinow suggests, to a politics of understanding whereby experts are permitted to get their prognoses 
wrong, rather than a politics of authority. 
148 Now distributed across the City’s political risk insurance brokerage firms, the core team that developed 
political risk insurance in the 1970s and 1980s was made up of brokers working at Hogg Robinson. Political 
risk insurance, which provides cover for nationalization or expropriation, was developed from kidnap and 
ransom insurance, which insures the costs of recovering a kidnapped person. It was further developed in 
conjunction with US Oil Companies looking to operate in ‘frontier’ jurisdictions during the 1980s.  
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risk insurance brokers who would in turn arrange cover for mining and infrastructure 
developers operating in ‘frontier’ markets. Several presentations included colour-coded ‘risk 
maps’, in which territories are coded red, orange or green according to the levels of political 
risk contained within them (although several analysts I spoke to during my fieldwork were 
rather dismissive of these broad brush world pictures). Others attempted to visualize, 
measure and map risks at a finer scale. Dr A, the CEO of a boutique political risk agency 
that I will refer to as ‘PolRiskCo’, presented herself as offering fine-grained political risk 
metrics: 
In the past, political risk has been defined by, you know, which way 
the flag goes, so what we’re providing is metrics. Metrics, measuring 
these forms of risk can give us a real handle on investment climates 
over time. And the new key risk we are seeing is the risk of contract 
review.149 
I will return to the issue of measuring and managing ‘investment climates’ in Section 7.4. 
While Dr A is dismissive of risk analysts who merely take account of the ideological 
orientation of a ruling party (see Simon, 2002, p. 127), she retains the notion that risks can 
be fixed to territories reconceived as investment climates. Her risk mapping efforts are clearly 
oriented towards resource nationalism, or unwelcome expressions of sovereignty more 
broadly, represented by the ‘risk of contract review’. Dr A also presented graphs mapping 
‘political freedoms’ against ‘societal resilience’, arguing that when a country’s rating falls 
beneath the ‘x=y’ line, community unrest would ensue, potentially forcing governments into 
“creeping nationalization”. This applied beyond the extractive industry sector, to 
manufacturing, for instance, where her message was “feed your workforce, because one of 
the fastest ways to get people on the streets is hunger”. And what PolRiskCo offered was fine 
grained analysis of risk, down to one hundred square metres in some cases. This within 
country sensitivity was designed, she said, to avoid the temptation of feeling that frontier 
markets are “high risk but you’ve just got to be there,” and so locating yourself unwisely 
amidst a community with poor ‘societal resilience.’  
The keynote at this event took on the big world-picture more directly. Ian Bremmer, speaking 
quickly before dashing to the airport, presented his image of a world that was “G-Zero,” 
where there was an “absence of global leadership.” His reference points included the USA’s 
apparent waning interest in being world policeman or lender of last resort. Recalling 
                                                          
149 Fieldnotes, December 2012. 
186 
 
conversations with his friend and self-styled globalization guru, Thomas Friedman, Bremmer 
elaborated: 
I remember Tom Friedman’s book the World is Flat. He said he got 
off a plane, he goes to a golf course in Bangalore. He sees a Pizza 
Hut billboard and he’s not in Kansas anymore. It’s a beautiful 
moment, a Coca-Cola moment. In a flat world, in a Tom Friedman 
world, in a Coca-Cola world, you don’t need conferences on 
political risk. 
But, of course, Bremmer reminded us, we are not in a flat world, exemplified for him by 
China’s ability to block Facebook. “The biggest mistake we ever made,” he went on, “was 
thinking globalization was global-driven.” It was instead USA-driven, but there had now 
been an “unmooring of geopolitics.” As a result, countries no longer had to play by the 
USA’s rules, which included aid conditionality, and, apparently, transparency and 
accountability in business affairs. This meant that we would be entering a world in which 
“political risk will matter more.” As the host of the briefing, a distinguished political risk 
insurance broker, commented “the takeaway for me is the new global order is a global 
disorder,” Bremmer closed with reference to Fareed Zakaria’s (2009) Rise of the rest: “He’s 
wrong. It’s the rise of the different.” 
Bremmer is among the most sophisticated of the political risk gurus who attempt to 
understand the emergent present in terms of political risk reference points that coalesce into 
an image graspable on a global scale. In a book co-authored by Bremmer a few years before 
my fieldwork began, he argues that political risks constitute “fat tail” or infrequent-but-severe 
events that are more properly grasped in terms of uncertainty than calculable probability. They 
differ from unpredicted, surprising, but potentially catastrophic “black swans” (Taleb, 2007), 
in that they can be known, communicated and mitigated. The predictability of political risk 
events, Bremmer argues, arises from the fact that such risks “are generated by individuals,” 
which means that the “incentives and constraints” motivating those individuals can be 
mapped, making political risk forecasting possible (Bremmer & Keat, 2009, p. 21). The 
means by which these risks should be communicated and incorporated into corporate 
decision-making is, for Bremmer, Enterprise Risk Management (ERM). Bremmer and Keat 
(2009, p. 195) describe ERM as  
the main framework for risk management that most corporations 
and financial firms are currently implementing…a form of holistic 
risk management that formalizes efforts to break down information 
silos across organizations and to standardize the ways in which risks 
are analyzed, reported, and addressed. 
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For Michael Power (2005), however, as discussed in Chapter Four, Enterprise Risk 
Management is better understood as a tool for financializing all aspects of risk management, 
recasting all risk in terms of its impact on shareholder value (or Net Present Value). In the 
process, risks caused by corporations are made to disappear, except where they generate 
‘social’ or ‘political’ risk that impacts on a corporation’s ability to operate, for instance, a 
money mine (see Dr A, above). For Bremmer and Keat (2009, p. 197) political risks are to 
be mitigated by the use of complex financial structures, political risk insurance, “complex 
legal agreements, commercial treaties, and diplomacy” (see Chapter Five, and below). These 
and other tools have been developed because “gunboat diplomacy” is no longer acceptable, 
and Bremmer and Keat (2009, p. 187) present as a matter-of-fact that Clive’s 1757 victory at 
Plassey can be seen as “an early corporate attempt at risk mitigation.”  
Where political risks cannot be prevented, they must be mitigated (with foresight if possible), 
and Clive’s dealing with the “Bengali takeover” of the East India Company’s Calcutta 
possessions is taken on a par with Enron’s purchase of political risk insurance prior to 
entering into an agreement with the State of Maharashtra in 1993 which ultimately resulted 
in “breach of contract” (ibid., p. 194). I dwell on this example because it captures with chilling 
clarity the extent to which contemporary techniques of private intellectual law reproduce the 
conditionalities upon which Third World sovereignty was recognized during the age of 
European colonialism, whereby “non-European sovereignty is subject to a foreigner’s ‘right 
to trade’” (Anghie, 2007, p. 251). I return to questions of sovereignty, the risk of ‘breach of 
contract’, and the foreigner’s right to trade in subsequent sections of this chapter, but in the 
remainder of this section, I trace in more detail the emergence of political risk analysis as part 
of a response to post-colonial efforts to destabilize the continuity of conditional sovereignty 
for non-European colonial nations.  In tracing out the history of political risk analysis, it also 
becomes apparent that the definition of ‘political risk’ subscribed to by most lawyers, analysts 
and consultants has both narrowed and stabilized considerably over time. 
Bremmer works with a disordered world picture and a notion that the probability of political 
risks can be known (even if analysts are accountable only for fixing ‘reference points’ rather 
than predicting actual events). Earlier architects and students of political risk analysis, 
however, worked with neither. In the late 1960s, when talk of political risk was nascent, 
Franklin Root (1968, p. 73) surveyed 124 US-based transnational corporations and found 
that not one had “any evidence of a systematic evaluation of political risks,” with all making 
investment decisions based on measures of “market opportunity” alone. Just over a decade 
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later Stephen Kobrin’s (1982, pp. 50, 167) survey of 193 US-based transnational corporations 
found that over half had carried out some analysis of political environments, with over a 
third beginning to institutionalize political risk management, albeit not to the extent or in the 
form that Bremmer and Keat (2009) would come to recommend. Kobrin attributed this 
growing interest in political risk to the 1979 Iranian revolution, which seemed to shake up 
the world-picture held by American executives much as the unforeseen Arab Spring 
prompted reflection in London’s political risk analysis industry. The rise of political risk 
analysis was also enabled by a post-World War Two revolution in managerial science, a 
revolution that significantly predates the claims that social scientists have begun to make 
about capitalism becoming “knowledgeable” and partaking in academic understandings of 
sociality and culture (e.g. Thrift, 2005 [1997], p. 21). Indeed, Kobrin locates the need for 
political risk analysis capabilities in the rise of transnational corporations headquartered in 
the US but operating in newly sovereign post-colonial territories, whose national 
governments have started to intervene in the economy for the purpose of social welfare 
objectives (see Chapter Six). He also identifies as a source of political risk the problems posed 
by centralizing power in states divided by traditional sociopolitical loyalties, citing Clifford 
Geertz’s (1963) work on the primordial attachments that troubled the formation of these 
new states (Kobrin 1982, p. 60). 
At this early stage of political risk analysis, Kobrin’s (1982; see also Fitzpatrick, 1983) reviews 
of approaches to political risk in the managerial literature avoided defining political risk in 
terms which portrayed all government intervention as negative. Both authors also rejected 
the analysis of discrete political risk ‘events’, with Fitzpatrick (1983: 250) calling for analysis 
of the broader political process as it may impact on business activities in unforeseen ways. 
Kobrin, meanwhile, emphasized that political risk assessment would always be subjective 
(Kobrin, 1982, pp. 44-46), and bemoaned the lack of capacity that led to executives 
expressing uncertainty in the vaguest of synthetic terms, such as “poor investment climate” 
(ibid., p. 173).  As I go on to describe in Section 7.3, the ‘investment climate’ has now taken 
on a much more concrete aspect, in part thanks to ranking tools such as those produced by 
the Fraser Institute, as well as the aid-funded ‘investment climate reform’ programmes that 
are being promoted in Bangladesh and other ‘frontier’ jurisdictions.  
In the decades following Kobrin and Fitzpatrick’s work, however, as political risk analysis 
became institutionalized within transnational corporations and as an industry in its own right, 
its definition was consistently narrowed. Firstly, moves were made to define or measure 
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political risk in quantitative terms (Moran, 1998, p. 9; Simon, 2002). More significantly, 
however, political risk came to be understood much more narrowly and pointedly in terms 
of the  
risk that the laws of a country will unexpectedly change to the 
investor’s detriment after the investor has invested capital in the 
country…Put simply, political risk is the risk of government 
intervention. (Comeaux & Kinsella, 1994, p. 1) 
As political risk analysis grew and became institutionalized, particularly in the extractive 
industry sector, it rapidly departed from Kobrin and Fitzgerald’s more nuanced position and 
aligned itself with the understanding of non-European or post-colonial sovereignty as 
contingent on the foreigner’s ‘right to trade’. This alignment becomes particularly clear as 
Comeaux and Kinsella (1994, pp. 7-12) and others sharing their definition of political risk 
(Hill, 1998, pp. 293-94; Moran, 1998, pp. 9-14) move on to enumerate the techniques with 
which political risk might be mitigated, focusing in particular on Bilateral Investment Treaties 
which provide for international arbitration, and the inclusion of stabilization clauses in 
resource extraction concessions.  
But contemporary techniques of private international law do not only replicate colonial 
distributions of sovereignty. In addition to adopting political risk ranking techniques that are 
redolent of the hierarchies of national progress curated at World’s Fairs, political risk experts 
seem to draw upon elements of a genre of colonial discourse whereby the disconcerting 
properties of colonial subjects were fixed in place, and territories could be known 
metonymically through the qualities of their ‘natives’ (cf. Appadurai, 1988). Consider Claire 
Hill (1998, pp. 296-97) writing in the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law: 
Among investors’ greatest fears may be the ascension to power of a 
figure like former Emperor Bokassa of the Central African 
Republic. He spent in excess of $20 million, an amount representing 
a significant portion of his country’s foreign reserves, to give himself 
a grand coronation on a solid gold throne. He was deposed and later 
tried for cannibalism…Might another comparable person succeed 
in taking over another country? It may not be likely; however, 
investors may not feel comfortable concluding that it is too remote 
to warrant concern. 
Read alongside assertions that political risk is “negligible” in developed markets (Hill 1998, 
p. 298) or “Western liberal democracies” (Comeaux & Kinsella, 1994, p. 24), these definitions 
of political risk suggest that more is at stake than Dr A and PolRiskCo’s quantitative 
pretensions and cold graphical depictions of political risk distributions. The political risk 
analysis industry, and the techniques of private international law which it informs, are 
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haunted by images of almost interchangeable, disordered post-colonial subjects, fixed in 
place within jurisdictions that can nonetheless be ranked by their compliance with the Fraser 
Institute’s report card. It is difficult to avoid recollecting Homi Bhabha’s (1983, p. 33) 
depiction of colonial fantasy which, one the one hand, 
proposes a teleology – under certain conditions of colonial 
domination and control the native is progressively reformable. On 
the other, however, it effectively displays the ‘separation’, makes it 
more visible…Colonial fantasy is the continual dramatisation of 
emergence – of difference, freedom – as the beginning of a history 
which is repetitively denied. 
In the next section of this chapter, I move between two ethnographic sites. The first consists 
of a set of briefings on Corporate Foreign Policy in the City of London, where extractive 
industry corporations are given advice on how to deal with expressions of sovereignty in 
post-colonial resource rich ‘frontier’ nations. The second is in Dhaka, where activists and 
state agencies have recently invoked the sovereignty of Bangladesh over its natural resources 
in disputes with extractive industry firms, who have responded by pursuing international 
arbitration.  
I once again take ethnographic encounters with mining professionals seemingly oriented to 
the ‘emergent present’ (Marcus, 2012), and trace out the historical developments that make 
their briefings appear sensible and, for some, necessary. In particular, the following section 
is concerned with tracing out how it became possible for expressions of sovereignty to be 
treated as the culmination of ‘political risks’, framed as a breach of contract made between 
two entities (one a post-colonial state, the other a transnational extractive industry 
corporation) of apparently equivalent legal status. The final ethnographic section of the 
chapter then explores how one particular ‘political risk mitigation’ tool or aspect of Corporate 
Foreign Policy, the provision for international arbitration between a foreign investor and a 
host state, is deployed by extractive industry corporations and donor agencies operating in 
Bangladesh. 
 
7.2: PRESSING PAUSE ON PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY 
For the political risk analysts discussed above, ‘breach of contract’ or ‘creeping expropriation’ 
constitute two of the most significant political risk events that can occur in frontier 
jurisdictions with poor investment climates, or during periods of surging resource 
nationalism. If their role was to create a world-picture and a set of ‘metrics’ that would help 
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extractive industry corporations understand jurisdictions in terms of political risk, it fell to 
other specialists to provide the tools with which these techniques could be mitigated. One 
such mitigation technique is found in the purchase of political risk insurance (on which see 
Lobo-Guerrero, 2012). But in London’s mining market, the most frequently referred to 
method for mitigating political risk was making sure that an investment in a foreign territory 
was set up to fit with a relevant Bilateral Investment Treaty. At briefings from lawyers at 
Mines & Money, at masterclasses for mining analysts hosted in the offices of City law firms, 
and in training sessions at British trade export bodies, those operating in the mineral 
exploration sector were advised to ensure that their investment would fit the ‘Salini criteria’ 
and thus endow them with the right, should disputes with the state or local companies arise, 
to submit to arbitration and not to the local courts.150  
The Salini criteria result from a ruling by an arbitration under the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) rules, Salini vs. Morocco,151 which declared that 
an ‘investment’ must involve a substantial commitment, duration, assumption of risk, 
contribution to economic development, and regularity of profit if ICSID was to arbitrate on 
disputes arising between host states and corporations belonging to other states, where both 
states have ratified the ICSID Convention. ICSID came into being as an international legal 
body affiliated to the World Bank in 1966, after submitting the convention to World Bank 
member states in 1965. Designed to promote foreign direct investment, the ICSID facilities 
were in fact lightly used until the profusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties containing 
arbitration provisions that took place in the 1990s (Parra, 2012, pp. 8-9). Although ICSID 
rules are not the only arbitral rules to which contracting parties can agree, they are the most 
common, and the arbitrations between Bangladesh and transnational extractive industry 
companies that are discussed in Section 7.4 have taken place under ICSID rules.  
One of the most forceful advocates of Bilateral Investment Treaty adoption to be found 
briefing London’s mining market during my fieldwork was the well-known lawyer Robert 
Amsterdam. Amsterdam, who runs the website corporateforeignpolicy.com, describes 
Corporate Foreign Policy as a replacement term for Corporate Social Responsibility, 
“rendered meaningless by the insincere rhetoric of the public relations industry” 
(Amsterdam, n.d.). For Amsterdam, the question is not whether to have a Corporate Foreign 
Policy, but what form that policy to take, and like Bremmer (above), he locates the need for 
                                                          
150 Fieldnotes, November 2012; December 2012; March 2014, November 2014. 
151 ICSID Case Number Arb/00/04, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001. 
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such a Policy in terms of waning US hegemony and the rise of a New World Disorder. 
Writing for Insurance Day during my fieldwork, Amsterdam pointed to the rise of resource 
nationalism in ‘frontier markets’, and the consequent need to map relationships among elites 
in host countries, take out political insurance, and complement that insurance with both 
Corporate Social Responsibility programmes and a Corporate Foreign Policy that 
incorporated “the full tool box of legal responses from arbitration to local criminal law to 
international treaties” (Amsterdam, 2012, unpaged).  
I saw Amsterdam speak at Global Mining Frontiers 2012, an event hosted in the City of 
London’s Chamber of Commerce. Global Mining Frontiers was an extractive industry bazaar 
on a much smaller scale to Mines & Money, but organized in a similar way, mixing investor 
pitches from gold explorers in Indonesia, sales pitches from geological consulting firms, and 
‘Frontier Mining Matchmaking’ sessions designed to connect consulting geologists with 
newly formed juniors. A follow up event in 2013 also included briefings from the 
International Finance Corporation, and from a law firm which represented family wealth 
funds that were increasingly keen to finance “under the radar” exploration projects. 
Amsterdam, too busy to stay beyond his presentation, framed his speech like so many others 
in terms of the apparent rising tide of resource nationalism. “Let’s be frank,” he began, “in 
most countries where there are resources the law is weak and not very well enforced.” Being 
a good corporate citizen goes without saying, but how could you deal with the “aggressive 
renegotiation of deals” by countries “in an aggressive way, attacking miners’ interests?” The 
first step, he suggested, was to “level the playing field” by insuring you were covered by a 
Bilateral Investment Treaty that provided for independent, out-of-country arbitration. His area of 
expertise was the former-USSR, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and he warned 
of the dangers of getting in-country arbitrators in the region. “The most difficult is the Czech 
Republic, which we often think of as almost Western.”  
There was, he noted, a need to look beyond a company’s reputation when examining the 
political risk landscape (see Section 7.1). But for Amsterdam, resource nationalism was not 
easy to see coming: “Do not feel that resource nationalism and the threat of appropriation is 
something you can immediately recognize.” Resource nationalism could even include “overly 
harsh environmental checks.” The best hope of recognizing it in time was to make the 
transition from Corporate Social Responsibility to Corporate Foreign Policy: 
We’ve taught so many of our companies to avoid politics, that CSR 
is talking to NGOs and not governments. So many of these 
companies are wrong-footed when a new government comes, they 
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don’t know what to do. These governments, they aren’t 
governments, they’re clans. You need to know, what clan does 
gold?152 
Clifford Geertz’s (1963) writing on ‘primordial sentiments’ in post-colonial states, which 
informed Kobrin’s (1982) early work on political risk analysis, walked a tightrope between 
expository anthropological language and anxious colonial Othering. Amsterdam, however, 
has fully embraced a more troubling “trope of the tribe,” which seems to revive our “deepest 
racial images of black Africans and native Americans, of blind loyalties and arcane rituals, of 
cannibals and kings…violence, terror and displacement” (Appadurai, 2007, pp. 128-29; cf. 
Bhabha, 1983), all transposed onto the investment climates of specific frontier jurisdictions.  
Last in Amsterdam’s sights was the “inept World Bank,” and the advice of global technocrats 
and philanthrocapitalists like Paul Collier and George Soros, who apparently advised Guinea 
to “take 30%” of a large iron ore project. This, Amsterdam argued, was “news to many on 
the ground who had invested tens of millions.” Worse still, the resource nationalism was 
contagious, spreading now to Ghana and other places that “we’d always thought of as very 
pro-Western, very stable.”  
Amsterdam’s words of warning were well received. Though he is a particularly vocal and 
empassioned advocate and analyst, his is by no means an atypical mining market narrative. 
Like Bremmer and the political risk analysts discussed above, Amsterdam layers the cold, 
analytical and technical language of risk mitigation in a time of resource nationalism over a 
bed of colonial fantasy that is occasionally made manifest. But what is particularly significant 
is the way that he, like other less eloquent and eminent mining professionals, views specific 
risks engendered by the rise of resource nationalism (the ‘aggressive renegotiation of deals’, 
‘overly harsh environmental checks’), and development agencies (increased ‘take’ in Guinea) 
as affronts to corporate sovereignty, and illegitimate expressions of state sovereignty. This may 
seem like simple international realism, but it is an approach to international private law that 
has only been enabled because of the retreat of the Third World project, and the ultimately 
abortive attempts made by Third World jurists and post-colonial states to assert permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources.  
As a complement to the narrowing of standard definitions of political risk, to reflect the view 
that any government intervention is necessarily negative, orthodox legal scholarship has come 
to extend the definition of expropriation of foreign-owned assets to include raising royalty or 
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taxation rates, in the manner that so caused affront to Amsterdam. The term ‘creeping 
expropriation’, invoked by so many of the participants at the risk analysis briefings discussed 
in Section 7.1, was, in the early days of political risk analysis, subjected to careful scrutiny in 
an effort to dispel “normative overtones [which] tend more often to describe a result than 
to define the process by which the result is reached” (Weston 1975-1976, p. 111). In 
contemporary usage, it covers any act by a state that reduces that flow of wealth and profit 
to a foreign investor, whether that be an increased taxation rate, altered labour laws or all-
out nationalization (e.g. Comeaux & Kinsella, 1994, p. 15; Joffé et al., 2009, pp. 8-9).  
For Weston, writing in the mid-1970s, private foreign investment in post-colonial states was 
essential for development and well-being. Consequently, “deprivative ‘regulations that 
counteract the flow of important values across national boundaries thus may be seen to work 
against the achievement of global well-being” (Weston 1975-1976, p. 128). Weston, in what 
by contemporary standards appears as a rather even-tempered effort to categorise actions by 
states that could constitute ‘political risks’, also discusses the extent to which state action 
constitutes creeping expropriation or ‘regulatory taking’ when it does not advance a 
recognized social purpose. By “recognized social purpose” (ibid., p. 115) he intends 
what traditionally has been considered legitimate ‘regulatory’ 
intention in the economically conservative but normatively 
influential West, i.e., promotion of ‘the general welfare’ and/or 
prevention of ‘socially noxious uses.’ 
 In defining reasonably economic policy, efforts to construct an international legal regime 
that protects against ‘creeping expropriation’ were from the start premised on only 
recognizing post-colonial sovereignty where it accords with international norms. 
Anthony Anghie goes further, suggesting that sovereignty, as it has come to be known and 
used in international law, emerged through a series of encounters between expansionary 
European colonial powers and subject territories, with the result that “the development of 
the idea of sovereignty in relation to the non-European world occurs in terms of 
dispossession, its ability to alienate its lands and rights” (Anghie, 2007, p. 103). Anghie traces 
European thinking on sovereignty back to Francisco de Vitoria’s discussion of Columbus’ 
rights over ‘Indian’ territory in the Americas, through nineteenth century positivist jurists 
who ruled on rights over colonial territories, and up to mid-twentieth century responses to 
post-colonial expressions of sovereignty over their natural resources. He argues that Third 
World sovereignty has always been different: it is only ever recognized in order that it may be 
surrendered (ibid.: 220).  
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Anghie’s primary concern is the Western/Northern response to the assertion of Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources by post-colonial states participating in the short-lived 
‘Third World project’. Vijay Prashad describes the Third World project as an effort that 
began at Bandung in 1955, on the part of a miniscule group of international brokers to 
become leaders, elaborating principles that “skewered the hypocrisy of imperial liberalism 
and promoted social change, while signalling “their refusal to take orders from their former 
colonial masters,” but which had capitulated to “IMF-driven globalization” by the early 
1980s (Prashad, 2007, pp. 29, 56, 220; also Worsley 1964, pp. 84, 275). One of the apparent 
successes of the Third World project was the adoption by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1974 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which included, 
in Article 2(2)(c), a declaration of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR), 
the successor to a 1962 resolution (1803 [XVII]) on the same issue.  
For Third World jurists like Kamal Hossain, who features in the ethnography presented in 
Section 7.3, the doctrine of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR) was a 
response to inequity of colonial concessions, and could be “invoked by producer states to 
claim negotiation of contracts, or alteration of the terms, when changed circumstances had 
made the original terms inequitable,” as, for instance, if a concession had been based on a 
US$3 oil price and oil subsequently rose to US$15 per barrel (Hossain, 1983, p. xi). The kinds 
of ‘windfall tax’ renegotiation that Hossain advocated were among the most feared political 
risks, acts of creeping expropriation or markers of resource nationalism in the mining market 
during my fieldwork. Hossain and his fellow jurists (e.g. Chowdhury, 1983a) were insistent 
that the doctrine of PSNR constituted a new legal norm, compatible with international law, 
emanating from the “inherent and overriding right of a state to control and dispose of the 
natural wealth and resources in its territory for the benefit of its own people,” and which 
justified the renegotiation of contracts or terms, while allowing for just compensation to be 
provided. Industry-oriented lawyers today, however, reject the PSNR doctrine as an 
aggressive act of resource nationalism itself, echoing early European theories of sovereignty 
whereby interference with an adventurer’s right to trade and sojourn constituted an act of 
ware (see Anghie, 2007, pp. 20-21). Jurists in the mid-twentieth century had also contested 
PSNR on the grounds that post-colonial sovereign states had not existed as such prior to 
colonisation, and so there was no permanent sovereignty vested in the people of a particular 
territory (ibid., p. 212). In Anghie’s terms, sovereignty could only be recognized where 
dispossession was accepted. 
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Industry lawyers and sympathetic academics today advocate the adoption of stabilization 
clauses in exploration and concession agreements, clauses which prohibit the state’s right to 
exercise its sovereignty in the way Hossain and his colleagues envisioned. With these 
contracts, a hold is put on the exercise of sovereignty, while transnational corporations are 
elevated to sovereign status, and their relationship elevated upwards and out of the nation-
state into the international arena. In the next section, I revisit some of the ethnographic 
personae from Chapter Six in order to examine recent attempts that have been made to assert 
Permanent Sovereignty over Bangladesh’s Natural Resources in the face of apparently 
negligent actions taken by a Barbados-registered subsidiary of a Canadian exploration firm, 
Niko Resources (Bangladesh) Ltd.  
7.3: NIKO V. BANGLADESH 
In January 2005, a blowout occurred in the Chhatak (West) Gas field in Sylhet, at Tengratila, 
during drilling that was being carried out by a company subcontracted by Niko Resources, 
operating as part of a joint venture with BAPEX, but with full operational responsibility. In 
May, Niko began drilling a nearby relief well to prevent the loss of gas. This was followed by 
a second, larger blowout in late June. The blowouts set in place a series of inquiries and 
committees established by BAPEX, the Prime Minister’s office, and various Ministries, 
which set out to determine the cause of and allocate responsibility for the blowouts, as well 
as determine the appropriate quantity of compensation to be made. In 2008, the People’s 
Republic of Bangladesh filed a ‘money suit’ against Niko for the sum of Tk. 746,50,83,973 
(746 crores, 50 lakhs, 83 thousand and 973 taka),153 which included the loss of burned gas 
and Tk. 84,55,83,973 in environmental damages. The case became a public affair, and the 
site for disputes over the proper valuation of contestation, and the appropriate expertise that 
should be invoked in determining responsibility and compensation. 
For Sayeeful, the geologist sensitive to, but not involved in, the National Committee (see 
Chapter Six), the blowout became an opportunity to reflect upon domestic expertise and 
international incompetence: 
BAPEX is not like the international oil companies, it cannot explore 
at sea, but is good enough onshore. They have been producing for 
forty years now. There is no problem in BAPEX drilling 
wells…Chhatak was producing under BAPEX. Then production 
stopped. Instead of sending a new BAPEX team, they sent the 
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unknown, Niko. There was no bidding, no competition, then two 
blowouts in 2005. 154 
Sayeeful even alleged that Niko had delivered a large car to a minister’s house and that 
because of this the National Committee  
can bring people forward with just a few speeches. The confidence 
of the people in the government energy sector is absent, especially 
in the idea that a deal can be made in national interests. But there is 
no point trying to drive IOCs out and do it all ourselves. That is 
where I differ with the National Committee. 
In Sayeeful’s analysis, the National Committee’s political performances were enabled by a 
lack of confidence in the government, though the national technical capacity was superior to 
that of the ‘unknown’ (though in fact rather long established) Canadian explorer. Indeed, it 
was the government’s willingness to enter into agreements with apparently inexpert foreign 
extractive corporations that animated these politics that might be viewed from London in 
terms of ‘resource nationalism.’ 
Sayeeful continued to emphasize the technical capacity of BAPEX and the inadequacy of 
Niko when he explained the blowout with reference to geology and drilling practice: 
if you consider very simple geology, what you can see is this gas 
went up through this pipe and entered into this loose sand layer…so 
the most erroneous step Niko had taken is they drilled a well without 
a casing. What you do when you drill a hole through this soft layer 
you use a casing. BAPEX and Petrobangla have drilled many holes 
in that area without any difficulty. Because what they do is they case 
the hole. This is normal. Niko created a pocket and then at the 
second blowout, they drilled into a soft pocket. A totally kind of 
irresponsible job. When one drills a hole there without casings, 
taking a risk of you know blowout. There are many Petrobangla or 
BAPEX holes cased all the time. 
Just as resource materialities are assembled in momentary stabilizations of human, geological 
and technical actants (Chapter Three), geology, expertise and technical equipment are 
implicated in their unravelling. And, as I discuss below, it was precisely the designation and 
unwinding of Chhatak as a gas resource that became the centre of the subsequent legal 
controversies. 
Not all the experts who appeared in Chapter Six accepted Sayeeful’s account. Toufiq had 
authored the technical report on the first blowout, which, as quoted in the ‘money suit’ filed 
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in 2008, found Niko to be guilty of “technical lapse and gross negligence”155 in part for their 
failure to adopt an appropriate well casing design. When I met Toufiq at the Hay Festival, 
and asked about the casing issue, he became exasperated: “Look I don’t know who told you 
that. If lawyers told you that, lawyers know nothing. There are only three or four people 
maximum in this country who can understand the causes.”156 The drilling plans, he said, had 
been perfect, and the accident could not have been foreseen. His original estimate for lost 
gas was almost twenty times lower than that of a second committee whose compensation 
claim was quoted in the money suit. The official in charge at Petrobangla was, he said, “some 
kind of resource nationalist, and he was not able to separate the technical and legal issues.” 
He had accepted ‘non-expert’ claims about the need for Niko to compensate for lost gas 
that, were, as Imtiaz (see Chapter Six) put it, simply unprecedented: 
Nowhere in the world do you pay for gas that has been destroyed. 
All that with BP in the USA – that is about compensation for the 
farmers. Otherwise how would you work? If you had an accident 
and gas leaks out and it will be worth ten times your company? How 
will you work? 
But Toufiq did grant that what had been wrong in the Niko case was the rendering of the 
fields “marginal” rather than “suspended” in Petrobangla’s classification, in order to allow a 
Joint Venture between BAPEX and Niko. The classification matters, and is part of what 
made the field a viable resource (see Chapter Three). Niko were given access to fields that 
were suspended full-production fields, rather than exhausted marginal fields, and for which 
BAPEX had already paid the development costs.  
Kamal Hossain also took issue with rendering the fields ‘marginal’. Hossain was the architect 
of Bangladesh’s constitution, prominent Third World jurist during the era of promoting 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR), and author of Bangladesh’s first 
Production Sharing Contract, a type of joint venture designed to put an end to the colonial-
era concessions that sparked the PSNR movement. He likewise challenged the Cabinet and 
Petrobangla for failing to adjudicate appropriately between geological and legal fields: 
The geologists all certified these were not abandoned fields. Some 
asked the Law Minister for an opinion. How can the Law Minister 
give an opinion when the geologists have said these are not 
abandoned fields? So they were given terms that were not 
appropriate.157 
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Toufiq had used his geological and engineering expertise to discredit those who had 
privileged legal concerns in the calculation of compensation. Hossain, a lawyer, had, however 
questioned the Law Minister’s capacity to overrule geologists in the matter of classifying gas 
fields. To the extent that gas fields are social–natural hybrids or ‘quasi–objects’ in Bruno 
Latour’s (1993) terms (see Chapter Three), they create conditions for the strategic 
deployment of ‘social’ and ‘scientific’ expertise in the making of political claims; such claims 
are not merely made by privileging one’s own domain of expertise. At times, lawyers may find 
their political concerns best served by subordinating legal expertise to geological knowledge. 
In a subsequent lawsuit, a writ petition filed by the Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers’ 
Association (BELA) in 2005, BELA exercised their constitutional right to challenge the 
government for an account of why the Niko joint venture should not be declared illegal. 
BELA made their challenge on the grounds that Niko had been given a productive field on 
the basis that it was technically “marginal”, and asked why the joint venture should not be 
declared illegal, and in violation of Article 143 of the Constitution, which vests in the 
Republic “all minerals and other things of value underlying any land of Bangladesh.” 
Included in the evidence attached to the petition was a letter from Niko in which they 
petitioned for the Chhatak East field to be included in the joint venture in order to “mitigate 
the reserve risk that we face in Chhatak West.”158 The finding of the petition, given in 2010, 
and which considered responses from Niko, BAPEX, Petrobangla and the Government of 
Bangladesh, was that the joint venture was not fraudulent or improper, but that Niko did owe 
the stated amount of compensation in the 2008 money suit. In addition, Mr Justice Quamrul 
Islam Siddiqui ruled that the Bangladesh Government and parastatal respondents were 
“restrained by an order of injunction from making any payment” to Niko for gas that had 
already been delivered.159 
The BELA petition was not the only legal effort made to assert Bangladesh’s Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources in recent years. In 2010, a judgement was issued by the 
High Court on a petition made in 1998 by prominent academic Shah Abdul Hannan to 
declare a moratorium on onshore gas exploration by foreign companies, and ensure a stake 
for the Government in all Production Sharing Contracts before bidding was opened to 
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foreign developers.160 In this case, Kamal Hossain gave an opinion for the Government, 
defending the Production Sharing Contract model that he had instituted and arguing that the 
Government should be free of judicial micromanagement in this area, which is a perspective 
echoed in the ruling on the case. What the BELA case and the Hannan petition demonstrate 
is that attempts to exercise Permanent Sovereignty over National Resources can at times be 
frustrated by the policy, party or personal politics of Government members and 
administrators. The state, in this case, stands in the way of exercising sovereignty over natural 
resources.  
In the disputes that arose over responsibility and compensation in the wake of the Niko 
blowouts, claims were made about the superiority of domestic expertise over that of foreign 
investors. This makes the claim, often heard in London’s mining market, and in writing on 
the legality of ‘creeping expropriation’, that foreign expertise is needed to develop resources 
in frontier jurisdictions, harder to countenance. In the money suit brought by Bangladesh 
against Niko, it was claimed that the arbitration clause in the BAPEX-Niko joint venture had 
no legal determination because they were seeking damages for “tortuous liabilities” and not 
damages for “breach of contract”161, that most frightening of all political risks. Nonetheless, 
Niko has taken BAPEX, Petrobangla and the People’s Republic of Bangladesh to an ICSID 
tribunal on the grounds that the non-payment of outstanding dues, enforced by Mr Justice 
Sidiqqui in his ruling on BELA’s writ petition. Bangladesh’s insistence that dues not be paid 
and arbitration not be resorted to are not difficult to understand in this case, given past 
experience with ICSID’s rulings on jurisdiction. These past experiences, and the contests 
over their meaning that I witnessed in London and Dhaka, form the ethnographic core of 
Section 7.4. Even if civil society organizations find their efforts to enforce Bangladesh’s 
constitutional commitment to Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources frustrated by 
the State itself, Bangladesh’s experience with ICSID tribunals only serves to drive home 
Anghie’s (2007, p. 251) point that non-European post-colonial sovereignty is upheld only 
subject to the foreigner’s right to trade and turn a profit.  
Disputes between states and transnational corporations may ultimately be resolved in ICSID 
arbitration tribunals, as provided for in Bilateral Investment Treaties, so long as extractive 
industry corporations have been careful enough with their Corporate Foreign Policy to 
structure themselves in an appropriate and ‘Salini compliant’ manner. In Section 7.4, I 
                                                          
160 Writ Petition Number 3507 of 1998. 
161 Money Suit Number 224 of 2008, p. 70. 
201 
 
examine the politics surrounding an ICSID arbitration between Bangladeshi state agencies 
and an Italian gas pipeline construction firm. 
7.4: ARBITRATION AND THE STATE OF EXTRACTION 
In the final section of this chapter, I focus on the case of Saipem v. Bangladesh, an ICSID 
arbitration that was ruled on in 2009. I describe how this case was discussed first at an aid-
funded training course for arbitrators in Dhaka, run as part of an investment climate reform 
programme, and subsequently at a training course for British overseas investors held by a 
trade export association in London. I contrast the ways in which the Saipem v. Bangladesh 
award became an object at the centre of two very different ethical projects. In Dhaka, a group 
of high-profile lawyers and young trainees engaged in reflection about the level of 
internationalism that was desirable for development, the extent to which international arbitral 
tribunals might work to undermine Bangladesh’s sovereignty, and the problems with the 
Bangladeshi courts that might invite these tribunals to extend their influence over 
Bangladesh. In London, the trainer from a City law firm deflected questions from the 
audience about whether or not Bilateral Investment Treaties and arbitration clauses might 
undermine sovereignty and democracy with reference to the fundamental difference of 
developing country politics. The trainer also treated the Saipem award as an example of 
opportunities for foreign investors to be creative with private legal technique, using it for 
purposes other than those intended, in order to ensure a future flow of revenue.  
In her recent work on international private law in financial markets, Riles (2010, 2011) has 
argued forcefully for the ethnographic study of legal knowledge and legal technique, rejecting 
calls to explain what is interesting about law in terms of the operation of “social forces” 
(Riles, 2011, p. 18; cf. Weszkalnys 2010). Consequently, Riles has suggested that legal 
documents should be understood not as entextualizations of the norms that define a given 
financial, legal or elite community, but as documents that are meant to be completed rather 
than read (Riles, 2011, p. 50). Here Riles is drawing on Bruno Latour’s (1994) account of 
how technologies and artefacts act as ‘speedbumps’, diverting or translating agency as they 
are encountered. For Riles, what is interesting about legal documents is how their finished 
form diverts, translates and shapes the agency of those in financial markets. In addition, Riles 
(2006) would argue that the material constraints imposed by the creation of those documents 
in the first place also displaces and translates the agency or intention of those who designed 
them.  
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From Riles’ perspective, then, the stabilization clauses referred to above, and which are taken 
by critical Third World jurists like Anghie (2007), Choudhury (1983b) and Oshionebo (2010) 
as the ultimate subordination of post-colonial sovereignty to transnational corporations, 
might be viewed as documents that work as “private constitutions” and allow parties to act 
as if they trust each other and defer mistrust into the future (Riles, 2010, p. 797). The trouble 
with Riles’ approach is that by focusing on the completion of legal forms, or the exercise of 
private legal technique, historical and contemporary challenges to the meaning and legitimacy 
of those forms and the norms they help to reproduce go unanalyzed. In this section, therefore, I 
emphasize precisely the normative component of Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
arbitration clauses. In disputes over the legitimacy of arbitral decisions, and even more clearly 
in training sessions where non-experts are educated about the importance of these legal 
techniques for their foreign investments, the norms that are encoded in and underwrite the 
use of these techniques come sharply into focus.  
The first of the sites I discuss in this section is a training session for arbitrators hosted at the 
Ruposhi Bangla Hotel (see Chapter Six) by the Bangladesh International Arbitration Centre, 
funded by DFID/UKAid, the EU and the IFC. I had been invited to the event after meeting 
in Dhaka with employees of the Bangladesh Investment Climate Fund (BICF), an investment 
climate reform project partly funded by DFID, whom I had first met in London at a 
symposium on regulatory reform hosted by the Department for Innovation, Business and 
Skills. If when Kobrin (1982) wrote his foundational text on political risk analysis ‘investment 
climate’ was the vaguest of terms deployed only by the least equipped executive, it has by 
now taken on a more concrete form, partially in response to the indices that are developed 
to rank nations according to ease of doing business, or their international competitiveness. 
Arbitration capacity has, in this way, become a key marker of a sound investment climate 
and a source of confidence for foreign investors. The clogging up of Bangladesh’s courts, 
and the increasing preference for arbitration and other ‘alternative dispute resolution’ 
measures among international business elites therefore led to the establishment of the 
Bangladesh International Arbitration Centre (BIAC), and to this set of training sessions in 
particular, for which IFC lawyers had flown in to Dhaka.  
The discussion at the Ruposhi Bangla began with a staged photo opportunity, with the Chief 
Guest, Kamal Hossain, seated in front of a banner listing the sponsors of the event and its 
purpose. Press photographers waiting at the front of the room took their picture s, before 
leaving as the session began. The head of BIAC, began by providing the rationale for the 
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event, explaining that “we wanted to provide our legal community with international best 
practice. It takes some time for the appropriate legal culture to develop.”162 Kamal Hossain 
was thanked for attending during a period of political turbulence163 before he began to set 
the tone for the event. The first thing, Hossain emphasized, was settling the arbitration 
clause, “not just accepting ‘No, no, no, these are all internationally settled.’ That’s just the 
opening gambit.” Of course, if one party to an agreement was a government, then a clause 
providing for international arbitration at a venue like ICSID was, of course, needed. Hossain 
also warned that people were moving away from South Asia because of its interventionist 
courts, and that “if we keep obstructing, the simple answer is that people will not take 
Bangladesh seriously. I say this with the Chief Justice sitting there.” 
Subsequent speakers discussed the difference between the relatively recent 2001 Arbitration 
Act, and the areas in which it differed to the 1983 UNCITRAL Model Law that had now 
been implemented in over 70 countries. The 2001 Bangladesh Arbitration Act (S42-43) 
allowed courts to challenge arbitral rulings if they were opposed to Bangladesh law or public 
policy, even if it was unclear what that meant (cf. Weston, 1975-1976). And, in departing 
from the UNCITRAL Model, the Bangladesh Arbitration Act gave courts the power to 
determine an arbitration authority’s jurisdiction, and questions were raised over whether this 
constituted an undue level of interference. Moving on from these technical discussions, and 
given Kamal Hossain’s role representing Bangladesh in the case, the Saipem v. Bangladesh 
award was raised by an up and coming barrister: 
When the law of Bangladesh applies as being the seat of the tribunal, 
how can the international tribunal revoke that? Saipem had the 
option to dispute in the courts, but they didn’t. Surely this is a case 
when an arbitral authority has exceeded its authority and acted as a 
court? 
The Saipem case involved an Italian gas and oil firm contracted in 1990 to build a pipeline 
that was delayed and ultimately abandoned because of local opposition. The original 
agreement between Saipem and Petrobangla allowed for arbitration in Dhaka under the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration rules, and such an arbitration 
commenced in 2000.  
                                                          
162 Fieldnotes, September 2013. 
163 Hossain is the founder of Gono Forum, a left-liberal party intended as a democratic ‘third force’ in 
Bangladesh. 
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However, after the ICC tribunal denied a series of requests made by Petrobangla regarding 
removing certain comments from the record and making others public, the Supreme Court 
in Dhaka issued an injunction against the continuation of the tribunal, and despite having 
two tiers of appeal courts available to them, Saipem did not pursue the option of appeal 
because they felt the courts to be ‘hostile’ and acting ‘illegally by all standards.’ The ICC 
arbitration nonetheless issued an award in 2003, ruling that Saipem had suffered a ‘breach of 
contract’ when Petrobangla failed to compensate them for the time extension caused by local 
opposition. But Petrobangla appealed under the 2001 Arbitration Act (S42-3), though the 
Supreme Court’s response was intriguing: as there was no award in the eyes of the law, it 
could neither be set aside nor enforced. Due to their earlier ruling, ignored by the ICC, the 
award did not exist and could not be enforced in Bangladesh. Only at this stage, in 2004, did 
Saipem file a request for arbitration with the Government of Bangladesh at ICSID. The 
ICSID ruling was unusual, in that the rights to the arbitral award were treated, effectively, as 
an investment, and the court’s decision to set it aside was viewed as an act of direct expropriation. 
In this way, the Saipem v. Bangladesh case became the first ICSID case that held a state 
responsible for expropriation based on the ‘illegal’ interference of the judiciary. An additional 
controversy arising from this case is that Saipem did not exhaust local court remedies, as they are 
obliged to, before turning to ICSID. As Michael Goldhaber (2013: 389) puts it in his survey 
of the increasing extension of arbitral power over domestic courts, 
Pretend otherwise though it might, the Saipem tribunal overruled the 
Bangladeshi courts, and thus performed the role of an appellate 
chamber. Observers must focus on what a tribunal does, and not 
what it says. ‘I’m not creating a new kind of supranational appeal,’ 
is exactly what one might expect an adjudicator to say when she is 
doing exactly that. 
Hence, as Kamal Hossain noted in his response to the young barrister’s question, “Saipem 
was the biggest disappointment of my professional life.” 
In the remainder of the session, the issue of the Niko arbitration, and whether it would be a 
repeat of Saipem, given that the arbitration was taking place in Geneva even while Dhaka 
was listed as the “place,” was raised by one of the barristers who had been assigned to 
represent Bangladesh in the tribunal. Kamal Hossain cautioned against a retreat from 
internationalism and a return to “forty years ago.” More internationalism was needed, he 
argued, but ICSID keeps giving “investor-friendly awards” and will only respect courts that 
have “earned respect by ruling against their own country.” When I later met with Hossain in 
his offices, he spoke at length about his experience with ICSID arbitrations and international 
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oil firms. In the 1992 Scimitar vs. Bangladesh arbitration, it turned out there had been no 
proper competitive bid, and Scimitar was awarded an already discovered field over more 
experienced companies like Shell. The Left had organized a Long March, he said, when a 
note in the margin of the bid was allegedly discovered reading ‘give it to Scimitar.’ In the 
ICSID tribunal,  
I said to Scimitar of the corruption, that ‘their’ company money is 
owed to Bangladesh as oil and gas. I threatened the CEO with 
criminal charges under Canadian law for the fun of it, asked for 
costs, and got it. So there are some good stories in our history.164 
However, he emphasized his distance from the Left on anti-IOC terms. Their heart may be 
in the right place, but his Scimitar inquiry panel was “certainly no left people, it was 
professionals.” Nonetheless, and as might be expected from one of the leading Third world 
jurists and promoters of the principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
(Hossain 1983), he viewed the Saipem case as a scandal. “There was this big bleating of the 
company that ‘the national courts didn’t suit us’, and now the ruling is cited boldly, though 
in international circles all of those agree this is absolutely outrageous.” When I asked how 
Saipem won, he responded that “the bulk of arbitrators are investor friendly. You know, with 
a capital I. You know, that is the ideology.” He was encouraging about my research, which 
he saw as “going into these kind of issues on how developing countries get ripped off.” 
Back at the Ruposhi Bangla, a few days after the BIAC session, however, the IFC lawyers 
sent to build Bangladesh’s arbitration capacity offered a very different interpretation of 
events. They worked for an NGO spun off from George Washington University that was 
spread up to “spread the rule of law, in a very American way I guess.”165 The Bangladesh 
training programme had come about after he met the Bangladeshi Law Minister at the offices 
of his NGO in Washington, who was visiting to ask advice on cases that couldn’t be cleared 
through the courts. The Minister didn’t know what arbitration was, and the lead trainer, 
originally from the UK, explained to him in terms of cricket, as a he recalled it to me: 
You remember when you played cricket as a kid, it wasn’t at Lords, 
you had a few people on each side, some people got out, some runs 
were made, and at the end someone won and someone lost. That’s 
arbitration.  
The trainer’s use of cricket as a model for arbitration resonates with a long history of using 
cricket as a model and forum for the assertion within the Commonwealth of “English-elite-
                                                          
164 Fieldnotes, November 2013.  
165 Fieldnotes, October 2013. 
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male models of authority” which are also claimed to be somehow above politics (Sen, 2001, 
p. 238). This trainer continued to bemoan the extent to which Bangladeshi lawyers didn’t 
understand the “spirit” of arbitration, getting hung up on words like the “place” of 
arbitration, when it is very obvious, he argued, that “place” means the seat (i.e., the jurisdiction 
that presides over the arbitration) rather than the physical venue (i.e., Geneva in the Niko 
case).  
Not only this, but Bangladeshi arbitrators and mediators could not seem to get past a “winner 
takes all” mentality. And, while it was true that arbitration capacity was likely to appeal to 
foreign investors since arbitration “has an international aspect in its DNA,” and UK Trade 
and Industry had “somehow got BIAC mentioned” in their investment climate advice for 
Bangladesh the trainers were not confident it would work: 
I think people go to ICSID when they have reached a political 
situation and there’s no solution to it. Bangladesh always wants 
Bangladeshi law on a contract. The compromise might be, OK, you 
have a Bangladeshi lawyer but you have a seat of the arbitration in 
London or Washington, so you don’t have Bangladeshi courts 
controlling the law of the situation. This is what the oil and gas 
companies want, they want a panel that is not all composed of 
Bangladeshis. So if you look at the BIAC board now, I don’t think 
the oil and gas companies will use it.  
The trainers denied that ICSID was biased toward foreign investors, as Hossain would allege, 
but insisted instead that in some countries, like Bangladesh, there is just ‘’no point” in 
attempting to exhaust the court system. ICSID it seemed, stood for the reliable umpire who 
could intervene when Bangladeshi courts and companies are suspected of ‘match-fixing’, 
introducing dirty politics onto the playing field of transnational extractive industry 
investment (cf. Sen 2001: 240). The arbitration trainer’s narratives recall those of the political 
risk analysts (Section 7.1) and Corporate Foreign Policy advocates (Section 7.2) who warn 
against the behavioural inclinations of post-colonial elites and officials which both stand for 
and can be known in terms of the territories they occupy. ‘Bangladeshis’ here stand for 
‘unreliability’ and a threat to (their own) investment climate, while Western or European 
arbitrators embody a universal, unbiased orientation to international law (cf. Anghie, 2007, pp. 
4–6ff.). 
I now move to London, to recount how the Saipem case was constructed and deployed as a 
means of socializing consultants and engineers working in infrastructure and extractive 
investment overseas into international law and a particular understanding of the distribution 
of sovereignty. I focus on a training session on Bilateral Investment Treaties run by a City 
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lawyer from a prominent firm, and hosted by ExportOrg (see Chapter Two). The lawyer’s 
task was to explain how to assure that you will be ‘safe’ in those countries where it is 
‘dangerous’ to invest money. After explaining the Salini criteria for investment, she went on 
to explain how Bilateral Investment Treaties can be used in creative ways. Companies can be 
structured to ensure that they are covered by as many treaties as possible, even taking 
establishing subsidiary mailbox companies abroad, say in the Netherlands, in order to do 
business in the UK, as a de facto UK company, while being protected from any changes to 
regulation or tax structures that might constitute ‘creeping expropriation.’ This prompted 
some concern from the audience: 
Surely countries can change their tax laws, as a company you’re 
supposed to take that risk. I don’t think any country says ‘this is 
forever’?166 
The City lawyer running the session responded: 
Think about the purpose of these Bilateral Investment Treaties, it is 
to promote that foreign investment, and for foreign investment, you 
need stability. Many investments are not going to profitable in a year 
or two, so if the law changes, profitability goes down. 
Another audience member asked whether by signing BITs, the government is not “giving up 
a degree of control,” and a third put it to the trainer that “presumably the issue is 
discrimination, I mean, surely it is fine if they change the laws for all companies in a sector?” 
The trainer’s response was that “the issue is developing countries, where these things can 
change more frequently.” 
The debates played out in this training session almost replay those that took place several 
decades ago between Western and Third World jurists over ‘creeping expropriation’ and 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (compare Hossain, 1983, and Weston, 1975-
1976). And the concerns raised by the audience members are dispelled by the City lawyer 
presiding on the grounds that developing countries must be treated otherwise, even if that means 
encroaching upon their sovereignty, While Riles (2011) argues that it is insufficient to explain 
away legal practices in terms of the social norms they reflect, it is certainly clear here that for 
private legal techniques like arbitration, as embodied in Bilateral Investment Treaties, to 
work, certain normative parameters have to be established, and questions about sovereignty, 
democracy and difference must be set aside.  
                                                          
166 Fieldnotes, February 2014. 
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Towards the end of the session, once the attendees had accepted the City lawyer’s normative 
parameters, the Saipem v. Bangladesh was brought up. Here, however, Saipem appeared in 
an utterly different pedagogical guise to the one it had adopted in Dhaka. The issue at stake 
was not whether arbitral tribunals were overstepping their jurisdiction and acting as appeal 
courts in nominally sovereign territories. Instead, Saipem was used as a precedent that would 
be, as the trainer put it, “quite useful for you, because it is a situation considered an indirect 
expropriation, but you would never have considered it an expropriation.” After the 
Bangladeshi courts has an ICC arbitration annulled on a “very grossly illegitimate basis,” the 
subsequent ICSID tribunal considered the non-payment of the ICC award as an expropriated 
investment. This, she argued, was a “counter-intuitive situation that can prove very useful. 
Locally that annulment was considered valid, but you have to look at it from an international 
view, and the tribunal viewed it as grossly illegal.” I asked what the ‘grossly illegitimate basis’ 
had been, and she responded that “I don’t really remember but I think it, procedurally, was 
to do with local procedure for public authorization. I don’t remember exactly but 
procedurally it was considered grossly illegitimate.” 
Here is an example of precisely the kind of ‘bold’ citation of the Saipem agreement that 
Kamal Hossain had bemoaned. There is no mention made of the tribunal overstepping its 
mark, or of Saipem’s failure to exhaust the remedies it ought to have done. Nor of the fact 
that the treatment of a withheld award as an investment in fact violates the Salini criteria. 
This training session can therefore be seen as an arena in which prospective users of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and arbitration tribunals are inculcated into a normative environment 
that enables the use of these techniques by replaying and dispelling the earlier objections of 
Third World jurists. Where Riles (2010, 2011) argues that private international law should be 
studied as technique, rather than as the embodiment of a set of norms, I would argue that a set 
of normative parameters have to be fixed in place before these private techniques can be 
rendered usable. In particular, it must be accepted that disputes between investors and states 
are private disputes between contracting parties, and to do this, the history of colonial extraction 
which has allowed post-colonial states to be accepted as sovereigns only insofar as they 
capitulate to the sovereignty of transnational corporations (Anghie 2007) must be 
overlooked. Likewise, attempts to render the constitution of post-colonial carbon 
democracies a matter of public concern (cf. Shalakany 2001: 455) must be bracketed off in 
order to enable the arbitration of private justice between two putatively equivalent 
contracting parties.  
209 
 
I began this chapter with a consideration of the political risk analysis industry as it comes 
into contact with London’s market for mining finance. Political risk analysts set out to 
develop globally encompassing views of political risk distributions (and their risk of 
contagion), whilst also identifying particular territories and their populations as bearers of 
risk. Where the earliest political risk analysts, faced with the ‘risks’ to business posed by post-
colonial nation-building, were equivocal about the rights and wrongs on government 
intervention in the economic sphere, contemporary risk analysts make no bones about 
viewing government intervention as threatening and morally wrong. Among the leading 
political risks that concerns Corporate Foreign Policy advocates is the risk of ‘creeping 
expropriation’ which has been fixed and expanded to include the increase of taxation and 
royalty rates by host governments. Bilateral Investment Treaties with arbitration clauses and 
stabilization clauses in oil, gas and mining concessions are advocated as key components of 
Corporate Foreign Policy with which these risks can be mitigated. Such an approach 
contrasts markedly with that taken by Third World jurists who asserted their Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, and challenged the unfair concession arrangements that 
were entered into during the colonial period and immediately afterwards, when post-colonial 
nations appeared to be in need of Western oil, gas and mining companies’ expertise and 
capital. For Kamal Hossain and his fellow jurists, writing in the 1970s and 1980s, increasing 
tax and royalty rates constitutes a legitimate expression of the inalienable right to sovereignty 
on behalf of post-colonial states.  
For risk analysts like Ian Bremmer, however, tax and royalty increases constitute a ‘breach 
of contract’ that might legitimately be responded to with the commencement of arbitration, 
insurance claims or, in an earlier period, ‘gunboat diplomacy’. Bremmer, like Robert 
Amsterdam, and the IFC trainers sent to increase Bangladesh’s arbitration capacity, view 
some territories as inherently risky and troubling, and not quite worth reasoning with. In this, 
they are cleaving to an understanding of Third World/post-colonial sovereignty as somehow 
less than Western sovereignty, recognized only through capitulation, and subject to challenge 
through international private law if exercised too readily. Within Bangladesh, extractive 
industry corporations frequently find themselves commencing ICSID arbitration against the 
State, Petrobangla or BAPEX, and activists have attempted to invoke Permanent Sovereignty 
as a means to annul the exploration and extraction rights of foreign juniors who manifestly 
do not bring with them the expertise that Third World/post-colonial nations are said to so 
manifestly require. And while leading Bangladeshi lawyers, arbitrators and jurists recognize 
that there are problems with their court system, they do not accept, as IFC trainers do, that 
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this constitutes the right for foreign investors to overlook due judicial process. As more and 
more foreign investors are trained in the art of structuring their activities under Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, however, it seems that the right of tribunals to extend their authority 
over the courts over countries whose investment climates are poorly ranked – or, in the 
language of so many lawyers and analysts, who are run by suspect ‘clans’ – will increasingly 
be naturalized. This only serves to heighten the need for ethnographies which do not 
capitulate to elite interests in the ‘emergent present’, and instead historicize that present in 
order to discover the disputes and dissent that have been settled and silenced in order to 
make contemporary risk analysis, Corporate Foreign Policy, and arbitration practice possible. 
This chapter, in examining contests over sovereignty at the scale of the nation-state, has 
perhaps departed from conventional anthropological inquiries, which have more often 
focused on the violent exercise of sovereignty over local and indigenous communities 
resisting extractive industry development (e.g. Samson, 2001.). There is therefore a risk that 
this chapter, struggles over the legality of Niko’s activities notwithstanding, could be read as 
based on a simple opposition between uniform Bangladeshi interests and those of a 
transnational capitalist class. In the next and final ethnographic chapter of this thesis, 
however, I examine how the capacity to aspire and make good on Bangladesh’s promise as 
a ‘frontier’ nation is unevenly distributed across vast social divides within Dhaka, that cross-
cut, but do not map on to, the divide between Bangladeshi and expatriate businessmen.  
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GLOBALIZING AMBITION & NEW FRONTIERS
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
RE–BRANDING BANGLADESH: 
CLASS & GLOBALIZING AMBITION IN DHAKA’S ELITE ENCLAVES 
 
In this final ethnographic chapter of the thesis, I step back for a moment from ‘following’ 
the processes through which extractive industry professionals attempt to conjure up 
opportunities in new frontiers. Rather, this chapter examines the divergent globalizing 
projects undertaken by emerging and established business elites in Dhaka. These elite 
globalizing projects involve attempts to reconfigure the relationship between national 
identity, the Bangladeshi state, and transnational economic activity. In the process, they allow 
different elite groups to realise their social and economic aspirations. Where some of these 
projects intersect (albeit not always successfully) with those of transnational extractive 
industry corporations, others do not, or may do so only incidentally. I introduce in Section 
8.1, and engage throughout the chapter with the literature on the ‘transnational capitalist 
class’ (Sklair, 2001), and with recent anthropological work on class (Carrier & Kalb, 2015) 
and the generation of capitalist life projects (Bear et al., 2015). 
 Existing formulations of the transnational capitalist class (TCC) thesis could be accused of 
presenting totalizing depictions of a cosmopolitan class whose members’ interests and 
actions are unproblematically aligned with those of ‘capital’. The ethnography I will present 
in this chapter challenges the notion that transnational business form a unified cosmopolitan 
class held together by a shared “fundamental interest in the continued accumulation of 
private profit wherever profits are to be made” (Sklair & Robbins 2002: 84). Rather, diverse, 
often countervailing, place-based elite aspirations underpin what might seem from a distance 
like a unified project of transnational capitalist expansion in Dhaka. The chapter traces the 
intersecting life projects of three of Dhaka’s elite groups, erstwhile constituents of the 
transnational capitalist class, that I encountered while ‘following’ the extractive industries in 
their search for new and profitable frontiers.  
In Section 8.2, I introduce Ijaz Khan167, a prominent financier who splits his time between 
Dhaka and London, and who has taken it upon himself to re-brand and promote Bangladesh 
as an enticing ‘frontier’ destination for foreign investors. His interest in ‘re-branding’ 
Bangladesh led me to encounters with the leading lights of the Bangladesh Brand Forum, an 
                                                          
167 As with almost all the names of people referred to in this thesis, this is a pseudonym. See Section 2.4. 
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organization concerned with re-branding the nation by projecting images of cultural 
sophistication to audiences in London, Paris and New York, as part of an effort to alter 
Bangladesh’s ‘reputation’, and so its standing in the hierarchy of nations.  
Subsequently, in Section 8.3, I describe meetings of private-sector and investment climate 
reform groups that I sat in on at ‘PromoteCo’ (see Chapter Two), which acts as a broker, or 
point of first contact, for transnational oil companies seeking opportunities in Bangladesh. 
Tracing out the biographies of the Bangladeshi elites I met at PromoteCo, I show that this 
Institute, at first glance an archetypal staging post for the transnational capitalist class (TCC) 
as it is presented in Sklair’s (2001) work, in fact draws together elites who are in many ways 
hostile to the interests of the TCC, but who are not without their own globalizing ambitions. 
These ambitions, and the ability to execute them, were unevenly distributed across the 
attendees of the PromoteCo meetings, as was their capacity to successfully position 
themselves as elites in relation to Bangladesh’s colonial, Islamic and transnational histories.  
The final group I introduce, in Section 8.4, considered themselves to be more ‘middle-class’ 
than elite. These were young professionals educated at Dhaka’s prestigious private 
universities, and who worked for foreign banks, transnational extractive industry 
corporations, and development agencies. They rubbed shoulders with the more established 
elites discussed in Section 8.2–3, but were all too aware of the extent to which their access 
to Dhaka’s elite enclaves and expatriate clubs was limited. Where the other elite groups I 
encountered were returnees, back to reconfigure the Bangladeshi economy with the help of 
their transnationally-derived competencies, or local elites who felt that expatriate capitalists 
were undercutting their globalizing ambitions, these ‘middle-class’ professionals perhaps did 
the most to facilitate the interests of large oil and gas companies. They did this by aligning 
their life projects with career advancement in extractive industry multinationals or the banks 
that arranged finance for them. Although self-consciously loyal to ‘brand Bangladesh’, these 
young middle-class professionals spent a great deal of time talking about how to leave the 
country in pursuit of further education or jobs that would allow them to operate on a more 
‘global’ scale. Bangladesh may be a new ‘frontier’, but it was delivering on its promise far too 
slowly for these young professionals. Least capable of enacting their own globalizing 
projects, they were nonetheless the most clearly instrumental to the ambitions of 
transnational extractive industry corporations. 
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8.1: TRANSNATIONAL CAPITALIST LIFE PROJECTS 
The notion of a ‘globalizing’ elite as I use it here derives from Leslie Sklair’s ongoing attempt 
to theorize and depict what he calls the transnational capitalist class (TCC). In Sklair’s (2001, 
2012) view, the TCC is both a concept and an empirical reality, and one that is made up of 
four fractions: the corporate fraction (owners and managers of transnational corporations), 
the state fraction (globalizing bureaucrats and politicians), the technical fraction (globalizing 
professionals) and the consumerist fraction (media and marketing professionals). By 
including a state fraction and describing its members as globalizing, Sklair intends to avoid 
globalization denial and end-of-the-state global triumphalism, presenting the TCC as the 
dominant political group in a unified but not wholly uncontested global system. Rounding 
out this global system are transnational corporations, the TCC’s analogues in the economic 
sphere, and a complementary, even functional, “culture-ideology of consumerism” (Sklair, 
2002, pp. 68-69). Sklair presents his theory as superseding earlier Leninist approaches to 
imperialism, which imagined Third World national capitalist classes that might be aligned 
with progressive nationalist forces against foreign imperialists (as per Mateen’s narrative in 
Chapter Six).  
In addition, he sees himself as updating subsequent dependency theory-inspired works, 
which took national elites to be aligned with “foreign capital” (Sklair & Robbins 2002: 81-
82). Instead, the TCC concept updates theories of class, capitalism and inter-state relations 
by depicting an “inner circle that makes system-wide decisions” (Sklair & Robbins, 2002, pp. 
84), with members who “connect with transnational capitalist class fractions in each locality” 
(Sklair & Struna, 2013, p. 751). Even if they are “not always united on every issue” (Sklair, 
2000, p. 70), the TCC is “in control of the process of globalization” (Sklair & Struna, 2013, 
p. 748).168  
                                                          
168 Sklair is not without his critics. His work is often gathered together with that of William Carroll under the 
rubric of the ‘Global Capitalism School’. Carroll has criticised Sklair for failing to give sufficient empirical 
evidence for the TCC; indeed, Sklair has argued that while insufficient evidence for the effective global inner 
circle exists, “global system theory predicts that one exists” and operates to give unity to the diverse economic 
interests and cultural/ideological formations within the TCC (Sklair & Robbins, 2002, pp. 84-85). Carroll’s 
solution (Carroll, 2009; Carroll & Fennema, 2002) is to trace interlocking board directorships, narrowing the 
TCC notion to reflect only direct control of transnational corporations. His work, focusing on Global 500 
directorships, suggests that there is less a transnational class than a thinly connected set of interlocking national 
and regional (i.e., European) capitalist classes, and his social network analysis suggests a “detachment of the 
Southern bourgeoisies from the elite networks of the North” (Carroll, 2009, pp. 60). While not without merit, 
Carroll’s narrowing of the TCC to exclude globalizing politicians, bureaucrats and technical professionals makes 
it difficult to imagine how the apparent interests of TCC members are formed, and how their actions emerge 
at an ethnographic scale.  
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At first reading, Sklair’s work on the TCC seems to provide a custom-made global systems 
framework for making sense of the extractive industries in general, and the ethnographic 
material outlined in this thesis more particularly. Indeed, there are significant parallels 
between Sklair’s approach to the co-optation of ‘sustainable development’ discourse by the 
TCC, its members’ promotion of self-regulatory audit cultures, and the deployment of 
counterscience by its technical fraction (Sklair, 2000, pp. 77-81; 2002, pp. 150-54), and Stuart 
Kirsch’s work on the corporate strategies that shape mining capitalism (Benson & Kirsch, 
2010; Kirsch, 2014, pp. 127-45, 159-79). Sklair’s formulation of the TCC leads him to argue 
that the corporate fraction works together with globalizing bureaucrats and globalizing 
technical experts to ensure that all business interests, but especially those of foreign investors 
who may feel discriminated against, are catered to, in the hope (perhaps) that their 
investments may enhance the national interest (Sklair, 2000, p. 73).  
I began my thesis by describing an extractive industry bazaar in which junior mining 
corporations sought out exploration geologists and rubbed shoulders with state 
representatives proudly announcing that their jurisdictions were ‘open for business’ (Chapter 
Three). I have subsequently depicted the apparent convergence of interests among 
Bangladeshi technical elites, Petrobangla officials and transnational extractive industry 
corporations, manifested in the writing of welcoming mineral codes and favourable 
production-sharing agreements (Chapter Six). The International Chamber of Commerce 
receives a special mention from Sklair, as a site in which the interests of the TCC are 
formulated and promulgated (Sklair, 2002, pp. 146-47); perhaps the Chamber’s role in the 
Saipem v. Bangladesh arbitration could be assimilated to this framework (Chapter Seven). 
Yet there are reasons to be wary of the unity of purpose implied by Sklair’s framework. 
Certainly, transnational capitalist projects may emerge from the combined agency of 
politically active engineers, friendly bureaucrats and ambitious corporate leaders. But recall 
Toufiq (Chapter Six): his insistence on the need for foreign investment in Bangladesh’s oil, 
gas and coal sectors, and his frustration with the National Committee, was accompanied by 
a refusal to go on ‘study visits’ to German coal mines that were paid for by Asia Energy in 
the hope of convincing critics that water table management would not be a problem at 
Phulbari.169 Indeed, during my first meeting with Toufiq, we were joined by a colleague who 
had just returned from structural assessment work at a garment factory in the context of 
heightened concern post-Rana Plaza. The two engineers began to complain that “a lot of 
                                                          
169 Fieldnotes, October 2013. 
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external consultants are in Bangladesh making a lot of money.” Toufiq recounted how he 
had correctly produced a gas reserve calculation in 1986, challenging an international 
assessment paid for by Petrobangla; a decade later on recalculation he was proven right. 
“They probably sent a really young engineer,” he continued, “Oh, ‘it’s a really small country’.” 
These engineers might share a faith in private sector-led development, and a belief that 
foreign corporate capacity is required for Bangladesh’s national interest, but it would be going 
too far to suggest, as Sklair does, that for the TCC “nationality as such is much less important 
than economic interests” (Sklair in Sprague 2009, p. 505), especially where energy 
developments in Bangladesh are concerned (see Chapters Six & Seven). The utility of Sklair’s 
concept of globalizing technical elites is evident, but his approach to the TCC conflates 
capitalist action and interest, writing over the diverse life projects that might align to give the 
impression that a unified, cosmopolitan TCC driven by nothing but a footloose profit-motive 
is in charge of globalization. 
Narratives like Sklair’s might be challenged by feminist economic anthropologists (see Bear 
et al., 2015; Gibson–Graham 2006, p. 133) on the grounds that they reproduce the wildest 
capitalist fantasies of corporate elites, who see themselves as remaking the world according 
to a single-minded, clear-headed purpose. But rather than do away with Sklair’s systemic 
perspective, I suggest there is value in retaining his notion of corporate, state and technical 
globalizing elites, while displacing the notion of a unified class interest in favour of 
perspectives emerging from anthropological work on capitalist life projects. Don Kalb (2015) 
and James Carrier (2015) have recently embarked upon a project to resuscitate the 
anthropological study of class, but depart from perspectives such as Sklair’s that depict 
classes-in-and-for-themselves. They employ a terminology that is “much more open and 
creative than a language of position and system allows” (Kalb, 2015, p. 17). Kalb mentions 
the “business class” only in passing (ibid., p. 16; also Neveling, 2015, p. 167), and focuses 
instead on what might have once been termed the working class, with the caveat that while 
extraction and exploitation may well, in the famous ‘last instance,’ 
depend on surplus labor in production, but none of the authors in 
this book would bet that the last instance necessarily has much to 
say about what they describe. Circulation, credit and debt, urban and 
territorial development – all sorts of social relations figure in the 
equation, as do the mythical and ideological forms in which they 
become represented. (Kalb, 2015, p. 19) 
Studying class anthropologically thus becomes a matter of studying social reproduction 
within a configuration of unstable and antagonistic interdependences (ibid., p. 14). It is a 
matter of attending to people’s ability to protect or improve their lives, and perceive the 
217 
 
threats to their life projects that may emerge from the relations that they depend upon for 
those very projects of social reproduction (Carrier, 2015, p. 38). 
If ‘working class’ life projects are only in the ‘last instance’ about surplus labour extraction, 
then the same could perhaps be said for capitalist ambitions: that they are in the ‘last instance’ 
about reproducing capital, and that profit-making ambitions emerge in the course of wider 
life projects. Laura Bear and her colleagues (Bear et al., 2015) have recently stressed the need 
to study diverse and often divergent capitalist life projects that might suture and allow 
capitalism to appear – as it does for Sklair – totalizing and coherent.170 From this perspective, 
“capitalism is a social and historical formation shaped by the pursuit of status by social 
groups; driven by sentiments and desires as forces of production; and is formed from various 
kinds of kinship and social reproduction” (Bear, 2014, p. 645; cf. Yanagisako, 2002). In the 
ethnographic material presented below, I depict various constituencies of globalizing elites 
in Dhaka, but I challenge the notion that these elites have a “fundamental interest in the 
pursuit of private profit wherever there is profit to be made” (Sklair & Robbins, 2002, p. 84). 
Instead, I trace out projects that emerge from the bonds of kinship, sentiments and attempts 
to pursue status; the divergent, sometimes antagonistic, life projects of diverse globalizing 
elites that from a distance, might appear to be positioned within a transnational capitalist 
class. 
The life projects undertaken by Dhaka’s globalizing elites must also be understood in terms 
of desires and concerns over status that emerge from the unevenly distributed experience of 
global connection in Bangladesh. Sklair stresses a cosmopolitan outlook among members of 
the TCC, referencing their efforts to depict themselves as “at home in the villages and cities 
of their native lands as well as in the boardrooms of major foreign corporations” (Sklair & 
Robbins, 2002, p. 84). While Sklair’s tone does not suggest an endorsement of the TCC’s 
claim to cosmopolitanism (although see Sklair, 2000, p. 72), the extent to which 
entanglements in place-based status hierarchies undermine or enable the cosmopolitan 
projects of globalizing elites in specific corners of the global system goes unaddressed. For 
anthropologists writing about business and development elites, to emphasize your 
cosmopolitan nature is to distance yourself from real or imagined “parochialism” (Rajak & 
Stirrat, 2011, p. 162), or in Jonathan Friedman’s sterner terms, 
                                                          
170 For Bear et al. (2015, unpaged) “Class does not exist outside of its generation in gender, race, sexuality, and 
kinship…Positing ‘class’ as an ideal-type outside such relations obfuscates the analysis, once again confusing 
capitalism with some imagined, overlaying economic logic.” 
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the reality of cosmopolitan existence may not be a wonderful bazaar 
of mixed-up differences for the great majority of people. It may be 
closer to…one in which skyscraper dwelling elites can enjoy the 
variety of the world by consuming its differences in the form of 
objects, recipes and menus that can now be recombined by cross-
cooking, but where the world becomes increasingly divided in 
conflictual terms as one descends into the depths of competitive 
poverty where potentially deadly boundaries are everywhere. 
(Friedman, 2002, p. 34) 
As I show below, elite globalizing projects in Dhaka draw on attempts that erstwhile elites 
make to mark themselves off from those whose linguistic capacities and religious habitus 
index a lower status. Cosmopolitan self-conceptions and globalizing ambitions do not 
necessarily imply a divorce from place-based politics. Equally, apparently cosmopolitan 
business elites, possessing Harvard MBAs, may find their globalizing ambitions frustrated by 
those with more established kinship ties to political and expatriate elites (Section 8.3). And, 
as per Friedman’s premonitions, the returnee entrepreneurs who emphasize their diversity 
and ability to operate at global scales, do so not from skyscrapers, but from within equally 
exclusionary expatriate enclaves. 
As such, my ethnography intersects with the existing literature on the negotiation of status 
in the context of struggles for transnational connection in rural Bangladesh. Katy Gardner 
(1995, p. 129ff) has written at length on the dynamic construction of hierarchy in Sylheti 
villages keyed into transnational migration networks, where access to foreign contexts 
(bidesh), negotiated through kinship ties, provides access to remittances and the opportunity 
to be a patron. Equally, successfully indexing “transnational style” (Gardner, 2008, p. 488) is 
required for those who wish to negotiate access to bidesh via transnational kinship ties. 
Manzrul Mannan (2002) has also written about the mutability of markers of status in rural 
Bangladesh. Mannan shows that the historical emergence of hierarchies marked by Ashrafi 
(high-status Muslim) bongsho names (surnames), arose not in the transposition of the Hindu 
caste system to Bengali Islam, but as a result of the claims to nobility made by those who 
could trace their putative ancestry to the Afghan, Turk and Mughal aristocracy following the 
end of Muslim rule and the beginning of the British administration (Mannan, 2002, p. 251). 
In Dhaka today, it is not difficult, as many of the elites I spoke to were only too eager to 
relate, for those from less distinguished bongsho to change their names upon arrival in the city.  
To be a cosmopolitan, globalizing elite requires not only emphasizing connection to a 
deterritorialized ‘global’ ecumene, but also that you be marked as superior with reference to 
the same symbolic and categorical repertoires that are used by rural and less privileged urban 
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Bangladeshis, engaged in their own struggles for transnational connection. While the elites 
whose life projects I present below may not form a unified inner circle unambiguously in 
control of globalization, it is undeniable that their very real globalizing capacities qualify some 
of them for membership in a transnational capitalist class. Not only that, but such globalizing 
capacities set all of them apart from the majority of Dhakaites, far less capable of generating 
capitalist connectivity in contemporary Bangladesh. 
8.2: RE-BRANDING BANGLADESH: THE OTHER ASIAN TIGER  
Emulating members of the transnational capitalist class seeking to invest in Bangladesh, one 
of the first people I contacted when I arrived in Dhaka was Ijaz Khan. Khan is the Managing 
Partner at ‘FrontierCo’, an asset management, brokerage and advisory firm located in an 
office block next to the Bashundhara City mall, one of the largest in Asia. I sought him out 
after noticing his recurrent appearance in Financial Times articles depicting Bangladesh as an 
enticing ‘frontier’ market, or an “attractive diversification play” (in Rintoul, 2012). I waited 
for Khan in the entrance hall of his office, leafing through a worn copy of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs’ Bangladesh: A Land of Cultural Diversity (Siddiqui et al., 2006). When I was 
invited through to his glass-walled office, Khan was answering emails as they arrived (“an 
old City habit”), and keeping an eye on the real-time of the Dhaka stock exchange, leaving 
the room several times during our meeting to find out why the DGEN, the Dhaka index, 
has suddenly dropped by three percent. He explained he was finishing work on the RMG 
[Ready-Made Garments] 10-point plan, over which he claimed authorship. The plan was part 
of the garment industry’s response to the Rana Plaza crisis, and advocated government 
financing for RMG reforms, inspection and reclassification of factories and the reform of 
the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), which was 
not met without resistance by local Chambers of Commerce (Financial Express 2013). He had 
also written the Government’s recent Public-Private Partnership plan (see Section 8.3).  
I explained that my research was concerned with the framing of Bangladesh as a ‘frontier’ 
market, and the work that firms like his did in promoting foreign investment. I asked about 
the pro-coal extraction position that was, at the time, prominently displayed on his company 
website alongside quotation from JP Morgan (Mowat & Gordon, 2007) and Goldman Sachs 
(2007) research notes identifying Bangladesh as one of the ‘Frontier Five’ or ‘Next-11’. His 
response was unequivocal: 
Bangladesh has fifty years of proven coal reserves, but it’s not 
managed to develop them mainly because of the environmental 
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concerns about open pit mining…I don’t think we can afford not 
to do open pit.171 
Necessity, for Khan, foreclosed upon the efforts to make Bangladesh’s energy futures a 
matter of public contestation that I have described in Chapter Six. And while the inchoate 
“we” who could not afford to forego open pit mining might seem to reference a 
homogeneous, egalitarian Bangladeshi citizenry, Khan would go on to differentiate himself, 
emphasizing his membership in a transnational financial elite. Simultaneously, he would 
present his second career as an author, quite literally, of Bangladesh’s capitalist future as a 
choice that he made to pursue the less profitable among the life projects available to him. 
I declined Khan’s offer of tea, which he appeared to read as a manifestation of excessive 
politeness during the month of Ramadan (Bangla: Romzan). “I’m not fasting anyway,” he 
countered, and ordered two cups of tea. He began to explain FrontierCo, in biographical 
mode. “As you can probably tell from my accent, I’m actually from London.” He spends 
four weeks in Dhaka, then two to three in London, and had been travelling like that for six 
years, since he had set up the company, after spending eighteen years in the City of London. 
There he had distinguished himself as a macro-economic researcher at BZW (the former 
investment banking wing of Barclays), Deutsche Bank and finally Citibank, where he had 
“set up a macro strategy group; whatever the hedge funds were into, we did research on it.” 
Hence, FrontierCo did more research than all of the other brokerages in Dhaka combined. 
When it comes to top-down macro-level research, “none of the other brokers can do that 
properly.” The tea came, and was served without eye contact being made.  
Khan continued to explain that research and brokerage, more than asset management, was 
his metier, particularly in the wake of Dhaka’s 2011 stock market crash, which had reduced 
the appetite for Bangladeshi securities. Nonetheless, he did have a joint venture with the 
biggest fund manager in Bangladesh, and his other clients in Dhaka included “BlackRock, 
Templeton – they’re one of the biggest Emerging Market funds in the world, with the biggest 
Frontier Fund. I meet with BlackRock in London. Everest is also big here, they’re a five-
million-dollar Emerging Market hedge fund.” When in London, he explained, he speaks at a 
lot of conferences, and asked if I had been to the recently held Bangladesh Investment 
Summit, which I had not been able to attend. “Someone you should speak to as well is S  , 
                                                          
171 Fieldnotes, July 2013. 
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at the Bangladesh Brand Forum, who focuses on country branding, which I also work on as 
well.”  
Ijaz Khan then spoke about an article he had written for the English-language press in 
Bangladesh on the “Bangladesh perception deficit – it was written four years ago but the 
issues haven’t changed really”): 
What I wrote is, if you do a word association game what comes to 
mind, and mostly it tends to be negative. Natural disasters, poverty, 
corruption. And these stereotypes tend to be reinforced by the 
international media. The only positive brand association of 
Bangladesh is [Grameen Bank founder] Professor Yunus, he’s the 
brand icon, the brand rockstar. Since Rana Plaza, it’s only got worse. 
But look at our achievements. Bangladesh has the best ‘sharp rate 
of growth,’ not the fastest but the most stable. And during the 
financial crisis Bangladesh only dropped 1.2% off growth at that 
time. So there’s the reality to Bangladesh with all of the positives 
and negatives and challenges, and then there’s the perception. It 
comes down to a lack of Government, Board of Investment, the 
country as a whole – country branding. Country branding, what I 
wrote, it’s like turning round a supertanker. It takes a long time to 
change the reality and an even longer time to change the perception. 
The Dhaka Chambers of Commerce seemed to Khan to be failing in their duties as 
globalizing elites, less because of any hostility to globalization per se (cf. Sklair, 2002, p. 70), 
but more because of their ineffective country branding strategy.  
This was especially so in comparison to the “proactive, focused, very structured long term 
engagement by ‘India Inc.’” that brought together government, the private sector and the 
Chambers, 
and the example I like to use is at the World Economic Forum, 2006 
or 2007, the Incredible India launch, the Indian delegation put 
pashminas and iPods in every delegate’s room, really influential 
people. And they flew in Indian chefs and Bollywood dancers. The 
Indian chambers are proactively sending out positive information. 
Bangladesh is very poor at doing that. 
Such a scenario seems to come from the playbook of the TCC as Sklair might imagine it. 
Bureaucrats, politicians, corporate representatives and media professionals coming together 
around a unified interest: selling their nation as a place to do business with ‘really influential 
people’, at an elite gathering in Davos. Indeed, Melissa Aronczyk (2008: 44-45) has made the 
connection between Sklair’s approach to the TCC and an emerging cadre of ‘nation branding’ 
consultants. Chief among these consultants is Simon Anholt, who claims to have invented 
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the term ‘nation branding’ in 1996, although he has since replaced it with an approach to 
developing ‘competitive identity’ (Anholt, 2006).  
Khan idea of what makes a proper nation branding strategy could have been borrowed from 
Anholt’s work, which emphasizes the need for tourist boards, investment promotion 
agencies, cultural institutes, exporters, and politicians to work together on a long-term nation 
branding strategy, in order to seek “permission” (Anholt, 2006, p. 6) from consumers of 
exports, or potential investors. Ultimately, a “‘brand’ is really just a metaphor for how 
countries can compete more effectively in the modern age” (ibid., p. 23), even if it has to be 
“mined” out of national history, and chime with “something fundamentally true about the 
place and its people” (ibid., p. 75). For Khan, those fundamental truths could even be derived 
from Bangladesh’s performance across a range of development indicators: 
Another thing on branding is interestingly, even in terms of poverty 
alleviation, Amartya Sen was just quoted, he published a new book, 
and on all poverty indicators Bangladesh is outperforming India. A 
lot of this I think is due to Grameen and BRAC. 
Even the institutions that were responsible for these comparative improvements could be 
folded into Brand Bangladesh, notwithstanding various critiques of their practices and 
development models (e.g. Muhammad, 2009; A. Rahman 1999).  
There was no apparent contradiction between the celebration of these comparative brand 
improvements and the desire to attract investment through a race to the bottom. Brand 
Bangladesh might be ‘outperforming’ India on development indicators, but it could also 
‘undercut’ China when it came to RMG production costs. This, Khan, explained, was “similar 
to the Walmart effect, you know Western consumers go to Walmart because it’s the cheapest. 
Bangladesh is the Walmart of suppliers, it’s the lowest cost. It’s an inherent hedge – a real 
grab for value.” Recalling the frontiersmen keen to profit from ‘mispriced risk’ discussed in 
Chapter Three, Khan challenged the tendency for Bangladesh to be depicted as a difficult or 
risky place to do business in investment climate rankings and political risk reports: 
Many of the people who think Bangladesh is a risky place don’t 
know the country. Yes, it’s difficult, there are problems with the 
legal structure, corporate governance, but this is true in many 
emerging markets. The fact of the matter is that Bangladesh can 
outperform its peers. 
Bangladesh might be lacking when it comes to nation branding strategy and the challenges 
of projecting a competitive identity. But, taken as an object, a national economy known by its 
growth rate and the cost of labour, Bangladesh could compete as a destination for foreign direct 
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investment, providing as it did an ‘inherent hedge’ due to the extremely low cost of 
production for RMG firms. That these low labour and regulatory costs may not be good for 
development ‘performance’ in the long term did not present itself as a problem. As for 
portfolio investment in Bangladeshi securities, that could be a fine ‘diversification play’, 
precisely because Bangladesh was ‘uncorrelated’, or not sufficiently linked to the ‘global 
economy’ for it to be affected by events like the global financial crisis.  
In his work on Japanese arbitrageurs, Hirokazu Miyazaki (2003, 3007) has written extensively 
about how these financiers conceive of their activities as driving the markets they participate 
in towards greater efficiency; arbitrage eliminates price discrepancies and makes markets 
operate as they ‘should’. Since there is no place for arbitrage in a truly efficient market, the 
traders about whom Miyazaki writes work on the understanding that their own success will 
gradually undermine the grounds for their existence (Miyazaki 2003, p. 261; 2007, pp. 404-
05). There is something of a parallel between the temporal orientations of the arbitrageurs 
Miyazaki writes of and the notion put forward by Ijaz Khan – and a number of officials I 
interviewed at Bangladesh Bank172 – that Bangladesh’s competitiveness was derived from its 
lack of global market correlation. Bangladesh Bank officials were only too keen to point out 
that in the wake of the financial crisis, uncorrelated Bangladesh’s future looked brighter than 
that of Greece, which was being ‘reclassified’ during my fieldwork from a developed to an 
‘emerging’ market. But where Miyazaki’s traders operate on the understanding that they will 
eventually erase themselves from perfectly efficient markets, Ijaz Khan seemed untroubled 
by the fact that Bangladesh’s lack of correlation was “circular,” or that “as more and more 
foreigners buy Bangladesh, that’s why its circular, correlation will increase.” There would 
always be an opportunity for a more globally correlated Bangladesh to rebrand in the future, 
and reposition its competitive identity. In the meantime, Khan seemed to be making his own 
‘diversification play’, explaining his choice to set up FrontierCo on the grounds that “I left 
Bangladesh when I was three. Personal interest was more compelling than the commercial 
logic. I could make a lot more money if I was still in the City even in these tough times.” For 
globalizing elites like Ijaz Khan, positioned as an author of Bangladesh’s capitalist future, 
profits are not simply sought wherever profits are to be made. Instead, Khan was able to make 
his own ‘grab for value’, leveraging his City experience and contacts to help increase 
Bangladesh’s correlation with global financial markets. 
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Khan’s globalizing project could certainly be set apart from those of the multinational banks 
operating in Dhaka. As Mr J, the CEO of Standard Bank, the largest multinational bank in 
Bangladesh, put it, “we’re not here to develop the country, we’re here to develop clients and 
add value.” 173 True, the “highly trainable” population were attractive, and Mr J had been a 
key organizer and speaker at the Bangladesh Investment Summit in London that Khan had 
referred to. But scaling Bangladesh up on a global level did not seem to figure among Mr J’s 
ambitions: “if someone wants to throw two percent of their portfolio into Bangladesh risk, 
they’re not making a big statement, it’s just going in the soup.” Bangladesh would do just 
fine where it was, as an uncorrelated diversification play. 
In addition to meeting with Mr J to talk about the Investment Summit, I followed Ijaz Khan’s 
advice and met with his colleagues at the Bangladesh Brand Forum. Having spent time with 
the market executives and artists at the helm of the forum, I attended their awards ceremony, 
where a succession of Indian and European marketing executives admonished the 
Bangladeshi audience for their country branding problem, deeming Brand Bangladesh “a bit 
of an empty vessel” and challenging the attendees to “project Bangladesh on a global 
scale.”174 A few weeks after the awards ceremony, I was attending an Eid dinner with some 
of the staff members from the PromoteCo (see Section 8.3), and began to discuss the Brand 
Forum with a fellow guest. He, it transpired, was a designer and animator, whose firm’s 
motto was ‘Exporting Culture’. Upon mention of the Brand Forum, he became rather heated, 
expressing his anger that “key cultural factors” were overlooked by the Brand Forum, who 
hardly mentioned, for instance, the fact that the shariah-compliant Islami Bank was among 
the biggest in the country, offering some of the lowest interest rates and even attracting 
Government deposits. “But never once at the BBF did I see them discuss these issues.”175 
They were, perhaps, too global. 
I later met several times with this young designer, Rubel, at his home and studio in Old 
Dhaka (Puron Dhaka), from where we could see into the prison yard in which Jamaat-e-Islami 
leader Abdul Qader Mollah would shortly be executed (see Chapter One). He recounted to 
me his father’s success at establishing himself amid the Dhakaiya business community, the 
Old Dhaka families who do not identify an ancestral home outside the capital. “You know 
the Dhakaiya – you know Dhakaiya? The Dhakaiya are famously closed but because my dad 
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is really sociable he somehow managed.” His father, educated during the Pakistan period, 
also spoke Urdu, and so was able to commune with the Dhakaiya Urdu speakers. The 
Dhakaiya, he continued, “tend not to be very educated. Not that you have to be educated to 
do business! The other thing about the Dhakaiya is they don’t tend to show their wealth. But 
these guys are unbelievably wealthy.” The significance of the stereotype of the uneducated 
Dhakaiya, as it is deployed by the educated elite of Dhaka’s old families or susil samaj (not to 
be confused with those from Old Dhaka), is returned to in Section 8.3. For now, Rubel’s 
concern was that because the Dhakaiya were uneducated, ‘business’ had become a dirty word, 
associated with corruption and “things like Hall-Mark [an unfolding corruption scandal 
involving unauthorized loans being siphoned off from Sonali Bank via the Hall-Mark 
corporation], this is what people think of when they think of business” (see Mateen’s 
narrative in Chapter Six). In Rubel’s social milieu, to be an entrepreneur, which is how he 
perceived himself - an entrepreneur intent on ‘exporting culture’ – was unacceptable, “your 
parents expect you to become a doctor, lawyer, engineer, or take a government job.” 
Although his father, as a businessman himself, had been more understanding than most.  
At this point in our discussion, Rubel’s friend Shaheed, a senior figure in the PromoteCo, 
had joined our conversation, and interjected: 
You know, this all comes back to the British. You know we were 
ruled by you for 200 years, and in that time, the way to have success 
was to crowd around the British, to be one of these “Babus,” to 
have a government job. And what did the British – the British and 
the Portuguese – bring? They brought medicine, they brought 
engineering, and they brought the rule of law. So these are the three 
careers. And all you have to do is to look at any Bengali literature. 
What? Well just Tagore! Start with Tagore! His characters are always 
– if not a zamindar, a doctor, a lawyer or an engineer. And look at 
any film from the time after partition, any Uttam Kumar movie. You 
will see all the characters are doctors, lawyers, or engineers. Ok, 
sometimes it’s a farmer.176 
At this point, Rubel interrupt, rather agitated, “You know it’s not even Tagore! It’s Thakur! 
And if you go to Kolkata you see all this ‘Tagore’s house’. What Tagore? It’s shameful, that 
we pronounce it like the English spelling.” Where Ijaz Khan had spoken to me of a 
“Bangladesh paradox, the very dynamic and entrepreneurial private sector that more than 
compensates for the shortcomings of the public sector,”177 here respectable members of the 
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susil samaj were caught in social expectations that prevented them from easily undertaking 
entrepreneurial careers.  
In Shaheed’s narrative, professional aspirations are recast in terms of a capitulation to the 
legacy of British servitude, and Rubel extended his analysis to the Bangladesh Brand Forum: 
There was a Bangladeshi Professor of Marketing from Dhaka 
University at one of these Bangladesh Brand Forum events. And he 
was talking of all these things about how we could present 
Bangladesh’s image, about Branding Bangladesh. And I put my 
hand up and I asked him, just this one simple question, “What is the 
Bangla for ‘brand’?” And he said, “Oh, yes that’s a very good 
question!” The guy who is up there talking all these things about 
Branding Bangladesh cannot even tell me the Bangla for brand. It’s 
shameful!178 
Rubel challenged Shaheed and the others in attendance to recall the word. “You forget, see 
– you’ll know it. It’s hash makka,” in response to which hesitant indications of recognition 
were made.  
Rubel and Shaheed approach to Branding Bangladesh, and their entrepreneurial desire to 
‘export culture,’ departs significantly from Ijaz Khan or the Brand Forum’s globalizing 
projects. Rather than attempting to establish a ‘competitive identity’ (Anholt, 2006) and 
project an image of the grounds upon which Bangladesh can ‘outperform’ rival investment 
destinations, Rubel and Shaheed articulate a critique of erstwhile Bangladeshi nation branders 
who have failed to “contend with the global” (Mazzarella, 2003, p. 33) on sufficiently 
Bangladeshi terms. At first glance, their critique seems to enunciate the “neoliberal 
nationalism” that Derya Özkan and Robert Foster perceive in Turkish branding strategies, 
where global Turkishness “sides with the global, yet attempts to speak its own language in the 
global marketplace” (Özkan & Foster, 2005, p. 9). Rubel and Shaheed are concerned that 
Bangladeshi nation branders have failed to speak their own language; they seem to have 
capitulated to the global. But the parallels end there. Özkan and Foster depict neoliberal 
nationalism as an attempt to collapse the opposition between Western ‘material civilization’ 
and Eastern ‘spiritual values’ that seemed to animate so many anti-colonial nationalisms 
(Foster, 1991); for neoliberal nationalists, equality “takes the form of representation on the 
shelves of the global supermarket” (Özkan & Foster, 2005, p. 20). In this line of thinking, 
recognizably Bangladeshi products should be available on American, British and Indian 
shelves, as well as vice versa. This, indeed, is the aim of the Bangladesh Brand Forum.  
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But Rubel and Shaheed’s globalizing ambitions rest on an inversion of Özkan and Foster’s 
approach: it was Bangladesh’s colonial encounter with Western ‘material civilization’ that 
seems to have created difficulties for today’s aspirant entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurship is thus 
recast not as imposed or cultivated by globalizing forces, but as a Bangladeshi subjectivity 
that needs to reassert itself in the face of a professional status hierarchy that is left as the 
legacy of colonial-era ‘Babus’. And Rubel and Shaheed are perhaps more aware than Özkan 
and Foster’s Turkish advertisers that attempts to speak your own language in a global 
marketplace always carry with them the seeds of their own destruction. When presenting a 
competitive identity to Anholt’s “global panel” of putatively cosmopolitan, predominantly 
Euro-American elites (Anholt, 2006, pp. 121-25) excessive difference is always liable to be 
rendered as a shortcoming. Faced with the Brand Forum’s ‘shameful’ failure speak its own 
language domestically, Rubel and Shaheed struggle to provide a sufficiently globalizing 
corrective. 
Some distance from Puron Dhaka, the elite Gulshan district is home to embassies, the large 
homes of cabinet-level politicians, expatriate clubs, and the new residences of Dhaka’s susil 
samaj. These are the educated elite (‘Babus’ in Shaheed’s terms) who previously had family 
homes dating back to the Pakistan period in areas like Dhanmondi, Farmgate and 
Mohammedpur, but whose globalizing life projects have drawn them ever closer to expatriate 
enclaves. Here, said Rubel, is where “you see the worst of the cultural influences.” He had 
noticed this when taking his wife, whom he had met overseas, to church at the American 
Club. Despite his own family’s blatant non-local ‘influences’, he was troubled by the fact that 
almost no Bangladeshis in Gulshan wore ‘Bangladeshi dress’. “We need to get the foreigners 
to wear it,” he half-joked, “then the Bangladeshis might copy them!” This quip led us to a 
discussion of one of the winners at the Bangladesh Brand Forum Awards, an advert for a 
cement company that portrayed a man proclaiming his love of all things foreign, and his 
absolute disbelief at discovering that the high quality cement he had used was in fact, a 
Bangladeshi brand. “You know the one advert that sums up everything here since ’71?” asked 
Shaheed. “It’s the Amanat Shah Lungi advert. Have you seen that one? Yeah, the Olympic 
one.” The advert had depicted a panel of ‘judges’ watching Olympic teams walk in holding 
banners, wearing their national dress. “But the Bangladeshis have no dress!” In fact, they are 
wearing white t-shirts, carrying a banner below waist height that, when lifted, reveals they are 
wearing blue and white lungis. And yet, all those present protested, every five-star hotel or 
expatriate club in Dhaka has a sign banning lungis! In Bonani, a district adjacent to Gulshan, 
the residents association had even attempted to ban rickshaw drivers from using the ‘low 
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status’ garments. “And you know what we are like? if someone from Sri Lanka, Tamil Nadu, 
Nepal or Myanmar comes wearing their lungi we say, ‘Oh, well done for your dress!’ But we 
cannot wear it!”  
Even ‘Awami Dress’, the white kurta (panjabi) associated with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is 
proscribed in some of Gulshan’s elite domestic and expatriate clubs. While for Rubel, this 
was ‘shameful’, for Shaheed, that was just the beginning: 
Awami dress is not the Panjabi, it is the Koti. But even this you 
know – people say Awami League is a Bengali nationalist party. 
Bengali nationalism nothing! Awam is an Urdu word and then they 
have ‘League’! From the Pakistanis and the British! How can you 
take it seriously? They should have just called it ‘Hasina Dal’ 
[Hasina’s Party] or something!’ 
For Rubel and Shaheed, globalizing Bangladesh, Branding Bangladesh, and exporting 
‘culture’ was not a matter of seeking ‘permission’ to market products to a cosmopolitan elite 
elsewhere. Nor was it a matter of demonstrating how Bangladesh could outperform its 
competitor nations and constitute an enticing ‘diversity play’ for the elite of the world’s 
financial hubs. Such a view only makes sense when looking out from a cosmopolitan centre, 
or when you split your time between London and Dhaka, brokering deals as you travel. For 
erstwhile entrepreneurs who wish to see Bangladesh scale itself up, such that Bangladeshi 
‘culture’ or products are recognizable globally, there is no readily available language or 
strategy that does not involve a capitulation to the perspectives of a self-consciously 
cosmopolitan, truly mobile capitalist class. But, as I show in the following section, this does 
not mean that the more successful globalizing elite in Gulshan share a unified set of interests 
with the transnational capitalist class. Theirs is a place-based cosmopolitanism, and the 
globalizing capitalism that emerges from their life projects frequently pits them against the 
foreign investors who would be Ijaz Khan or Mr J’s clients. 
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8.3: A CHANCE TO THRIVE: GRAPPLING WITH FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
Before he introduced me to Rubel, I had originally met Shaheed at a meeting of the 
PromoteCo, located in the particularly illustrious, sparsely-populated district of Gulshan-2. 
My first impressions were that this was a staging post for the transnational capitalist class. 
The civil servants, academics and retired ambassadors who worked at the PromoteCo struck 
me as archetypal globalizing bureaucrats and politicians. PromoteCo’s previous publications 
include a report on ‘reducing the cost of doing business in Bangladesh’, which referred to 
the need to take punitive action against militant union leaders, and ensure that every official 
in the Board of Investment had “proper training especially on how to handle a foreigner” 
(Reference anonymised). That training, it seemed, would position globalizing bureaucrats as 
brokers capable of mediating between the demands of a nation-state seeking investment and 
the opportunistic money miners seeking profit at new resource frontiers.  
The bidding round for exploration licenses that followed the release of the 2012 model 
Production Sharing Contract (see Chapters Six and Seven) had attracted a number of 
transnational oil companies in search of new resource frontiers to Bangladesh. These 
included Shell, and the previously much more staid and homely Norwegian Statoil. The 
former ambassador who chaired the PromoteCo was the first port of call for these 
companies, and had even worked previously with Santos, one of the already-producing oil 
and gas companies that had chosen to stay in Bangladesh, but, as its CEO put it, would be 
unlikely to do a “new entry…The terms in this PSC are just crazy, considering Myanmar’s 
bidding round is going out at the same time.”179 Now, Shaheed informed me,  
If Shell came and said, ‘we need this thing to be resolved’, we can’t 
just stay to government, ‘this is what Shell wants.’ But let us see if 
we have a programme that we can fit your agenda in and with that 
we can go to the government.180  
The ‘programmes’ to which he was referring were aid-funded trade facilitation or investment 
climate reform programmes (see also Chapter Seven), and they had in fact managed to invite 
the transnational oil companies to a set of these facilitation meetings before they had 
abandoned their interest in the Bangladeshi frontier. 
But, as I argued in Section 8.1, and began to show in Section 8.2, to interpret the actions of 
the PromoteCo and Shaheed through a vocabulary of class ‘position’ that determines a 
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unified set of ‘interests’ – in the last instance, the profit motive – would be to write over the 
life projects through which transnational capitalist action is able to emerge. For Shaheed, the 
Government and the Board of Investment understood the ‘private sector’ far too narrowly, 
as foreign direct investment. They did not appreciate that private sector reform was about 
“building your own competence,” making it possible for entrepreneurs other than the 
questionable businessmen involved in the Hall-Mark scandal to prosper and in so doing, 
enact a form of development.  
This broader approach to private sector reform agenda was evident at a meeting of a 
Parliamentary Private Sector development group, part-funded by USAID, that I attended at 
the PromoteCo, shortly before the ultimately abortive January 2014 national elections. 
Among those in attendance was Mahfuz, the scion of a Dhakaiya family that had begun as 
Chowk Bazar wholesalers, but now ran a significant construction and consumer goods 
conglomerate. Mahfuz, with a Harvard MBA that was noted prominently on his business 
card, might seem a prime candidate for inclusion within the transnational capitalist class, 
among whom shared sensibilities, social capital accumulation, and class formation is said to 
be facilitated via the alumni networks of leading management schools (Sklair, 1997, pp. 521; 
2000, pp. 71; also Hall, 2011). Mahfuz had accessed several transnational distribution 
networks, including those for internationally recognizable soft drink brands, but, MBA 
notwithstanding, his origins among the ‘not very educated’ Dhakaiya meant that he struggled 
to make inroads with the members of the globalizing elite who are drawn from the ranks of 
the susil samaj. In this regard, Mahfuz was perhaps not served by his devout and overt Islamic 
practice, and his association with the Tabligh-e-Jamaat. On every subsequent occasion that I 
visited Mahfuz in his offices, sufficiently new that the certificates and photographs from 
Harvard Business School still lay on the floor, balanced against the walls, I would be handed 
over for a time to young men from Tabligh, a Deobandi Islamic reform movement, and 
invited to pray at the large mosque (masjid) that had been built adjacent to Mahfuz’s board 
room.  The Imam at the masjid was frequently called upon to lead prayers at the close of 
billion taka deals with multinational banks and corporations that I was invited to sit in on.  
Ethnographers of rural Bangladesh have noted the extent to which transnational Islamic 
modernities are increasingly articulated in opposition to Bangladesh’s well-documented 
‘syncretic’ Islamic tradition that ties worship to place and ancestry through the veneration of 
saints (pirs) and their shrines (mazar); an all too Hindu practice in the eyes of many reformers 
(see Gardner 1995: 232-34; Wilce 2002: 164). For Gardner (1995), Islamic modernities in 
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rural Sylhet are increasingly oriented towards Saudi Arabia, but for members of Dhaka’s susil 
samaj, these apparent ‘Wahhabi’ influences are unsettling, and alien to their own secular or 
modernist Islamic sensibilities, which are nonetheless transnational, located in terms of 
Bangladesh’s faded Persian or Mughal past. At the PromoteCo, Mahfuz’s faith and practice 
may have been particularly problematic, given that one of the institute’s principal concerns, 
alongside private sector reform, is the overhauling of the Qawmi Madrasa schooling system.  
These madrasas are viewed by the PromoteCo as providing inadequate educating for modern 
secular Bangladeshis, and are additionally securitized as breeding grounds for a dangerous 
form of fundamentalism (References anonymised). Qawmi Madrasas are viewed as subject to an 
improper Wahhabi influence, but are also sites in which Deobandi interpretations of Islam 
are espoused, perhaps introducing frictions into Mahfuz’s relationship with others at the 
PromoteCo. 
As for the susil samaj (Shaheed’s ‘Babus’) the value placed on professional education derived 
from the British period often sits rather comfortably alongside attempts to portray or gain 
status from articulating kinship connections to bygone Mughal elites. This is regardless of 
whether these members of the susil samaj espouse a secular identity, or practice a form of 
Islam that they would inflect as ‘Persian’. One of the other attendees at the USAID-funded 
Private Sector meeting was Nabeela, who referred to herself as “the Prime Minister’s lawyer” 
in the course of expressing her lack of faith in the judiciary, and increasing interest in 
arbitration, “one of the things foreign firms favour more”181 (see Chapter Seven). Some 
months after this meeting, I would find myself in her brother’s company, along with the 
former-head of Dhaka’s Foreign Investor’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), 
and several other Bangladeshi businessmen. I asked what my chances of getting in touch 
with Gary Lye, the head of Asia Energy, would be. “I haven’t seen him at the [American] 
Club for a while,” noted the ex-FICCI chair, “you’ll probably find he’s in Bangkok playing 
golf – that’s all he seems to do!”182 The discussion soon turned to the then-upcoming 
elections, to rumours circulating on Facebook that Rabindranath Tagore had been “anti-
Muslim,” and to a book that all members of the group were busy reading: Richard Eaton’s 
(2003) The rise of Islam and the Bengal frontier. The issue, as Nabeela’s brother would have it was 
“what is a Bengali?” “Bengal is like this far-flung frontier,” noted another of the group, “so 
what happened when the Mughal’s came – for instance, where did all the Buddhists go?” To 
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which Nabeela’s brother responded by invoking his Mughal ancestry, insisting that he was 
an “Ashrafi Muslim,” while the others of the group were “mere circumcised Hindus.”  
This became a refrain for Nabeela’s brother during the rest of the evening: “trust me, I’m an 
Ashrafi Muslim,” with a pronounced stress on Ashrafi. When taken with the deliberate use of 
English linguistic forms associated with public school education, and the reference to his 
family’s tradition of educating their children at Mayo College, or Eton “these days,” the 
constant Ashrafi incantations worked as ironic self-stereotypes that were well understood by 
those in the room. They had less to do with an Islamic identity as such than they did with 
indexing Nabeela’s brother’s Mughal ancestry, and the large estates his family had long ago 
been granted in Sylhet and the Sundarbans (which rendered his RMG factories rather 
financially unimportant). Simultaneously, it allowed him to emphasize longstanding 
transnational connections that set him above the fray of “lower middle-class” party politics. 
His globalizing ambitions, such as they were, involved reproducing himself as a high-status 
Bangladeshi, implicated in the British and Mughal pasts of ‘Bengal,’ albeit through 
accumulated transnational connections. As he put it to me towards the end of the evening, 
Oh you know how it is here. Everyone knows everyone. Everyone 
there tonight is someone whose parents would have been something. 
You know like Bhuiyan’s father was the Chief Conservator of 
Forests for all of India [under the British]. You know that was really 
quite significant, to be the Chief Conservator of Forests, for all of 
India! 
The susil samaj are made up of those like Nabeela (although not all are quite so exalted), who 
are able to derive their contemporary status from a place-based palimpsest of Mughal, British 
and Pakistan-era pasts. A first-generation Harvard MBA, transnational as he may be, cannot 
readily compete with such dense cosmopolitan repertoires. And those members of the susil 
samaj with globalizing ambition do not abandon their commitment to place, or their position 
within Bangladeshi status hierarchies, even as they hope to profit from transactions with 
transnational corporations. 
Returning to PromoteCo, and the USAID-funded Parliamentary Private Sector group 
meeting, there was talk of the future of Ijaz Khan’s Public-Private Partnership strategy, and 
a sense among the Members of Parliament, Chamber of Commerce chairmen and business 
elites in attendance that not much would come of it. A Parliamentary Private Sector Caucus 
was proposed as a measure to ensure that the 60 percent of MPs who listed ‘business’ as 
their profession would serve the private sector as a whole, rather than their own interests, 
after the coming elections. Ijaz Khan and Mr J’s investment roadshows also came up, when 
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Sabur, a pre-eminent garment manufacturer and aspirant MP, questioned whether or not 
Bangladesh should be trying to ‘compete’ for FDI, as Mr S, chairman of the PromoteCo, 
suggested it should. Mr S had provided as examples of the need to attract FDI Bangladesh’s 
recent failure to lure oil prospectors away from Myanmar, and the fact that Vietnam was able 
to attract ten times the foreign direct investment. Sabur disagreed,  
For me this is an existentialist question. Every day when I wake up 
and read the paper, I have to pinch myself. The nation has a 
direction but the Government doesn’t align. For the last forty-two 
years we have grown well. This is the Bangladesh paradox. As quality 
of governance goes down, growth goes up. Maybe we should 
discourage intervention, if the private sector is doing well without 
Parliament? The last forty-two years, the growth I am talking about 
has basically transformed us from an agricultural nation to an 
industrialist nation. We could do that very well without 
governance.183 
Rather than go for foreign direct investment, Sabur suggested that the “low hanging fruit” 
of those in the diaspora be turned to in order to fund capitalist development in Bangladesh. 
Besides, you could embody Brand Bangladesh too much for some of those who came to 
investor roadshows looking for frontier opportunities: 
I go to these trade delegations and people don’t believe it’s a place 
to invest. Only when they see a white face or Mr J then they will 
come. They are not going to be impressed by the Chairman of the 
Board of Investment. 
Then, returning to the ‘Bangladesh paradox’ as he had formulated it, strong growth in spite 
of poor governance, Sabur presented an analysis of the geographies of capitalist globalization.  
His was an analysis that echoed closely one provided by anthropologist James Ferguson 
(2006) in his account of oil extraction in sub-Saharan Africa. Observing the correlation 
between high growth rates and poor ‘governance,’ or the prevalence of conflict, in oil-rich 
nations, Ferguson suggested that the effective absence of a functioning state, or 
“deregulation taken to its logical extreme” (Ferguson, 2006, p. 206; also Lash, 2002, p. 45), 
provided opportunities for risk-hungry extractive industry juniors. Sayeeful Islam’s account, 
while similar, folded his analysis into biographical narrative: 
The highest per-capita FDI is in countries where there is no 
governance at all! Because they can exploit these countries. The 
statistics, we do not need governance. I’ll tell you an anecdote. There 
was an American guy at R  ’s son’s birthday. He said if we improved 
Gulshan traffic, everything would be fixed in this country. I said 
sorry, it’s all difficult in this country, even trying to pay tax. And I 
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said, ‘Sir, because it is so difficult, it gives us a chance to thrive, if it 
was so easy you would have come to exploit us and we wouldn’t be 
able to live in Gulshan!’ 
On the last point, Nabeela provided affirmation: “I agree, there isn’t anywhere else I’d like 
to live in the world.” As I show in Section 8.4, and as should be immediately apparent in a 
country where few rural families are unaffected by transnational migration, and remittances 
are voluminous enough to provide the basis for Bangladesh’s sovereign rating from Moody’s, 
not everyone would rather live in Dhaka. And not everyone can live in Gulshan.  
Sabur’s perceptive and honest analysis makes abundantly clear the extent to which globalizing 
ambitions emerge from place-based elite life projects. To reproduce himself as a Gulshan 
elite, connected through kinship, memory and educational habitus to previous transnational 
ruling elites, Sabur requires precisely the kind of investment climate that alarms political risk 
analysts (Chapter Seven) and damages Bangladesh’s ‘Brand.’ Speaking some time later at a 
dinner in Gulshan, Sabur told me how he had “really pissed off” some IMF officials when 
he was invited to speak in Macau, in his former capacity as the head of one of Dhaka’s 
Chambers of Commerce. “You know of love at first sight?” he asked. “Well the woman who 
used to run the World Bank in Bangladesh, she hated me on site…I said it: the ‘p-word’.”184 
Protectionism. He had used the platform he was offered by those who had assumed he 
shared a unity of purpose with the rest of their transnational capitalist class to challenge the 
notion that Bangladesh should be made to compete on a level playing field. Yet, this was not, 
as Sklair’s model might suggest, an anti-globalization position (cf. Sklair, 2002, p. 70). Sabur’s 
wealth, his prosperous Gulshan existence, is built on a near monopoly on export-oriented 
shirt, collar and cuff factories in Dhaka. And he was, unabashedly, a capitalist ‘in the last 
instance.’ At yet another Gulshan dinner, Sabur was challenged by a fellow guest, a social 
auditor hired by transnational NGOs and clothes-buying firms to audit their factories. 
Emblematic of the communities of complicity (cf. Steinmuller, 2011, p. 36) that cross-cut 
the business and development communities in Dhaka’s elite enclaves, Sabur was asked, with 
reference to the recent Bangladesh Labour Law (Amendment) 2013, which demanded the 
setting aside of five percent of profits to a worker’s welfare fund, “Sabur, tell me, have you 
implemented your five percent fund yet?”185 His reply: “Of course not! How would I live?” 
The answer, perhaps, is not in Gulshan. 
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The globalizing ambitions of Dhaka’s elite emerge from their desires to reproduce 
themselves as rooted cosmopolitans. The access they have to political influence and 
transnational business partners emerges from their ability to act like ‘Babus’ and like ‘Ashrafis’ 
when necessary, and of course, like capitalists in the final instance. For globalizing elites like 
Sabur, Bangladesh’s ‘competitive identity’ matters only insofar as they can position 
themselves as the purchasers of low-cost labour, and the recipients of transnational orders, 
all in aid of ensuring they can continue to live in Gulshan. Neither are they interested in 
retrieving an egalitarian national identity, encapsulated perhaps in the wearing of the lungi, 
and asserting the equality and difference of Bangladesh as a nation on the global stage. Their 
capitalist life projects demand that they are marked off from, not identified with, the ‘cheap’, 
lungi-wearing labourers who make Dhaka the only place to live in the world. 
8.4: WHY WOULDN’T I? 
In this final ethnographic section, I briefly introduce some of the more marginal elites living 
in Dhaka, whose globalizing ambitions are less well-served by staying in place. These young, 
self-identified ‘middle-class’ professionals, educated at BRAC, North-South and other elite 
private universities in Dhaka, often travel abroad to acquire MBAs or Masters in 
Development Studies, before returning home. Working for donor agencies and for large 
multinational banks or transnational extractive industry corporations, their life projects 
contribute to the reproduction of frontier capitalism and the extractive industries in 
Bangladesh, even if they might not be considered members of a ‘capitalist’ class. If the 
language of class position and interests were to be adopted, these young professionals might 
fit into what Guy Standing (2014a, 2014b) terms the salariat; those with high salaries and 
employment security who benefit from the returns to their corporate employers’ capitalist 
endeavours, more than a conventional ‘working class’ might. But unlike Dhaka’s footloose 
transnational brokers (Section 8.2) or rooted cosmopolitan capitalists (Section 8.3), these 
young professionals would rather live anywhere but Dhaka. The role that they play in 
facilitating transnational capitalism in Bangladesh is perhaps incidental to their broader life 
projects. Excitement about Bangladesh’s future notwithstanding, most of these young 
professionals have ambitions to live out their lives at a much more global scale, a scale that 
would be reflected in the size of the business transactions they might be able to handle, and 
the possibilities for living a ‘handsome life’ that are not afforded to those without sufficient 
‘connections’ in Dhaka.  
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I met Jasim shortly after arriving in Bangladesh, at a meal (iftar) to break the fast during the 
month of Ramadan, although few attendees at this particular party had in fact been keeping 
the fast (roza rakha). Distracted by his new phone, Jasim apologised: “Sorry, I’m just really 
excited about the Bangladeshi brand.”186 This Walton phone was almost identical to the 
Samsung Galaxy S2, he told me, with parts made in the infamous Chinese Foxconn factories 
that produced the iPhone. It might be “SKD – slight knock down” because it was assembled 
in country, but it was close to “free” at only 18,000 taka (£150). And most importantly, it 
was Bangladeshi by brand. The affect generated by Jasim’s new Walton phone can perhaps be 
understood in terms of Robert Foster’s (1999; Özkan & Foster, 2005) notion of consumer 
citizenship, whereby shared acts of consumption, rather than the circulation of media 
enabled by print capitalism (cf. Anderson, 1983) help to generate new national identities. 
Except that this instance of “[c]ommodity fetishism with a national inflection” (Foster, 1999, 
p. 272) does not so much tell us about how the subjects of new nations are nationalized, 
through a uniformity of consumption practices that cut across very real diversity (ibid., pp. 
274-75).  
A mobile phone costing 18,000 taka in a country where the minimum wage for garment 
workers was 3000 taka and – enthusiasm about ‘bottom of the pyramid’ mobile money 
programmes notwithstanding – mobile phone “penetration” was only at 40% (GSMA 2014), 
could hardly be viewed as a nationalizing consumer good. Instead, it seemed to represent for 
Jasim the possibility that those with Bangladeshi citizenship and national identity might 
likewise scale themselves up and emulate more recognizably globalizing life projects.  
Jasim, like many of the guests at the iftar, was an employee of a large multinational bank in 
Dhaka that has begun to develop its own nationalizing networks, counting many Managing 
Directors of Bangladesh’s domestic banks as alumni. While wages were often higher in 
domestic banks, “the reputation is bad. They’re basically run by a politician. They’re 
essentially a proprietary concern; you know you have only one man making all the decisions.” 
Discussions at the iftar party turned towards efforts that were being made by Gulf State and 
Singaporean banks to headhunt Bangladeshi managers from the multinational that most of 
the guests worked for, and the concomitant global prospects of those in attendance. The 
conversation took place in stereotypical mode, but as Michael Herzfeld (2005) observes, 
much of what anthropologists do consists of the analysis of prejudice, our own as well as 
that of others. Thus, encounters with stereotypes should not be shied away from; the 
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stereotype ought to be analysed instead as a discursive weapon that “deprives the ‘other’ of 
a certain power” while disavowing its own material effect (Herzfeld, 2005, p. 202). The 
poetics of stereotyping can be revealing when it comes to conceptions of social and economic 
agency. This is especially so where these poetics can inform on how young Bangladeshi 
professionals believe they are perceived, by those who may have a determining influence on 
their globalizing ambitions.   
“Indians,” began Mohammed, a mid-level manager at Jasim’s multinational bank, “will 
always take ten to twenty Indians with them when they are promoted overseas. Thais and 
Bangladeshis are smarter, but the Indian economy, it’s down to their sheer muscularity.” This 
was true, acknowledged Fahim, another colleague. “I’m sorry to say but it is true. If a 
Bangladeshi gets the job in Dubai, he’ll say ‘See you, I’m off!’” This was in spite Fahim having 
earlier explained that one of his managers who had been headhunted by a Singaporean bank 
had not left, precisely because if he had taken the thirty people with him that he planned to, 
the staff left behind would be in trouble. Mohammed had met the head-hunter in question, 
he said, at another iftar party, and when he discovered that Mohammed had an MBA from a 
British university, his attitude changed  
and he only talked to me for the rest of the night. Other people there 
didn’t like that. He said to me, ‘It’s a shame about your skin colour. 
If you changed that, we could get you a job in London’! 
Before the evening descended into a heated debate over the pathologies of Jamaat-e-Islami 
supporters, and whether or not true secular Bangladeshi nationalists could support the BNP 
over the Awami League, in spite of the former’s alliance with Jamaat, a further discussion of 
the material consequences of stereotyping practices took place. 
One of the guests’ cousins, “Australian born, with an Aussie passport” had been visiting 
Dhaka, “and so he went to the Aussie [expatriate] club. And he got kicked out of the pool.” 
Pointing to his own skin, Mohammed explained “It’s for white Australians only. And I wanted 
to say to [my cousin], ask them, are they Australian or are they English?” As they portrayed it, 
the globalizing ambitions of these members of Bangladesh’s salariat seemed to be frustrated 
by the stereotyping practices of Singaporean head-hunters and the gatekeepers of Dhaka’s 
elite expatriate enclaves. This stereotyping is recursive, however. In Mohammed’s account, 
the Singaporean head-hunter would have offered him a job if he had not been concerned 
about what his own employers would think of Mohammed’s brown skin, which seemed to 
disqualify him, MBA or no MBA, from full membership of the transnational capitalist class. 
The Singaporean head-hunter, by Mohammed’s telling, perhaps believed that Mohammed’s 
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prospects were poor because his own bosses had made up their mind about Brand 
Bangladesh. Country branding works on stereotypes, as Simon Anholt observes when he 
encourages his readers to ask themselves, “if you had two equally qualified candidates for a 
senior management role, would you be more likely to pick the Turk or the Swede?” (Anholt, 
2006, p. 8). Or perhaps the Singaporean head-hunter had no intention of offering 
Mohammed a job, and was hiding behind the stereotypes of all that Mohammed might “find 
most odious” (Herzfeld, 2005, p. 208) about white, potentially racist corporate elites. And 
how else could Mohammed explain the difficulties he experienced getting a job outside of 
Bangladesh, given that he had already acquired an MBA from a prestigious university?  
At that iftar, a friend had asked Jasim if he knew anyone who might speak to me about the 
extractive industry corporations that his bank dealt with. “Why would I,” responded Jasim, 
“they are my clients.” Some cajoling later, I met with him and his acquaintance, Faisal, who 
worked for a transnational extractive industry corporation that was operating in Bangladesh. 
This extractive corporation had a very good business model, Faisal explained, always making 
sure they left the country before the reserves were too low, so they could get a “thick price” 
for selling on their installations.187 We talked a little about the National Committee, whom 
Faisal derided for “thinking all the resources are sent out of the country in an underground 
pipeline or something,” dismissing real concerns about distribution and the shape of the 
national interest as baseless conspiracy formulated by stereotypical ‘backward’ Bangladeshis 
(compare Chapter Six).  But the conversation rapidly turned to Faisal’s ongoing efforts to 
acquire a visa and get a job abroad. Just as there is a hierarchy of transnational connection 
for rural labour migrants in Bangladesh, beginning with the UK or USA, followed by 
Malaysia, and the Gulf States (see Gardner, 2008), there is a fairly clear destination hierarchy 
for Dhaka’s middle-class salariat. This hierarchy is shaped by increasingly restrictive visa 
requirements and the permissions that are provided for residency (and the possibilities of 
acquiring citizenship) following postgraduate study. First on the list are Canada and Australia, 
and Faisal was planning to use the connections he acquired from working at a transnational 
corporation in Dhaka to get there. He would complete five years at the corporation and then 
go, “otherwise I have no chance of getting a handsome job, or a handsome life.”  
Jasim too planned to leave. When I asked why, he said: 
My parents have certainly spent a lot more on my education than 
your parents have on yours. I have worked in Europe before, and if 
I work here, doing credit checks, closing deals, maybe I will close a 
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deal at one million dollars. It’s not the salary as such. For the same 
two hours’ work in Singapore, I could close 500 million dollars. Why 
wouldn’t I? 
Would you earn more, say on commission, I asked? “No, not necessarily. But Bangladesh is 
not in the global market yet. It is second rate.” Recall how the lack of correlation between 
Bangladesh and the global market was seen by Ijaz Khan (Section 8.2) as a component within 
Bangladesh’s ‘competitive identity,’ insulating it from the global financial crisis, and enabling 
his own ‘grab for value’ as a frontier broker. In the context of a different life project, this 
lack of correlation with the global was putting a stay on Jasim’s ability to operate on a scale 
that was in line with his ambitions.  This did not, however, mean that Jasim had no interest 
in the global future of the Bangladeshi nation-economy. He became visibly excited, rushing 
his speech as he explained that since his multinational bank was here, “they must be making 
profit.” The banking sector in particular was really strong, and “in a few years, Bangladesh is 
going to take off. I mean it’s really going to take off. It’s going to be flying. It really will take 
off. You can’t say that for Greece. Or even most of Europe.” 
Unlike Ijaz Khan, it would not be Jasim who facilitated that ‘take off.’ And, unlike Rubel and 
Shaheed, he was not concerned with ensuring that Bangladesh contended with the global on 
specifically Bangladeshi terms, that preserved cultural, linguistic and national difference in 
the face of nation branding pressures. His fervent consumer citizenship, marked by his 
enthusiasm for the new Walton smartphone, would not keep him in Bangladesh, but it placed 
him within the unmistakably hierarchical nation that would soon be flying: 
The Board of Investment has piles and piles of applications from 
companies that want to come here. Even Indian companies. And 
why wouldn’t they? The buying power is incredible. Obviously not 
poorer people individually, but in total, the market is absolutely 
huge! 
When the nation is imagined in terms of consumer citizenship, belonging becomes a matter 
of purchasing power. This is an unashamedly non-egalitarian form of citizenship that 
disguises its hierarchical constitution by treating purchasing power as a moral 
accomplishment. But anxiety is also generated for Jasim and his colleagues because they 
know that their globalizing ambitions will have to confront the stereotyping practices of 
members of a less-than-cosmopolitan transnational capitalist class. As such, there is always 
a risk that they fall victim to an overly successful nation branding strategy that does not allow 
them to differentiate themselves sufficiently from their less educated, less urbane 
compatriots. 
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As I left Jasim and Faisal in an Italian restaurant in Gulshan, they asked about my career 
plans. My European degrees would mean a lot in Dhaka, and “the best bit – you could work 
on a foreign salary!” The tendency for expatriates to be paid more was something with which 
many members of Dhaka’s Bangladeshi salariat had to contend, working as they did alongside 
much more highly paid expatriate colleagues. This wage inequality also affected a friend of 
mine in Dhaka who worked for an international donor agency, and who frequently asked me 
to help him with applications to study at postgraduate level in Canada and Australia. Precisely 
this issue became the focus of our evening at an English-language comedy club that we 
attended in Gulshan some months into my fieldwork. The act that night, Naveed Mahbub, 
was something of a celebrity, from a politically connected family. He had run a high profile 
media campaign in which he pulled his rickshaw driver, who was wearing a lungi, while 
wearing a suit, in response to an abortive attempt to ban the lungi in Bonani (see Section 
8.2). He had also introduced the Bangladesh Brand Forum awards, and I would go on to 
encounter him at several susil samaj weddings.  
Naveed asked for any oil and gas executives in the audience to lift their hands. Among the 
local and expatriate donor agency workers in attendance, one hand was raised. “So you’re 
the one whose sucking everything out of our country!” Naveed began, prompting laughter.188 
“Do you get ‘hardship pay’?” The English executive responded that yes, he got an “uplift.” 
“Oh and it is such a hardship isn’t it,” continued Naveed, sticking to the script, “in 
Bangladesh you don’t have to cook, you don’t have to clean, you don’t have to shop, you 
don’t have to drive. There’s even somebody to walk the dog for you!” Naveed went on to 
discuss how to carry on having sex while your maid (bhua) works around you, and his joke 
about hardship pay seemed to work, because the local and expatriate aidworkers and 
extractive industry executives present were part of a more-or-less coherent community of 
complicity, with shared experiences of elite life in Dhaka, and knowledge of outside 
representations of that elite life (cf. Steinmuller 2011: 25), such as those produced by the 
National Committee (see Chapter Six). Indeed, the joke only works because it plays on a 
stereotype of anti-transnational sentiment in a context where the audience all have globalizing 
ambitions. For some, these globalizing aspirations might in fact underwrite the process of 
‘sucking everything out of our country’, as with Faisal, who would put in five years at a 
transnational extractive industry corporation in order to gain the connections require to 
emigrate and live out a handsome, global life. For others, attracting foreign investment from 
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extractive industry corporations was development. Extraction of oil and gas by transnational 
money miners might even be seen as necessary by those Bangladeshi elites whose desire to 
live in Dhaka, with its very real absence of hardship, sees them take advantage of a poor 
investment climate that puts off other foreign investors: Sabur’s garment factories still need 
electricity.  
In each case, what is clear is that Mateen’s (Chapter Six) Leninist vision of a national 
bourgeoisie that would side with ‘revolutionary forces’ in Bangladesh against comprador 
capitalists and foreign Imperialists is as unfeasible in practice as Sklair (Sklair & Robbins, 
2002, pp. 81–82) finds it to be in theory.  The transnational capitalist classes are alive and 
well, and living in Gulshan.  
This chapter has been an effort to look sideways at the production of frontier capitalism in 
Bangladesh, in order to avoid the impression of frictionless endeavours or a unity of capitalist 
purpose that might arise from ‘following’ the construction of money mines. In addition, I 
have shown that despite the search for new extractive industry frontiers being underpinned 
by an international legal order that subordinates ‘Third World’ state sovereignty to the 
sovereignty of international corporations, there is by no means a unity of purpose or interest 
within ‘frontiers’ like Bangladesh, as regards the alignment of globalizing ambition’s and 
Bangladesh’s own ‘brand future’. I have also attempted to show that while Leslie Sklair’s 
work on the transnational capitalist class may be somewhat overdetermined and totalizing, 
the anthropological rediscovery of class is timely, and serves an important analytical purpose. 
Existing work on struggles for global connection in Bangladesh (e.g. Gardner, 2008, 2012) 
has described an unevenly distributed capacity to create those connections among rural 
Bangladeshis. Among Dhaka’s capitalist and salaried elites, however, what is significant is 
not only an unevenly distributed capacity to aspire, but the fact that realizing elite globalizing 
ambitions can have enormous consequences, in the final instance, for the economic future 
of millions of other, less elite, citizens of Bangladesh. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION: MONEY MINES 
OR, HOW TO CAPITALIZE ON CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY 
 
I began this thesis by asking how sovereignty, transnational corporations, national interest 
and capital might be configured in the extractive industries’ search for new and profitable 
frontiers. In particular, I set out to inquire into how the extractive industries’ own search for 
new frontiers intersected with a series of efforts to position or ‘re–brand’ Bangladesh as a 
‘frontier market’. To respond to these questions, I composed a ‘field’ by following the 
technical devices, imaginaries, aspirations and forms of expertise that must be brought into 
alignment, in order for a profitable extractive project to be established. The ethnography that 
emerged from these efforts has been presented in a manner that mimics the stages and 
hurdles that enterprising mining juniors must navigate if they are to transform a mineral 
deposit into a money mine. 
In Chapter Three, the first ethnographic chapter, I introduced the City of London’s market 
for mining finance, through the most significant event on that market’s calendar: the annual 
extractive industry bazaar that is ‘Mines & Money.’ From within this extractive industry 
bazaar, I described the first, speculative steps that must be taken for those who wish to 
explore, discover and ‘bring to book’ a lucrative resource. Before ‘real’ economic 
performance, comes performance of a different kind. The mining market’s exemplary (if 
somewhat roguish) men must foreground their muscularity and uprightness, and convince 
the audience that investing in their mineral deposit means realizing a profitable future. Since 
the assembled speculators know that it is politics which makes the difference between a 
mineral deposit and a mine, they must be convinced of the stability of the territory in question. 
And this is achieved through the deployment of a specific temporal imaginary. New frontiers are 
only worth exploring if their inhabitants can be ranked on a scale that is calibrated to measure 
territories in terms of their ‘backwardness’ or relative Europeanization. 
Towards the end of Chapter Three, I began to ask about the work that must be done for a 
deposit to move from being a speculative prospect, to an investable object. For geologists in 
the junior mining sector, the answer to that question is: spend millions on drilling (which, 
according to them, locals will misconstrue as meaning you are making money), collect 
millions of data points, and determine whether you can say, with confidence, that your 
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reserves are inferred, indicated, measured, probable or proven. This process, the produces 
what actor–network theory-inspired scholars might term ‘quasi-objects’ or ‘quasi-
companies’. It is not the rock as such that is speculated upon and rendered ‘bankable’, but the 
specific configuration of rock, technique, data, and territorial politics.  
At this point, I engaged briefly with recent work in anthropology that bridges actor–network 
theory and the ‘ontological turn’ in the concept of ‘resource materialities’. I argued that an 
attempt to counter the ‘extractive project’ that proceeds by re–conceiving resources as 
assemblages of human and non–human components, rather than as ‘inert’ matter waiting to 
be brought into the sphere of human activity, would simply be describing what money miners 
already know to be the case, even if they would express it using a different vocabulary. 
Assemblage thinking might help to trace the process of making a money mine, but so long 
as capital is implicated in resource materialities, an ethnographic understanding of extractive 
industry capitalism is required. 
Thus in Chapter Four, I focused on a series of training courses and briefings that I had 
attended during my fieldwork, hosted by a leading ‘enterprise optimisation’ consultancy, 
intent on spreading the ‘philosophy of cash’ throughout the industry. In this chapter, I 
showed that there are conflicts within the mining market over how best to ‘chase value’, 
centring on whether explorers and miners should stockpile ore by the tonne, or manipulate 
the ‘quasi-companies’ in which fund managers invest, by attempting to maximize their ‘net 
present value’. The extent to which fund managers have submitted to the philosophy of cash, 
and are able to pressure explorers and miners to demonstrate ‘capital discipline’, with the 
threat that poor returns to equity will not be tolerated, suggests that the extractive industries 
may be moving ever closer to the money mining ideal. That said, it also remains to be seen 
just what effect the rise of discreet ‘family wealth’ funds will have on the junior mining 
industry, and its search for new frontiers. 
From these enterprise optimisation consultants, I adopted the term ‘money mining’. I have 
used this term throughout the thesis, to characterize the ambitions of those who endeavour 
to move impatient capital in and out of newly liberalized frontier markets like Bangladesh, with 
little regard for the temporal scales and cycles in relation to which activists and experts might 
hope to see national energy and infrastructure development proceed. The software used by 
these enterprise optimisation consultants also provided the opening I required to render 
extractive industry capitalism traceable through ethnography. Money mining centres on the 
maximisation of net present value, and the calculation of net present value can also be 
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understood as the core ritual through which capitalism is generated, so long as we understand 
capitalism, along with self–professed extractive industry capitalists, as a claim on future 
earnings. 
For political economists Nitzan and Bichler (2009), and, more pertinently, for the money 
miners I described in Chapter Four, maximizing NPV depends upon the ability to demonstrate 
to potential investors that you have the capacity to secure a future flow of revenue, by exercising control over 
host states and communities. The NPV of a project reflects investors’ how confident investors are 
in an extractive industry corporation’s capacity to control the future in extractive frontiers. 
Equally, the ritual of capitalization worked as to direct my ethnographic attention to ask: 
what is it that gives investors confidence in money miners, and how do their capacities to 
ensure future flows of revenue emerge and sustain themselves? 
 To move towards answering these questions, I turned in Chapter Five to the field of 
Corporate Diplomacy. Corporate Diplomacy has evolved out of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, which anthropologists have increasingly come to understand not as a 
‘smokescreen’ for unchanged extractive behaviour, and nor as a sign of genuine ethical 
reform. Instead, CSR is viewed by Rajak (2011) and Gardner (2012) as a set of techniques, 
strategies and exchanges via which extractive industry corporations can reproduce 
enterprising, self-responsibilized local communities and workforces. While not entirely 
displacing CSR, Corporate Diplomacy is partially configured by a recognition among 
extractive industry professionals that CSR itself has become a ‘dirty’ term, precisely because 
it has come to be widely interpreted as a public relations exercise. It is perhaps ironic, then, 
that public relations firms have been at the forefront of developing Corporate Diplomacy, 
in tandem with business school academics and political risk analysts. What Corporate 
Diplomats have crafted is a set of tools for exerting influence over mine-area communities 
and workforces. They project images of the resultant stability (markers of ‘corporate 
reputation’) to investors, all while keeping the calculated pursuit of this effective influence invisible. 
Among the most potent weapons in the Corporate Diplomat’s armoury is their alchemical 
handling of the language of ‘risk’. ‘Social risk’ comes to mean risk to a company caused by 
local residents. The prepositional chain is cut short early on, and the fact that most ‘social 
risks’ are caused by local residents in response to actions taken by the ‘at risk’ companies, 
disappears from view. Harm emanating from the activity of money mines is thus recast as 
something to which these corporations are vulnerable. These vulnerabilities are ‘reputational risks’ 
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which must be managed, lest investors lose confidence in these money miners, and express 
their doubt by revisiting the ritual of capitalization and returning a reduced NPV. 
Paralleling their treatment of ‘risk’, Corporate Diplomats have developed a sophisticated set 
of morally charged temporalizing claims through which to manage their reputations, and 
deflect accusations of corporate harm. These diplomats tell us that extractive industry 
corporations today cannot be unethical, because they are disciplined by a networked 
panopticon of the subaltern, monitoring and transmitting information on their every move 
through the instantaneous or timeless time of the internet. It also follows from this first claim 
that a company with a good reputation must be ethical. Where reports of irresponsible and 
harmful behaviour do surface, they are always and only ever legacy issues, whose ultimate cause 
can be located in the past, before the industry’s moment of ethical rebirth. Corporate 
Diplomats manage to represent themselves and their clients as Enlightened moral agents, 
converts to ethical extraction, while at the same time subjected to the disciplinary power of an 
imagined multitude.  
As extractive industry capitalists speculate upon deposits in new (suitably stable) frontiers, 
optimize the designs of their money mines in order to maximize net present value, and enlist 
Corporate Diplomats to communicate the influence they hold over host governments and 
communities back to investors, they will occasionally come unstuck. The monetary 
magnitude of capital may reflect capitalists’ confidence in their own ability to order the future, 
but it does not guarantee their power, and mining professionals have developed their own 
theories to makes sense of why it is that their extractive endeavours are occasionally 
disrupted. Mining professionals deem any host government’s demand for a greater ‘take’ 
from mines in their territory as a manifestation of ‘resource nationalism’, which seemed to 
be contagious during 2012–13.  
In Chapter Six, I examined the resource nationalism imaginary that haunted the extractive 
industries during my fieldwork, and troubled their speculative search for new frontiers. In 
the industry, resource nationalism is explained as a response to the commodity price boom 
or ‘supercycle’ that also seemed to be peaking around 2012–13. Resource nationalism is a 
sign of ‘greedy’ Southern governments seeking an ‘unfair’ share of the profits, now that 
mined commodities are selling for far more than they were when royalty and taxation rates 
were initially set.  
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To explain resource nationalism as a cyclical phenomenon with its roots in the market’s natural 
cycles is also to deterritorialize it, and divorce resource nationalism from specific struggles over 
resource sovereignty. In the latter half of Chapter Six, I therefore examined the distinctly 
territorial conflicts that take place in Bangladesh, between experts sympathetic to foreign 
extractive corporations, and activists from the National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Ports 
and Natural Resources. While Bangladeshi engineers and economists who view foreign 
investment as vital to the nation’s interests refer to National Committee members as 
‘resource nationalists’, they do not explain their rivals’ actions in terms of deterritorialized 
market cycles. Nor do these experts explicitly give their support to impatient money miners, 
seeking to profit without contributing to national development. Instead, they see the 
National Committee as morally compromised players in Bangladesh’s dirty partyarchy 
politics, and situate themselves as outside and above the political fray, aligned, if at all, to the 
neutral caretaker government who came closer to ruling in the ‘national interest’. Their 
understanding of the national interest is, of course, disputed by the National Committee, 
whose members do find themselves, often unwillingly, embroiled in partyarchy politics.  
If it would be meaningful to term the National Committee ‘resource nationalists’, it is because 
they link their struggles against transnational oil, gas and coal mining corporations in terms 
of an unfinished struggle for liberation, in which the 1971 Liberation War was only the first 
step. But, the troubled relationship that the Beijing–aligned Left has had with the history of 
the Liberation War means that National Committee members are themselves open to 
accusations of being insufficiently patriotic, from those same experts and engineers whom 
they would term ‘compradore capitalists’. And, perhaps surprisingly, some National 
Committee activists drawn from communist parties seek, as an alternative to these 
compradore capitalists, the establishment of a new patriotic, national, but still capitalist class. 
Several of the extractive industry corporations, juniors and questionable ‘network 
enterprises’ whose operation in Bangladesh has been challenged by the National Committee 
have, in fact, found themselves in legal disputes with the Bangladeshi state. However, just as 
Corporate Diplomacy can work to discipline mine areas and reassure investors of your 
influence, money miners have in their arsenal another weapon for dealing with hostile host 
states: Corporate Foreign Policy. In Chapter Seven, I describe the contents of the Corporate 
Foreign Policy toolkit, starting with the political risk analysis industry that grew up in 
response to post–WWII waves of decolonization. The threat posed by postcolonial states 
exercising their sovereignty and renegotiating the terms of concessions, taxation and royalty 
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rates set in the pre–independence period, required not only a new kind of corporate 
intelligence, but the development of new legal instruments. The World Bank Group’s belief that 
foreign capital, however impatient, was necessary for Southern development, led to the 
establishment of ICSID, and the parallel rise of countless other investor–state arbitration 
venues. 
Investor–state arbitration cannot be understood simply as an emergent legal technique; it is 
underpinned and given life by a principle that has been developing in international law since 
the seventeenth century. This is the principle that the sovereignty of non–European 
(Southern) states is only acknowledged when they capitulate to the sovereignty of European (Northern) 
trading concerns. Or, in the words used by Kamal Hossain, author of Bangladesh’s constitution, 
ICSID only respects those states where the judiciary has ruled against their own governments 
and for transnational corporations. When the World Bank Group sent lawyers to Bangladesh 
to increase its domestic arbitration capacity, they were doing so in order to improve the 
Bangladeshi ‘investment climate’, which in turn designates the ease with which transnational 
corporations can be expected to guarantee a future flow of revenue to their investors.  
Bangladesh’s sovereignty was, in fact, denied by these transnational lawyers in the same terms 
that are used to speculate on new extractive frontiers. There is no real point exhausting the 
domestic courts in Bangladesh, these lawyers say, even though you technically should before 
you go to ICSID; this is because they do not play by the rules, they are not sufficiently 
Europeanized.  When they emphasize the stability and ‘Europeanization’ of the territories in 
which their deposits are located, the exemplary men back in London’s extractive industry 
bazaar are ultimately asking their audiences to speculate on the capacity of extractive industry 
corporations to, in the final instance, exercise sovereignty over the people and governments of frontier 
markets. 
In following the construction of money mines, from speculation (Chapter Three) to 
capitalization (Chapter Four), via Corporate Diplomacy (Chapter Five), and struggles over 
‘resource nationalism’ and resource sovereignty (Chapters Six & Seven), a relatively linear 
account is generated. This could, perhaps, give the misleading impression that money mining 
is enabled by a transnational capitalist class acting with a unified set of interests, searching 
for profits wherever they may be found. In Chapter Eight, I step sideways and examine the 
diverse elite projects through which Bangladesh emerges as a ‘frontier’ market. For ‘returnee’ 
brokers who hope to attract investors to Bangladesh, on the grounds that it is not ‘correlated’ 
with the ‘global’ economy, Bangladesh is an ‘attractive diversification play.’ Of course, if 
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enough people make that play, Bangladesh’s global correlation will increase and it will 
disappear as a frontier. A lack of global correlation is, however, precisely what drives the 
young educated Bangladesh elites in the service of transnational banks and extractive industry 
corporations, many of whom want to leave Bangladesh. It might be ‘coming up,’ but not fast 
enough for them. In their desire to ‘get out’ and operate on a ‘global’ scale, they help to 
reproduce the very transnational corporations whose presence causes problems for Dhaka’s 
more rooted business elites. 
For transnational corporations seeking assurances that they will be able to exercise their 
sovereignty over a host state (should they need to), a ‘positive investment climate’ means, 
among other things, enhanced arbitration capacity. For local business elites in Dhaka, it 
means getting parliamentarians to make life easier for businessmen as a whole, and not 
merely for their own businesses. However, it would not do to make Bangladeshi markets too 
easy to navigate: if that was the case, Bangladesh would be too much of a frontier, flooded by 
patient and impatient capital that would foreclose upon opportunities for local business elites 
to reproduce themselves within Dhaka’s social and spatial hierarchy. These elites have 
businesses with globalizing ambitions, but also come into conflict with the agents of 
globalization who would completely open Bangladesh to foreign capital. It is, perhaps, 
difficult to imagine how the patriotic, national capitalist class envisioned by activists in the 
National Committee and the Bangladesh Communist Party (Marxist–Leninist) might thus 
differ from Gulshan’s existing capitalist elite. 
The frontier market discourse put into play by the IFC during the 1990s was part of a 
deliberate effort, beginning with the earlier concept of ‘emerging’ markets, to displace the 
apparently unappealing language of ‘Southern’, ‘Third World’ or ‘developing’ nations, and so 
encourage foreign direct investment. Picked up by the fund management industry, it has 
become a way to describe jurisdictions in which it can be difficult to do business, but where 
the potential for profit is substantial. Frontier market discourse comes laden with terms and 
images from earlier colonial narratives, about adventurous men prospecting in new and risky 
territories. But in dispensing with the ‘unappealing’ Third World appellation, the concept of 
frontier markets also writes over the failed ‘Third World project’, an effort made by jurists 
and others to  rework an international legal order that had emerged in an age of imperialism: 
the Third World jurists demanded permanent sovereignty over natural resources. And it is 
here that the wider ‘frontier market’ discourse promulgated by the IFC and JPMorgan 
intersects with the extractive industries’ own search for new frontiers: without the death of 
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the Third World project, which occurred as the IFC sought to ‘re–brand’ Third World 
nations as ‘emerging’ or ‘frontier’ markets, the configurations of state and corporate 
sovereignty that provide extractive industry investors with the guarantees they need would 
not have been put in place.  
The extractive industries’ search for new frontiers was driven by declining ore bodies in 
conventional mining jurisdictions, and the opening up of new terrain for exploration in 
countries where, at the behest of the World Bank Group, new and friendly mineral codes 
were written. The fact that there are no troublesome requirements, such as the hard–won 
Australian Native Title Act, in new frontier territories like Burkina Faso or Liberia is an added 
bonus. But, despite having its own origins ‘within’ the industry, the search for new extractive 
frontiers is only made possible by the death of the Third World project, the failure of 
postcolonial states to assert their permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and a new 
project of reforming and rating ‘frontier’ investment climates. These investment climate 
ratings, and the arbitration capacity building programmes that come with them, effectively 
measure how easy money miners might find it to exert their sovereignty over the people and 
government of territories like Bangladesh. This, then, is what allows extractive industry 
capitalism to be generated: ore deposits become speculative, and then capitalized, money 
mines, only when influential men are able to convince the mining market that, in the final 
instance, they, and not the populace of their host nations, will be sovereign. 
It has become something of a disciplinary convention to end anthropological explorations 
of financial experts and elites by observing an apparent narrowing of the “distance between 
the field and its subjects…who sometimes invoke the same concepts and analytical apparatus 
as anthropologists do” (Maurer, 2005, p. 190), or, more broadly, suggesting that “‘our 
methods,’ that is the practices of ethnography, have been assimilated as key intellectual 
modalities of our time” (Homes & Marcus, 2008, p. 84). The anthropologists who have made 
these points have themselves contributed to this narrowing or parallelism between 
anthropological and elite financial knowledge by advocating a ‘deferent’ or anti–critical form 
of ethnographic engagement (ibid.). Likewise, a blunting of oppositional politics has been 
defended as part and parcel of ethnographic inquiry in the social studies of science (e.g. 
MacKenzie, 2005), where defendants of the ‘performativity thesis’, or the notion that 
economic theories and models construct or assemble the world rather than describe it, have 
questioned the utility of the kind of “epistemic critique” that accuses a body of knowledge 
of being “wrong” (Muniesa, 2014, p. 38; also Callon & Latour, 1997). But is this move to 
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narrow the distance between anthropological and financial expertise, to blunt the 
oppositional politics of ethnography, and to undermine critique, either necessary or justified?  
Throughout my thesis, I have attempted to show that tracing the relational, performative, 
technical, legal and historical work that goes into creating profitable ‘frontier’ opportunities 
for mining capitalists enables the ethnographic production of knowledge about the generation 
of capitalism that need not be deferent. Indeed, where the often violent expansion of extractive 
industry capitalism is at stake, the fact that economic and legal knowledge can be 
performative demands an oppositional politics: critique need not be limited to showing that 
knowledge is epistemologically ‘wrong’, but can also work to question the forms of justice 
(or injustice) produced by a body of knowledge being ‘performed’ or ‘enacted’ (Jackson, 
2009). And, where the distance between financial expertise and anthropological knowledge 
is ‘narrowed’ by political risk analysts re–appropriating Geertz’s (1963) work on 
primordialism in postcolonial states (Chapter Seven), or extractive industry capitalists 
speculating on the stability of territories inhabited by putative evolués (Chapter Three), the use 
of ‘our methods’ by capitalist elites becomes grounds for demanding confrontation and 
critique, not dispensing with it.  
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